THE

CABINET CYCLOPÆDIA.

London:
Printed by A. Spottiswoode,
New-Street-Square.

THE

CABINET CYCLOPÆDIA.

CONDUCTED BY THE

REV. DIONYSIUS LARDNER, LL.D. F.R.S.L. & E.
M.R.I.A. F.R.A.S. F.L.S. F.Z.S. Hon. F.C.P.S. &c. &c.

ASSISTED BY

EMINENT LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC MEN.

Biography.

THE BRITISH ADMIRALS.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY VIEW
OF THE
NAVAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

BY
ROBERT SOUTHEY, LL.D. POET LAUREATE.

CONTINUED BY
ROBERT BELL, ESQ.

VOL. V.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR
LONGMAN, ORME, BROWN, GREEN, & LONGMANS,
PATERNOSTER-ROW,
AND JOHN TAYLOR,
UPPER GOWER STREET.
1840.

ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL

TABLE

OF THE

NAVAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

SIR MARTIN FROBISHER.

1576.

SIR ROBERT MANSEL.

15——16—.

SIR WILLIAM MONSON.

1569.

EDWARD MONTAGUE,

AFTERWARDS EARL OF SANDWICH.

1625—1672.



LIVES

OF

THE BRITISH ADMIRALS,

ETC.

SIR MARTIN FROBISHER.

15——1594.

Sir Martin Frobisher, or, as he is called by some writers, Forbisher, holds a conspicuous place amongst those courageous navigators who, in the reign of Elizabeth, raised themselves from obscurity to distinction by the force of their natural ability. From the scanty memorials that have been preserved of his youth, we learn that he was born somewhere in the neighbourhood of Doncaster, in Yorkshire; that his family were people of mean condition; and that he was put to sea in his boyhood. It may be inferred that the indigence of his parents induced them to select this course as the only available means of procuring him a livelihood; and that consequently his education, if he ever received any at home, was confined to the mere rudiments of reading and writing. But it was an age of action and enterprize; and the experience of the young seaman before the mast was the best preparation for the scenes in which he was afterwards destined to be distinguished.

We have no record of his early life; but his conduct must have been meritorious, since it procured him the

confidence of a body of London merchants and capitalists, whom he induced to undertake an important expedition, the sole direction of which they intrusted to his hands. The object of this expedition was to discover a north-west passage. For this purpose two barks were fitted up,—the Gabriel, of thirty-five tons, commanded by Frobisher in person; and the Michael, a pinnace of thirty tons, commanded by captain Mathew Kindersley, acting under the orders of the former.*

The frequent attempts that had been made without success to establish a north-eastern passage to the Indies, while they failed to produce the specific results that had been looked for, gave a stimulus to the spirit of discovery in another direction; and the question of a north-western passage, round America to Cathay and the East Indies, was revived with increased eagerness and enthusiasm. Martin Frobisher had long entertained the opinion that this voyage was easy of execution; and regarding it "as the only thing of the world that was left yet undone whereby a notable mind might be made famous and fortunate," he persevered in urging the feasibility of the undertaking; but during a period of fifteen years he was unable to obtain the necessary equipment. At length, under the patronage of Dudley, earl of Warwick, the expedition was formed; and the courageous mariner, with his two small vessels, set sail from Gravesend about the middle of June, 1576. Queen Elizabeth witnessed the departure of the vessels from the windows of her palace on the river, and waived her hand as they passed in token of encouragement. She afterwards sent a gentleman on board, to desire the captain to come to the court on the following day, in order to take a formal leave of her majesty.

1576.

On the 28th of July, according to Hakluyt, Frobisher discovered land, which he supposed to be the continent of America; but which seems to have been the southern part of Greenland. It was so invested by floating ice,

* Hakluyt. Purchas.

that he was unable to make the shore; and finding a hundred fathom water within a cable's length of the strand, he stood to the east-north-east. On the 10th of August he landed on a desert island, within a mile of the mainland; and on the 11th he entered a strait, which he called Frobisher's Strait—afterwards named Lumley's Inlet. According to other accounts, after losing the pinnace, which returned home, he discovered land on the 1st of July, but could not approach it on account of the ice; and on the 20th reached a high land, which he named Queen Elizabeth's Foreland; and soon afterwards another, with the strait between them, to which he gave his own name. He entered this strait on the 9th of August, in latitude 63° 8′, and concluded that it formed a passage between Asia and America.

The appearance of the Esquimaux on these shores, and in their boats or kajaks, filled the sailors with so much surprise that at first they mistook them for porpoises, or some strange species of fish. When they came, however, to examine them more closely, they discovered a remarkable resemblance between them and the ancient Britons; "the men with black hair, broad faces, flat noses, swarthy complexions, and cloathed in sea-calf skins, and the women painted about the eyes and cheeks with a blue colour." Their uncouth aspect, rendered still more striking by the architecture of their boats, which were covered with seal-skins, furnished much matter for amusement and speculation; and regarding them as "strange infideles, whose like was never seen, read, nor heard of before," Frobisher resolved to kidnap one of them as a specimen, and bring him home to England. He does not appear, however, to have formed this resolution until after he had received two or three visits from the natives. On one occasion he lost a boat with five men, which he had despatched to set an Esquimaux on shore; and the next day he decoyed one of the savages on board, and carried him away. While he remained here he took possession of the country in

the name of the queen, and ordered all his followers to carry off something with them as an evidence. He arrived at Harwich on the 2d of October, "highly commended of all men," says the old chronicler, "for his great and notable attempt, but specially famous for the great hope he brought of the passage to Cathaia." The poor Esquimaux Indian he conveyed to England died shortly after his arrival.

Of the memorials of the country collected by the mariners, one was a piece of black stone, resembling sea-coal; and, probably to test its ignitible virtues, the wife of the sailor who brought it home threw it into fire, when, instead of burning like coal, it "glistened with a bright marquesset of gold." At such a period, when the pursuit of riches occupied so large a share of public attention, a circumstance of this description was not likely to escape notice. The fact soon became known; the gold-refiners were ordered to assay the stone; and, discovering that it contained a large proportion of gold, a new incentive was given to the prosecution of Frobisher's long-cherished enterprize. Although he had really accomplished nothing more than touching the shores of Greenland (which had, in fact, been discovered upwards of six centuries before*), seizing an Esquimaux, and finding a stone impregnated with gold, his reputation rose suddenly to so great a height that a fresh expedition was organized to make the same voyage in the following year; the queen not only openly favouring the undertaking, but directly assisting it by the equipment of an additional ship.

1577. Frobisher set sail from Harwich on the 31st May, 1577, with three vessels, — the Aid, a ship belonging to her majesty; and two barks, the Gabriel and St. Michael. This expedition was costly of its kind. Frobisher, with the title of general of the whole company, took the command on board the Aid, with seven officers, nine private gentlemen, about twenty soldiers, and fifty

* Some writers assert that Frobisher was the discoverer of Greenland. This is a mistake: it was discovered by the Northmen, in the tenth century.

mariners; while the accompanying barks were manned in equal proportions. The experience of his former voyage, and the general accuracy of his previous observations, appear to have led the persevering commander to a very correct conclusion as to the actual state of the northern seas; for he announced his belief that the ice which impeded the navigation was formed in the sounds, or towards the pole, and that the ocean itself was never frozen.*

The adventurers, after touching at the Orkney isles on the 7th June to take in fresh water, arrived at Friezeland on the 4th July; from whence they steered for the strait where their former voyage terminated.

At first they were afraid to venture in with their ships, in consequence of the masses of ice that covered the waters, and which are described to have been so "monstrous and huge," as to be "comparable to great mountaines;" but on the 19th the ice cleared off; and, taking immediate advantage of the circumstance, they ran into the strait, and anchored in a bay, to which Frobisher gave the name of Jackman's Sound. The real object of this second voyage soon became apparent. The discovery of a north-west passage was forgotten in the eagerness to discover gold; and the whole attention of the party was engrossed by an examination of the surface of that rich soil, where they hoped to find inexhaustible treasures. Indeed, there is no doubt that the voyage was expressly undertaken for the sole purpose of procuring gold; Frobisher's instructions, directing him to search for ore, and to defer the further discovery of the passage until another time.† The natives, terrified by the approach of the English, who had left so unfavourable an impression upon them in the preceding year by the abduction of the Esquimaux, fled precipitately from their huts, and retired into the recesses of the rocks, from the summits of which many of them flung themselves into the sea. The habitations of these

* Holinshed. Hakluyt. Purchas. Lediard. † Hakluyt.

people consisted of tents, made of the skins of sea-calves and whales, suspended from poles, and firmly sewn together, leaving two openings to the south and west. Wherever the mariners advanced the land was deserted; and although they occasionally discerned some of the savages at a great distance, the only individuals they could seize upon were a man with a woman and child. When the man saw the picture of the Indian who had been formerly taken by the English, he supposed it to be alive, began to talk to it, and exhibited great uneasiness because it did not answer him. Soon afterwards they captured an old woman; but she was of such hideous form that they suspected her to be a witch or a devil, and stripped her to ascertain whether she had cloven feet!

This was not the only monster they fell in with. Disappointed of the golden sand, they coasted higher up; and on their way they saw a huge incomprehensible creature, with its terrible head above water, and a horn growing out of it nearly two yards long, which they concluded was the sea unicorn. Having satisfied their curiosity by the strange experiment of dropping spiders into the horn of the monster, where they instantly died, the navigators landed again upon the coast, or, according to some authorities, upon one of the neighbouring islands. Here they were more fortunate in obtaining the object of their search. Throughout their previous excursions they could not find a piece of ore "as big as a walnut;" but they no sooner reached this remote shore than they found themselves treading upon glittering sand that blazed like gold under their feet. They now made several attempts to conciliate the natives, and open a sort of traffic with them, for the ultimate purpose of facilitating their intercourse with the country. After a variety of overtures had taken place between them, the natives invited them by signs to advance up the river, — giving them to understand that their expectations would then be fully answered. "Accordingly," says the historian of the expedition, "Martin

Frobisher got into a boat with some soldiers, and having ordered his ships to follow him, went up the river; and seeing a great number of the savages posted among the rocks, he did not think fit to expose himself, by approaching too near the banks. At last three among them, who appeared somewhat better than the rest, having made a signal for him to land, he resolved to do it, all the rest being at a considerable distance; but his boat scarce touched the bank of the river, when the savages began to appear in great numbers, which made him soon take to the stream again. Nevertheless, the savages endeavoured to persuade them by signs to come ashore, throwing to them some raw fish; but finding the English mistrustful, they resolved to draw them thither by the following stratagem. They laid one of their men upon the bank, who, pretending to be lame, they supposed the English would come to take him, whilst they pretended to be retired at a farther distance, being all out of sight behind the adjacent rocks. The English being aware of their design, discharged a gun at him, which made him soon recover his legs; and the savages, coming to his aid, pelted the English in their boat with stones and arrows, but were soon dispersed by their great guns."*

In this transaction, as in most, if not all, of the transactions that occurred in the early intercourse between navigators and the aborigines of newly-discovered countries, we find the civilised man inflicting injury upon the natives; and, instead of addressing their kindly feelings and cultivating their confidence, inspiring them with horror, and giving them cause to regard the future approaches of strangers with terror and mistrust. Nor does the injustice end in such acts of superior craft and destruction. Having first violated the laws of humanity by forcible captures, and then by firing upon them with insidious weapons, which, to the superstitious imagination of the Esquimaux, must have had all the

* Hakluyt. Lediard. Monck.

appearance of supernatural agency, we next find these discoverers representing the natives as a race of treacherous and ferocious savages. They first rouse all their evil passions, compel them to resort to stratagems and perfidious acts for their self-protection, and then, casting back upon them the odium of the vices which their own conduct and example had engendered, they stigmatise them as barbarians, fit only to be treated with violence and cruelty. Yet these savages are admitted, notwithstanding, by the author who preserved the narrative of Frobisher's voyages, to be an ingenious and dexterous race, excelling in the use of arrows and the construction of a rude but secure kind of boat. "All their riches consist in their slings, bows, arrows, and boats. Their bows are very slender, and their arrows thin, tipped at the end with a pointed bone or horn. They manage them with great dexterity, and hit the fishes as they are swimming in the water. Their boats are covered all over with the skins of sea-calves, and fitted only for one single person. Their larger vessels are made of wood, covered with the skins of whales, and are big enough to contain twenty men at a time. Their sails are made of the same materials with their shirts; and notwithstanding there is not the least iron-work about these boats, they are so strong that the savages venture with them very deep at sea."* The dogs of the Esquimaux, since become celebrated for their strength and beauty, are also spoken of as being employed in the sledges instead of horses.

Martin Frobisher, finding that he could not carry on any traffic with the natives, filled his vessels with the shining sand to the extent of 200 tons; a "freight," says Settle, who accompanied the expedition, "sufficient for our vessels, though not our covetous desires†;" and made sail for England on the 24th of August, having penetrated the strait to the distance of only thirty leagues. On the homeward voyage the vessels

* Lediard. † See the account preserved in Hakluyt.

were dispersed by violent storms; but they all arrived safely at different ports, the commander himself reaching Milfordhaven on the 20th of September.

It does not appear that the glittering sand contained so much ore as the adventurers expected; but it produced sufficient results to encourage the hopes of the speculators at whose charge the expedition was undertaken. The queen, deluded into the belief that the new country teemed with riches, gave it the name of *Meta Incognita*, and resolved, without loss of time, to fit up an adequate armament for taking formal possession of the place, and founding an English colony upon its golden shores. Nor was the prospect of ultimately establishing a north-west passage wholly overlooked in the announcement of this project. It was set forth that the ore "had the appearance and made show of great profit;" and that the last voyage had greatly increased the hope of discovering a passage to Cathay. The undertaking was carried out on a scale commensurate with its supposed importance. A fleet of fifteen ships, well manned and furnished with all necessaries, was provided. Three of these vessels conveyed all the requisite materials for the foundation of the settlement, with a wooden fort ready framed, and 100 men, who were to form the colony. The remaining twelve vessels, leaving the others behind, were to return freighted with the golden ore; and sanguine expectations were entertained that a regular trade could at length be matured between the colony and the mother country. Frobisher was appointed admiral in command, receiving a gold chain from the hands of the queen as a testimony of her favour; and the fleet, having previously assembled at Harwich, set sail from England on the 31st of May, 1578.

1578.

Friezeland was reached on the 20th of June; and the admiral, taking possesion of it in the name of his sovereign, called it New England. While they remained on shore at this place, they saw several tents similar to those they had seen up the straits, and discovered a

race of people apparently similar to the inhabitants of Meta Incognita. The natives fled as they advanced; and upon penetrating to their tents a variety of articles were found, such as nails, deal boards, and implements of workmanship, which showed either that these people understood the mechanical arts, or were in habits of intercourse with others who did. The circumstance, at all events, afforded a valid proof of the capability of the aborigines to adopt the inventions of civilisation; but the science of colonisation was at that period so little understood, that the suggestions it presented were wholly overlooked by the founders of the new settlement.

It is related amongst the incidents of this voyage that one of the vessels, "being under both her courses and topsails, happened to strike with her full stern against a whale, with such force that the ship stood still, and neither moved backwards nor forwards." The language of exaggeration and astonishment in which such matters are described in the old chronicles reflects the imperfect knowledge of the age. The sequel, however, is still more curious; for, however strange it may be thought that a ship should be paralysed by the shock of a whale, it is still more extraordinary that the whale should be killed by the collision. "The whale," continues the historian, "made a hideous noise; and, after having appeared with its tail and part of its body above water, sank. Two days after they found a whale dead, *which they supposed to be the same.*"

On the 2d of July, the little fleet reached the mouth of Frobisher's Straits; but the entrance was choked up with ice, and when they attempted to continue their passage a violent storm arose and scattered the vessels. In the confusion and distress that ensued, one ship of 100 tons was shattered by the icebergs and went down, but the crew was providentially saved. Others were dispersed, and unable to rejoin the rendezvous for nearly three weeks, in consequence of the drifting of the ice, the heavy fogs, and the violence of the currents. Four only of the ships kept safe out at sea; and these were

driven to the southward of Frobisher's Straits, running into another strait at a distance of about sixty leagues. The haziness of the waether prevented them from making any observations, and it was not until they cleared this new strait or bay that they met the rest of the vessels, and, joining company, resumed their voyage: with great difficulty they worked their course through the straits, and on the 31st of July they arrived at their destination. The storm and ice-drifts had committed considerable damage upon the ships; but, although a portion of the moveable fort was destroyed, enough was saved to enable the mariners to establish themselves on the mainland; while the miners were occupied in procuring large quantities of the ore, with which they loaded their vessels to the full extent of their tonnage. But the time that had been lost in the vain strife with the elements rendered the project of colonising Meta Incognita impracticable at so advanced a season of the year: and Frobisher reluctantly determined upon returning home. Before he took his departure, however, he built a house of lime and stone, by way of experiment, in order to ascertain what effect the climate would have upon it by the ensuing year, and leaving a variety of baubles to attract the goodwill of the inhabitants, such as knives, whistles, looking-glasses, &c. He built an oven, and left some bread ready baked in it. He also sowed different kinds of grain, to determine whether the soil was susceptible of such cultivation. But these speculations of the ardent navigator were of no avail; for he never returned to observe the results.

The ships departed on the last day of August. Fresh impediments beset them in their dangerous passage to the open sea; but, after encountering numerous disasters, they all arrived safely in England before the end of October, with a total loss of only forty persons. On the homeward voyage one of the vessels, the Emmanuel Buss of Bridgewater, escaping from the ice with great difficulty, was driven to the northward through a channel studded with rocks; and making sail into the

northern sea discovered a great foreland, which they believed presented a likelihood of obtaining the widest passage towards the South Sea. To the south-east of Friezeland, in latitude 57° 30′, they also discovered a large island, which, until then, was wholly unknown; and coasting along its shores for three days, they declared the country to be exceedingly fertile and richly wooded. This island, upon the authority of these navigators, was accordingly laid down in the charts. But no such island has ever been seen since; and it is conjectured either that the report was false, or that the place was swallowed up by an earthquake: which latter conjecture is rendered probable by the recent discovery of a bank in those seas, which is supposed to be identical with the Friezeland of Zeno, and the land seen by the Emanuel Buss.

The failure of these three voyages so completely discouraged the hopes of the adventurers, that the project of the north-west passage was abandoned. Nor was the pecuniary speculation more successful; for the sand yielded, upon analysis, so small a proportion of gold, that it was thrown away as being utterly worthless. It is barely possible, however, that the refiners might not have employed proper tests; for, upon a subsequent occasion, sand of a similar description was submitted to an intelligent chemist in Denmark, who extracted a large quantity of pure gold from it, although some assayers who had previously tried it declared it to be valueless. But the eagerness of gain generated by such undertakings admits of little pause or hindrance, and is as readily turned aside by disappointments to seek other channels of fortune, as it is tempted into desperate ventures by the remotest prospects of acquisition.

Frobisher suffered much discredit by the issue of his expeditions. His sanguine temperament refused to contemplate defeat; and, still convinced of the practicability of his favourite scheme, he continued to urge it upon the attention of the public. But the zeal of those who had supported him was extinguished: new bubbles

had become popular; and the design was finally relinquished. It is supposed that the writings of sir Humphrey Gilbert contributed to foster and encourage the opinions entertained by Frobisher on this subject; but the example of that chivalric and accomplished person was not calculated to inspire confidence in others. Sir Humphrey Gilbert was a man of distinguished talents, and possessed of a romantic love of adventure. In 1578 he obtained a royal patent authorising him to take possession of the northern parts of America and Newfoundland, and to prosecute certain discoveries in the west. He embarked upon this mission in 1583, and succeeded in reaching Newfoundland, where he formed a temporary settlement; after which he proceeded on a voyage of discovery to the northward. Finding himself exposed to a succession of unforeseen disasters, he altered his course, and resolved to return to England. The miserable bark in which he sailed, and which he refused to leave, although his companions declared her unfit for sea, had hardly passed the Azores when she was engulphed, and every soul on board perished. The melancholy fate of that intrepid explorer, who has been justly designated as the father of western colonisation, may be reasonably supposed to have damped the ardour of his countrymen in reference to such projects.

The treatise written by sir Humphrey Gilbert in proof of the existence of a north-west passage, presents an elaborate series of arguments well calculated to make a strong impression upon an age in which discovery was cultivated with such enthusiasm. It is regularly divided into ten chapters, each being distinctly appropriated to a particular class of evidence. Thus, the first chapter collects into one view a variety of authorities upon the subject, — such as Plato, Siculus, Ficinus a Florentine, Crantor a Grecian, Philo a Jew, and several others, who in former ages had arrived at the conclusion that America was an island. The second chapter proceeds to prove by reason that such a passage must exist. The arguments in this chapter are remark-

ably curious, being based upon very ingenious inferences derived from the motions of the sea, and the fact that not only none of the inhabitants, but that "not one savage or wandering beast" of Cathay or Tartary had ever entered America, which would have been the case had they been separated only by land or mountain ridges. "So that it seemeth," adds sir Humphrey, "we have now more occasion to doubt of our return than whether there be a passage that way, yea or no; which doubt hereafter shall be sufficiently removed. Wherefore, in mine opinion, reason itself, grounded upon experience, assureth us of this passage, if there were nothing else to put us in hope thereof. But least these might not suffice, I have added in this chapter following some further proof hereof, by the experience of such as have passed some part of this discovery; and in the next adjoining to that, the authority of those which have sailed wholly through every part thereof." The authorities cited in the two preceding chapters are numerous, and drawn from a variety of sources. Sir Humphrey, who seems to have been an excellent logician, was resolved that his proofs should at all events be clearly marshalled in the order of their respective kinds. "The diversity," he observes, "between brute beasts and men, or between the wise and simple, is, that the one judgeth by sense only, and gathereth no surety of any thing that he hath not seen, felt, heard, tasted, or smelled; and the other, not so only, but also findeth the certainty of things by reason, before they happen to be tried. Wherefore, I have added proofs of both sorts, that the one and the other might thereby be satisfied." In the three following chapters he maintains that certain Indians, who are stated by Orthon, in the story of the Goths, to have been cast by stress of weather, in the time of the German emperors, upon the coast of Germany, could not have arrived there by the south-east, the south-west, the north-east, nor by any other part of Africa or America; and that, therefore, they must have come there by the

north-west passage. In the course of his statements, he relates, amongst other direct testimonies, the following narrative of a traveller who had actually navigated the disputed waters, but who was prevented by the king of Portugal from publishing the discovery to the world.

"Also there was one Salvaterra, a gentlemen of Victoria in Spaine, that came by chance out of the West Indies into Ireland, anno 1568, who affirmed the north-west passage from us to Cataia constantly to be believed in America navigable. And further said, in the presence of sir Henry Sidney (then lord deputie of Ireland), in my hearing, that a friar of Mexico, called Andrew Vrdaneta, more than eight yeeres before his then coming into Ireland, told him there that he came from Mar del Sur into Germany through this north-west passage, and shewed Salvaterra (at that time being then with him in Mexico) a sea-card made by his own experience and travell in that voyage, wherein was plainly set downe and described this north-west passage, agreeing in all points with Ortellius' mappe.

"And further, this friar tolde the king of Portugall (as he returned by that countrey homeward) that there was (of certainty) such a passage north-west from England, and that he meant to publish the same: which done, the king most earnestly desired him not in any wise to disclose or make the passage knowen to any nation; for that (said the king) if *England* had knowledge and experience thereof, it would greatly hinder both the king of Spaine and me. This friar (as Salvaterra reported) was the greatest discouerer by sea that hath bene in our age. Also Salvaterra, being persuaded of this passage by the friar Vrdaneta, and by the common opinion of the Spaniards inhabiting America, offered most willingly to accompanie me in this discouery, which of like he would not have done if he had stood in doubt thereof."*

In the eighth chapter sir Humphrey replies, *seriatim*,

* Hakluyt, vol. III. p. 19, 20.

to certain reasons alleged before the queen and the privy council in favour of a north-east passage, by one Master Anthony Jenkinson, "a worthy gentleman, and great traveller," who was of opinion that a better and shorter passage could be obtained to Cathay in that direction; and he follows up the argument, in the next chapter, by showing that even if there be such a passage as that by the north-east, the north-west course is more commodious for traffic, more accessible at all seasons of the year, and free from all hindrances or rivalry from other countries, "it being out of all their trades." The last chapter is occupied with a very full account, in detail, of the great advantages that would accrue to England from the prosecution of the design:—the exportation of all manner of merchandise; the establishment of a foreign trade in "gold, silver, precious stones, cloth of gold, silks, all manner of spices, grocery wares, and other kinds of merchandise of an inestimable price, which both the Spaniard and Portugall, through the length of their journies, cannot well attain unto; also the establishment of penal colonies in those far countries, where we might settle 'such needy people of our country which now trouble the commonwealth, and through want here at home are inforced to commit outrageous offences, whereby they are daily consumed with the gallows;' also the formation of free settlements, from whence a yearly revenue might be derived; the increase of our ships and mariners, without further burthening the state; and the introduction of handicrafts amongst the children of the poor, which would rescue them from idleness and vice, and afford them abundant employment in the fabrication of those trifles which the Indians are known to hold in great esteem." The conclusion of this elaborate discourse, which is written all throughout with singular perspicuity, shadows forth very touchingly the melancholy fate of its enthusiastic author. After referring to certain improvements he had devised in the common sea-card, and a spherical instrument he had invented, "with a compasse of variation for the perfect

knowing of the longitude," he desires his readers "hereafter never to mislike with me for the taking in hand of any laudable and honest enterprise; for if through pleasure or idlenesse we purchase shame, the pleasure vanisheth, but the shame remaineth for ever. And therefore, to give me leave, without offence, always to live and die in this mind, that he is not worthy to live at all that for fear, or danger of death, shunneth his country's service, and his own honor; seeing death is inevitable, and the fame of virtue immortal. Wherefore in this behalf, *mutare vel timere sperno.*"

This treatise was familiar to Frobisher, as also an essay upon the same question written by Rich and Willes, in which the whole controversy concerning the other routes is succinctly traversed, and similar arguments employed to establish the practicability of the north-west passage. Notwithstanding, however, the apparent cogency of the proofs adduced by these writers, and the strong faith of Frobisher in their validity, the attempts that were made about this period to follow up the project were no less unfortunate than those by which they were preceded. In 1585, a voyage was undertaken by Mr. John Davis, at the instance of several gentlemen of note and authority, which was successively followed up by the same adventurer in the two following years; but all three voyages were attended with the usual disasters, without leading to any positive results. Davis was all throughout confident that the passage was practical; and although he was unable to make it himself, he continued to assert his firm belief in the solution of the problem. Nor did he even surrender his opinion to that of the public at large, and the merchants of London, who at last wholly withdrew from an enterprise which had entailed upon them so many grievous failures. He attributed the abandonment of the undertaking solely to the death of sir Francis Walsingham, who had been one of its most earnest patrons; "for," says he, "when his honor died, the voyage was friendless, and men's minds alienated

from adventuring therein." Being unable to interest the country any farther in so hopeless an adventure, he published a brief report of his three voyages (in addition to more detailed accounts that had previously appeared), the substance of which may be inserted in this place, as forming an important feature in the narrative of these famous north-western expeditions.

"In my first voyage, not experienced of the nature of those climates, and having no direction either by chart, globe, or other certaine relation, in what altitude that passage was to be searched, I shaped a northerly course, and so sought the same toward the south; and in that my northerly course I fell upon the shore that in ancient time was called Greenland, five hundred leagues distant from the Durseys, west-north-west northerly, the land being very high, and full of mightie mountaines, all covered with snow; no viewe of wood, grasse, or earth, to be seene; and the shore, two leagues off into the sea, so full of yce as that no shipping could by any meanes come neere the same. The loathsome view of the shore, and irksome noise of the yce was such, as that it bred strange conceites among us; so that we supposed the place to be wast and void of any sensible or vegitable creatures, whereupon I called the same Desolation. So coasting this shore towards the south in the latitude of sixtie degrees, I found it to trend towards the west. I still followed the leading thereof in the same height; and after fifty or sixty leagues it fayled and lay directly north, which I still followed; and in thirtie degrees of sayling upon the west side of this coast, by me named Desolation, we were past al the yce, and found many greene and pleasant isles bordering upon the shore, but the hils of the maine were stil covered with great quantities of snow. I brought my ship among those isles, and there moored to refresh ourselves in our weary travell, in the latitude of sixty-foure degrees or thereabout. The people of the countery having espyed our shippes, came downe unto us in their canoes, and holding up their right hand to the sunne, and crying Yliaout, would strike their breasts. We doing the

like, the people came aboard our shippes,—men of good stature, unbearded, small-eyed, and of tractable conditions, by whome, as signes would permit, we understood that towards the north and west there was a great sea; and using the people with kindness, in giving them nayles and knives, which of all things they most desired, we departed. And finding the sea free from yce, supposing ourselues to be past al danger, we shaped our course west-north-west, thinking thereby to pass for China; but in the latitude of sixty-five degrees we fell in with another shore, and there found another passage of twenty leagues broad, directly west, into the same, which we supposed to be our hoped streight. We entered into the same thirty or forty leagues, finding it neither to wyden nor streighten; then, considering that the yeere was spent (for this was the five of August), not knowing the length of the streight and dangers thereof, we tooke it our best course to return with notice of our good successe for this small time of search. And so returning in a sharpe fret of westerly windes, the 29th of September we arrived at Dartmouth; and acquainting master secretary Walsingham, with the rest of the honourable and worshipfull adventurers, of all our proceedings, I was appointed again, the second yeere, to search the bottome of this streight, because, by all likelihood, it was the place and passage by us laboured for. In this second attempt the merchants of Exeter, and other places of the west, became adventurers in the action; so that being sufficiently furnished for five months, and having direction to search these streights untill we found the same to fall into another sea upon the west side of this part of America, we should againe returne; for then it was not to be doubted but shipping, with trade, might safely be conveied to China and the parts of Asia. We departed from Dartmouth, and arriving upon the south part of the coast of Desolation, coasted the same upon his west shore to the latitude of sixtie-five degrees; and there ancored among the isles bordering upon the same, where we refreshed ourselves.

The people of this place came likewise unto us; through whom I understood, by their signes, that towards the north the sea was large. At this place the chiefe ship whereupon I trusted, called the Mermayd of Dartmouth, found many occasions of discontentment; and being unwilling to proceed, shee there forsook me. When considering how I had given my faith and most constant promise to my worshipfull good friend master William Sanderson, who of all men was the greatest adventurer in that action, and took such care for the performance thereof that he hath to my knowledge at one time disbursed as much money as any five others whatsoever out of his owne purse, when some of the companie have bene slack in giuing in their aduenture; and also knowing that I should lose the fauour of M. secretary Walsingham if I should shrink from his direction,—in one small barke of thirty tunnes, whereof M. Sanderson was owner, alone, without further company, I proceeded on my voyage; and arriving at these streights, followed the same eighty leagues, until I came among many islands, where the water did ebbe and flow sixe fadome upright, and where there had bene great trade of people to make traine. But by such things as there we found, we knew that they were not Christians of *Europe* that had fled that trade: in fine, by searching with our boat, we found small hope to pass any farther that way, and therefore recouered the sea, and coasted the shore towards the south; and in so doing (for it was too late to search towards the north) we found another great inlet, neere forty leagues broad, where the water entered in with violent swiftnesse: this we also thought might be a passage; for, no doubt, the north parts of America are all islands, by aught that I could perceive therein. But because I was alone in a small bark of thirtie tunnes, and the yeere spent, I entered not into the same, for it was now the 7th of September; but, coasting the shore towardes the south, wee saw an incredible number of birds: hauing diuers fishermen abooard our barke, they all concluded that there was a great skull of fish. We,

being vnprouided of fishing furniture, with a long spike nayle made a hooke, and fastened the same to one of our sounding lines: before the baite was changed, we tooke more than fortie great cods, the fish swimming so abundantly thick about our barke as is incredible to be reported; of which, with a small portion of salt that we had, we preserued some thirtie couple, or thereabouts, and so returned to England. And having reported to M. secretarie Walsingham the whole successe of this attempt, he commanded me to present unto the most honourable lord high treasurer of England some part of that fish: which when his lordship saw, and heard at large the relation of this second attempt, I receiued favourable countenance from his honour, aduising me to prosecute the action, of which his lordship conceiued a very good opinion. The next yere, although diuers of the aduenturers fell from the action, as all the western marchants, and most of those in London; yet some of the aduenturers, both honourable and worshipfull, continued their willing fauour and charge, so that by this meanes the next yere two shippes were appointed for the fishing, and one pinness for the discouerie.

"Departing from Dartmouth through God's mercifull fauour, I arrived at the place of fishing; and there, according to my directions, I left the two ships to follow that busines, taking their faithful promise not to depart vntil my returne vnto them, which should be in the fine of August, and so in the barke I proceeded for the discouerie. But after my departure, in sixeteene days the two shippes had finished their voyage, and so presently departed for England, without regard of their promise; myselfe not distrusting any such hard measure, proceeded to the discouerie, and followed my course in the free and open sea betweene north and north-west to the latitude of 67 degrees, and then I might see America west from me, and Gronland, which I called Desolation, east: then, when I saw the land of both sides, I began to distrust it would prove but a gulfe. Notwithstanding, desirous to know the full certainty, I

proceeded, and in 68 degrees the passage enlarged so that I could not see the western shore. Thus I continued to the latitude of 73 degrees, in a great sea free from yce, coasting the western shore of Desolation: the people came continually rowing out vnto me in their canoes, twenty, forty, and one hundred at a time, and would give me fishes dryed,—salmon, salmon peale, cod, caplin, lumpe, stone-base, and such like; besides diuers kinds of birds,—as partrige, pesant, owls, sea-birds, and other kinds of flesh. I still laboured by signes to know from them what they knew of any sea toward the north; they still made signes of a great sea, as we understood them. Then I departed from that coast, thinking to discoper the north parts of America; and after I had sailed towards the west forty leagues, I fel upon a great banke of yce: the wind being north and blew much, I was constrained to coast the same toward the south, not seeing any shore west from me, neither was there any yce towards the north, but a great sea, free, large, very salt, and blew, and of an unsearchable depth: so coasting towards the south, I came to the place where I left the ships to fish, but found them not. Then, being forsaken and left in this distresse, referring myself to the mercifull providence of God, I shaped my course for England, and unhoped for of any, God alone releiuing me, I arrived at Dartmouth. By this last discouerie, it seemed most manifest that the passage was free and without impediment toward the north; but by reason of the Spanish fleet, and unfortunate time of M. Secretarie's death, the voyage was omitted and never sithens attempted. The cause why I use this particular relation of all my proceedings for this discouery, is to stay this objection, why hath not Davis discouered this passage being thrice that wayes emploied? How far I proceeded and in what forme this discouery lieth, doth appeare vpon the globe which M. Sanderson to his very great charge hath published, for the which he deserveth great fauor and commendations." *

* Hakluyt, iii. 119, 120.

The progress made by Davis in these voyages, although it was not decisive enough to induce commercial men to risk any more capital upon the undertaking, was yet of sufficient importance to encourage the sanguine hopes of mariners who, like himself, believed in the practicability of the passage. In his first voyage, as we have seen, Davis discovered a part of Greenland, to which he gave the name of the Land of Desolation, sailing afterwards through those waters which have since been called Davis's Straits, and thence to the latitude of 66° 40′; and in his last, he proceeded again through the Straits to about, or nearly 73°, and found an open sea to the south west. These expeditions took place during Frobisher's life-time, and as he had made the first attempt to explore a north-west passage, and may, therefore, be said to have given a direct impulse to subsequent discoveries in that direction, a brief glance at the voyages of those adventurers who immediately followed him in the same track, will not be wholly irrelevant to the subject of this biography.

Mr. Henry Hudson, who had previously failed in his efforts to make a north-east passage, attempted the north-west in 1610. The straits and bay which bear his name were the result, affording fresh evidence of the extent of the undiscovered waters; but a mutiny amongst his seamen, who abandoned him in a situation of imminent danger, compelled him to forego any further progress. In the following year, James Hale and William Baffin embarked upon the same course; but Hale was murdered by a native, and the object of the adventure was defeated. Baffin again set sail in 1615, and passing through Davis's Straits explored the sea indicated by that navigator, and found that it was a large bay, which has been subsequently laid down in the maps as Baffin's Bay. Stimulated by this discovery, he returned in the following year, found an inlet in the latitude of 78°, which he called Sir Thomas Smith's Sound, but could not make any further progress. This

failure was still more discouraging than any that had previously occurred, in consequence of the expectation excited by the preceding voyage; but Baffin always maintained his opinion in favour of the north-west passage.

The discovery of Hudson's Bay led to an attempt, in 1611, to complete the investigation of that sea, which was undertaken by Mr. (afterwards sir Thomas) Button, who advanced 200 leagues farther to the south-west, and traced a great continent, to which he gave the name of New South Wales. He was the first navigator who touched at the eastern coast of America to the west of Hudson's Bay. On the same coast he also discovered a cluster of islands, called by him Mancel's but now known as Mansfield's Islands. These discoveries were attempted to be followed up, in 1614, by captain Gibbon, but without any success.

Several similar expeditions were undertaken about this period by the king of Denmark, whose attention had been drawn to the subject by Frobisher's voyage, and who believed that the geographical position of his kingdom afforded him greater advantages in exploring the northern seas than any other nation possessed. But, although he took the trouble to send to Iceland and Norway for seamen, supposing that they could endure the hardships of the climate better than his own subjects, he made no advance towards the accomplishment of his object. At length, in 1619, an intrepid and able mariner, Captain John Munk, undertook the voyage, and arrived safely at Cape Farewell. Here, in the latitude of 60° 30′, he encountered an extraordinary change of temperature, the cold being one day so intense that the tackle was frozen and laden with icicles, and useless to the sailors; while on the very next day the weather was so sultry and overpowering that the men were obliged to work in their shirts. Munk appears to have been a man of great courage and capable of enduring the greatest calamities with exemplary fortitude. During the winter he passed in Hudson's Bay,

the hardships he underwent are described as having been almost incredible. "In the month of May, 1620," we are informed, "he found himself alone in a hut, scarce alive himself, and almost morally certain that all his mariners were dead: he collected his spirits, however, as well as he could, crawled out, and found, of all his crew no more than two left, and those in almost as weak a condition as himself; however, they removed the snow in some places, and finding fresh herbs underneath, recovered from the scurvy by eating them; and when the season permitted, and they had collected a little provision, they left their ship behind them, and ventured to return in their pinnace, with which, after overcoming great difficulties, they safely arrived in Norway."* The sequel of Munk's history is even more melancholy than the narrative of his sufferings. A few years afterwards he revived the design of finding the north-west passage, and his talents as a navigator and mathematician were held in such high estimation by the Danish nobility and merchants, that a joint-stock capital was readily furnished to carry the project into effect. At this juncture the king sent for him, and demanded to be informed how it happened that he had not discovered the passage on his last voyage; upon which Munk gave his majesty a full account of his misfortunes. But the king, instead of being moved by the narrative of his distresses, reproached him with his failure, and told him that he had already lost men enough. Munk, wounded by these undeserved censures, made a hasty answer, which provoked his majesty so much that he struck him with a cane. This indignity took such an effect upon the mind of the valiant officer, that he went home, and, refusing all nourishment, died in a few days. Thus terminated the expeditions of the Danes in that quarter, the fate of Munk deterring them from again venturing upon such a perilous undertaking.

* Harris's Collection, vol. ii. Folio.

The Greenland Company continued for many years to prosecute the discovery, but without much success. Instructions were regularly issued to all the English captains engaged in that trade for the purpose of directing their operations towards an object which was still held to be attainable by the most distinguished seamen of the age. One of these commanders, Thomas Marmaduke of Hull, penetrated as far as 82° north latitude, to the extremity of Greenland; and it was believed that if he had kept out to the westward, he would have floated into the open sea, and finally solved the problem. In 1631, another attempt was made by Captain Fox, who asserted that he traversed in succession the various tracks of Frobisher, Davis, Hudson, Baffin, and Button, but did not pretend to have achieved any new discovery. Captain James, who followed and fell in with him near Port Nelson, was equally unsuccessful, and the question up to this time still remained open to controversy; but every successive voyage contributed to justify and confirm the calculations of Gilbert and the enthusiasm of Frobisher, who never ceased to express his conviction that a north-west passage would be ultimately established. The only naval authority of any weight, who seems not to have been thoroughly satisfied about its existence, was sir William Monson, whose original doubts, nevertheless, were very much shaken by Hudson's discoveries. "I have perused," he says, "all the voyages to the north-west made by sir Martin Frobisher and Mr. John Davis, with whom I have often conferred touching this passage, and I have found by them a likelihood of it, but no more assurance than from those that never went so far as they did. Therefore, whatever is hitherto done is but imaginary. I must confess that the last year's attempt of Hudson's has given us knowledge of four hundred leagues further than ever was known before; and out of this discovery we may conjecture more or less possibility of it." *

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, vol. iii. 398.

Having thus delivered his own opinion, and given an analysis of Hudson's voyage, he concludes by laying down a plan for undertaking the discovery; which, at all events, proves that he thought there was enough of probability to warrant perseverance in the enterprise.

The gallant conduct of Frobisher upon every occasion of imminent danger to which he was exposed, is warmly testified by those historians of his three voyages who participated in the peril and witnessed his courage, patience, and self-possession. In every case of extreme risk he was the first to venture life, and to inspire his desponding followers with hope. Having lost five of his men, who were captured by the Indians on the first voyage, he left no means untried in his subsequent ventures to discover whether they still lived, and, if so, to rescue them from captivity. In the second voyage, being informed by the savages through the medium of signs, that the men were living and should be delivered up, and being requested to write to them, the savages indicating that they knew the use of writing, he despatched the following letter to the captives, which affords a strong proof of the ardour and constancy of his character.

"In the name of God, in whom we all beleeue, who (I trust) hath preserued your bodies and soules amongst these infidels, I commend me unto you. I will be glad to seeke by al means you can deuise, for your deliuerance, either by force, or with any commodities within my ships, which I will not spare for your sakes, or any thing else I can doe for you. I have aboord of theirs, a man, a woman, and a child, which I am contented to deliver for you, but the man which I carried away from hence the last yeere, is dead in England. Moreover, you may declare unto them, that if they deliuer you not, I will not leaue a man aliue in their country. And thus, if one of you can come to speake with me, they shall have either the man, woman, or childe, in pawne for you. And thus unto God, whom

I trust you doe serve, in hast I leaue you, and to him we will dayly praye for you. This Tuesday morning the seuenth of August, anno 1577.

"Yours to the uttermost of my power,

"MARTIN FROBISHER.

"I have sent you by these bearers, penne, ynk, and paper, to write back vnto me againe, if personally you cannot come to certify me of your estate." *

The prisoners, however, if they still survived, were never recovered, nor could Frobisher, notwithstanding the efforts he made to trace them, even ascertain their fate. Speaking of that voyage, Settle observes, that upon approaching Frobisher's straits, they seemed to be shut up with ice, "which gave no little cause of discomfort to us all; but our general (to whose diligence imminent dangers and difficult attempts seemed nothing, in respect of his willing mind for the commoditie of his prince and country), with two little pinnaces prepared of purpose, passed twice through them to the east shore and the islands thereunto adjacent: and the ship, with the two barks, lay off and on something further into the sea, from the danger of the ice." Frobisher appears always to have gone upon shore himself, especially when the crew betrayed any apprehensions about the natives, and to have set the example to his men in exploring for good harbourage, or endeavouring to make a passage through the ice; so that whatever risk was to be encountered, he took a prominent share in it. On one occasion, having mistaken their course, in consequence of the great similarity of the coasts, Frobisher, who was well aware of the error, prudently persuaded the fleet that they were in the right course. "Howbeit, I suppose," says the old chronicler, "he rather dissembled his opinion therein than otherwise, meaning by that policie (being himself led with an honourable desire of further discovery) to induce the fleet to follow him, to

* Hakluyt, iii. 70.

see a further proofe of that place: and, as some of the companie reported, he hath since confessed, that if it had not been for the charge and care he had of the fleet and freighted ships, he both would and could have gone through to the South Sea, called Mar del Sur, and dissolved the long doubt of the passage which we seeke to finde to the rich country of Cataya."

The resolution with which he acted on this last voyage, when the men, finding themselves surrounded by ice, and believing it to be utterly impossible to make Warwick's Sound, the destined port of the vessels, began to exhibit manifest terror, and to murmur against him for his "wilful manner of proceeding," proved his great capacity for the arduous task he had undertaken. The dangers presented on all sides by the inclement elements, were trifling in comparison with the horrors of the threatened mutiny under such circumstances; but Frobisher was determined in spite of all difficulties to persevere. The whole narrative is strikingly descriptive of the scene, and illustrative of the fortitude of the heroic Frobisher.

"Some desired to discover some harborow thereabouts to refresh themselves and reform their broken vessels for a while, vntil the north and north-west windes might disperse the yce, and make the place more free to passe. Other some forgetting themselves, spake more vndutifully in this behalfe, saying that they had as leave be hanged when they came home, as without hope of saftie to seeke to passe, and so to perish amongst the yce.

"The general not opening his eares to the peeuish passion of any priuate person, but chiefly respecting the accomplishment of the cause he had undertaken (wherein the chiefe reputation and fame of a general and captaine consisteth), and calling to his remembrance the short time he had in hand to prouide so great a number of ships their loading, determined with this resolution to passe and recouer his poste, or else there to bury himself with his attempt.

"Notwithstanding, somewhat to appease the feeble passions of the fearfuller sort, and the better to entertaine time for a season, whilst the yce might the better be dissolued, he haled on the fleete, with the belief that he would put them into harborow: therefore whilst the shippes lay off and on under Hatton's headland, he sought to goe in with his pinnesses amongst the islands there, as though he meant to search for harborow, where indeede he meant nothing lesse, but rather sought if any one might be found in that place, as by the sequele appeared.

"In the meane time, whilest the fleete lay thus doubtfull, without any certaine resolution what to do, being hard aboord the lee-shore, there arose a suddaine and terrible tempest, at the south-south-east, whereby the yce began maruellously to gather about us.

"Whereupon euery man, as in such case of extremitie he thought best, sought the wisest way, for his owne safetie. The most part of the fleete, which were further shot up within the straights, and so farre to the leeward, as that they could not double the land, following the course of the general, who led them the way, tooke in their sayles, and layde it a hull amongst the yce, and so passed over the storme, and had no extremitie at all, but for a short time in the same place.

"Howbeit the other ships which plyed out to seaward, had an extreme storme for a longer season.' And the nature of the place is such, that it is subject diuersly to diuers windes, according to the sundry situation of the great Alps and mountaines there, every mountaine causing a seuerall blast, and pirrie, after the maner of a Leuant.

"In this storme, being the six and twentieth of July, there fell so much snow, with such bitter cold aire, that we could not scarce see one another for the same, nor open our eyes to handle our ropes and sayles, the snow being about half a foot deepe upon the hatches of our ship, which did so wet thorough our poor mari-

ners' clothes, that he that had five or six shiftes of apparell had scarce one drie thread to his backe, which kind of wet and coldness, together with the overlabouring of the poore men amidst the yce, bred no small sicknesse amongst the fleete, which somewhat discouraged some of the poore men, who had not experience of the like before, every man persuading himself that the winter there must needes be extreme, where they found so unseasonable a sommer.

"And yet, notwithstanding this cold aire, the sunne many times hath a marvellous force of heate amongst those mountaines, insomuch, that when there is no breth of winde to bring the cold aire from the dispersed yce upon us, we shall be weary of the bloming heate; and then sodainely with a pirry of wind, which cometh downe from the hollownesse of the hilles, we shall have such a breth of heate brought upon our faces as though we were entered within some bath-stove or hote-house; and when the first of the pirry and blast is past, we shall haue the winde sodainely anew blow cold againe.

"In this storme the Ann Frances, the Moone, and the Thomas of Ipswich, who found themselves able to hold it up with a saile, and could double about the Cape of the Queen's Foreland, plyed out to seaward, holding it far better policie and safetie to seeke sea-roome, than to hazard the continuance of the storme, the danger of the ice, and the lee-shore.

"And, being uncertaine at this time of the general's private determinations, the weather being so darke that they could not discerne one another, nor perceiue which way he wroughte, betooke themselves to this course for best and safest.

"The general, notwithstanding the great storme, following his own former resolution, sought by all meanes possible by a shorter way to recouer his post, and where he saw the yce neuer so little open, he gat in at one gappe and out at another, and so himselfe valiantly led the way thorow before to induce the fleete

to follow after, and with incredible paine and perill at length gat through the yce; and upon the one and thirtieth of July recouered his long wished post, after many attempts and sundry times being put backe, and came to anker in the Countesse of Warwick Sound, in the entrance whereof, when he thought all perill past, he encountered a great island of yce, which gaue the Ayde such a blow, having a little before wayed her anker a cocke bill, that it broke the anker-flouke through the ship's bowes under the water, which caused so great a leake, that with much adoe they preserued the ship from sinking.

"At their arrival here, they perceiued two ships at anker within the harborough, whereat they began much to marvell and greatly to rejoice, for those they knew to be the Michael, wherein was the lieutenant-general, captaine Fenton, and the small bark called the Gabriel, who so long time were missing, and never heard of before, whom euery man made the last reckoning neuer to heare of againe.

"Here every man greatly rejoyced of their happie meeting, and welcomed one another after the sea manner, with their great ordinance, and when each party had ripped up their sundry fortunes and perills past, they highly prased God, and altogither upon their knees gave him due, humble, and hearty thankes; and master Wolfall, a learned man, appointed by her majestie's councill to be their minister and preacher, made unto them a godly sermon, exhorting them especially to be thankful to God for their strange and miraculous deliverance in those so dangerous places."*

The high naval reputation and great experience which Frobisher acquired in these expeditions, speedily recommended him to employment, notwithstanding the ill success of his efforts to establish the north-west passage; and a fitting opportunity for his services was offered in 1585, by the impending disputes with the king of

1585

* Hakluyt, iii. 83, 84.

Spain, arising from an embargo laid by that government upon all English vessels. In consequence of that embargo, queen Elizabeth, entertaining no hope of procuring satisfaction from the court of Spain by amicable measures, issued letters of reprisal, authorising her subjects to arrest all ships or merchandise they should find at sea belonging to that power, for the purpose of indemnifying themselves for any losses they might have sustained. She commissioned sir Francis Drake, at the same time, with a fleet of one-and-twenty, or, according to Monson, five-and-twenty sail, to make an expedition against the West Indies, where the Spaniards were least prepared to resist so formidable a descent. Frobisher was distinguished by the honourable post of vice-admiral, or second in command on this occasion; and the zeal, energy, and courage he displayed in that brief but hazardous service, led to a still higher distinction three years afterwards, when the Spanish Armada threatened the coasts of England. As the progress and fate of that armament have been already related in detail in the course of these biographies, it is unnecessary to retrace events already so familiar to the reader, but it is essential to specify the prominent position that was assigned to Frobisher in that glorious action.

1588. Of the force that was brought against the Armada, there were thirty-four vessels of her majesty's serving immediately with the lord high admiral, who commanded in a ship of 800 tons burthen. There was another vessel of equal tonnage commanded by sir John Hawkins; but, with the exception of a vessel of 1000, commanded by lord Edmund Sheffield, and the Triumph, commanded by Frobisher, the other vessels were all of inferior tonnage. The Triumph was the largest vessel in the service, being no less than 1100 tons burthen; and it may be inferred that the selection of Frobisher to take the command of her was a mark of peculiar confidence and distinction. In the course of the anxious days that ensued after this formidable fleet put out to

sea, it was considered advisable that the whole force should be divided into four squadrons, for the command of which the most "skilful navigators" were expressly chosen — the lord admiral commanding the first squadron, Drake the second, Hawkins the third, and Frobisher the fourth. In the flying engagement that followed off the Isle of Wight, Frobisher exhibited great ability in extricating himself from a situation of considerable danger, and was knighted the next day together with lord Thomas Howard, lord Sheffield, Roger Townshend, and Hawkins.

The fame of sir Martin Frobisher was now at its height; and if opportunities had arisen for the exercise of his talents, he must have taken and held a still more conspicuous place amongst the English commanders. But the principal occupations afforded to naval enterprise during the few succeeding years lay in the private adventures that were undertaken against the Spaniards. The letters of reprisal granted to the English merchants encouraged a variety of speculations of that kind; for the Spaniards offered a rich harvest of booty, which their government was too weak to protect efficiently on the open seas. The defeat of the Armada led to an expectation that some attempt would be made to repair so signal a discomfiture; and the English cabinet considered that it was necessary, under all the circumstances, to maintain a fleet upon the Spanish coast, partly to prevent any hostile preparation, and partly to intercept the Spanish trade with the Indies, at that time one of its most copious springs of revenue. Agreeably to this resolution, ten ships, divided into two squadrons, were sent out in 1590—one squadron commanded by sir John Hawkins, and the other by sir Martin Frobisher. Upon receiving intelligence of this movement, the king of Spain ordered out twenty ships of the line for the purpose of forming an escort to the Indian vessels and carracks on their homeward voyage; but he had hardly issued this order than he retracted it, and countermanded the sailing of the Indian vessels,

1590.

directing them to winter in the Indies rather than to venture out to sea that year. This arrangement, while it successfully frustrated the hopes of the English squadrons, produced serious inconvenience to the Spanish merchants, who had calculated upon the regular arrival of their merchandize; and the long delay of the goods led to numerous bankruptcies in Seville. In the meanwhile, Frobisher and Hawkins cruised fruitlessly for seven months along the coast of Spain and the neighbouring islands without taking a single ship: and at last failing in an attempt upon the castle of Fial, which had recently been re-fortified, they returned to England, having gained no positive advantage by the enterprise beyond that of embarrassing the operations of the enemy.

1592 We next find sir Martin Frobisher superseding sir Walter Raleigh in the command of an expedition against the Spaniards, mainly directed to Panama, from whence they were in the habit of exporting gold to Europe. This expedition was partly a private speculation, and partly public, the two principal vessels being fitted up by government, and the rest by private individuals. Upon this occasion, as upon the former, orders were issued by the Spanish authorities prohibiting their vessels from putting out to sea; and sir Walter Raleigh had reached Cape Finisterre before he received information to that effect. A violent storm soon afterwards committed considerable damage upon his vessels, and, resolving to return to England himself, he divided his ships into two squadrons, giving the command of one to sir Martin Frobisher, with orders to cruise on the Spanish coast, and directing sir John Burroughs to proceed with the other to the Azores, there to lie in wait for the East India carracks, which used to touch at those islands on their return. As there are different versions extant of the circumstances under which sir Walter Raleigh retired from the command of this expedition, it is desirable to observe that Monson dates the recal some days after the vessels were at sea, while Hakluyt assigns it to the morning after their departure

from England. Monson's words are as follow: "Sir Walter's design was to have surprised some place in the West Indies; but being at sea, and spending two or three days in foul weather, her majesty was pleased to command his return, and to commit the charge of the ships to sir Martin Frobisher, who was sent down for that purpose; but with an express command not to follow the design of the West Indies."

Hakluyt says, that "sir Walter Raleigh put to sea the 1st of May, and the very next day sir Martin Frobisher, in a pinnace of the lord admiral's, called the Disdain, met him, and brought letters of revocation from the queen, with command to relinquish (for his own part) the intended attempt, and to leave the charge and conduct of all things in the hands of sir John Burroughs and sir Martin Frobisher; but that his honour being so far engaged in the undertaking of this voyage, that he could not, with reputation, and satisfaction to his friends, leave his fleet which was now under sail, he put a dubious construction on the queen's letter, as if it left him at his liberty to proceed or to return, and thereby continued his course, till the advice he received off Cape Finisterre made him alter his resolution." It is certain, however, that sir Walter was distinctly recalled, that he accompanied the fleet as far as Cape Finisterre, and that, then taking leave of his friends, the command devolved upon Burroughs and Frobisher, from whom several of the private adventurers separated shortly after they undertook their duties. Before this separation took place, however, the united squadron fell in with a Biscayan ship of 600 tons burthen off the coast of Spain, and seizing the whole of her cargo sent her to England. Her cargo consisted of iron-work, such as horse-shoes, bars, bolts, locks, plough-shares, &c., and was valued by the English at 6000*l.* or 7000*l.*, but was worth treble that sum to the Spaniards. This adventure was succeeded by the capture of a Spanish fly-boat near Lisbon, which prize fell into the hands of sir John Burroughs.

At this time the Spaniards had a fleet at sea, and sir Martin Frobisher, with an inadequate force of three or four ships, hung upon the coast, being exposed all the while to great peril, owing to the inferiority of his vessels.* Burroughs, who sailed towards the islands, had a narrow escape from the enemy, whom he discovered to the seaward of him, and, but for the speed of his ship, he must have fallen into their hands. He took several caravels in his voyage, and, joining some vessels under the command of the earl of Cumberland, went in chace of a richly-laden carrack. The enemy, finding themselves in imminent danger, ran the carrack ashore, and setting fire to her, endeavoured to destroy the loading; but the English landed a hundred men, and were fortunate enough to save a part of the cargo. The issue of these adventures was the seizure of the Madre de Dios, a seven-decked ship of 1600 tons burden, laden with precious stuffs, drugs, and spices, valued at 150,000*l.*

This was the richest prize that ever was brought into England; nor was it won without a desperate struggle, in which even the victors suffered severely.

The attention of the English government was now directed to the coast of Bretagne, where the king of France was maintaining a protracted resistance against the League. In 1591, sir John Norris had been sent out from England to Brest, with a force of 3000 men, to assist the French king; but the Spaniards having subsequently taken up a fortified position near that place, his majesty besought of the queen the further assistance of a naval squadron. The policy of occupying the haven of Brest, and preventing the Spaniards from putting in their shipping there, was promptly recognised by her majesty, who dispatched sir Martin Frobisher, in 1594, with a fleet of ten ships, according to Camden, 1594. but according to Monson with only four ships of the line, having explicit instructions to enter the harbour. The fort of Crodon, near Brest, was then in the possession of the Spaniards, and sir John Norris, who had returned home to render an account of the state of the

war, was sent back with orders to seize upon the fort. On the 1st of September, after having, in conjunction with the marquis d'Aumont, taken Morlaix and Quimpercorentin, he lay down before the fort, the assault being sustained on the other side by sir Martin Frobisher. The defence was obstinate, and for a long time successful. The loss on the part of the besiegers was so heavy, that the queen, learning at what a sacrifice of blood the siege was carried on, endeavoured to moderate the rashness of the troops by issuing fresh instructions to the commander. In this instrument she admonished Norris "that the blood of man ought not to be squandered away at all adventures, that the boiling heat of pushing and forward men had need be curbed, and not encouraged and egged on into danger and ruin; that if he observed these measures he would save the credit of his conduct, and sit free at the same time from the charge of cruelty; and she herself should, upon better ground, commend his care and regard for her subjects." This was a hazardous display of tenderness at such a moment; but happily it did not abate the ardour of the besiegers. The place, exhausted and incapable of further defence, surrendered: the garrison was put to the sword, and the fort reduced to ashes. The victory was decisive, but it was purchased dearly. Sir Martin Frobisher, in the heat of the engagement, and setting a noble example of heroic devotion to his men, received a shot in his hip. He survived this fatal wound until he arrived at Plymouth; but in consequence of the unskilfulness of the surgeon who attended him, he expired a few days after his return.

Thus fell one of the best seamen of his age—a man of the highest order of courage—an able commander, and a zealous prosecutor of geographical discoveries. He is said to have been a rigid disciplinarian, and disagreeably rough in his manners; but his character was well adapted to his times, and his energy, firmness, and zeal conferred lustre upon the various services in which he was engaged.

SIR ROBERT MANSEL.

15— — 16—.

ROBERT Mansel was descended from an ancient and noble family who long held their seat in Glamorganshire. He was the third son of sir Edward Mansel, knight, and the lady Jane, daughter of Henry, earl of Worcester. At a very early age he embraced the profession of the sea. Under the immediate patronage of lord Howard of Effingham, then lord high admiral of England, he rose rapidly in the service; and we find him distinguishing himself so conspicuously in the Cadiz expedition under the earl of Essex, in 1596, as to be selected, upon that occasion, for the honour of knighthood. This testimony of approbation, however, was not conferred upon Mansel alone; for it appears, that when the English, after forcing their way into the town, had succeeded in gaining the market place, where the gallant Wingfield was shot in the head, two brave men, Savage and Bagnal, covered with blood and wounds, were knighted on the spot, in consideration of the valour they displayed in being the first to leap into the streets from an adjoining house.* Amongst those who followed in the suit of the lord admiral when the earl of Essex advanced to take possession of the town, the name of Robert Mansel is recorded; and when the action was over, he was one of sixty gentlemen chosen from the officers who served in that expedition, and knighted expressly for their courageous conduct.†

1596.

It cannot now be determined whether sir Robert Mansel commanded a ship on the occasion of this expe-

* See Lediard, vol. i. For a full account of the Cadiz expedition, see the life of Essex in Vol. IV. of this series.

† A list of the names is given by Camden.

dition, or merely held a subordinate post; but it is not at all improbable that he went out in the command of a vessel called the Acquittance. We are led to form this conjecture from an error of rather a remarkable kind in the MS. lists of vessels, drawn up by sir William Monson, deposited in the Cottonian library. In a list of fourteen of the ships, belonging to the fleet destined for Cadiz, sir William Monson sets down the name of sir Robert Mansfield as the commander of a vessel, the Acquittance; but in his printed tracts subsequently published, he corrects this statement by substituting the name of sir George Gifford. A similar mistake occurs in the list he furnishes of the ships employed on the island voyage, the name of sir Robert Mansfield being set down in the MS. as captain of the admiral's ship, but afterwards altered in the printed tracts to Mansel. Whether it may be inferred that the similarity of the names led sir William Monson into the error in both instances, and that sir Robert Mansel, and not sir George Gifford, commanded the Acquittance, we must not venture to affirm; but there is no doubt that Mansel commanded the Mary Honora, and afterwards the Repulse, under the earl of Essex, in the expedition to the islands.

1597. Sir William Monson, who also held a command upon this occasion, may be referred* to as the principal historian of the voyage; but, being personally concerned in the events he relates, he bestows his chief care upon those matters which came principally within his own observation. His narrative, consequently, affords but few individual details, and enables us to assign to sir Robert Mansel nothing more than a general participation in that unsuccessful enterprise.

Upon his return from the islands, sir Robert Mansel appears to have held high favour with his old patron, and to have maintained his interest at court throughout the whole of the reign of queen Elizabeth; being frequently employed in active service, especially in defence

1600. of the coast. During the interval that elapsed before

* An account of this expedition has been already given in the life of Essex, previously referred to.

he was called again into any foreign service, he is said to have fought a duel with one sir John Heydon or Heybron; but the cause of the quarrel, or its ultimate consequences, we have been unable to trace. The only allusion to this circumstance we have found, is in a private letter from Rowland White to sir Robert Sydney, in which the writer says, "It's reported, that sir Robert Mansel and sir John Heydon have fought in Norfolk, and both are very dangerously hurt." * This letter is dated the 9th of October, 1600. Mansel's antagonist may have been that colonel Heybron who commanded the French regiment upon which the king bestowed the *drapeau blanc*; but this is a mere supposition which, even if it be correct, throws no light whatever upon the transaction itself.

1602. While sir Robert Mansel was engaged cruising off the South Foreland, he had the good fortune to render an important service in intercepting some Spanish gallies that had just escaped from the British fleet off Coimbra. Sir William Monson had been sent out with an adequate force for the purpose of seizing some of the rich galleons expected from the East. It was arranged that the Dutch squadron was to form a junction with the English vessels, but finding that they failed to keep their engagement, sir William Monson continued his course alone down the coast of Portugal, and finally resolved to attack a galleon which lay in the road of Coimbra protected by eleven gallies. The action was decisive. The garrison, after defending the citadel with much bravery, were at last driven out at the point of the bayonet, several of the gallies were burnt and sunk, and the galleon captured with a treasury of a million pieces of eight. Out of this scene of destruction Frederic Spinola contrived to escape with six of the gallies, the St. Lewis, the St. John Baptist, the Lucera, the Padilla, the Philip, and the St. John; intending to make for the coast of Flanders.

On the 23d of September he entered the British channel, near the Straits of Dover, where sir Robert

* Sydney, State Papers, vol. ii. p. 217.

Mansel was cruising with two men-of-war, supported by four Dutch ships, along the French and Flemish coasts. As the gallies approached, only two Dutch ships were visible, and Spinola resolved to engage them: but while he was making preparations for the attack, he discovered one of the English vessels at a distance, and, instantly changing his course, he stood off for the remainder of the day, hoping under cover of the night to succeed in reaching his destined port in safety. Perceiving the intention of the enemy, sir Robert Mansel immediately gave the signal to chase them, and continued to pursue them from eight o'clock in the morning until sunset. Finding himself thus harassed, Spinola again changed his plans, and made for the English shore, which he approached so closely, that some of the slaves, throwing off their chains, flung themselves into the sea, and swam ashore. One English vessel and one or two Dutch ships were lying in close to the land; and sir Robert Mansel, anticipating that the gallies, if they continued their course, must fall in with those vessels, stood out to sea, in order to intercept them, if they should steer for Flanders. The event justified his tactics. The English and Dutch ships opened a brisk fire upon the gallies as soon as they came within gunshot; but the enemy, having no inclination to risk a contest, took to their oars, and got out to sea as well as they could without any distinct object in view, or without knowing what course to take for safety. In the confusion that ensued, one of them during the night struck upon the admiral's ship. A volley of guns was discharged into the unlucky bark, which brought down her mainmast, and committed extensive destruction amongst her crew. A cry of terror and agony rose up from her deck, and the admiral offered quarter to the miserable survivors. The five remaining gallies came up to her rescue at this moment, but were received with a broadside. In the meanwhile, one of the Dutch ships fell foul of the Lucera in the dark, and carrying away her rudder disabled her to

such an extent, that she immediately sunk, and all hands perished. A similar fate attended the Padilla, which was split in pieces by the concussion; a third was lost at sea by the unskilfulness of the sailors in an attempt to put into Calais. The remaining three escaped, — Spinola being a second time successful in securing his own safety, with a very valuable cargo, carrying his shattered boats to Dunkirk, where they were refitted, and from thence transporting them to Sluys. This gallant commander fell in an engagement with the Dutch in the following year.*

This action was subsequently so strangely misrepresented by Dutch and Flemish writers, that sir Robert Mansel drew up a circumstantial statement of the whole affair, which, in his own vindication, he laid before his friend lord Howard. An extract from this document will afford an excellent characteristic specimen of the talents of the admiral in delineating those scenes in which he occupied so conspicuous a position. As a defence of his conduct it is conclusive.

"On the 23d of September," he observes, "being in the Hope, and having in my company the Advantage only of the queen's ships, which captain Jones commanded, and two Dutch men of war, I rid more than half-channel over towards the coast of France, upon a north-west and south-east line, myself being nearest that coast, captain Jones next to me, and the Dutch men of war a-sea-board, and to the westward of him. The small force at that time present, and with me, remaining thus disposed for the intercepting of the gallies, having dismissed the Dutch men of war, that served under me, having upon their own entreaty to revictual and trim, and having employed the rest of the queen's ships upon special services, I descried from my top-mast heads six low sails, which some made for gallies, others affirmed them to be small barks that had struck their topsails, and bound from Dieppe towards the Downs. To which opinion though I inclined most, yet I di-

* Campbell's Naval History, vol. i.

rected the master to weigh and stand with them, that I might learn some news of the gallies, which, by your lordship's advertisement sent me, I knew had either passed me that night, or were near at hand, unless the sea had swallowed them up, in the storms which had raged three days before. Having set myself under sail, the weather grew thick, which obliged me to lash some two points from the wind towards the English coast, lest the continuance of that dark weather might give them power to run out a-head of me. About eleven o'clock the weather cleared, when I discovered them plainly to be the Spanish gallies so long time expected, at which time with the rest I plied to receive them by crossing their fore-foot as they stood along the channel, which they endeavoured till they perceived that, by the continuance of that course, they could not escape the power of my ordnance.

"All this time these two fly-boats were between them and me; and, as the slaves report that swam ashore at Dover, they determined with three gallies to have boarded each of those ships, and could have executed that resolution but for the fear of her majesty's great galleon (as they termed the Hope), whose force that they shunned in that kind, considering the disadvantage that twice six of the best gallies that ever I saw hath by fighting against one ship of her force, I do as much commend, as otherwise I do detest their shameful working, in that, full of cowardliness and weakness, they rowed back to the westward, and spent the day by running away, in hopes that the darkness of the night would give them liberty sufficient to shun the only ship they feared, or that was indeed in the sea at that time to give them cause of fear, I mean between them and Dunkirk or Newport. This error only of theirs bred their confusion, as you may perceive by the sequel.

"For they no sooner began that course of rowing back again, but I instantly made signs for captain Jones in the Advantage of the queen's to come to me, whom I presently directed to repair to Calais road, and there

to send the alarm into the States' army assembled before Sluys, and to advise such men of war as kept on the coast of Flanders, upon any other occasion, to stand off to the sea, to meet with the gallies in the night, which should be chased by me, with my lights in my top-mast heads, and a continual discharging of my ordnance. Captain Jones having shaped his course according to my direction, I gave orders for hoisting and trimming of my sails by the wind to keep sight of the gallies: the two fly-boats, being still a-weather of me, did the like.

"Which chase we held till sun-setting, observing this course following all the day. They being a-weather of me, kept their continual boards, that the gallies were always between them; and myself, being to leeward, made such short turns, as I kept all the afternoon, in a manner even in the very eye of their course, between them and the place of their design, ever discharging my best ordnance to warn the Answer of her majesty's, that rid by my directions at the Downs upon important service, as your lordship knoweth; and the Flemings that were there, having left the sea, upon unknown grounds to me (yet sent from Portsmouth by the most provident direction of her sacred majesty to await the coming of the gallies), neither came they within shot of them till after night, howsoever the reputation of the service is wholly challenged by them.

"Having given your lordship an account how this day was thus spent by me from eight o'clock until the evening, and with these only helps, I beseech your lordship to be pleased to understand, that with the setting of the sun I could discern the ships last mentioned under sail at the Downs, and the gallies to have set their sails, directing their course close aboard our shore, each of them being out of sight of the other, and my Dutch consorts by this time to have been left by the gallies to a stern chase. When I perceived them to hold that course, which would bring them within shot of the Answer, and the rest that were in the Downs

I held a clear contrary course from them towards the coast of France, to confirm the secure passage they thought to find on our coast, which continued until the report of their battery gave me assurance of the gallies being engaged with them.

"How the battery began, who began it, how it was continued, how ended, and to whom the reputation of the service is due, I leave to be considered by your lordship by the perusal of the true disclosure following. The Answer of the queen which captain Broadgate commanded, as she rid more southerly at the Downs than the Flemings, so came the first to the gallies, and bestowed twenty-eight pieces of ordnance on them before the Flemings came in, who at length seconded him with very many shot.

"During this battery of ours upon the gallies, which I so term, because they never exchanged one shot, at the very first report of the Answer's ordnance, I directed the master of my ship to bear up with the south end of the Goodwin, with which directions I delivered my reasons publicly as I stood on the poop of my ship; viz. that if I stood directly into them, the gallies, before I could recover the place, would either be driven ashore or sunk, and so there would prove no need of my force, or else by their nimble sailing they would escape the ships, of whom (once getting a-head) they would receive no impediment; for there was no one ship but the Advantage in the sea that could hinder them to recover any port in Flanders, or the east countries (Sluys only excepted), unless I stayed them at that sand-head.

"Having recovered as near that place as I desired, I stayed at least a quarter of an hour before I could either see the galley, hear or see any of those ships, their lights, or report of their ordnance, which made me and all my company hold opinion, that they had outsailed the Answer and the rest of the Flemings, and shunned sight of me, by going a-sea-board of my ship, which I so verily believed, as I once directly deter-

mined to sail for Sluys, with the hope only that the preparation which I know the States had there, would be able to prevent their entrance into that place. Whilst I remained thus doubtful, or rather hopeless, to hinder their recovery of Dunkirk or Newport, in case they had been a-sea-board of me, some of the company descried a single galley plying from the shore to get a-head of my ship. When she approached within caliver-shot, I discharged about thirty pieces of ordnance of my lower and upper tier at her along; myself with many other in my ship saw when her main-yard was shot asunder, heard the report of many shot that hit her keel, heard many of their most pitiful outcries, which, when I perceived to continue, and, instead of making way from me, to near me what she could, I forebore shooting, and commanded one that spoke the Portuguese language to tell them, that I was contented to receive them to mercy, which I would accordingly have performed, had not the other five gallies offered to stand a-head of me at that very instant, and thereby would have left me, as they had both the first two Dutch ships, and afterwards the Answer, with the rest of the Flemings, had I omitted any small time of executing the advantage I had of their being on my broadside, which, as appears, was so effectually employed (howsoever the night wherein this service was performed might hinder the particular mention of their hurts), as none can deny but that God pleased thereby only to work their confusion: for, since that time, none hath said or can speak of any one shot made towards them; yet four of them are sunk and wrecked, the fifth past doing the enemy service, and the sixth they are forced to new-build at Dunkirk, where (if I be not much deceived), she will prove more chargeable than profitable, if the default rest not in ourselves.

"The disagreement between the Dutch captains themselves, touching the stemming and sinking of the gallies (whereof one challenged before your lordship, and in many other public places, to have stemmed and sunk

two himself), and the printed pamphlet, containing the stemming and sinking of three gallies, gives the reputation thereof to three several captains, amongst whom no mention is made of the first; and, whereas there are but two in all sunk, I leave to be reconciled among themselves, and to your lordship, whether that the same of right appertaineth not to her majesty's ship the Hope, in respect of the allegations before mentioned, every particular whereof being to be proved by the oaths of my whole company, and maintained with the hazard of my life, with that which followeth:

"1. As the shooting of the single galley's mainyard; my bestowing above thirty pieces of ordnance upon that one galley within less than caliver-shot.

"2. That they in the galley made many lamentable outcries for my receiving them into mercy.

"3. That I would accordingly have received them, but for giving them over, to encounter with the five other gallies, which else had left me to a stern chase.

"4. To these reasons I add the assertion of the vice-admiral himself, who told me (whatsoever he spake in other places), that one of the gallies which he stemmed had had her mainyard shot asunder before his coming aboard her; by whomsoever she was then stemmed, your lordship may judge who ruined her, considering she made no resistance by his own report, but by crying to him for mercy.

"Touching the other galley stemmed and sunk, I have already proved how she (as all the rest), had got a-head the Answer of the queen's not named, and the rest of the statesmen of war with her, who challenge the whole credit of this service. They, as all other seamen, cannot deny but that the gallies will outsail all ships in such a loome gale of wind and smooth sea, as we had that night.

"The gallies being then quicker of sail than they, how could they by any means possible fetch them up but by some impediment? Impediment they received none but by my ordnance, which amounted to fifty

great shot at those five which came last from the shore, when all the ships were a mile astern.

"Some, notwithstanding, out of their detracting disposition, may perchance say, that the two which were wrecked at Newport would have perished by storm, though they had not been battered: whereto, though I have sufficiently answered, first, in showing that they might have recovered any of the places thereabouts before eight o'clock that night but for me, and then the second time before the morning, had they not been encountered by me alone, at the South-sand head; yet, for further proof that they miscarried by our battery only, I say, that if one of the gallies which received least damage by our ordnance did outlive Friday's storm continuing till Saturday noon, being driven among the islands of Zealand, to recover Calais, then surely those two (unless they had been exceedingly torn), would have made shift to have recovered the ports Newport, Graveling, or Dunkirk; especially since from the place where I battered them, they might have been at the remotest of those places, before any storm began. But such seemed their haste to save their lives, as their thought ran of a shore, and not of a harbour.

"Now that I have delivered unto your lordship the whole and true discourse of this business, I shall forbear to trouble your patience with any further relation of that night, and the next day's spending my time (though the same in their chase had like to have cost her majesty her ship, and the lives of as many as were in her), and conclude with admiration of their not holding her majesty's ship, nor I (her unworthiest servant), and then, and yet, by her highness's grace and your lordship's favour, admiral of the forces in that place, am not once mentioned, especially since the six gallies might safely have arrived before seven o'clock that night, at any of the ports of Flanders to the westward of Ostend. And that the Dutch ships, but for the signs (signals) they received from me. Then, that the force of her majesty's ship wherein I was, enforced

them to keep close aboard the English shore, whereby those ships in the Downs had power given them to come to fight, which fight was begun by the Answer of the queen's.

"And, lastly, since the gallies escaped their battery, and had gotten a-head those ships above a mile at least, and never received any impediment after but only one by me, who lingered them (as you have heard), until the coming up of those ships that challenge to stem them, which being granted, I cannot see how any other credit can rightly be given them (for that stem I mean), than to a lackey for pillaging that dead body which his master had slain." *

The clearness with which this paper is drawn up, exhibits the ability of the writer, in a highly favourable point of view, and the circumstantial character of the details affords a remarkable evidence of the strictness of investigation to which the conduct of public men was exposed at that period. Such an investigation was not called for in the present instance; but sir Robert Mansel felt that it was due to his own honour to vindicate himself from the first breath of calumny, without waiting for any formal accusation. The example which he thus set to the service was of the utmost value, and was duly appreciated in the proper quarter. Upon the accession of king James he was confirmed in the office of vice-admiral of England, a post to which he had been previously advanced, through the interest of the earl of Nottingham; and which he filled for many years with great credit to himself and advantage to the country.

1603. James I. ascended the throne on the 24th March, 1603. The alteration which this event produced in the maritime policy of the country was remarkable. Elizabeth's whole reign was a great war. James, on the contrary, was resolved on peace. In one hour he changed the entire aspect of our foreign relations; recalled the fleet; and stood in amity with the world. The wand that had so long disturbed the passions of mankind was

* Campbell's Naval History, vol. ii. p. 37—44.

broken, and England, exhausted, but crowned with many victories, was once more restored to repose. The beneficial effect of such a transition could not be felt at once; the languor of fatigue supervened upon the suspension of excitement; but, whatever consequences it entailed in other respects, it was productive of essential benefits to the navy. There was now time to look into those defects which could neither be examined nor remedied during the war; and immediate steps were taken for the better victualling of the navy, and for the regular supply of the materials requisite for its maintenance; but these measures not proving adequate to the necessities of the case, a commission was issued to the lord high admiral, sir Robert Mansel, sir Guildford Slingsby, sir Richard Bingley, and Peter Buck, esquire, (all officers of the navy,) calling upon them to take the whole subject into their consideration, and to report the result. Sir Robert Mansel took a prominent share in this investigation, and the report drawn up by the commissioners proves the earnestness with which they set about their laborious task, and the consummate ability they brought to bear upon it. The document is entitled "A Project for contracting the Charge of his Majesty's Navy." It exhibits the then actual state of the navy, the deficiencies of stores and means of reparation, the strength necessary for the efficient protection of the coasts and trade of the kingdom, and furnishes clear and succinct estimates of the expense of the desired improvements, with numerous suggestions for future regulation.

1604.

According to this report it appeared that the navy stood in need of supplies to the extent of 20,348*l.* 16*s.* for cordage, masts, anchors, canvas, sea-stores, seasoned planks and timbers, long-boats, pinnaces, and lighters. Supposing these necessary provisions supplied, the estimates of the annual charge of the whole navy were laid at 20,876*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* These estimates included the charges for maintaining the navy in harbour, with all incidental expenses, allowing four ships to be always employed for guarding the narrow seas, the Severn and

the coast of Ireland, and two ships for the western coast. All unnecessary waste was thus provided against, and, carefully descending into the minutest particulars affecting the preservation of the fleet, great pains were taken to ensure a sufficient force for all purposes. It is worthy of note that in these statements, which are remarkably comprehensive in substance upon all points to which they refer, scarcely any notice is taken of the naval arsenals at Plymouth and Portsmouth, which were established long before the time of king James. The grand depôt, which had supplanted all others, including Woolwich and Deptford, was Chatham, which appears to have been considered more convenient and less expensive. In reference to the ships employed for the service of Ireland and the Severn, the commissioners expressly ordered "that if any of them should prove soe defective, that she cannot continue, she be immediately brought about to Chatham, and another fitted out for that service." Even the guard-ship stationed in the Irish channel, says an intelligent naval writer, was ordered to repair, on the approach of winter, up to Bristol, instead of going round the land, a distance very little exceeding the former (Portsmouth and Plymouth), and where the vessel might have had the advantage of being refitted, if necessary, in a king's port.*

The result of these inquiries and suggestions was highly beneficial to the service. Greater uniformity was observed in the management and surveillance of ships, and several new vessels were built as occasion demanded. One of these has been frequently alluded to on account of its enormous size, being no less than twelve, or according to some authors, fourteen hundred tons burthen, and its gorgeous decorations which transcended all efforts in ship-building that had at that period ever been attempted. Stow gives the following account of this vessel, which was called the Prince Royal. "This year (1610) the king builded a most goodly ship for warre, the keel whereof was 114 feet in length, and the cross beam was

1610.

* Charnock's History of Marine Architecture, vol. ii.

44 feet in length: she will carry 64 pieces of ordnance, and is of the burthen of 1400 tons. This royal ship is double built, and is most sumptuously adorned, within and without, with all manner of curious carving, painting, and rich gilding, being in all respects the greatest and goodliest ship that ever was builded in England; and this glorious ship the king gave to his son Henry, prince of Wales; and the 24th September, the king, the queen, the prince of Wales, the duke of York, and the lady Elizabeth, with many great lords, went unto Woolwich to see it launched; but because of the narrowness of the dock it could not then be launched; whereupon the prince came the next morning by three o'clock, and then at the launching thereof the prince named it after his own dignity, and called it the Prince. The great workmaster in building this ship was master Phineas Pett, gentleman, some time master of arts at Emanuel College, Cambridge." The decorations of this sumptuous vessel were far more magnificent than any ever employed before or since; but its construction was still more remarkable, as exhibiting a vast improvement upon the ingenuity of preceding ages. "Were the absurd profusion of ornament," says Charnock, "with which the Royal Prince is decorated, removed, its contour or general appearance would not so materially differ from the modern vessel of the same size, as to render it an uncommon sight, or a ship in which mariners would hesitate at proceeding to sea in, on account of any glaring defect in its form, that their opinion might render it unsafe to undertake a common voyage in." *

The progress which was thus made in the art of ship-building contributed materially to the solid extension of the naval power of the kingdom; and during the latter years especially of his majesty's reign, such was the number of new vessels built, that, upon the whole, king James augmented the royal navy by one fourth. But in proportion as the royal navy increased,

* Charnock's History of Marine Architecture, vol. ii. An accurate and curious portrait of the Royal Prince is given in Charnock's work.

the commercial marine diminished. During the reign of Elizabeth, and the long war with Spain, English merchants were compelled for their own protection, as well as with a view to those rich prizes and adventures which were licensed alike by the government and the enterprising character of the age, to employ large ships adequately manned and armed; but after the death of the queen, and the peace that ensued, the merchants ceased to build ships for their own use, preferring to hire vessels from foreign countries for the transport of their goods. The rapid decline in the commercial marine which was precipitated by this narrow and short-sighted economy, attracted the serious attention of the corporation of the Trinity House, who petitioned the king upon the subject; but the merchants interposed and used all the influence they possessed to prevent the ministry from bringing in an act to prohibit the export of British commodities in foreign bottoms. The arrival, however, of two Danish vessels, belonging to Danish merchants resident in London, by bringing the actual advantages of ownership practically before them, produced a sudden conviction of the benefits that would accrue to them from becoming the carriers of their own goods; and the mercantile body now urged upon the government the very measure of prohibition they had recently denounced. The ardour exhibited in all quarters for the re-establishment of their former profitable usage speedily led to the creation of a powerful civil navy; and the rapid progress made in its formation may be inferred from the fact, that in 1615 there were not more than ten merchant vessels of two hundred tons burthen in the port of London, and in less than seven years afterwards there were no less than one hundred sail of ships belonging to Newcastle alone, each of which exceeded that tonnage.* Such was the advance made by the merchant service, that a vessel of ten hundred tons burthen was built for the East India

* Charnock's History of Marine Architecture.

Company; and the king, to signify his gratification at the circumstance, dined on board, and named the ship the Trades' Increase.

While, however, these striking improvements were growing up in the sea-ports, it was felt, and now became visible, that the general management of naval affairs under the earl of Nottingham's administration was neither as vigorous nor watchful as the early promise of the new reign had led the people to expect. The system still required a radical reformation. The commission issued in 1604 had not been acted upon with sufficient vigilance, nor was it comprehensive enough in the objects it embraced to satisfy the enlarging necessities of trade. The expences of the navy increased year after year, and an obvious want of uniform superintendence produced considerable confusion in that department, upon the judicious control of which the national prosperity mainly depended. That sir Robert Mansel had no participation in the abuses which had been suffered to creep into these affairs, his subsequent conduct, and the confidence reposed in him, sufficiently testify; but his position placed him in an embarrassing dilemma between the public and his patron. An inquiry was demanded into the naval administration of the country, and if he refused to oppose a measure which struck at the reputation of his friend, he must have incurred the imputation of abetting the enemies of that noble person. Flagrant corruptions had, no doubt, been introduced into the navy, especially amongst the inferior officers, who usurped powers that ought to have been wielded by their chiefs; and, although the motives of those who pressed for an investigation were not wholly free from suspicion, there was yet enough of culpability to justify their clamour on public grounds. But sir Robert was faithful to his friend in this trying exigency, and strongly advised him not to submit to the commission, which he regarded as an insult to his station and authority. For this piece of advice, which was, perhaps, more generous than wise, he was com-

1613. mitted to the Marshalsea in 1613, and imprisoned there for several months. In the mean while, the inquiry proceeded, a variety of extravagant and unwarrantable items of expenditure were detected, and upon the issue a considerable saving was effected to the country. The discovery of these abuses, and the new light which the commission had thrown upon the general subject of naval affairs, plainly betrayed the incapacity of the earl of Nottingham for the discharge of such responsible functions. He had in fact outlived his abilities; and sir Robert was now no less eager to rescue his patron from the risk of continuing in office, than he had previously been to defend him from external assaults. With his usual frankness, he accordingly recommended him to resign, pointing out the detriment to his own character as well as the public service which must inevitably follow his future administration under such adverse circumstances, and urging upon him the magnanimity of a sacrifice which was so strenuously required for the renovation of the service. The earl had the good sense to adopt this wholesome, but not very flattering counsel.

The vacancy which was thus made through his interference, sir Robert exerted himself to supply efficiently, and with that view applied to the duke of Buckingham* to accept the office. The duke objected on the plea of youth and inexperience; but sir Robert overruled his scruples by showing that, in time of peace, the best service which could be rendered to the navy was a diligent watchfulness of its condition, so as to keep it in constant repair, and always ready for action; a duty which required no previous experience, and in the fulfilment of which he would obtain all the knowledge necessary for his position in the event of war. The arrangements for the duke's appointment were speedily adjusted, the earl of Nottingham going out with a pension of 1000*l.* per annum, and a gift of 3000*l.* to

* It is to this nobleman that one of Purchas's quaint dedications of his "Pilgrims" is addressed.

the countess from the hands of his successor. Sir Robert Mansel, through the interest of the new lord high admiral, was immediately appointed (1616) vice-admiral for life. 1616.

Thus restored to office, he was enabled to effect more extensive reforms than any of his predecessors had even contemplated. At his suggestion was issued that famous commission in 1618, which placed the navy of England upon a securer basis than it had ever maintained before, and which terminated not only in the correction of numerous evils, but in the promulgation of an elaborate body of regulations for the government of the service, the sagacity of which was soon tested by the events that shortly afterwards gave so much employment to the British fleet*; and so effectively did he instruct 1618.

* The proceedings of this commission are extremely voluminous, but not less curious and important. They exhibit a complete view of the secret government of the navy, of its entire civil economy and internal management, and, tracing back every portion of the inquiry to its origin, they contain in fact, a comprehensive history of the institution from its foundation to the date of the report in 1618. The following passage, taken from the body of that document, displays in a short compass some of the leading abuses that prevailed in the general and particular administration of the affairs of the service:—

"To settle the execution of our propositions for the navy, three things may be considered:—

"The antient institution.

"The late innovation.

"The meanes of redress.

"The antient institution was briefly this:—

"1. The lord high admiral of England, receiving his directions from the king, governed the officers and services by his authority and warrants.

"2. The principal officers had their speciall duties, the treasurer for the moneys, the surveyors, one for the shipps, another for the victuals, the clerk of the navy for the workes and provisions, and the controller for all their accounts; and every one, for his daylie attendance to oversee and dispatch theire distinct business, had their fees, travailing charges, boat-hire, and clerkes, allowed by patent.

"3. The inferior officers had also their severall charges and trusts. One clerk of the stores received, issued, and accompted for all provisions in all places, and had no deputy allowed.

"Two clerkes of the checque, one at Deptford, and another at Chatham, kept journalls, or books of report, of the same receipts and issues, as well to charge and discharge the stores, and checque books of every man's place and attendance, to make bills and books of every man's due.

"Four principall masters governed the shippkeepers, and guided the shipps; three master-carpenters commanded the workmen, and directed the workes.

"Thus the officers were few, yet all was kept in order by their daylie attendance and continuall accompts.

"From this antient institution, the officers declyned long since by degrees,

the duke in the nature of the interests over which he was called upon to preside, that, upon his impeachment,

---

but of late by more confident and ordinary practice, and at last by a new booke of ordinances, signed by themselves and offered to the state.

"The innovations are these: —

"1. The principal officers now assume power to make and execute ordinances of their owne, to suppresse inferiours in their ordinary right, to enterprise things of weight and charge without warrant, to give arbitrary allowances, and raise unlawful fees

"2. They have changed their propper ministerial duties into generall duties of govourners or commissioners at large, all interesting themselves in all things of advantage, or preheminence, but none submitting himselfe to anything of service or accompt.

"3. They have to this end translated the trust and service of all their offices into clerkes, who receive, survey, allow, issue, dispose, execute all things, without charge, without accompt, without obligation on oath, and without creditt or estate, to answer their defaults.

"4. Thus the officers are raised above their own orbe, and the clerkes and the inferiours come into their roomes, and their places againe are subdivided and multiplyed into those of many new offices specifyed in our bookes; by all which means the king is overcharged, the services detracted, and the lord-admirall disparaged, by suffering old and new offices to bee now carried on by pattents for life, which formerly passed by his warrants, and but dureing pleasure, to keepe them in order and still under checque.

"And these be the true inward causes of decaying the navy, pointed at in our last and ninth reason, which, with the precedent eight outward causes, doe plainely demonstrate, that our propositions for restoreing the shipps cannot possibly bee performed by the officers or offices in the frame they are now exact: for though we still forbeare all personall taxation, yet the matter itselfe requireth a reducement of all their deviations to the antient right course.

"The last point then is this necessary reducement to the antient frame, the substance whereof may happily bee effected by a temporary ordinance with little more charge than is already made by the state, by the meanes which follow, wherein wee humbly desire to bee rightly understood, that wee offer our services only out of the zeale of our duty to our prince and country, without either interest or pretence

1. "By suspending, if it bee soe thought fitt by his majesty and his councell, those new and unnecessary (if not surreptitious) offices and patents, and restoareing to the lord high admirall his due and antient jurisdiction, soe as in the right line of order from above he may govern and direct all that is below.

"2. By enlarging the commission that already is on foote, giving power to the commissioners to put in execution their propositions for restoreing the navy, so soone as they shall bee allowed and ratified under the hand of the lord high admirall, and hee to acquaint his majesty therewithall.

"3. By establishing to that end the said commission, to bee for that time a commission of comptrollment of the shipps, soe as the said commissioners, or any three, or more of them, whereof A, B, or D to bee one, may doe and perform for his majesty's service in his marine causes, all and whatsoever the comptroller, or the other principall officers of the shipps, joyntly or severally might or ought to have done, and that whatsoever shall be done, allowed, directed, or ordered by them as aforesaid, shall bee of like force and effect, and as duely executed and observed as if the said officers, joyntly or severally, had done, allowed, directed, or ordered the same: and that all bookes, or bills for payments rated and signed by any foure of them, whereof A, B, or D to bee one, shall be sufficient warrants to the treasurer of the navy to make payment thereof, and to all auditors and officers whome it may concerne, to give allowance of the same upon his accompts.

his grace acquitted himself better in what related thereto, than in regard to any other article.* It ought to be observed, also, that he contrived this commission with so much tact that it was issued just before the earl of Nottingham retired from office, so that his patron acquired in the first instance whatever credit was likely to flow from its formation.

The commission sat at intervals for many years. The original warrant, directed to the earl of Nottingham and others, was dated 23d of June, 1618; it was renewed on the 12th February ensuing, addressed to the duke of Buckingham; confirmed by king Charles in March 1625; and re-organised by the same monarch in 1628. The results of its labours present a mass of information concerning the navy, which reflects infinite credit upon the industry and talents of the individuals who were employed in its collection.

Shortly after this commission was framed, the active services of the British fleet appear to have been called into requisition in consequence of numerous piracies

"4. By appointing two of us speciall commissioners for the building, repairing, and surveying shipps, and for their complete rigging and equipage, and for all manner of sea-stores, according to the rules prescribed in our bookes, and to indent with the boatswaines and carpenters, and to take all such surveys and accompts, and doe all things the surveyor of the navy, or his deputy, did or ought to have done, first acquainting the other commissioners, being advised or directed by them.

"5. By authorising the said commissioners to make choice of an able clerke as the lord admirall shall approve, both to attend the said commissioners to register their acts, to make warrants, bills, and bookes of controllments: and also, at other times, to attend the workes, and to find out and provide such supplys of all provisions as shall bee required, according to such directions as the said commissioners shall give.

"6. By requireing the said commissioners to sett down by generall advice such orders and rules for the good government of all inferiour officers, and particular directions of every part of the service, as shall bee further expedient, and the same to present to the lord admirall, to be considered and allowed as to his wisdome shall seeme meete.

"7. By continuing this commission during the terme appointed for the performance of the propositions in our booke, or else soe long as to his majesty shall seeme best. And if any of the said commissioners shall dye in the meane time, by substituting one in his roome, as his majesty upon the recommendation of the lord admirall shall approve. And after the execution of the said propositions, his majesty may bee pleased either to continue such a government hereafter, or againe reduce these temporary commissioners to settled officers, according to the first institution, if the experience of this time shew inconvenience in this frame."

* Campbell, vol. ii.

committed on English merchant vessels by the Algerines. According to a minute annexed to an historical report presented soon after the Restoration to the duke of York, the force intended for the chastisement of the pirates consisted of six king's ships with 1300 men, and fourteen merchant ships with 1200 men; and the command of the expedition was confided to sir Robert Mansel. But we possess no means of ascertaining the issue of this undertaking; and it is even doubtful whether the squadron ever put out to sea, since all the historians of the period are silent concerning it. There is no doubt, however, that such an expedition was actually planned, and that in 1620 a still more formidable armament actually did proceed against Algiers under the command of sir Robert Mansel. This armament consisted of six king's ships and twelve vessels hired from the merchants, the former ranging from 400 to 600 tons burthen, and the latter from 100 to 300 tons. The real grounds of this expedition have never been satisfactorily explained. It is asserted by some writers, that count Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador at the court of London, obtained so great an ascendancy over the king's mind, that he easily persuaded him to fit out this fleet for the purpose of acting against the enemies of Spain; while, according to other authorities, it was a project that had been long before contemplated by the earl of Nottingham, and taken up by the duke of Buckingham at the instance of sir Robert Mansel. But, whoever was the author of the scheme, little can be said in its justification; for a more unnecessary expenditure was rarely incurred before or since, and a more ludicrous spectacle never was exhibited at sea than this fleet presented. Having left in England on the 12th October, the squadron cast anchor in Algier road on the 27th November, saluting the town, but without receiving a single gun in reply. The next day, the admiral sent a white flag ashore to announce the object that brought him there, and received a very civil answer to the effect, that the viceroy had orders from

1620.

the Grand Seignior, to treat the English with respect and hospitality, and that if they desired to land, they should have any provisions they wanted. A tedious negociation ensued, betraying no little distrust and chicanery at both sides; the Turks refusing to suffer the gentlemen who conveyed the white flag on shore to return to the ships, unless a consul was left in the town, and the admiral sending a common seaman dressed in good clothes to represent a consul. This equivocal masquerade succeeded. The Turks delivered up forty slaves, and promised to comply with the other demands of the English. But provisions at this juncture falling short, the whole fleet set sail for the Spanish coast. The only incident throughout these proceedings, of which Purchas gives us an exact daily narrative, that deserves particular mention, was the arrival of six Spanish vessels, the admiral of which upon joining the English squadron, "struck his flag and saluted our admiral with small shot and ordnance;" which seems, says a modern commentator, "to have been the greatest honour, and, perhaps, the greatest advantage, too, that attended the whole expedition."* Having replenished themselves at Gibraltar, it was resolved that the fleet should make another descent upon Algiers in the spring, for the purpose of burning the ships in the mole; apparently indifferent to the fate of the unfortunate sailor, who was all this time acting the part of British consul amongst the Turks. Arriving at their destination towards the conclusion of May, they prepared to put their intention into execution. The manner in which it was proposed to accomplish the conflagration was by the help of two Turkish vessels they had captured, and which were now filled with "great store of fire-works." The account of this transaction is eminently characteristic of the labour in vain by which the entire expedition was pre-eminently distinguished.

1621.

"There was layd in them plentie of dry wood, wood

* Campbell—who falls into the mistake of describing these Spanish ships as French men of war.

of ocham, pitch, rozen, tarre, brimstone, and other materials, fit to take fire; they had likewise in them chaines, and grapnels of iron to fasten themselves to the ships which they were to fire: they had also boats to bring off their men when they had fired the ships: then were there, three brigandines fitted with fire-bals, buckets of wild-fire, and fire pikes to make their fire-workes fast unto the ships: there was a gun-lod filled with fire-workes, chaines, and grapnels of iron; she was to goe into the midest of the ships in the mould, where fastening her to some ship she was to be set on fire. Shee had likewise a boat with her to bring off her men. Likewise, there were seven boates which wec called boats of rescue, well filled with armed men, who were to rescue and relieve the boats of execution, if they should chance to be pursued by other boats or gallies at their coming off. These had also fire-works in them, to fire the ships which rode without the mould: these boats being all aboord, the admiral sent for most of the captains and masters in the fleete to advise whether it were fit to attempt it with boats and brigantines, in regard it was little wind, and that westerly, so that it was impossible for the ships to get in. After some deliberation, it was concluded, that it was not fit, for that the surest and most certaine meanes of firing was by the ships which were to bee made fast to the shippes in the mould, and to burn with them. Whereupon it was deferred for that time till a fitter opportunitie was offered. The two and twentieth at night, there were like preparations made, but deferred for like reason. The three and twentieth in the beginning of the night we had a fresh gale of wind at south by south-west, continuing the space of two houres or more, with thunder, lightening, and some drops of raine: the two ships weighed, and with the brigantines and boats set forwards towards the mould, but the wind shifting before they came neare, they were forced also to give over for that night.

"The four and twentieth at night after a great showre of raine, we had the wind out of the bay at south-

south-west; the weather then clearing up, both the ships and boats advanced themselves towards the mould, as before they had done: but coming within less than musket-shot of the mould's head it fell calme, so that the ships could by no meanes get in, the boats and brigantines finding that they were discovered, by reason of the brightness of the moone, which was then at full, and hearing it reported by a Christian captive, which did swimme from the towne the night before to the ships, that the Turks had left their ships without guard, saving one or two in a ship, as fearing no such attempt from us. And moreover, hearing the alarum given to the towne by those which kept watch on the walls, with good resolution went on, but wanting wind to nourish and disperse the fire, the fire-workes tooke no effect at all. In this service were only sixe men slaine outright, four or five dangerously hurt (which not long after dyed), and some thirteen sleightly hurt, yet notwithstanding the attempt was given under the wals of the towne, where both small shot and ordnance played continually upon them; the hurt done our men was their comming off, for that they were got into the mould before the towne was risen, and being in, the shippes in the mould defended them both from small shot and ordnance of the towne, our boates still keeping the shippes between them and the towne." *

Thus ended this remarkable expedition, for, after being cast "to and fro" by the wind for a few days, the admiral thought it advisable to put to sea, and arrived in England in the following month. The ridicule cast upon the undertaking had the effect of exposing our commerce to fresh insults and assaults; and the severest censures were passed upon all parties concerned. Sir William Monson complains that the fleet lost the opportunity which offered itself of "destroying those hellish pirates," and openly asserts, that, "besides their going and coming, they spent not twenty days at sea whilst they continued in the straits, but retired into harbour,

* Purchas, 885, 886.

where the pirates might find them, but not they the pirates. This ill-carried action was a sufficient subject of scorn for all nations to laugh at, considering the reputation this realm had gained in their former expeditions by sea: and yet the chief actors in that voyage, like men naturally given to excuse their errors, gave out to justify themselves, and it was afterwards believed by all men, that the want of authority, and their limited commission, was the cause of their ill-success."* Mansel's defence of his own conduct may, notwithstanding, be admitted as explanatory to a certain extent, of the causes of his failure. He complained that there was not a sufficient latitude left to his own discretion, that the disappointment of a supply of provisions at the expected time seriously embarrassed his operations, and that he found it impossible to effect any decisive movement where so many raw and inexperienced officers were employed in the fleet through the favour of courtiers. These statements remained uncontradicted, and we are bound to accept them on the veracity of the distinguished officer who put them forward; and if they do not altogether acquit him of the discredit of the failure, they considerably diminish his personal responsibility.

After this unfortunate affair, sir Robert Mansel never took any active part in the public service. He continued to hold his office of vice-admiral, but latterly it seems to have become a sinecure, for he resided at Greenwich, and was out of favour both with Buckingham and the court. He lived to a great age, and witnessed the breaking out of the civil wars. His reputation, however, stood so high in the reign of king Charles, and his knowledge of his profession was esteemed to be so extensive, that sir John Pennington recommended him to that monarch in 1642 as the properest person to seize the fleet for his majesty's service. It was supposed that his great influence with the seamen would overpower the authority of the parliament. But his majesty set aside the application on

1642.

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, vol. iii. p. 235.

the ground that the admiral's advanced period of life, and the physical infirmities attendant upon it, might render the attempt hazardous, expressing at the same time his high opinion of sir Robert's courage and integrity.*

The precise date of sir Robert Mansel's death is not recorded; but it must have taken place shortly after the commencement of hostilities between the king and the parliament. The latter years of his life were devoted to retirement. All his biographers accord to him the character of an honest man and an able officer; and the great improvements introduced into the navy during the period of his administration under the duke of Buckingham, to the credit of which he is in a great degree entitled, prove that he was intimately acquainted with the wants of the service to which he belonged.

* Clarendon, Hist. of the Rebellion.

SIR WILLIAM MONSON.

1569—1642.

THE principal events of the life of Sir William Monson are related by himself in a series of tracts, which are valuable not only for the autobiographical materials they contain, but for their felicitous illustrations of naval history, and the curious criticisms, suggestions, and descriptions with which they abound. In tracing his career, we shall constantly have occasion to refer to these papers; and, as they are equally rare and important, we shall avail ourselves as largely of them as the general scheme of these memoirs will permit.

1569 The family of sir William Monson appear to have long held their seat at the village of South Carlton in Lincolnshire, where he was born in 1569. He was the third son of sir John Monson. At an early age, he entered Baliol College, Oxford, where he remained about two years, when the excitement of the war with Spain, just then commenced by queen Elizabeth, determined his disposition in the choice of a profession. His natural temper inclined him to the sea, which presented so many allurements to his passionate and restless youth; and, being resolved to have a share in the scenes which, at that period, filled the imaginations of the people with dreams of glory and conquest, he threw up his studies, and, without making any communication of his intentions to his father or mother, volunteered into the service. At this time he was only sixteen years of age. "I put myself," he tells us, 1585. "into an action by sea, where there was in company of us two small ships, fitted for men-of-war, that authorised us by commission to seize upon the subjects of the king of Spain; then made I the sea my profession, being led to it by the wildness of my youth."*

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 225.

The first adventure he fell in with was an encounter with a "strong and obstinate ship of Holland, who refused to strike his flag, or show his socket." The Dutch vessel had an English pilot on board, through whom the communication was held, without any appearance of hostile intentions. But the master of the privateer, finding himself close to the Dutch ship, affected great alarm, lest he should come foul of her, and cried aloud to the man at the helm to post the helm, desiring him at the same time in an under-tone of voice to put his helm a-star-board; while he called aloud to the English pilot with great vehemence to bear up, for by this time the vessels were nearly foul. "The Hollanders," says Monson, "thought all we said was true and every one of them put their helping hand to keep off our ship with oars and fenders, not apprehending our intention; and when we saw their people thus employed and not to have time to take arms, we suddenly boarded, entered and took her by this stratagem."* This exploit dazzled the imagination of the young sailor, and he speaks of it afterwards in his old age with evident satisfaction, setting it down in his list of "stratagems to be used at sea."

Recording the subsequent events of this voyage, he boasts of having been an actor "at the taking of the first Spanish prize;" and, considering that the vessel in which he sailed was merely a privateer, and that the engagement was one of the most fiercely contested on record, he had abundant reason to congratulate himself upon having escaped alive out of the peril. The privateer came up with a vessel of Biscay of 300 tons burthen, off the coast of Spain, in the month of September. The Spaniard refusing to strike when she was hailed by the English, the gallant crew prepared to board her, notwithstanding the disparity of their strength. In the midst of the struggle the sea rose to such a height that those who yet remained behind in the privateer were compelled to ungrapple, and leave

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 460.

their comrades who had got on board the enemy to their fate. Monson was amongst the latter. This brave handful of men fought the whole night from eight o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock the next morning at fearful odds, nor can it be very easily comprehended how either party under such circumstances sustained themselves. At last, the Spaniards attempted to blow up the decks where the Englishmen all throughout maintained their stand, but they were prevented by fire-pikes; and, finding this last resource defeated, they surrendered after a sanguinary and uninterrupted contest of eleven hours. The loss was great on both sides, and when the sun shone upon the deck of the prize, it discovered a melancholy spectacle of the dead and dying. "I dare say," observes Monson, "that in the whole time of the war there was not so rare a manner of fight, or so great a slaughter of men."*

Any youth of a less ardent temperament might have been appalled by so unpropitious an opening to a life of hardships; but it only confirmed Monson in his resolution. The honour of sharing in a capture which was purchased so valiantly gave an increased impulse to his spirit; and having now, it is to be presumed, reconciled his friends to the step he had taken, we find him commanding a vessel in 1587, on which occasion he tells us he had two pinnaces and one Spanish frigate with him.† This was an extraordinary advance in two years, from the condition of a volunteer at 10*s.* per month wages, to the rank of captain before he had completed his eighteenth year. Such unprecedented promotion can hardly be referred altogether to his abilities, as they could scarcely have been sufficiently ripened for the responsible duties of commanding a ship at so early an age. Nor does it appear that his experience at sea justified his sudden elevation, for, with the exception of his adventures on board the privateer, he had no opportunity of acquiring any prac-

1587.

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 225. † Ib. 456.

tical knowledge. It must be inferred, therefore, that the influence of his family anticipated the rewards of his merit, and placed him at once in a position which enabled him to achieve the greatness for which he yearned.

It seems, however, that the practice of appointing captains in those days was not always regulated by the fitness of the individuals, although unlimited powers were granted to them in the ships they commanded. "The captains," says Monson, "in queen Elizabeth's time were gentlemen of worth and means, maintaining their diet at their own charge." * But there were two kinds of captains, those who served under the patent of the sovereign, and those who served in what were called ships of reprisal. The former, holding their commissions direct from the sovereign, were selected for particular ships by the general or admiral, and acted under his orders; the latter were of inferior authority, because their commission was not issued by letters patent, but were taken out of the court of admiralty. "In this quality," says Monson, "any man may make himself a captain, if he put in the security aforesaid." † The difference between the two classes was marked by still broader distinctions. The authority of the former was paramount over all the officers subordinate to him. He was responsible only to the admiral, and made choice of all the officers, except the master, who was appointed by the Trinity House. He had the power, upon any just cause, of displacing any inferior officer, except the master, who was charged with the safe conduct of the ship from port to port, and "to and fro at sea" as the captain might direct; but if the master should commit any offence during the voyage, he might stop his wages until the matter were heard before a tribunal of officers, or the lord admiral himself, if the offence were criminal. The captain also possessed lawful authority to punish misdemeanours committed within the ship, or, in the event of a mutiny, he might apply

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 307. † Ibid. 308.

to the admiral, who would inflict death, if it were merited, a sentence beyond the jurisdiction of the captain. In the other class, the captains had a similar right of appointment of their own subordinates, but had no power of control over them. "This captain," observes Monson, "after a ship is furnished, is to make choice of his master, officers, and company; and though he be styled the captain, yet do they not use to obey him so strictly as him that has power from a general, as I have said before, for they receive no pay whereby to oblige them, but every one goes upon his own adventure; and therefore they will tie the captain to the same conditions in his diet, or his part of any goods taken, as themselves. His authority is little better than the captain in a pirate; for the interest and division of goods are alike, only that this captain has commission to take from an enemy, and a pirate takes without commission, and makes all the world his enemies." *

We are justified, probably, in inferring that it was in a vessel of this description Monson made his second voyage, although he bears testimony to the fact, that men were frequently advanced to the rank of captains in the royal service, who were utterly ignorant of the duties they undertook to discharge, relying upon the skill of the master, instead of being able to control and direct him. "The captain," says Monson, "ought to have experience and ability, by his art and skill, to control his master, if he do amiss, or else his master may willingly commit such an error as will cast a disgrace upon his captain. These latter times have advanced captains, who only take upon them that name, holding it a maxim, that they need not experience, but refer themselves to the direction of a master. I must say, that the generals who place such captains are very careless of their master's service, and forgetful of their own rising from the degree of a soldier to a general, and the mischiefs that ensue upon it; nay, I will say, that such a general is improvident of his master's profits;

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 308.

for if a master should direct a captain, and have the managing of the charge committed to him, why should a prince allow ten shillings a day to a captain, when a master can execute the place of both captain and master for his bare allowance ?" *

Monson's second expedition was hardly less desperate than his first. Being kept out longer at sea than he had calculated upon — a circumstance which may be fairly ascribed to his inexperience — he was reduced to the extremity of distress for want of provisions, and, returning home from the Canary Islands, was nearly shipwrecked in Dingle Bay on the coast of Ireland. The master, however, discovered a little rock called the Crow, and guiding his course by it, brought the half-famished mariners safely into harbour. "Here I received," says Monson, "two lives from God. The one was the escape from shipwreck, the other from famine ; for when we were safely arrived we took view of our bread : other victuals we had none, and we had divided to every man his proportion of bread a fortnight before, and found but six biscuit cakes amongst our whole crew, fifty men or more." † He might have added to this providential deliverance the fact of his singular good fortune in escaping the second voyage of the privateer in which he made his first essay, and which, on her homeward course from a successful cruise, was swallowed up by the sea, when every soul on board perished.

Up to this time Monson had not distinguished himself in any remarkable way ; but he had seen some rough service, and braved some of the worst perils of a sea-faring life. His zeal was his highest recommendation, and, although his opportunities were as yet limited, the intelligence and energy he displayed procured him rapid promotion. We now find him on board a king's ship, the Charles, acting under the orders of the captain ; but in the ensuing year he accompanied the earl of Cumberland in his expedition to the Azores, in the capacity of vice-admiral. Here he rendered

1588.

1589.

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 307. † Ibid. 467.

good service at Fayal, but was again exposed to the peril of his life, for it seemed to be his strange fortune throughout these adventures to be placed in perpetual risk of death, and yet to survive the most imminent dangers. The vessels were reduced to great distress from scarcity of water, while cruising amongst the Azores, and the men began to clamour tumultuously, demanding their return to England. In this difficulty a goodly spout was seen issuing out of the cliffs of one of the islands, and the earl of Cumberland, finding no man so heartily true to him as Monson, conjured him to take a small boat rowed with three oars and one man to steer, to ascertain what the spout yielded. While Monson was rowing towards the shore to fulfil this hazardous commission, a great whale was discerned from the ship lying with his back upon the water asleep. Supposing it to be a rock, and considering it dangerous to bear nearer to the land, the vessel tacked about to sea, leaving Monson to the mercy of the waves. "I had no sooner," he continues, "set my foot ashore, but it began to be dark with night and fog, and to blow, rain, thunder, and lighten, in the cruelest manner that I have seen. There was no way for me to escape death, but to put myself to the mercy of the sea; neither could I have any great hope of help in life, for the ship was out of sight, and there only appeared a light upon the shrouds to direct me."* Fortunately, there was a gunner on board, who was a countryman of Monson's, and who prevailed upon his lordship to forbear filling the sails for one hour longer. This afforded the boat a little more time to struggle; but being still out of sight of the ship, all chance of rescue was hopeless. They fired a musket, and in this charge the last of their powder was expended. If it failed to reach the ship, all hope was at an end. But the distant flash was seen through the fog, and the report of the shot indicated from whence it came. "We were preserved," he adds, "rather by miracle than any human art. And to make

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 468.

it the more strange, we were no sooner risen from our seats, and ropes in our hands to enter the ship, but the boat immediately sunk." *

Such startling narratives seem almost incredible; and in this recital, the truthful simplicity of which raises it above suspicion, we have an extraordinary accumulation of fortuitous incidents, each of which in succession appears more terrible than the last. But the horrors of this voyage did not terminate with this wonderful instance of preservation. The subsequent sufferings of the crew were still more calamitous. "The extremity we endured," says Monson, "was more terrible than befel any ship in the eighteen years' war; for, laying aside the continual expectation of death by shipwreck and the daily mortality of our men, I will speak of our famine that exceeded all men and ships I have known in the course of my life. For sixteen days together we never tasted a drop of drink, either beer, wine, or water; and though we had plenty of beef and pork of a year's salting, yet did we forbear eating it, for making us the drier Many drank salt-water, and these that did died suddenly; and the last words they usually spake was 'Drink, drink, drink!' and I dare boldly say that of 500 men that were in that ship seven years before, at this day there is not a man alive but myself and one more." † At last they made the coast of Ireland, at a place within five miles of Dingle Bay, where Monson had so short a time before nearly suffered shipwreck: with some difficulty they obtained a horse for the earl of Cumberland; and Monson and others followed him on foot to the house of the sovereign or mayor. On their arrival they found his lordship telling the mayor of his strange adventures, and of his dangerous escape of famishing for want of drink. "The sovereign told his lordship," says Monson, "that about two years before, a gentleman came into the port in as

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 469.
† Ibid. The Naval Tracts from which these papers are taken, were written by sir William Monson between forty and fifty years after these occurrences took place.

great a want of meat as his lordship was of drink; and even as he was repeating my name, I entered the door, when my lord took me by the hand, and said, *lupus est in fabulâ*. They beheld me with admiration, and told my lord it was my fortune that brought him thither, and held themselves happy that it was in their power to give him relief, as they had done the like to me before."* This was the gladdening sunshine after the storm.

1590. The illness occasioned by these sufferings affected Monson's health so seriously that for a whole year he was obliged to forego the labours of his profession; but as soon as he found himself again able to resume them, he joined the earl of Cumberland in his expedition to Spain, on board her majesty's ship Garland, which, with 1591. seven other vessels, left England in May 1591. Having arrived safely off the coast of Spain, a dead calm set in, and the admiral being distressed for intelligence, Monson entered the ship's boat and rowed after two caravels they descried at a distance of two or three leagues. He promptly succeeded in taking one of them, but the other in the meanwhile escaped. In these circumstances he had recourse to one of those stratagems of which he was so fertile a master. Taking out some of the men on board the captured caravel and manning her with his own company, he sent her after her consort, taking his own boat back to the ship. The device was completely triumphant. The fugitive, believing the prize discharged, was easily entrapped and seized. But Monson merely wanted information, and having obtained it dismissed them both. This act of generosity soon afterwards stood him in good stead; for being left in charge of a ship laden with spices that had been taken from the Dutch, he was attacked by six gallies, and after a valiant resistance made prisoner by the Spaniards: when he found that the favourable report of the kindness he had shown to the caravels procured him better usage than had been extended to any other prisoner throughout

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 469.

the war. His good fortune deserted him on this occasion; and the fortunate mariner who had escaped so many serious perils now found himself a captive on board the galleys at Cascaes. All the other prisoners were exchanged, and he was kept as a hostage.

During the gloomy period that ensued his mind was as active as ever, and he was constantly making such observations as circumstances allowed, to enable him whenever he should obtain his freedom, to take advantage of the peculiar situation of the place. Amongst other plans of retaliation that occurred to him was the seizure of the prince cardinal Albert, who was then viceroy of Portugal. Perceiving that the cardinal used to pass down to a country-house called Cintra, about the beginning of September, where he annually spent some time in devotion, he bethought him of a scheme for surprising that dignitary. He proposed to get two or three ships of war to anchor before Cintra, which is seated on a hill, about two miles from the sea, and then landing silently in the middle of the night about 100 men with firelocks, to surround the house, seize the prince, and carry him down to the ships. The plan was easy enough of execution, but no opportunity afterwards offered for carrying it into effect.

From Cascaes Monson was removed to the Tagus, and here a means of escape opened to him, which was unluckily frustrated by an unforeseen circumstance. While the gallies rode in the harbour, the master of a Dutch ship, who spoke good English, chanced to come on board the galley where he was confined, and greatly commiserating his misfortunes, offered to conceal him on board his vessel, if he could only compass his escape. Monson, relying upon the honesty of the man who was a Brazilian by birth, was not idle in devising a plan by which he could accomplish so desirable an object. He accordingly wrote a letter, directed to the rest of the prisoners, in which he declared that he could no longer endure his captivity, and that he chose rather to end his

life by drowning himself, wishing them to signify so much to his friends in England. Having thus far prepared the way, he intended one night, "when all things were whist and silent in the galley," to effect his escape by stealing secretly into the ladder at the ebb tide, and dropping into the water, without moving hand or foot till he was clear out of view, to swim to the Dutch ship which lay just in the wake of the galley. All this might have been done without exciting notice or suspicion; but, just as his stars would have it, the gallies were ordered out to sea the day before he intended to put his stratagem into execution, and when they returned the friendly Brazilian was gone.

While he remained on board the gallies a conspiracy, hatched by an Italian, to arm the slaves against the soldiery was discovered to the general. The Italian confessed his guilt, and was condemned to death. The manner of his execution was not unlike one of the old Roman punishments. His arms and legs were severally tied to the sterns of four galleys, and he was quartered by the action of rowing them in four different directions. Sir William Monson, with his usual sagacity, denounces the absurdity of the plot.

"If this Italian," he observes, "had had the wit of an Italian, he would not thus have played the fool; for he might well know that where so many men were to be trusted, as were in a galley, it could not choose but be revealed; the slaves consisting of so many nations, and the trespasses being so different, some condemned for life, others for years more or less, and any one revealing it was able to purchase his own liberty and reward. Or suppose they had prevailed in their design, the rest of the galleys had been able to have mastered them; or if not, they had been destitute of victuals to sustain them, not having so much water, for every second day they used to fetch their water from the shore; or though all those I have spoken of had been no impediment to them, yet there had been no place to have fled to but some port of

France, no nearer them than seven or eight hundred miles."*

He also relates some remarkable circumstances that occurred to the captain of the vice-admiral, or general of the gallies, about the same time. This captain was a churlish, ill-tempered fellow, and had acted with rudeness and severity to Monson when he was made prisoner, depriving him, without warning or explanation, of the services of his page, whom he sent into a remote part of Spain, intending that he should never return to England. But through the liberal assistance of a fellow-countryman who resided in that part of the country, Monson recovered his servant, and afterwards had the satisfaction of raising him to the rank of captain in the war against the Spaniards. The ill-conditioned Spanish captain, by a curious train of incidents, received in the end a just punishment for his conduct on this occasion. He had a Moor in his service who used to attend him at table, and who was so diligent and faithful that he obtained the entire confidence of his master. It happened one day that this Moor was sent on shore to wash the captain's linen (an employment in which the Moors are said to have exceeded the women), having in his possession at the time one hundred crowns belonging to his master, which, together with other monies and plate, had been committed to his charge. While he was on shore, he was tempted by some companions to play, and lost the whole of the money. The captain no sooner discovered what had taken place than he put the Moor into chains, and committed him to his former slavery in the gallies. Nor was his vindictive passion satisfied with this; but he inflicted upon him a cruel punishment, usually applied only to malefactors, so that the unfortunate Moor was for a long time unable to stand or walk. In the course of time, however, the captain being again in want of his services, released him from bondage, and took him to wait upon him as usual. But the Moor had not forgotten his ill-usage, and secretly determined to watch his own oppor-

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 465.

tunity of taking a terrible revenge, carefully dissembling his purpose in the meanwhile, by all necessary show of obedience.

"At his usual hour in the morning," continues the narrator, "he repaired to get up his captain, but provided all things for his purpose; as first, a cross-bar to keep down the scuttle; and being below, he provided himself with powder, fire, match, and other necessaries, which he placed in the outward room, and suddenly rushed into his captain's cabin with a naked dagger in his hand, to whom he gave eight stabs, making account he had slain him; but hearing a noise without, he left the captain, and betook himself to a gentleman who cried out for help; which being done, he put the match to the train he had prepared, and set the galley on fire, which he leapt into and burnt himself to ashes; but by the help of the other galleys that rid near her, they suddenly boarded her, saved all her slaves, and the captain who was not quite dead; but what else was in her was all consumed — a rare example of revenge from a heathen to a Christian; and though the captain and he differed in religion, yet not much in condition and perverse natures."*

When this tragedy was consummated, the captain was called to account for the loss of the galley, occasioned by the ill-treatment of his slave, and would have been disgraced and punished were it not for the influence of the general. But his misfortunes were not yet quite over, for he was shortly afterwards robbed by another Moor, who fled with two Spanish soldiers who incited him to the theft. The fugitives had no sooner arrived in safety at the opposite side of the river than the soldiers slew the Moor, possessed themselves of the money, and were never heard of afterwards.

In the month of September, when the galleys are ordinarily laid up in harbour for the winter, Monson and his fellow-captives were removed to the castle of Lisbon. The treatment to which he was now subjected appears to

* Monson's Tracts in Churchill, iii. 465, 466.

have been rigorous in the last degree. The prisoners were kept in close confinement, being guarded even when they were taken to the castle walls in the morning, and limited to an allowance of 7½d. *per diem*, which was less than 3d. according to the rate of things in England. Here one morning, looking down upon the river from the walls of the castle, he saw a sumptuous galleon, the St. Andrew, sailing up the stream with all her bravery, and being struck by the sight, he laid a wager of one to ten that if he lived he would be at the taking of that triumphant vessel. It was a mere idle passing remark; but strangely enough, in five years afterwards, in the expedition against Cadiz under the earl of Essex, it was his extraordinary fortune to redeem his pledge, and capture that very galleon.

The whole term of his imprisonment lasted two years. Once, during that time, he nearly accomplished his escape, by a plan laid with a Portuguese fellow-prisoner, an emissary of Don Antonio, one of the claimants on the throne of Portugal: but through the treachery of the Englishman whom he was obliged to employ as an interpreter, his hopes were frustrated, and his life would probably have been forfeited, were it not that the letter, containing his secret application to Lord Burleigh, and which for better security he had hidden in the shoes of the page who was to convey it, was completely obliterated by a shower of rain. The page was seized on the information given by the English traitor, but the evidence of the plot having been thus destroyed, no further steps were taken in the matter.

He was placed, however, in serious jeopardy by assisting in turn to forward the escape of the Portuguese emissary. This man was condemned to death, and shortly before the day appointed for the execution of the sentence, he contrived, with the help of Monson, to effect his object, passing through the centinels in the disguise of a soldier, and then lowering himself from the walls by means of a rope. His flight was no sooner discovered, than a guard was placed upon Monson, who

was accused of having abetted him. The next morning he was taken before the judge. But neither threats nor promises of liberty could induce him to confess. He pleaded that he was a prisoner of war, that he was subject to the law of honour and arms, and that it was lawful for him to seek his freedom; he urged the improbability of holding such intercourse as was imputed to him with one whose language he did not understand; and he concluded by cautioning them to be wary what violence they offered him, as he had friends in England, and was of a nation that could and would revenge his wrongs. These arguments succeeded; but during the remainder of his imprisonment he was closely watched, nor did the authorities, who had too much reason to mistrust him, scruple to lay traps in the hopes of ensnaring him into some new scheme.*

1593. Being at last delivered from prison, he again joined the earl of Cumberland, as captain of the Golden Lion, a queen's ship, wherein the earl served as admiral. His fidelity to that nobleman appears to have prevailed over his better judgment, for even at this period he had some reason to suspect the sincerity of his lordship's friendship. But Monson was himself of a nature too open and manly to entertain, without ample cause, any doubts of the truth of others; and dismissing all such feelings he cheerfully followed him upon this occasion. In the course of the voyage, the admiral took a dozen Spanish hulks freighted with powder, and, standing out to sea with one half of them, left the remainder with Monson to examine and rummage. Towards night the admiral cast off the hulks he had taken with him, which immediately made towards their consorts, over which Monson had been placed in guard with only a small ship and a long-boat with fifty men. This proceeding seemed very strange to Monson, who soon discovered that the hulks intended to attack him. Resistance under such circumstances would have been fruitless, and when he found

* The narrative of the escape and subsequent fortunes of Fernandez the Portuguese above referred to will be found in vol. III. p. 15—17.

the enemy boarding him on one side of the vessel, he leaped into the long-boat on the other side, receiving a hurt in his leg which continued to affect him to the last day of his life. * * *

The conduct of the earl of Cumberland in this affair admits of no reasonable or satisfactory explanation; for although it is difficult to believe that he really released the hulks with an intention of abandoning Monson to the consequences, yet it is still more difficult otherwise to account for so extraordinary a proceeding. Monson however bore it without repining, and instead of exhibiting any resentment to the earl, he ventured his life in the homeward voyage to preserve that of his commander, which he says he valued as much as his own. The earl was seized with some melancholy sickness, which could be relieved only by the milk of a cow. Monson undertook to go ashore on the island of Corvo, then in the possession of the Portuguese, for the purpose of procuring a cow by foul or fair means. Carrying with him a flag of truce, and bespeaking the hospitality of the islanders by fair words, he was generously entertertained, staying on shore all night, and carrying a cow and "other refreshments" aboard the next morning. "This cow," he adds, "in all likelihood was the saving of my lord's life for the present, which he acknowledged.*

In the following year, resting from his toils, he was created Master of Arts at Oxford; and in 1595 he married the widow of a Mr. Smith. But he evidently had no view to his own ease in this alliance, as, before his marriage, he gave a promise to the earl of Cumberland that he would attend him in his next voyage, which took place immediately after, as his vice-admiral. The earl sailed in a brave ship of his own building, called the Malice Scourge, and Monson in the Allsides, "a goodly ship of the merchants." The perfidy of the earl was now plainly developed for the first time. Having drawn Monson into his service by "sweet words and promises," and proceeded with him to Plymouth,

1595.

* Monson, 470.

and from thence eight or nine leagues to sea towards the Spanish coast, he suddenly left his ship, and, without holding any communication with his vice-admiral, appointed another captain to take the command of the vessel. So gross an indignity as this proved too much even for the tranquil temper of Monson, who, deeply offended, abandoned the company at sea, and took to his own adventure; a step which bred a quarrel between them that was not appeased for many years. The incidents of the subsequent voyage are scanty. The only enemy he encountered were the storms, which drove him to Spain before the sea, between Gallicia and Brittany, a position of considerable peril. He was compelled to cut away his mainmast by the board, and in that condition to bear for England as well as he could. The vessel was raked fore and aft, and he looked for nothing but foundering. Happily, however, he made Plymouth in safety, and just as news arrived that four Spanish galleys had appeared on the coast and sacked the village of Penzance. Drake happened to be in Plymouth at the time, preparing for that fatal West Indian expedition in which he afterwards lost his life. He and Monson instantly put to sea, but when they arrived in Cornwall there was no trace of the Spaniards, who had already taken their departure.

1596. Monson's next service was in the expedition to Cadiz, when he commanded the Repulse, under the earl of Essex. Throughout the whole of this affair, which was not less remarkable for the courage than the skill with which it was conducted, Monson acted a conspicuous part. If his advice had been followed, the ships in the harbour would have been taken, instead of having been for the most part destroyed; and then, as he observes, "being brought to England, they would be always before men's eyes there, and put them in mind of the greatness of the exploit." But it must be allowed on the other hand that the destruction of the fleet, which amounted to the value of six or seven millions, seriously impoverished the whole country.

The conquest was complete and overwhelming. "The king of Spain," says Monson, "never received so great an overthrow, and so great an indignity at our hands as this; for our attempt was at his own home, in his own port that he thought as safe as his chamber, where we took and destroyed his ships of war, burnt and consumed the wealth of his merchants, sacked his city, ransomed his subjects, and entered his country without impeachment." *

It having been determined in the first instance to surprise the ships, Monson was sent on board the Admiral to devise the manner in which the service was to be undertaken. He was afterwards sent in the boat of the Repulse to take possession of the great galleons, and was subsequently, together with sir Anthony Ashley, commissioned to convey instructions to the Admiral to seize upon the merchant vessels, lest they should attempt to convey away their wealth, or effect its destruction. And when the earl of Essex, forgetful of the tender wishes of the queen, who especially desired that he should be careful of his life, penetrated, sword in hand, to the market-place of the town, we find Monson, as usual, in the front of the danger. And here his usual good fortune once more befriended him. "My lord of Essex," he says, "having made way through the town, at length came to the spacious market-place, where he found the greatest and sharpest resistance from the houses thereabouts, that sorely flanked him, which way soever he passed or looked, and one house more than the rest seemed most dangerous; whereupon I desired my lord to spare me fifty old soldiers of the Low Countries, to give an assault upon that house, which his lordship granted, and I performed, and took it. In that conflict I was shot with a musket-bullet through my scarf and breeches; and the handle and pummel of my sword shot from my side, without any further hurt. As I stooped for the handle and pummel of my sword, sir John Wingfield

* Monson, 171.

who was next to me on horseback, had received a hurt in his thigh a little before, and as he was asking me how I did (for it seems he thought I was sorely wounded by my stooping), he was shot with a bullet in the head, and suddenly fell down dead; and these were the last words that ever he spoke."*

This escape is rendered the more remarkable as it was the second deliverance of the same kind that had occurred to him in the course of his adventurous life, the former having happened in 1589 at the island of St. Mary, where, encountering a rough reception upon landing, he tells us, in the encounter his sword, which he placed naked, and the point upwards, was shot asunder, and the bullet passed through his doublet, which, had it not been for his sword, must have gone through his body. "This I note," he adds, "that as the sword is the death of many a man, so it hath been twice the preserver of my life."

For his distinguished conduct at this siege, Monson received the honour of knighthood at the hands of the earl of Essex.

1597. The Island expedition, hardly less important, succeeded in the following year. Sir William Monson had the command of the Rainbow, a queen's ship, which was afterwards placed in imminent peril, having fallen in alone with the Spanish fleet, while obeying the orders of Essex in standing away to the south to make observations and give signals. The intrepidity exhibited by Monson in this conjuncture afforded, perhaps more than any other act of his life, extraordinary proof of great personal courage. Discerning in the deadwatch of the night a fleet of twenty-five sail in the distance, and not being able to ascertain what flag they carried, he resolved before he gave the preconcerted signal to the English squadron, to make a personal inspection at the hazard of his life. He accordingly put himself into his boat, and approached the ships, hailing them in Spanish; they replied in the same lan-

* Monson, 470.

guage, saying, that they were of Spain, and demanded to know whence he was. He answered of England, and told them that the ship in sight was a queen's galleon, single and alone, of which they might make an easy capture. His object was to draw them after him, and so bring them into the wake of the squadron. But this gallant stratagem failed; the Spaniards were too wary to be deceived, and all he got by the attempt was some foul abuse and a volley of shot. Returning to his vessel, he made the signal that had been agreed upon. It was now, however, too late. Essex had already altered his course, and stood away that night to St. Michael's. He did not abandon the enemy, nevertheless, but tracked them the whole of that night and the next day, until he brought them into the road of Angra, in the island of Terceira.*

1599. On his homeward voyage, at the close of this memorable expedition, he was exposed to more hazard than any other ship in the fleet; "for," says he, "the Rainbow is known to be the most rolling and laboursome ship in England, especially in the condition I was in, having spent my foremast in a mighty storm and mountainous seas, where we hourly expected death." †

An interval of four or five years followed, in which no movements of any consequence took place at sea. In 1599, we find Monson commanding the Defiance, under lord Thomas Howard, the admiral in the Downs, watching the necessity for active hostilities, rather than seeking it. Both Spain and England seemed to be equally ready for war, but neither of them willing to begin. There never, says Monson, was greater expectation of war, with less performance. Preparations, however, were going forward with extraordinary vigour at both sides, as if each expected an invasion, or as if they entertained the mutual policy of making peace with drawn swords. The French were astonished at the incredible alacrity with which the English vessels were got ready for sea, and regarded as a piece of magic the

* Monson, 174—470. † Ibid.

celerity with which her majesty had actually rigged, victualled, and furnished the royal ships in the short space of twelve days. Thus, sitting armed upon our coasts, and prepared at an hour's notice for any emergency that might arise, the hostile designs of the enemy were suspended in astonishment. "Another benefit," says Monson, referring to these circumstances, "which we received by this preparation, was, that our men were now brought suddenly to arm, every man knowing his command, and how to be commanded, which before they were ignorant of; and who knows not, that sudden and false alarms in an army are sometimes necessary? To say truth, the expedition which was then used, by drawing together so great an army by land, and rigging so great and royal a navy to sea, in so little a space of time, was so admirable in other countries, that they received a terror by it; and many that came from beyond the sea, said, *The queen was never more dreaded abroad for any thing she ever did.*" *

1600. The summer of 1600 yielded great hope of a permanent peace, but it came to nothing. Commissioners on both sides met at Bologne, in the territories of the French king, who was friendly to both, but the treaty was broken off on some frivolous pretext of precedency. Some people believed that the treaty was a mere show to gain time, and that nothing serious was ever really contemplated by it. Elizabeth was abundantly justified in dealing cautiously with the Spaniards, for it could not be forgotten, that scarcely twelve years had elapsed since they proposed a similar treaty, and, while it was in progress, treacherously sent out a formidable squadron to invade England. It seems that the meeting at Bologne was looked upon with distrust by both parties, and that its abrupt termination was mutually anticipated; for, upon the pretence of guarding the western coast, three ships were fitted out under the command of sir Richard Lewson, to undertake an expedition to the islands, in the hope of seizing the carracks and Mexican

* Monson, 178.

fleet, the Spaniards on the other hand anticipating the movement, and sending out no less than eighteen "tall ships" to the same station. As it happened, they never came in sight of each other, and sir Richard returned home without having even seen a single sail the whole time, except two Dutch vessels from the East Indies.

1601. Throughout the whole of 1601, there was a sort of tacit cessation of arms, but without any valid prospect of peace, and mutual annoyances were indirectly resorted to as if from a perverse desire to provoke hostilities; the English relieving the Netherlands, and the Spaniards lending secret assistance to the rebels in Ireland. Towards the winter, however, the Spaniards made a decisive demonstration. A fleet of forty-eight sail, with four thousand soldiers, commanded by Don Diego de Borachero, was sent to invade Ireland. The history of the events that rapidly followed, terminating in the total discomfiture of that undertaking, does not properly belong to this memoir. But it may be observed, that sir Richard Lewson valiantly expelled the vice-admiral of the Spaniards, after a sanguinary and unequal conflict, and that the land forces, despairing of succour from Spain, and seeing that their cause was desperate, made offers of a parley, and were permitted, under certain conditions, to return home in English vessels.

During this period of comparative inaction, sir William Monson was successively employed in various ships in the Downs and the narrow seas; including, besides other vessels, the Garland, the Nonpareille, the Swiftsure, the Mary-Rose, and the Mere-honour.

1602. The recent attempt in Ireland produced an immediate alteration in the naval policy of the country. Elizabeth saw that it would no longer be safe to remain inactive, and a fleet of nine vessels was ordered to sea with such speed that there was not time enough to man or provision them upon the usual scale. Her majesty, says Monson, "was content with what could be got in so short a warning, so desirous was she to see her ships at

sea."* The haste with which this armament was fitted out proved fatal to the objects of the expedition. Sir Richard Lewson left England with five of these vessels on the 19th of March, leaving Monson who was second in command behind with the other four to wait for the arrival of twelve Dutch ships which were to have joined the squadron. But intelligence was received in the meanwhile of the arrival of the silver ships at the Azores, and the impatience of the queen would not suffer sir William to remain long enough to complete his complement of men and supplies, and he accordingly followed the Admiral on the 26th. Notwithstanding the rapidity of these movements they were too late, the plate-fleet having departed from Terceira before Monson arrived. Sir Richard Lewson fell in with them on their passage to Spain; but his force was inadequate for a conflict with thirty-eight sail; and although he attacked them with great valour, the rich argossy escaped.† "We may very well account this," observes Monson, "not the least error or negligence that has been committed in our voyages, for if the Hollanders had kept course, according to promise, and the queen's ships had been fitted out with care, we had made her majesty mistress of more treasure than any of her progenitors ever enjoyed."‡

Sir Richard Lewson, being thus frustrated, plied towards the rock which had been appointed as the rendezvous with the rest of the fleet. Monson had already been there a fortnight, and not hearing any tidings of the Admiral, had gone round by the southward cape. Here he was fortunately joined by three ships which had been dispatched by sir Richard to look out for him; and falling in at the same time with some French and Scotch vessels, he received information from them of five galleons, lying at St. Lucar, and ready to take the next tide for the Indies. Two other galleons, with the governor of the Havanna on board, had sailed three days before, and were met at night by one of the English

* Monson, 181. † Lediard, i. p 384. ‡ Monson, 181.

ships, but escaped, "whether by the darkness of the night," adds sir William, "or by what other casualty (for the sea is subject to many), I know not."

The prospect of seizing the five galleons revived the hopes of the vice-admiral who, thus luckily reinforced, directed his course into the latitude the Spaniards were likely to take. As he had anticipated, he soon came in sight of five ships, which he concluded must be the prizes he was in pursuit of, and he congratulated himself on the prospect of finally determining that day the difference between the strength and power of the English and Spanish ships, their number and capacity being equal. But his joy was quickly abated on discovering that they were English vessels homeward bound from the Straits. He did not wholly, however, abandon the hope of coming up with the enemy, and the next day descrying a single ship, laden from the Indies, he gave chase, and took her after a brisk action. As ill fortune would have it, he lost the galleons through this adventure, for his pursuit of the prize carried him so far to the leeward that the galleons passed off to windward in the course of the night, at a distance of not more than eight or ten leagues, as he learned on the following morning, to his great mortification, from an English pinnace that had met him. These accumulated misfortunes falling first on sir Richard Lewson and afterwards on sir William Monson, were sufficient to discourage them; but they still relied confidently on their united resources, for shortly after this adventure they met accidentally at sea, and resolved to prosecute their enterprize. "Knowing," says Monson, "the accidents of the sea, and that fortune could as well laugh as weep, having good ships under foot, their men sound and in health, and plenty of victuals, they did not doubt but that some of the wealth which the Indies sent forth into Spain would fall to their share."* Nor were their calculations ultimately disappointed. Lying close to the rock they seized two ships of the East

* Monson, 182.

Country bound for Lisbon, and while they were rummaging these vessels, they received intelligence by a caravel from cape Espichel that there were a carrack and eleven galleys lying in Cerimbra road. The joy diffused through the fleet by this information may easily be imagined. Sir Richard made signs to Monson to stand out to sea, but the approach of night prevented them from taking effect.

2d June. The next morning, a council was held on board the admiral's vessel. It occupied nearly the whole day. Some of the captains alleged the impossibility of taking the carrack, which was defended by a castle and eleven galleys; but Monson was of a different opinion, and prevailed. It was, therefore, agreed that he and the admiral should anchor as near the carrack as they could, and that the rest of the vessels should ply up and down, to be in readiness for any opportunity of action that might offer. The sight of these galleys reminded sir William of the slavery he had endured at Lisbon in similar vessels, if not in some of these identical craft, and he longed to take revenge upon them. In order to show his contempt and defiance of them, he tells us that he singled himself out a league from the rest of the fleet by way of challenging them. The marquis of St. Cruz, general of the Portuguese, and Frederic Spinola, general of the galleys, accepted the invitation and put out with the intention of fighting him; but they were diverted from their purpose by a renegade Englishman, who knew the force of the vice-admiral's ship, and that she was commanded by Monson.

The situation of the galleys was so formidable and advantageous, that, as Monson afterwards discovered, they entertained the design of sinking the English ships without any farther assistance. The town of Cerimbra lies in the bottom of a road, which is described as an excellent harbour for vessels in a northerly wind. At that time a strong and spacious fort, well replenished with ordnance, stood close to the shore, while the town, castle, and road, was completely commanded by an

ancient building, which Monson calls a friary, placed on the summit of a hill at the back, and which, from its position, was impregnable. The carracks lay close to the shore, to the west of the castle, which, as also the east front of the town, it defended like a bulwark. The eleven galleys were flanked and fortified by a small neck of rock on the west side of the road, with their prows right forward to play upon the English ships, and so screened that they could not be damaged by them until they came so close to the town that all the batteries could play upon them at once. This powerful position was rendered still more secure by the array of land forces on shore. Tents were pitched along the coast, and great troops of soldiers drawn out, "which," says Monson, "was no less than the whole country in arms against us." Boats were constantly in motion between the shore and the carrack. At first it was supposed that these movements were for the purpose of unlading her, but it was soon afterwards found out that the object was to strengthen her with men and ammunition. The difficulties and dangers of the undertaking were more and more developed as these circumstances became evident to the fleet; and little hope presenting itself of making a prize of the carrack, it was conjectured that she must be sunk or burned in the last alternative. The obstacles to the capture are thus detailed by Monson: "The danger from the galleys was great, they being flanked with a point of a rock at our entrance, as you have heard, it being likewise calm, and they shooting low; another danger was that of the wind; for, if it had come from the sea, the road being open, and the bay deep, our attempt must have been in vain. And notwithstanding these, and many more apparently seen, and that there was no man but imagined that most of the carrack's lading was ashore, and that they would hale her a-ground under the castle, where no ship of ours would be able to come at her, all which objections, with many more, were alledged, yet they little prevailed. Procrastination was perilous, and there-

fore, with all expedition, they thought convenient to charge the town, the fort, the galleys, and carrack, all at one instant; and they had determined if the carrack had been a-ground, or so nigh the shore that the queen's ships could reach her, that the two easterlings the day before taken should board and burn her." *

3d June. This bold plan being clearly arranged and decided upon, the men commended themselves the next morning to the protection of God, and prepared to open their work, according to the agreement the day before. A gale sprung up at ten o'clock. The admiral weighed, fired a signal-gun, and hung out his flag at the maintop. Monson promptly followed his example. The captains severally encouraged their crews, who, though recently desponding under such adverse circumstances, now seemed animated by a new spirit. "The admiral was the first that gave the charge; and after him followed the rest of the ships, showing great valour, and gaining great honour. The last of all was the vice-admiral, who, entering into the fight, still strove to get up as near the shore as he could, where he came to an anchor, continually fighting with the town, the fort, the galleys, and the carrack, all together; for he brought them betwixt him, that he might play both his broadsides upon them. The galleys still kept their prows towards him. The slaves offered to forsake them, and swim to us, and every thing was in confusion amongst them; and thus they fought till five of the clock in the afternoon." †

The gallant conduct of Monson so completely paralysed the galleys, that they rowed from side to side, endeavouring to avoid him; and the admiral, struck by his heroism, came on board his vessel, and embracing him in the presence of the whole company, declared that "he had won his heart for ever."

All the ships were now engaged except the admiral's, which, by some mismanagement of the master, was

C

* Monson, 182, 183. † Ibid. 183.

suffered to fall off to windward, so that the wind and tide carried her out of the road, and she could not be recovered until the next day. Sir Richard Lewson was so enraged at this disaster that he put himself on board the Dreadnought, and anchored close to the vice-admiral. It was now two o'clock in the forenoon. The easterlings that were appointed to board the carrack betrayed symptoms of reluctance, naturally enough if the peculiarity of their situation be taken into consideration; but Monson instantly went on board them himself, and threatened them with a worse fate than they might expect from the enemy, if they failed to execute the design entrusted to them. At this critical moment the admiral interposed, and countermanding the instructions that had been previously given, took Monson on board his own vessel for the purpose of devising measures for seizing and preserving the treasures of the carrack. It was agreed at this conference that the ships should be ordered to cease firing, and that a parley should be immediately offered.

The person selected for the office was one captain Sewell, who had been four years a prisoner in the galleys, and who had just effected his escape by swimming to the English ships. He was instructed to ask the enemy to yield upon honourable conditions, intimating to them, as from himself, that their condition was hopeless, as some of the galleys were beaten, others burned, and the rest fled, while the English were in possession of the road, and the castle was no longer able to resist. In the event of a refusal to accept the offer of mercy, he was to inform them that they must prepare for all the cruelty and rigour a conqueror could impose upon a vanquished foe. The captain of the carrack was not in a disposition to treat with an officer who had so recently been in slavery, and he announced his intention of sending some gentlemen of quality to conduct the negociation, desiring that others of like quality might be appointed on the opposite side.

The Portuguese deputation having been received on

board the admiral's ship, had no sooner delivered their message than they expressed a desire to hasten back, as there was a great division and tumult in the carrack arising from a difference of opinion as to whether the parley ought to be entertained or the vessel set on fire. When Monson heard this, without waiting for orders from the admiral, he leaped into a boat, and rowed to the carrack. Several gentlemen on board, who knew him when he had been a prisoner amongst them, recognised him at once, and Don Diego Lobo, a gallant young gentleman of a noble house, who commanded the carrack, motioning his men apart, received him at the side of the vessel. Monson did the same; and, having, in answer to an inquiry from the captain, stated that he knew enough of the Portuguese language to treat of the business he came about, opened the conference by acquainting him with the rank he held in the fleet, by assuring him of the respect and esteem he entertained for the Portuguese nation, adding that the parley was offered at his suggestion, and that he wished to hear the proposals he desired to make. Don Diego then stated his demands, which were to the effect that he and his followers should be put on shore safely that night with their arms; that the carrack and its ordnance should be left as belonging to the king, but that the English should take its treasures, and that the ancient and flag should not be taken down while the carrack was unlading. To these proposals sir William replied, that such demands gave suspicion that some treachery was intended under pretence of parley; that their hopes were greater than their cause; and but that he knew it was the artifice of some men to demand great things when less would serve them, he would not lose his advantage to entertain a treaty. He then desired that whatever they resolved upon might be concluded quickly, as night was growing on and might bring them some advantage; for his resolution he desired them to understand it in a few words:—1. He was willing to yield that they might be put ashore with their arms; 2. He

was content they should be set ashore that night, with the exception of some eight or ten principal gentlemen whom he would detain for three days; 3. He held the proposal to separate the ship and goods as frivolous, regarding it as a jest which they could not imagine he would consent to; and 4 He was resolved never to permit a Spanish flag to be worn in the presence of the queen's ships, unless it were disgracefully over the poop. A long expostulation followed upon these points; but sir William was determined not to abate or modify any of his demands, and, finding the captain obstinate, he threatened to return to his boat and break off the treaty. The gentlemen, perceiving that it was vain to offer further opposition, entreated him once more to ascend into the carrack, when the following capitulations were finally agreed upon:—namely, that a messenger should be sent to the admiral to obtain his confirmation of the points agreed upon, and that in the meantime the flag and ancient should be taken down; but if the admiral should not consent to the agreement, the Portuguese were to be allowed a reasonable time to put out the flag and ancient before the fight should be renewed; that the company should be presently set on shore, but the captain, with eight of the principal gentlemen, three days afterwards; that the ship with her goods should be surrendered without practice or treason; and that endeavours should be used to prevail with the garrison in the castle to forego their firing while the English remained in the road. These conditions having been agreed to by the admiral, sir William Monson conducted Don Diego and eight gentlemen on board his own ship, "where they supped, had variety of music, and spent the night in great jollity."* But, although the term of three days was allowed for the detention of the hostages, they were not kept longer than it required to bring off the carrack safely to the ships. Sir William accompanied them on shore the next morning, where he found the count de Vidigueira at the head of a

* Monson, 185.

force amounting to no less than 20,000 men, who, as the event proved, had been drawn together in vain.

This action was not only the most fortunate occurrence in the life of sir William Monson, as it affected his own personal advancement, but is accounted by him the greatest naval exploit, all circumstances considered, that happened in the reign of Elizabeth. The value of the prize (afterwards sold by king James on his accession), was estimated at nearly 200,000*l.** The carrack, called the St. Valentine, was a vessel of 1700 tons burthen; she had wintered at Mozambique on her return from the Indies, where the infection was so fatal that of a crew of six hundred and odd men less than twenty survived the whole voyage. At last, after suffering manifold calamities she put into the port of Cerimbra, to endure the worst of all. The viceroy of Portugal sent eleven galleys to protect her and 400 mochas du camera, gentlemen who are ready to aid the king whenever any extraordinary occasion requires their services. But neither the galleys nor this worthy fraternity of brave gentlemen were of much utility. The galleys under the command of the marquis of St. Cruz, fled in the middle of the fight, and were only shamed back again by the heroic conduct of Spinola, who, with diminished strength, still continued to defend the carrack. Such was the loss sustained on board these vessels, that they must all have fallen into the hands of the English, but for want of boats to take possession of them. Two of them were burnt and sunk in the course of the engagement, the captain of a third was taken prisoner, and in a fourth sir William Monson had the satisfaction of discovering the galley in which he was imprisoned eleven years before. The total loss of life in the town, the castle, the carrack, and the galleys must have been very considerable; while on the side of the English there were not more than six men killed and seven wounded. Sir William had the left wing of his doublet shot off, but received no other hurt.

After the conditions were mutually agreed to, the

* Monson, 225.

conduct of the leaders at both sides appears to have been in the highest degree honourable and generous. Sir William Monson, touched by the misfortune of the gallant young captain of the carrack, and suspecting that his loss would make shipwreck of his worldly means, offered him free permission to take out of her whatever portion of her freight he could conscientiously claim as his own. But Don Diego, perhaps somewhat proudly, declined to accept such a favour, extraordinary as he acknowledged it to be; what he had, he said, he gained by his sword, and he doubted not his sword would repair his fortunes again. It would have been happy for him if the noble spirit he exhibited on this occasion had been fully appreciated by his own government; but it fell out otherwise, and he was doomed to a life of misery by the events of that disastrous day. Don Cristoval de Mora, viceroy of Portugal, enraged at the indignity of seeing a carrack taken out of the port in the sight of eleven galleys and a formidable battery, and actually within hearing of the guns of Lisbon, and being unable to satisfy the complaints of the people and the soldiery — some mourning the loss of their goods, others grieving for their friends, and all wounded in reputation — caused Don Diego and the gentlemen of his company to be arrested that night on reaching their lodgings. He imputed the capture of the carrack to their cowardice and fear, if not to their treason and connivance with the enemy.* After some time, the gentlemen were released, through the intercession of powerful friends; but Don Diego was still kept in prison. At length he received secret intelligence that the viceroy intended his death, and nothing remained for him but to effect his escape. By the aid of his sister he was enabled to accomplish it; and, flying into Italy, he remained there until 1615. Throughout this long period of exile, his fortunes drooped on all sides. His

* These charges were, doubtless, ill-founded, although strongly favoured by appearances. Monson himself tells us that sir Robert Cecil used to attribute the submission of the carrack to Monson's acquaintance with the gentlemen on board, p. 184.

government of Malacca, for which he held a patent in reversion, was confiscated; and no hope offered of being permitted to return to his native country. In this extremity he was recommended to repair to England, for the purpose of obtaining certificates from the commanders who had been present at the taking of the carrack, to clear him of cowardice and treason. Sir William Monson, who was much surprised to see him, testified the greatest interest on his behalf, treated him with unbounded courtesy, and procured him the desired certificates; which, to give them a stamp of authority, he caused to be enrolled in the Admiralty. With these documents, don Diego went into Flanders, and presenting the papers to the archduke and the infanta, obtained through them assurances of the king's favour, and restitution to his government. But just at this auspicious moment, when his prospects, after thirteen years of calamity, began to brighten for the first time, he died as he was preparing for his journey into Spain. "And this," adds Monson, "was the end of an unfortunate gallant young gentleman, whose deserts might justly have challenged a better reward, if God had pleased to afford it him."*

The carrack — which was the cause of all these misfortunes to don Diego — was no sooner secured, than the English fleet stood out with a favourable wind for England. On their way they met a pinnace despatched with a packet from the lords, to inform them that a second fleet was in readiness to join them, and that the Hollanders had already set out. Under these circumstances, the commanders agreed that they could not both appear at home, leaving so large an armament upon the enemy's coast without a head. It was accordingly arranged that Monson should return. He had not long parted from the fleet, when a violent storm and contrary winds rendered his course extremely perilous; and, as the vessel in which he sailed, the Nonpareille, was incapable of weathering the tempest, the

* Monson, 186.

carpenters and crew petitioned him to abandon his object, apprehending that, by keeping the seas, they should all perish. He was thus compelled by mere extremity, to bear for England. Upon his arrival at Plymouth, he found the carrack safely in harbour, and had the mortification to discover that the fleet he went to take charge of had not yet quitted the coast.*

Immediately upon landing, he was sent for by the queen. Great apprehensions existed that the Spaniards meditated a second descent upon Ireland, and it was considered advisable to send out a fleet to keep a strict watch upon the enemy's coast. A long conference took place between her majesty and sir William Monson in the presence of the lord admiral, treasurer, and secretary; and it was finally resolved that he should repair, with such vessels as were then ready, to the harbour of the Groyne, where the Spaniards made their rendezvous; and if he detected any symptoms of preparation for an invasion, not to leave the shore till he saw the issue. If, on the other hand, he could trace no likelihood of such a design, his instructions were to repair to the place where the Dutch fleet was ordered to join him, the conduct of all further movements, having for their chief object the defence of Ireland, being confided solely to his discretion.

31st Aug.

Six weeks elapsed before he could clear the coast, in consequence of contrary winds. This was the more unfortunate, as in the interval the plate-fleet made good its voyage from the Indies, reaching Spain a whole month before his arrival. He left Plymouth on the last day of August, and with all the disadvantages of foul weather persevered in keeping the sea rather than hazard the overthrow of the voyage by his return. Arrived at the Groyne, he discovered that the fleet which was supposed to be intended for Ireland was gone to join the admiral at Lisbon; upon which he lost no time in repairing to the Rock. Here, through a caravel which he sent to the islands of Bayona, he obtained intelli-

* Monson, 185.

gence of the Spanish fleet, which consisted of twenty four sail, and which was reported to be on the look-out for the English. Falling in with two French ships bound for Lisbon, he took them, and exacted pledges from them that they should directly return to France, without touching at any Spanish harbour, as he understood that the Spanish fleet was ill provided with men and provisions, which these ships could supply. During this anxious interval of suspense, he was drawn, in the eagerness of a chace, into his old quarters in the road of Cerimbra. The castle defended the vessel, but, after a brisk fight, they came to a friendly treaty, and exchanged presents. The same night a caravel came in, and, not mistrusting him, was seized, but dismissed, after he had obtained from the company some information concerning the affairs of Lisbon. All this time, however, he could not procure any intelligence of the Dutch fleet, and thought it prudent, in obedience to his instructions, to repair, without further delay, to the Rock.

26th Sept. His whole force consisted of seven ships, a merchant vessel, and a small caravel. The continuance of the boisterous weather rendered it impossible to keep his fleet together, and on their way they were all separated, except the Adventure and the Whelp, which still remained with the admiral's ship, the Swiftsure. On the 26th of September, he arrived in this reduced condition at the appointed rendezvous. In the middle of the night, he discerned a light which, suspecting it to be the fleet from St. Tome or Brasil, bound for Lisbon, he immediately chased. But he no sooner found himself close to the vessels, than he discovered that it was the Spanish Armada, of which he had received notice from the caravel. An engagement with such a superior force must have ended in the total destruction of the English; and Monson, resorting to a *ruse*, commanded a Spaniard, who served on board his ship, standing over him at the moment with a dagger, to call aloud that there was a strange ship fallen among the fleet, and that he knew not what she was. By this expedient he hoped

to divert attention from his own vessel, and so to clear the danger in the midst of which he was placed.* In the meanwhile, he tacked about in a secret manner and escaped. But the Adventure and the Whelp were still surrounded, and before they could stand out to sea, the former received several shots, which killed and wounded some of her men. As soon as the daylight broke, the Spaniards saw the three English ships ahead of them, and gave chase. Three of them, which were better sailors than the rest, gained upon them, and drew close upon the Whelp, which was too weak to offer any effectual resistance. Monson, seeing the evident peril to which the Whelp was exposed, resolved to risk his own life to save her; and, in direct opposition to the entreaties of his master and company, he struck his topsail, and commanded the Whelp to stand her course, while he staid for the three ships of the enemy. The Spanish admiral, who probably had not much inclination to encounter a commander, whose name was so famous on that coast, perceiving that Monson lingered for his coming up, took in with the shore, and fired off a warning for his fleet to follow him.

In the employment of such devices in times of danger, the fertility of Monson's invention and the promptitude of his movements are conspicuous; and many of his suggestions concerning the conduct of a fleet under various circumstances of difficulty, drawn as they were from his own experience, may be referred to with advantage, even at the present day. He lays great stress upon the importance of having vessels built with a view to speed in sailing; and, upon the occasion of this escape, he observes, "It may appear by this, as by several other expeditions of ours, how much the swift sailing of ships does avail, being the principal advantage in sea service, and indeed the main thing we could presume upon in our war against the Spaniards."* The device of hailing the enemy in their own language, for the purpose of deceiving them, he sets down amongst

* Monson, 187.

his stratagems as one of those plans that may be usefully adopted at night. "If a ship," he says, "fall into company of a fleet at night, it is necessary to have a sudden and a ready answer; as also two or three of the nation to speak as they shall be directed."* But he recommends the employment of this stratagem only when a single ship falls in with an enemy's fleet; when ships are scattered at sea, he condemns the practice as being both useless and dangerous. "It is a common use," he observes, "when ships are scattered, and chance to meet in the night, not knowing one another, to hail one another in a strange language, which I disapprove, as a thing dangerous; for the other being satisfied by his tongue not to be his consort, or of his country, prepares to fight; and thus it had like to fall out with me. The Mary-Rose and I meeting one night, after we had lost company, one of my company hailed her in Spanish, without my privity, whereat I was angry, and caused her to be called to in English, even as she was giving fire to her broad-side. It is folly in this case to counterfeit; for no good can come of it, seeing the one cannot part from the other without knowing what they are." †

Several adventures at sea followed the escape from the Spanish fleet; and as there was plenty of trade upon the coast, sir William was drawn into many chases. On one of these occasions while he was pursuing one vessel, and the Adventure another, they lost company and did not meet again throughout the remainder of the voyage. Hearing from a French ship that the St. Domingo fleet was looked for daily, he bore up for the South Cape, but his hopes were frustrated by finding on his arrival that they had passed two days before. He kept the coast until the 21st of October, rescuing several vessels from pirates and giving safe conduct to others that were in amity with England. On that morning he gave chase to a galleon which ran under the shelter of the castle of Cape St. Vincent. Monson

* Monson, 456. † Ibid. 457.

was well acquainted with the strength of that fortress, but nevertheless would have captured the galleon but for the cowardice of his helmsman, who bore up the Swiftsure just as he was ready to board the enemy. The fight was not long, but sanguinary. The vessels did not exchange a shot until they were within a ship's length of each other, and then being under the guns of the castle, worked by an expert English renegade, the admiral's vessel suffered so severely that "a team of oxen might have crept through her under the half-deck."* She was so completely at the mercy of the batteries that one shot alone killed seven men. The united fire of the castle and galleon killed ten or twelve men in the Swiftsure and wounded a great many more; and this fruitless expenditure of blood took place in view of the Spanish squadron to the westward, and numerous English men of war to the eastward, who "durst not put themselves in to the rescue for fear of the castle." It seems almost a miracle how the Swiftsure escaped sinking, for Monson concludes the disastrous narrative by observing that she "was so beaten from the castle, that it was a spectacle to behold my ship, for she might be crept through from side to side."†

24th Nov.

Being now left almost a wreck, alone, and exposed to Spanish ships whatever head-land he made, Monson sailed for Terceira in the hope of better fortune. But when he came within forty or fifty leagues of the island, he was taken short with the wind, but continued notwithstanding to bear up for the Rock. At last his provisions began to fail; his mast was already gone, and taking into consideration the dangers to which he was exposed on that coast, he shaped his course for England, and reached Plymouth on the 24th of November. Two of the ships arrived before him; but most part of their companions were either dead or sick. The Adventure arrived, singularly enough, within an hour after him, having several men killed in an encounter with the

* Monson, 188. † Ibid. 472.

Brazil fleet on her homeward voyage. The merchant-vessel had reached England long before with a prize of spices and sugars; and another ship belonging to the squadron had lost her captain in an engagement with two Dunkirk vessels. The expedition, however unfortunate in the various incidents that befell the ships, was entirely successful in the object for which it was fitted out, having acted effectually as a check upon Spain. The disasters to which it was exposed, may be in some degree accounted for by the fact that it was the latest fleet in winter that up to that time had ever kept the sea upon the Spanish coast. It was also the last fleet employed by queen Elizabeth, for, although she made arrangements for future naval operations, she did not live to see them carried into effect. Sir William Monson, in concluding the narrative of this voyage, looks back with honest pride upon his own career, observing that in the beginning of the wars he was a soldier and a youth assisting at the taking of the first Spanish prize, and at the termination of the reign of Elizabeth he was the general of the last fleet that acted under her orders.

The policy of keeping a constant watch upon the Spaniards had already been productive of such security, in addition to the rich prizes taken from time to time from the enemy, that her majesty resolved to fit out two fresh fleets against the ensuing February; the first to be commanded by sir Richard Lewson, and the second by sir William Monson. The intervening months of the winter were devoted to the necessary preparations; and the numerous complaints that were made of the ill-furnishing of ships in former voyages led to increased exertions on this occasion to prevent similar deficiencies. In the meanwhile, her majesty fell ill, and the preparations lingered and slackened, although they were never actually suspended; but when her majesty's disease became serious, the ships were hastened out to sea to prevent any foreign attempt until her successor should be firmly established on the throne. The

1603.

fleet departed from Queenborough on the 22d of March, and on the 25th received intelligence in the Downs of the death of her majesty which had taken place the day before.

The proclamation of James was received at least in France and the Low Countries with unequivocal tokens of satisfaction. The English fleet hovered along the shores of France and Flanders, appearing on each coast on alternate days for the purpose of intimidation; but the truth is, says Monson, any incursion was beyond their abilities, whatever was in their hearts to impugn his majesty. The archduke Charles immediately recalled his letters of reprisal, and threw open the trade with Flanders; and the king of France neither impeached the right of James, nor made any show of hostility by land or sea. James gladly responded to these symptoms of a pacific disposition, acknowledged the league he had with those princes with whom his predecessor had waged a protracted war, and, recalling the fleets, ordered them to repair to Chatham, giving manifest testimonies, says Monson, how desirous he was that his subjects should recover that wealth and freedom by peace which they had formerly lost by war.

The appointment of Monson as second in command on this occasion, was forced upon him by the importunity of the lords of the council, who reposed implicit confidence in him, and who secretly disliked Lewson, a man of an ambitious temper. To make some amends to Monson for accepting the post of vice-admiral, he was nominated to a better ship than sir Richard served in. "All this," says Monson, "was done out of policy, and few of the lords, but such as were intimate friends of the king, knew of it; for their intention was, if the queen died and king James had found any opposition, that my lord Thomas Howard, afterwards earl of Suffolk, should take charge of this fleet and come aboard me, and I go into sir Richard's ship, and sir Richard's authority to cease. But, God be thanked, there was no cause for this wise forecast of the lords, for his majesty

repaired peaceably to London, and we returned safely to Chatham after we had seen the king's entertainment by his well-affected subjects."*

Monson was a courtier. His long experience of the rough usages of a sea-life had not rendered him indifferent to the advantages of a flattering and acquiescent demeanour at court. His attachment to Elizabeth was boundless;—but the facility was no less remarkable with which he transferred his devotion to her successor, whose policy, we might have supposed, being totally different, would have provoked some strictures from the old admiral. "When God called her majesty," he says, "to his mercy, it had long been looked for, and desired by her foes, and feared by her friends; some laugh'd, some lamented; Spain and its adherents rejoiced, having tasted the bitterness of eighteen years' war with her; Holland fear'd, and suspected their good days began to wain, because his majesty needed not to support factions abroad to defend his just and lawful titles.

"These two nations that were opposite to each other, had their particular ends; but the people that heartily and inwardly mourn'd, were the English, to see themselves deprived of a sovereign so good and gracious, so virtuous and victorious, whose reign had continued so long, as few had before in England, which made them the more uneasy.

"But this trouble was soon turned into joy; for when his majesty appear'd, they recover'd a new life and spirit, and received him with that alacrity, that they had soon forgot their grief, and fix'd their hearts as faithful to serve the king, as they had willingly obeyed the queen. But before I end," he continues, "with the queen's death, I will shew you and the world, by comparison, the difference betwixt peace and war in the queen's time, if she had been so happy as to enjoy it; for though her actions were of great reputation to her and her subjects, through the success she had against

* Monson, 472.

so mighty and potent an enemy as the king of Spain, yet, I must confess, the actions of our two succeeding kings (king James and king Charles) settled a firm and quiet league and peace in this kingdom, that has produced greater happiness and benefit, if we will lay aside passion and partiality."* He then goes on to demonstrate the advantages of peace over war, to show how peace eased the people of needless taxes, took away all fear of enemies, so that every man might "live quietly under his olive-tree," and trebled the number of ships and mariners, enabling the country the better to resist the fury of war if such an occasion should arise. By war, also, he thinks the queen greatly impeded the progress of colonization and the profitable employment of the public industry, while Spain, he observes, "is more punished by the king's peace than by the queen's war; for, by our peace, England is enlarged by several plantations in America, all neighbours to Spain in their habitation of the West Indies, in case they become insolent or offer injuries."† The justice of these observations cannot be impeached. Nor can the sincerity of the writer be doubted, for, however suddenly his enthusiasm in favour of the new order of things sprung up, it is quite clear that he owed the new monarch no personal obligations whatever. Under Elizabeth he had risen to fame and fortune; but under James he received neither honours nor preferment, having, on the contrary, sufficient ground for complaining of absolute neglect. On one occasion he pursued a vessel, which had escaped twenty-four hours before he received orders to chase her, with such celerity and success that he took her within four miles of Calais; yet he says that he was not rewarded for this action in proportion to the importance of the service. Indeed, it is evident, from many passages in his tracts, that, although he was upon sober conviction an advocate for peace, he was indebted to the wars of Elizabeth for all his professional promotion and emoluments. "Since the death of queen

* Monson, 209. † Ibid. 210.

Elizabeth," he informs us, "who was both gracious and bountiful to him, he never tasted or received either recompense or preferment, more than his ordinary entertainment, according to the services he was employed in, for he began the wars with ten shillings per month pay; then with two shillings and sixpence per day; after with five shillings, with ten shillings, with fifteen shillings, with twenty shillings, and sixteen pages allowed him for his retinue; after with thirty shillings per day; and lastly, with forty shillings per day. He had served as a soldier, a private, captain, a rear-admiral, a vice-admiral, a captain under the general, and, lastly, an absolute general." *

The appointment of sir Richard Lewson to the command of one of the fleets fitted out just before the death of Elizabeth was not intended to be final; for it seems that Lewson was distrusted by the lords of the council, who knew him to be ambitious. Monson was reluctant to accept the appointment of vice-admiral, but yielded to the importunity of the lords, who reposed implicit confidence in him, and nominated for his use a better ship.

As soon as the accession of James was made known in Europe, the king of Spain very wisely despatched an ambassador to congratulate his majesty upon the event. The reception of this ambassador at the English court justified the belief that proposals of peace would be as acceptable on the one side as on the other, and this disposition being thus mutually avowed, a treaty to that effect was speedily put into form and ratified. 1604. On the 1st of July, 1604, the then lord Cecil sent for sir William Monson, and informed him that it was his majesty's pleasure to appoint him to the charge of the ships serving in the narrow seas, desiring him at the same time to make such provision for transporting the Spanish ambassador, who was then expected to conclude the peace, as should be consistent with the dignity and honour of the crown. The difficulties that surrounded

* Monson, 218.

this post were of no ordinary kind, for although peace was about to be finally settled between England and Spain, the war between Spain and Holland continued to rage as fiercely as ever. The admiral of the narrow seas was now, says Monson, to think to walk indifferently and without partiality betwixt the two nations, like a careful shepherd, to keep his neighbours' flocks from intruding upon one another.* Monson did not hesitate to point out to Cecil the embarrassments of his position; and, after tendering humble thanks to his majesty for conferring, unsought, so high a favour upon him, he made bold to tell his lordship, that by his employment he was to enter into a labyrinth; for, though the navigation was but short and easy, yet it was both difficult and dangerous; for he was to sail betwixt Scylla and Charybdis—the one he might call Holland, and the other Spain; and willing to avoid the displeasure of the one, he might as well fall into enmity of the other. As for Holland, he considered, that by the permission of the English government in past times they might challenge a prerogative, although nothing had been granted except by courtesy; and therefore, after having had the rein so long, they could not be curbed suddenly without great envy, if not danger, for their forces at sea considerably exceeded his majesty's, who had but one ship and pinnace to guard his coast. On the other side, he felt that if he should fail to satisfy the Spaniards, he must inevitably incur the displeasure of two princes, who had their ambassadors resident near the king; and whose power in respect of their masters was able to crush him, if he should either wilfully or ignorantly commit the least error. To these observations Cecil replied by the expression of his entire confidence in sir William's discretion. "I omit his lordship's answer," says Monson, "lest I should be charged with vain-glory,—a vice I ever detested. I departed from my lord," he adds, "with this resolution in myself,—above all things to

* Monson, 217.

stand upon his majesty's honor and right, to carry myself like a neuter, to do justice indifferently; and if there happened any question of ambiguity, to acquaint my lord admiral and the lord Cecil, from whom I would be directed in all doubtful and difficult cases."*

The sequel unfortunately proved that Monson's apprehensions were too well founded. He held the post of admiral of the narrow seas for a term of twelve years, but not without entailing upon him much of the anxiety and ill-will he anticipated.

On the 1st of August, accompanied by fifty knights and gentlemen of quality, he repaired to Graveline to receive the ambassador agreeably to his instructions. This grand retinue and the expenses attendant upon it were at his own cost, and were designed to add the more grace to the service. "If my expense in that journey," he observes, "were valued, with the rest of my disbursements for the transportation of princes and ambassadors, for which as yet I have received no satisfaction, it is not the rewards or presents of ambassadors that would countervail the expense of their diet."† The difficulties of his new office commenced the day after his arrival, when he was ordered by the ambassador, the constable of Castile, to go to Dunkirk for the purpose of guarding his provision-barks against the Dutch, who usually rode with a squadron of ships before that town. Monson acted with firmness and candour. He went at once on board the Dutch admiral, who happened to be an old and familiar acquaintance, having served in many actions with him, and told him, that, after twenty years spent in the wars, he had now become a watchman, with a bill in his hand, to see peace kept and no disorders com-

* Monson, 219.

† Monson preserves amongst his tracts a curious account of the disbursements he incurred in the transport of numerous persons of rank and quality during the term of his service in the narrow seas. We insert this table at foot, chiefly as an amusing record of a very troublesome part of his duties. It was drawn up, together with the rest of his reminiscences, at a late period of his life, and it does not appear that he ever received remuneration for the expenses to which it refers.

"A note of such princes, ambassadors, and others, whom sir William Monson transported from the 20th of July, 1604, till the 13th of January, 1616,

mitted in the narrow seas; and that as many outrages and misdemeanours had been offered by the Dutch

---

with the number of their followers, and their meals, at his own charges, aboard his majesty's ships, for which he is as yet unsatisfy'd, and which did amount to the sum of 1500*l.*

Year.	Month.	Day.	Princes, Ambassadors, &c.	Followers.	Meals.
1604	August	4	The constable of Castile, at his coming over - -	200	3
1604	August	31	The constable, at his return - -	300	3
1604	November	7	The duke of Holstein - -	40	2
1604	December	23	The duke of Lenox, at his going into France - -	110	4½
1604	February	28	Two gentlemen of the archduke's chamber - -	10	3
1604	March	13	The duke of Lenox, at his return out of France - -	300	4
1605	April	19	The earl of Hertford, going into Flanders - -	300	4
1605	May	16	The earl, at his return from Flushing - - -	300	4
1605	June	30	The emperor's ambassador - -	70	4
1605	July	25	The emperor's ambassador, at at his return - -	70	4
1605	September	1	The earl of Villa Mediana, aboard five days in foul weather -	200	10
1606	April	21	The marquis of St. Jerman's, coming	50	4
1606	May	3	The same marquis, at his return -	74	4
1606	September	14	Count Vandemont, at his coming over - - -	300	3
1606	October	13	In his return - -	250	3
1607	May	5	Prince Janville, at his coming over	40	4
1607	June	1	At his return - - -	40	4
1607	November	27	The landgrave of Hesse - -	30	4
1608	October	1	The ambassador in ordinary of Venice - - -	40	4
1608	February	25	The Spanish ambassador, Don Hernando Jeron, at his return	30	3
1610	March	25	The duke of Brunswick, coming over	38	5
1610	May	6	Sir Thomas Edmonds and the duke of Wirtemberg's ambassador - - -	50	3
1610	June	3	Don Pedro de Cunaga, at his return	35	5
1610	June	18	The duke of Brunswick, at his return	35	5
1610	August	20	The lord Wotton, going over -	46	1
1611	September	5	The Spanish ladies, coming over -	28	2
1611	February	11	The marshal Laverdin, at his return	200	2
1612	April	23	The duke of Bologne, coming over	200	2
1612	June	27	Don Pedro de Cunaga, coming over	50	3
1612	August	24	The Spanish ladies, returning	25	2
1612	October	16	Don Pedro de Cunaga, at his return	53	3
1613	April	25	The earl of Arundel and his lady going over with the lady Elizabeth Grace, for which I received allowance.		

ships against the English since the death of the queen, he entreated him from henceforward to observe more discretion and mildness, otherwise it would exasperate his majesty and alienate the English hearts from them, whose love they had sufficiently made proof of. The admiral replied, that if the English offered to trade into the archduke's Flemish ports, his commission was to impeach them. Monson advised him, if it were so, to perform his duty in a friendlier spirit than he had hitherto shown; which he promised, but, adds Monson, meant nothing less.*

The pledge of the Hollander was openly and even daringly violated. The Dutch exhibited greater cruelty than ever in taking and burning English ships, and sometimes carried their hostility so far as to murder the crews, while at the same time they suffered their own countrymen to enter the Flemish harbours with impunity. Monson frequently represented these proceedings to Cecil, who, however, from motives of secret policy, was not unwilling to connive at them. He endeavoured also, by all gentle and courteous means, to win over the admiral to a more friendly and humane line of conduct, but in vain. On one occasion a Yarmouth bark was surprised by a Dutch ship in the road of Calais, and seized on the shallow pretence that she was bound for Dunkirk. Monson rescued her, and found fifteen Dutch mariners in her whom he might have executed as pirates; but, being desirous of setting an example of mercy, he dismissed them, after two or three days' imprisonment, with a letter to the admiral, stating what he had done, and hoping that he would act with similar forbearance towards the English. But his generosity was unavailing. The Dutch admiral continued to mark his enmity by every injury and indignity he could commit towards the English flag,—refusing even to strike his topsails and concede other rights due to his majesty's prerogative. The dilemma thickened every day, and rendered Monson's duties more

* Monson.

and more irksome and invidious. Still he was resolved to observe a strict neutrality as long as he could. On the 4th of October, a Dunkirk ship of war arrived in the Downs, where she found three or four Dutch merchant vessels bound for France. Apprehending that she would seize the opportunity to make reprisals, Monson sent for the captain, and warned him not to offer violence to the merchantmen, as they were under his protection. The captain obeyed, and the merchants proceeded on their voyage unmolested. Three days afterwards, three Dutch men of war arrived, and Monson in like manner forbade them to meddle with the Dunkirker. Perceiving, however, that the Dutch acquiesced more from fear than from any respect to his majesty's authority, and that the case was likely to form a precedent for future proceedings, he applied to the lord admiral for instructions; adding his own opinion that it ought to be referred to the captain of the Dunkirker, whether he would retire to the harbour of Dover or Sandwich, or remain in the Downs to take his fortune in case Monson should be commanded on some other duty,—in which case it was not improbable the Dutch ships would take advantage of their superiority. This suggestion was approved of by the lord admiral, and the Dunkirk captain retired to Sandwich. The questions which were likely to arise in other instances, out of this circumstance, appeared so pressing and important, that Monson urged upon the government the necessity of declaring explicitly how far his majesty would protect ships that should repair to his harbours for succour. A proclamation was accordingly issued, prohibiting all nations from offering violence one to another within the compass of a certain line drawn from headland to headland, and providing that any ship, merchant or other, that should first arrive in any of his majesty's harbours, should have two clear tides to depart before she should be pursued by an enemy. This proclamation absolved Monson from a large amount of indefinite and painful responsibility; but, in order to satisfy his own feelings

in the execution of the duties it enjoined, he obtained a ratification of these regulations in a special warrant addressed to himself. Thus doubly protected in the performance of a critical service, he entered upon his task with a determination to enforce the prohibition without respect to any nation that might become involved in the consequences. Nor were occasions long wanted for the exercise of all the energy and tact he could bring to his arduous and onerous employment.

1605. Towards the close of the month of April, he carried the earl of Hertford and sir Thomas Edmonds on their embassy to the archduke;— the former in his own vessel, the Vanguard; and the latter in a pinnace, called The Lion's Whelp. The pinnace was a league behind the admiral's ship, and passing two Dutch ships, was saluted in the usual way; but, by way of putting a disgrace upon her, the trumpeter "blurred with his trumpet, which is held a scorn at sea." Sir Thomas Edmonds was so indignant at this open insult to the national flag, that he caused a piece of ordnance to be shot off for the purpose of calling back the admiral. Upon Monson's arrival, he acquainted him with the affront that had been offered to his majesty's pinnace; when Monson immediately commanded the Dutch captains to attend him on board, threatening to compel them if they refused. He requested lord Hertford and the gentlemen of his train to be present at the interview, so that, if he carried himself otherwise than they approved of, they might have it in their power to control his proceedings. When the Dutch captains made their appearance, Monson demanded, in the first instance, an explicit answer to one question before he entered farther into the business,—namely, whether they were authorised by the States to impeach the free passage of his majesty's ambassadors, or no? and if they were, he required to see their commission,—promising to let them depart without violence, when he had transmitted a copy of it to the king. To this question, the captains frankly replied. that they had no such instructions, and intended

no disrespect; upon which Monson observed, that, as the affront did not proceed from their masters, but from themselves, he would take redress upon them, and afterwards acquaint the States with his reason for doing so. Seeing the dilemma to which they were thus reduced, they earnestly protested that they no hand in the indignity, which they attributed solely to "the lewdness" of their trumpeter; and, lord Hertford interfering on their behalf, Monson dismissed them after they had given a strict promise to punish the offender severely. One of these very captains, who were treated so leniently upon this occasion, committed a foul murder, shortly afterwards, upon some of his majesty's subjects in Ireland; so slight an effect had the moderation of the English upon the temper of the Dutch at that period.

On the 10th of May, Monson anchored in the Downs, where six Dutch ships had recently arrived, apparently with the intention of pursuing a Dunkirker that lay in the harbour of Sandwich. Monson immediately sent for the Dutch captains, caused the proclamation to be translated into Dutch for their perusal, and informed them that, by virtue of his commission, he required them to obey his majesty's injunctions. After an angry discussion, they at length consented to wait two tides after the Dunkirker, on condition that Monson should signify under his hand to the States, that he compelled them to submit to his majesty's proclamation. They were apparently satisfied with this arrangement, which was adopted at their own suggestion; but the next morning they weighed, and sailed to the mouth of Sandwich harbour, when they anchored, one excepted, which lay close to the Dunkirker. The object of this movement could not be mistaken; and Monson immediately set sail, and cast anchor directly between the admiral and vice-admiral, so that he could command them with both his broadsides. The captain of the Dunkirker, finding that, if he attempted to take the tide, the vessel that lay next him was prepared to board him, appealed to Monson, who instantly sent for the

Dutch captains, and reproached them with their flagrant violation of their words, and contempt for his majesty's authority. They did not affect to dissemble their purpose; but plainly told him that they had reflected upon the subject, and that they could not appear before their masters — the States — with safety, if they permitted the Dunkirker to escape. "Upon their answer," says Monson, "I was enraged, and told them that hitherto I had treated them in a friendly and courteous manner, and, in any reasonable man's conceit, had given them good satisfaction in my letter to the States; but seeing they dealt so indirectly, I put them on board their ships again, and willed them to stand upon their selves, and vowed, if one shot was made at the Dunkirker, I would sink them, or they me. When they thus saw I would believe no longer in words, they permitted the Dunkirker quietly to escape, and remained themselves two tides, according to the proclamation." *

These proceedings were witnessed from the shore by the people, who, instead of taking part with the gallantry of the admiral, appear to have sympathised exclusively with his perfidious antagonist. "If your lordships," says Monson, many years afterwards, in his relation of these occurrences to lord chancellor Elsmore and Bacon, then attorney general, "had seen the dispositions and carriage of the people of Sandwich, you would have thought it strange that subjects durst oppose themselves so openly against the state; thousands of people beholding me from the shore, look'd when the sword should make an end of the difference, and publicly wished the success to the Hollanders, cursing both me and his majesty's ship." This extraordinary conduct of the good people of Sandwich, he accounts for by the circumstance, that "most of the inhabitants are either born, bred, or descended from Holland; their religion truly Dutch, as two of the grave ministers of Sandwich have complained to me, protesting they think that town

* Monson, p. 221.

and the country thereabouts swarms as much with sects as Amsterdam."

From these and other circumstances, Monson strongly advised the government of the day to strengthen the town and harbour of Sandwich, which, by its peculir position, is capable of being rendered impregnable. He considered it to be "more naturally seated for strength than any town in the kingdom," while its situation on the coast, being only one night's sail from Flushing, exposes it to an easy descent from Holland, should the Dutch ever be disposed to attempt such an experiment. The haven of Sandwich presents, no doubt, very little temptation to an enemy, as no ships can enter it except upon a flood, and even then none of any great burthen; but the proximity of the Downs, which is only two miles distant, where thousands of the largest vessels might ride in safety, would afford ample refuge in such an enterprise.

The vigilance of the Dutch throughout the year 1605 gave unremitting occupation to the admiral of the narrow seas, who felt the embarrasments of his situation increase upon his hands every day. He was frequently required to perform services which must have overwhelmed him with reproaches if he failed, but from the success of which he could derive neither honour nor advantage. One of these was upon an occasion when the king of Spain attempted to transport 1000 soldiers through the narrow seas to Flanders. In this undertaking only eight ships were employed, as that was the number to which the articles of peace limited the entertainment of Spanish vessels in the English harbours. By some means the Dutch obtained notice of the convoy, and intercepted it at sea. A sanguinary engagement ensued. Many Spaniards were killed and taken prisoners, and the remainder escaped with difficulty into the Dover road, where they were defended by the guns of the castle and platform. Thus protected, they only waited a safe opportunity to pass over to Flanders by stealth; but the Dutch continued to hover round the coast for seven or eight months, knowing that the Spaniards durst not encounter a second

battle. The king, as a neutral power, interceded in their behalf, and sent sir Nevil Charoon over to Holland to solicit a free passage for the beleaguered ships; but the States stood out upon a point of honour, and refused to comply.

Finding all open means of rescuing the Spaniards of no avail, Monson was consulted by lord Salisbury as to the possibility of putting them across the seas without using his majesty's authority or force, or risking an encounter with the Dutch. Sir William replied, that it was a service of great importance,—and the greater, because the honour of two kings was engaged in it; but that, if his lordship would undertake to insure the fulfilment of the directions he should lay down, he had no doubt it could be accomplished.

At this time there were two Spanish ambassadors in London,—the one having just arrived to supersede the other. To these gentlemen the secret plan suggested by Monson was confided, and they required some time to deliberate and communicate with their own court before they would venture to decide upon its adoption. Eight or nine weeks elapsed before they received an answer from Spain. The proposition was fully approved of; and Salisbury, apprising Monson of the result, desired him to perform what he had undertaken with care, as it was a service of extraordinary consequence. Monson does not inform us by what ingenious device he effected this hazardous proceeding, but he completely succeeded in conveying the Spaniards safely to their destination. "The secresy and policy," he says, "that was used to contrive this stratagem, with the several passages that happened, is too tedious to set down; only I will say, that in spite of the fleet of Holland, that usually rid in the mouth of Dover pier, in the road of Graveline and Dunkirk, to impeach the Spaniards' passage, yet they arrived safe in Dunkirk the same night designed for them by sir William Monson to be expected, without the help of his majesty's ships, or other assistance of his

authority." * The Dutch never forgave Monson. They regarded the whole affair as an affront, exposing them to contempt and ridicule; and, suspecting Monson to be the author of the stratagem, they left no arts untried to obtain his removal from the narrow seas. This single act procured him, for the rest of his life, the active hatred of the Dutch nation, and their friends and emissaries in England.

While the Spaniards were lying at Dover, the animosity of the Hollanders nearly led to hostilities with the British admiral. Returning from Calais on the 1st of July, with the emperor's ambassador, Monson discovered an increase of six Dutch ships—one of them with an admiral on board—more than he had left there three days before. As he approached, the Dutch admiral struck his flag thrice, and advanced it again. Suspecting that his arrival at that moment was designed to diminish, in the presence of the ambassador, the estimation in which his majesty's prerogative of the narrow seas was held, Monson hastened to put the ambassador ashore; and then sent a gentleman to entreat the admiral to dinner the next day, which he willingly promised. This gentleman, however, had other business to transact with the admiral besides the delivery of the invitation. Having discharged the courtesy with which he was intrusted, he required the admiral to take in his flag, as a duty due to his majesty's ships. The admiral replied, that he had struck it thrice, which he thought was a sufficient acknowledgment, and which was as much as former admirals of the narrow seas had exacted. To this the gentleman responded, that he had expected such an answer, and was prepared to meet it. He told him that the times were altered; for when the mere ceremony of striking the flag was accounted sufficient, England and Holland were at war with Spain, which induced his majesty to tolerate many things,—such, for instance, as the admiral's wearing his flag in the Cadiz and Island

* Monson, p. 218.

expeditions, when the lord high admiral of England and lord Essex went as generals,—a courtesy which could not be challenged by right, but simply by permission; but now that the wars were ended, his majesty demanded the full recognition of such rights and duties as belonged to his predecessors. The admiral denied the cogency of this reasoning, and refused to comply with the demand, observing, that he expected more indulgence from sir William Monson than from other admirals, in consequence of their long acquaintance. The gentleman replied, that all obligations of private friendship must be laid aside when the honour of one's king and country is at stake; and advising him, in a friendly manner to accede to the request, he told him that, if he did not, it was sir William Monson's intention to weigh anchor, and decide the question by the force of their ships; for that rather than suffer his flag to be worn in view of so many nations, he had resolved to bury himself in the sea. This final warning appears to have had the desired effect; for the Dutch admiral, after some further reflection, took in his flag, and stood out to sea, firing a gun for the rest of the fleet to follow him. "And thus," says Monson, "I lost my guest the next day at dinner, as he had promised." *

Relating this circumstance afterwards to a Spanish general, who, in the time of queen Elizabeth, had been employed under the ambassador Mendoza, the Spaniard observed, that if the Dutch had worn their flag, times must have been greatly altered in England since his old master Philip II. was shot at by the lord admiral of England for wearing his flag in the narrow seas, when he came to marry queen Mary. Monson, however, assured him that this was a mistake; for neither Holland nor any other nation had ever contended the prerogative of the narrow seas; and that the accident to which he alluded arose from the error of a boy, who mistook his orders, and after taking in the flag, put it out again,

* Monson, p. 222.

although he was instructed to take it in altogether; for which mistake the admiral offered a sufficient apology. "Thus I excused their insolency," adds Monson, "lest it should be divulged his majesty's prerogative had been questioned by the Hollanders. Had I yielded to a bare striking their flag, as other admirals had done, his majesty had not reconciled his right again without bloodshed." Yet there is no doubt that the Dutch did attempt to hold the sovereignty of the narrow seas at nought; and only a few years subsequently, an English nobleman, speaking of this transaction, applauded the maintenance of his majesty's rights, which, he said, the Hollanders went about to infringe.

This question of prerogative was necessarily urged with peculiar force upon Monson's attention while he held the command of the narrow seas; and he took considerable pains in his writings to prove that the privilege is authenticated by antiquity and immemorial usage, and that it never was impugned except by the Dutch. It seems that they were not satisfied with flippant insults, calumnies, and malicious practices, but that they even disseminated factious pamphlets in defence of the open liberty of the waters. The king bore their insolence for many years with exemplary patience, to which, however, he was moved rather by his doubts of the policy of embroiling himself in a war in the then state of Europe, than by any disinclination to take revenge upon them, which his navy would have enabled him to have done with signal success at any time. Besides, says Monson, "his majesty graciously imputed the Hollanders' carriage to the rude, rustical, and unmannerly behaviour of some of their captains, who were never taught morality, civility, humanity, or honesty; wherefore his majesty held it fitter, in this case, that their masters — the States — should know their errors by a sharp apprehension, declared by his majesty's resident there abiding, than by any way at present to chastise them." *

* Monson, p. 263.

The States were not unwilling to afford redress in cases of actual aggression, although, from the frequency of the insults offered by the Dutch captains, it is evident they secretly connived at the offences they affected to condemn. In one instance, the captain of a Dunkirk ship, arriving at Portsmouth, and finding his vessel out of repair, sold her, sending back the tackle, ordnance, and rigging on board an English bark. But, in consequence of contrary winds, the bark was compelled to put into the Downs at a time when none of his majesty's ships happened to be riding there. A Dutch vessel, apprised of the circumstance, seized this bark in violation of the law of nations, and carried her into Holland. A statement of the facts was immediately forwarded to the king, who insisted upon and speedily obtained restitution of both ship and goods. The States pretended to censure the conduct of the captain; but the same line of petty insults continued to be pursued nevertheless.*

The next prominent event of the year was still more serious in its results, so far as Monson was personally concerned, than any of the preceding incidents. On the 1st of September, he received a warrant to transport Don John de Taxes, the Spanish ambassador, and all his train to Flanders. Lord Arundel, who was appointed to the service of the archduke, and who ought properly to have accompanied the ambassador, was prohibited from going over in the same vessel, because the Dutch affirmed that it would afford the world an excuse for supposing that England was in league with their enemies. The ambassador, however, obtained a promise that lord Arundel should have a free and safe passage within ten days; but his lordship was determined to evade the injunction, and kept out of the way, in order that he might not receive a command to stay his voyage. Sir William Monson, suspecting his intentions, issued strict orders to all ships and barks, on their peril, not to receive

* Monson, p. 260.

him on board. Intelligence of this proceeding had no sooner reached his lordship, than it determined him to carry his wild project into execution. Having succeeded in corrupting a captain of a king's ship, he disguised himself on the passage, and reached Graveline before the ambassador. Monson was so astonished and disconcerted at finding him there on his arrival, that he expostulated with him somewhat bitterly on his conduct, which the ambassador earnestly disavowed, blaming his lordship's indiscretion with equal severity, as being not unlikely to involve all parties concerned in disagreeable consequences. Lord Arundel, who could offer no justification for so rash a freak, was resolved nevertheless to revenge himself upon Monson for having drawn upon him the censure of the ambassador.

A little before supper, on the same night, news was brought to the ambassador that the Dutch had seized upon his provision ships as they were entering Dunkirk. Lord Arundel took advantage of this circumstance to persuade the ambassador that Monson had betrayed them. At supper, Monson perceived a strangeness in the manner of Don John; and having previously had an intimation of lord Arundel's perfidy, he speedily resolved upon the course he should adopt. Taking his leave for the night, he requested the governor of Graveline to furnish him with horses; and, posting for Dunkirk, he arrived there as the gates were opened the next morning. He found the barks, exactly as they had been reported, in the possession of the Dutch, and instantly wrote to the admiral demanding their release; reminding him, at the same time, that in intercepting the ambassador's provisions he had exceeded his commission,—the States having issued an order for their passage,—and requiring not only that the ships should be immediately discharged, but that he should give a satisfactory answer to the contempt. The admiral replied to the effect that it was true the States had issued such an order for the free passage of the provision ships, but that his commission authorised him to inter-

cept any merchandize that should be transported under colour of the ambassador's furniture; that in one of the barks he had found a fardel of bays, and that, therefore, the seizure was justifiable.

All this was perfectly true. Previously to the ambassador's departure from Sandwich, just as his horses were shipped and the bark was ready to leave the harbour, an informer went on board and seized a fardel of bays, about the value of 10*l.* or 12*l.*, which belonged to one of the ambassador's servants. This proceeding was regarded by Don John as a personal affront, it being obvious that the intention was to cast an indignity upon him; and he declared he would not leave the country until he was righted by his majesty's own order. Monson took an active part in obtaining satisfaction; and by threatening the informer to omplain to the lords, and urging upon him the resentment of his majesty at such an insult offered to an ambassador, he prevailed upon him to restore the fardel; but the informer, mortified at his disapointment, secretly wrote to the farmers of the customs to let them know that Monson countenanced and carried over uncustomed goods concealed in the ambassador's provisions. Private information was also given to the Dutch fleet, then in the Downs, of what had taken place, and the Hollanders accordingly arrested the vessels on their arrival in Dunkirk.

Being in possession of these facts, and aware of the right of the Dutch admiral to detain the goods, Monson wrote to him, acknowledging that he was justified in what he had done by the strict letter of his commission, but adding that, as the value was so small, and especially as it had already been questioned at Sandwich, he would feel himself personally obliged if the admiral would either restore the seizure or keep it in his hands for fourteen days. To the latter request he consented; and Monson, after having given assurance to the ambassador that he would procure the release of the barks, returned to England and laid a statement of

the whole affair before the lord treasurer Dorset, informing him fully of the conduct of lord Arundel and of the complaint made to the farmers of the customs. The lord treasurer acted promptly upon these representations. The informer was imprisoned in the gatehouse, and released only at the special suit of Monson; the captain who conveyed lord Arundel was displaced, and kept for a long time in prison: and the fardel was restored to the governor of Dunkirk by a letter from sir Nevil Charoon.*

Upon all such occasions, Monson acted with so much energy and discretion that he incurred fresh hatred at the hands of the Dutch; which the renegades of Sandwich laboured incessantly to foment into an open rupture. Wherever Monson fell in with any of the ships of Holland, some insult was almost certain to be cast upon him; but especially if there happened to be a Spanish minister on board. "I observed," he says, "at all times that I was to transport a Spanish ambassador, the Hollanders laboured to show some point of insolency; as I remember at the return of the marquis of St. Germain's, I met a Dutch fleet in the midst of the Channel, convoyed by a man of war, who would not take in his flag, till I was forced to use violence. I could entertain your lordships with a volume of these discourses; but what I have said is sufficient to show the arrogant and unmannerly carriage of the Hollanders, who ambitiously desire to encroach upon his majesty's jurisdiction. Had I connived at them, I had purchased less hate of them and their well-wishers."†

The Hollanders were not the only people, however, who invaded the privileges of the English coast; for we find that, about this time, the towns of Rye and Hastings complained bitterly of the conduct of the French, who almost ruined them by encroaching on their fishing, in violation of the articles of agreement

* Monson, pp. 223, 224. † Ibid.

between the two countries. Sir William Monson was employed to redress this great grievance, in which he completely succeeded, but not without being compelled to resort to force which cost the lives of several Frenchmen. This service occupied him throughout intervals for two years. He appears to have been deeply impressed with the importance of protecting and encouraging the fisheries, and dedicates one of his books expressly to the subject; pointing out in detail the manner in which the Dutch carried on their fisheries with so much prosperity, and showing how "a fishery could be set up on the coast of England, Scotland, and Ireland, with the benefit that would accrue by it to all his majesty's three kingdoms." In the course of this elaborate treatise, he avows the interest he had always taken in the inquiry. "I confess this fishing," he observes, "is a business I have taken into consideration. My lord of Northampton, if he were now living, was able to witness how much it was solicited and desired by me, and no less wished and desired by his lordship. I caused one Tobias Gentleman, a mariner by profession, but indeed a man of better parts than ordinary seamen, and much practised in their northern fishing, to dedicate a book to his lordship, which gave particular notice of the Hollanders' proceedings in their pinks and busses, and what we shall do in the imitation of them." * The adventurous spirit of the age was averse to an employment so tranquil and so near home as the coast fisheries; besides that it was generally believed that we could not compete with the Dutch in a branch of industry in which they had hitherto excelled all other nations. Sir William combated both fallacies, and maintained that the cultivation of the fisheries was more likely to advance the general prosperity of the country, than the colonial enterprises in which so much capital and energy were embarked; while he proved the practicability of successfully rivalling Holland in her great staple of fish. "My

* Monson, p. 479.

meaning is," he says in his "Book of Fishery," addressed to the king, "not to leave our fruitful soil untilled, our seas unfrequented, our islands unpeopled, or to seek remote and strange countries disinhabited, and uncivil Indians untamed, where nothing appears to us but earth, wood, and water at our first arrival; for all other hope must depend on our labours and costly expenses, on the adventures of the sea, on the honesty of undertakers: and all these at last produce nothing but tobacco—a new-invented useless weed, as too much use and custom make it apparent. In what I propound, I will not direct you to the eloquence of books to persuade, to the inventing wits to entice, to the affecting traveller to encourage, nor to any man that with fair words may abuse you; you shall know as much as I can say, in casting a line and hook into the sea. His majesty doth instantly challenge his own; and by example of one line and net, you may conjecture by multiplication the profit that will arise from the work. You shall be made to know, that though you be born in an island seated in the ocean, frequented by invisible fish, swimming from one shore to the other, yet your experience has not taught you the benefits and blessings arising from that fish. I doubt not but to give you that light therein, that you shall confess yourselves blinded, and be willing to blow from you the foul mist that has been an impediment to your sight; you shall be awakened from your drowsy sleep, and rouse yourselves to follow this best business that ever was presented to England, or king thereof,—nay, I will be bold to say, to any state in the world. I will not except the discovery of the West Indies by Columbus; an act of greatest renown, of greatest profit, and that has been of greatest consequence to the Spanish nation." *

The obvious advantages derived by the Dutch from their fisheries is referred to by Monson as affording an unanswerable proof of the necessity which then existed, and which must at all times exist, of legislating vigilantly

* Monson, pp. 475, 476.

for the encouragement and security of the English fishermen. "The Hollanders," he says, "by their long travels, their excessive pains, their ingenious inventions, their incomparable industry and provident care, have exceeded all other nations in their adventures and commerce, and made all the world familiar with them in traffick; whereby we may justly attribute to them, what the Chinese assumed to themselves,—That only they have two eyes, the Europeans but one, and all the rest of the world none. How can this better appear than out of their labours and our fish only?" *

The practice of the Dutch was to vend their fish in all the European markets, and bring back in exchange the productions of the different countries; so that their "ships were continually going and bringing inestimable profit, like a weaver's shuttle, he casts from one end to another, ever in action, till his gain appear in the cloth he makes." It appears also, that, taking advantage of the indolence of the English, they used to come into our waters, and take the fish we neglected. "There are three fishes of little note," says sir William, "and not regarded by us, which they make gain of themselves:— the first is lobsters, the greatest part whereof that serves London, at the time of year, they bring from the furthest northern part of England, which is never practised by the English. The second is, the great quantity of oysters yearly transported by them into Holland, which causeth the decrease and dearness of oysters among us. The third is lampreys, out of the river of Thames, which they use for bait for cod in the north seas; and this is the cause of the scarcity and dearness of this fish in London." All classes of persons in Holland were more or less engaged in this profitable business; and Monson says, that it was owing to the strength and fame they gained by land and sea through their fishing, that they were enabled to maintain the war against so potent an enemy as the king of Spain.

* Monson, p. 477.

Nine thousand Dutch vessels were kept in constant employment by the fisheries, and such was the vast extent of the trade, that "if the food of fish were prohibited," says Monson, "by all sorts of Christians, and duly observed, it would lessen the number of shipping three parts in five." The transfer of a great portion of their European traffic to the fisheries of England merely required succour from the government and the infusion of capital in the commencement. The materials used by the Dutch were to be had cheaper in England than in Holland, and all other expenses would have been considerably less*, so that nothing was wanted but resolution and perseverance to convert the coasts into a permanent source of national profit. Several acts of parliament were passed with a view to the encouragement of the fisheries; one of the most important of which was an act for enforcing the rigid observance of Lent. By this act, butchers were prohibited from killing meat in Lent except for the use of the Navy, and peace officers were authorised to enter all houses of entertainment in the county, and seize all meat they should find there in the forbidden season. Monson highly approved of this measure, and desired in addition that a prohibition should be issued, such as there was in Holland, to prevent all persons, except the subjects of his majesty, from bringing fish into the kingdom. He also suggested that the rural populati might be compelled to become regular consumers of fish in exchange for the productions of the soil. "Neither," says he, "will it seem a thing unreasonable to enjoin every yeoman and farmer within the kingdom to take a barrel of fish for their own spending, considering they save the value thereof in other victuals; and that it is no more than the fishermen will do to them, to take off

* "In a buss of fifteen or sixteen men, the meanest amongst the Hollanders has twenty shillings a month, and we will ease the charge of wages eight in sixteen in our fishing about the Lewes, viz., we will carry but eight men to the place of fishing, where we will hire eight more for less than half the wages we give the rest, and herein shall we save forty-eight pounds a-year in every buss, by means whereof we shall go cheaper than the Hollanders nine thousand six hundred pounds in our two hundred busses. And moreover in the wages and victuals of the men, we shall save so much as will come to sixteen hundred pounds."—*Monson*, p 482.

their wheat, malt, butter, and cheese, for their food at sea.° The farmer by this means shall never be unprovided of fish, to observe the days commanded by his majesty, without sending to the market, as otherwise they would be compelled to do." The policy of such compulsory enactments is at all times very doubtful; and any attempt to enforce them upon religious grounds in the reign of James would probably have been attended with fatal results.

One of the temptations presented by the occupation of fishing, is the safety with which it may be pursued, in comparison with all other services at sea. "The only thing that is required in it," says Monson, "is labour and pains; for danger is little to be regarded, considering it is not far from home we are to seek our profit, nor our harbours so few, but they may be entered for our safeties both day and night, by erecting lights." The greatest danger to which the fishermen were exposed, was interruption by pirates, — "the very scum of a commonwealth, and people to be abhorred by all honest and industrious men." At that time they infested the coasts so thickly, and committed such extensive depredations, that it became necessary at last to adopt systematic measures for their suppression. The most heartless part of their conduct appears to have been the injuries they inflicted upon the poor fishermen.

"It is usual," says Monson, "when these miscreants fail of relief of victuals, and are made desperate by want of it, to place all their hope of food upon the poor painful fishermen, who, we may truly say, get their living with more hazard, with more pains, with more cold and watching, than any other trade or people whatsoever; their labour produces nothing that is ill, but the best help for man, which is food to live on.

"Husbandmen and fishermen are the upholders of commonwealths; all other people live by their labours. They are stewards to provide sustenance to feed on; and yet, comparing them together, there is great differ-

ence in their lives and pains: the husbandman's work is without danger or hazard; if it be wet, he has present help of fire to dry him; he is allowed a bed instead of the other's board to lie on; his diet is certain, and in a quiet manner, when the others are tossed to and fro without a steadfast standing; if the one be cold he may recover himself with exercise and work: if the other be cold, he is made colder, his labour being in cold water: the one keeps his certain hour for sleep; the other has no certain time to rest, but must attend his danger, which he is never free from; every hour he must be ready to look out for his shoal of fish, to watch his opportunity of weather and tide to take them: the one has pleasure on holidays, and is free from labour; all days are alike to the other, and the Sundays can give no more content or comfort, than the rest of the week.

"What heart can be so hardened, or pirate so pitiless, as to disturb those harmless and innocent creatures, that make pain their pleasure, and their labour their country's plenty, procuring good for it by their own toils." *

The alarms occasioned by the pirates on the Scottish coast rose at length to such a height, that his majesty was earnestly importuned to furnish some ships for the immediate protection of that part of the kingdom, and sir William Monson and sir Francis Howard were despatched in such haste that the provision for their vessels was sent after them. They left Margate on the 14th of May, 1614, and arrived at Leith on the 23d. Sir William Monson immediately went to Edinburgh, and presenting himself to the lords of that realm, desired to be put in possession of the requisite information respecting the number and haunts of the pirates, and to be provided with able pilots, as the ships he commanded were of greater bulk than were usually employed on those coasts, the navigation of which was for the most part unknown to the English. Their lordships recommended the discharge of these demands

1614.

* Monson, p. 497.

to the Trinity-house at Leith; and pilots being accordingly provided, the vessels sailed without loss of time for the Orkney islands.

They reached Sinclair Castle on the 1st of June,—the residence of the earl of Caithness, and the utmost promontory of Great Britain. Here they found that the accounts of the pirates had been strangely magnified; from twenty in number they dwindled down to two; and both of these were men of base condition—one of them having been but a short time before boatswain's mate to sir William in the narrow seas, and the other a common sailor. Nor could the latter be fairly considered a pirate, for he had no sooner discovered the real nature of their lawless courses than he abandoned them, and placed himself in the hands of the earl of Caithness, where Monson found him and his bark, and brought both away. Clarke, the boatswain's mate, had been ashore the day before, receiving friendly entertainment from the earl, whose house and tenants were so exposed to his depredations that his lordship thought it prudent to maintain pacific relations with him; but hearing that sir William was approaching, he left the coast and fled into the island, where he recruited himself by levying spoils on the poor fishermen. Sir William Monson, finding it useless to remain at Caithness, passed on to the island of Orkney, where he left sir Francis Howard in guard of the coast, proceeding himself in pursuit of Clarke. After some time spent at sea, exploring every place where there was a probabilityof finding the pirate, he put into the island of Shetland, and went from thence to the Hebrides, whose inhabitants he describes as being more brutal and uncivilised than the savages of America. Disappointed in the object of his search, he changed his course, and sailed for Broad Haven in Ireland, a harbour much frequented by pirates in consequence of its security and remoteness, few people being acquainted with it, and the pirates being particularly drawn there by a resident gentleman, "who spared not his own daughters to bid them welcome." The danger he incurred in this expedition was

very great. Before he came in sight of the coast of Ireland, he met with so furious a storm and ground sea, "that it were fit only for a poet to describe." Of the four vessels he had in company, one was swallowed up in the ocean, and the other three were dispersed, and never saw each other again until they met in England.

On the 28th of June, he arrived at Broad Haven, "the well-head of all pirates." The only person in his ship, who was acquainted with the place, was the pirate he had taken from the earl of Caithness, and he made a profitable use of this man in the execution of the ingenious stratagem he resorted to on this occasion. As soon as he came to an anchor, he made choice of such persons of his company as had formerly been pirates, and sent them to "the gentleman of the place" with a ready-made story well calculated to impose upon that worthy individual. The man who was chiefly trusted with this service, described Monson as a pirate, under the name of captain Manwaring, spoke boastfully of the wealth he had on board, and extolled his royal disposition and the liberality he extended to those who showed him courtesy. To give a greater appearance of truth to all this, the crafty messenger used the names of several pirates of his acquaintance, and feigned messages to the women from their sweethearts, making them believe that he had tokens from them on board. The hope of wealth and reward set the hearts of the whole family on fire; and the women were so overjoyed by the love tales and presents, that no suspicion of deceit entered into their minds.

Mr. Cormat, the gentleman of the place, acted warily, notwithstanding, and, absenting himself from the house, left his wife and "hackney daughters" to entertain the new guests till he saw the coast clear; then returning home, he proffered his services to captain Manwaring, recounting the favours he had bestowed upon sundry pirates, at imminent peril to himself, and volunteering to send two gentlemen of trust on board the next morning by way of assurance of his sincerity. In the mean

while he advised them to send some of their men on shore, armed, that it might appear their cattle was taken by violence; and he would appoint a place where his own cattle should be found with their ears split, to distinguish them from other beasts. Thus far the plot was carried on with complete success, and the messengers returned to the vessel at night. The next morning, at dawn of day, the comedy began. Captain Chester went on shore with fifty armed men in a disorderly manner, like pirates; the cattle were killed; and the captain, in a secret manner, invited to Cormat's house, — coming, however, publicly, to make it appear that he came without invitation. He received a riotous welcome, especially from the daughters, who were impatient to obtain the tokens from their sweethearts, and to see captain Manwaring, who, it was expected, would enrich them all.

Cormat strictly fulfilled all his undertakings. The two ambassadors went on board agreeably to his undertaking, and delivered a friendly message to sir William, who now began to think that the play was sufficiently advanced for a discovery. When they had delivered their message, sir William desired them to observe every thing around them carefully, and to tell him whether they thought that ship and company were pirates? It was idle to dissemble any longer, especially as these men could not, if they would, betray sir William's design. He accordingly reproached them for their transgressions, told them to prepare for death, and ordered them to be put into irons, taking care that neither boat nor man should be allowed to go on shore until he was ready to land.

The time now approached for sir William to visit the gentleman's house, and four or five hundred people collected to attend him from the sea-side. He affected to be shy of such a multitude, and to entertain some fear of treachery; at which they redoubled their protestations of friendship, confirmed by all manner of oaths and vows, and three of the principal men ran up to their arm-pits in water, striving who should have the

honour of carrying captain Manwaring on shore. One of these was an Englishman, and formerly a London tradesman; another was a schoolmaster; and the third a Galloway merchant, whose chief business was to trade with the pirates. These three men conducted sir William to Cormat's house amidst general rejoicings, and every body strained forward to obtain a sight of the munificent captain Manwaring. "Happy was he," says Monson, "to whom he would lend his ear. Falling into discourse, one told him they knew his friends, and though his name had not discovered it, yet his face did shew him to be a Manwaring. In short, they made him believe he might command them and their country, and that no man ever was so welcome as captain Manwaring."

When he reached Cormat's house, the three "hackney daughters" conducted him to the hall, strewn with rushes for the occasion, where a harper, seated in a corner, played merrily for the guests. Endless inquiries were made for the far distant lovers; the two unlucky ambassadors who were supposed to be carousing in the ship, were made the subject of many broad jokes, and the women offered to dance, one of them selecting sir William,—an honour, however, which he declined, while he gave permission to the rest of the company to join in the festivity. In the height of these tumultuous enjoyments, the Englishman was particularly pleasant. He seemed as if new life had been infused into him; showed sir William a pass he had procured on false pretences from the sheriff, authorising him to travel from Clare to make inquisition of goods, which he affected to have lost at sea; laughed heartily at the sheriff for being made the dupe of such a story, and explained to sir William the advantage that might be made of the pass in sending to and fro in the country without suspicion. "His antick behaviour," says sir William, "was enough to put the melancholiest man in good humour; sometimes he played the part of a commanding sheriff; then he acted his own, with many witty

passages how he deceived the sheriff." The exuberance of his devotion to captain Manwaring so completely mastered all considerations of danger, that he proffered him the service of ten mariners who lay lurking in the neighbourhood, expecting the arrival of men-of-war, and who were entirely at his command. Sir William, of course, embraced the offer, with a promise of reward, and caused the mercurial Englishman to redeem his undertaking at once, by writing for the men, which he did as follows:—"Honest brother Dick, and the rest, we are all made men; for valiant captain Manwaring and all his gallant crew are arrived in this place. Make haste; for he flourisheth in wealth, and is most kind to all men. Farewel; and once again make haste."

Sir William took charge of this letter, with the pass inclosed in it, and would doubtless have availed himself of it to capture the runaways, but night drawing in it was necessary to bring the play to a conclusion. Desiring the harp to cease playing, he commanded silence, and proceeded to address his motley and astonished audience. He told them that, hitherto, they had played their part, and he had no share in the comedy; but though his was last, and might be termed the epilogue, yet it would prove more tragical than theirs. He undeceived them as to his being a pirate, but that, on the contrary, he was a scourge to all such, and was sent by his majesty to discover, suppress, and punish them and their abettors, whom his majesty did not think worthy the name of subjects. He informed them that he had received information of Cormat's practices, and that he could devise no better expedient to confirm the truth of it than by assuming the habit of a pirate; that they had made themselves guilty in the eyes of the law without farther accusations; and that there now remained nothing but to proceed to their executions, by virtue of his commission; for which purpose he had brought a gallows ready framed, which he caused to be set up, intending to begin the mournful dance with the two men they

thought had been merry-making aboard the ship. As to the Englishman, he should come next, because, being an Englishman, his offence did surpass the rest. He told the schoolmaster he was a fit tutor for the children of the devil, and that as members are governed by the head, the way to make his members sound was to shorten him by the head, and therefore willed him to admonish his scholars from the top of the gallows, which should be a pulpit prepared for him. He condemned the merchant as a receiver of stolen goods, and worse than the thief himself; reminding him that his time was not long, and hoping that he might make his account with God, and that he might be found a good merchant and factor to him though he had been a malefactor to the law. The mirth of the goodly assemblage was now on the sudden turned into mourning; and Cormat and his associates abandoned themselves to despair. Night having now arrived, sir William retired to his ship, leaving the carpenter ashore to finish the gallows, which was done next morning, and the prisoners were brought out to die. But it was not sir William's intention to act with such severity, and, being sued strenuously by the people, he accepted their promise never to connive at pirates again, and "after four and twenty hours fright in irons, he pardoned them."*

The Englishman was the only individual who suffered any actual punishment. He was banished from the coast, and a copy of his pass sent to the sheriff with a hint to be more cautious in future in granting his safe conduct.

The next morning, while he was at anchor in Broad Haven, sir William descried a ship bearing into the harbour, which by her working he judged to be a pirate. Having the opportunity of a heavy fog, he put himself into his boat, hoping, although it blew strongly, to come upon her unawares; but just as he was within shot of her the fog cleared up, and the pirate, perceiving him,

* Monson, p. 228.

cut cable, and stood off to sea, the admiral pursuing at great risk of being drowned in his boat. For six days she kept the sea in foul weather, and anchored on the seventh at an island within seven leagues of Broad Haven, where no attempt could be made upon her in consequence of the wind. Under shelter of the darkness of night, the pirate contrived to despatch a letter secretly to Cormat, who, terrified by the peril from which he had so recently escaped, carried it immediately to sir William. The terms of the letter were sufficiently indicative of the pirate's fears:—"Dear Friend,—I was bearing into Broad Haven to give you corn for ballast, but I was frighted by the king's ship, I supposed to be there. I pray you send me word what ship it is; for we stand in great fear. I pray you, provide me two kine; for we are in great want of victuals: whensoever you shall make a fire on shore, I will send my boat to you."*

Sir William dictated the answer to this momentous epistle, and made Cormat sign it, to the effect that "he rejoiced to hear of his health, and desired to see him. He bid him be confident this ship could not endanger him; for she was not the king's, as he imagined, but one of London that came from the Indies with her men sick, and many dead. He promised him two oxen and a calf; to observe his directions by making a fire; and gave him hope to see him within two nights."†

Three or four of the ship's company, disguised in Irish habits, were sent to accompany the messenger, with instructions to remain in ambush. The pirates kept an anxious look out for the beacon fire, and it was no sooner lighted than they rowed ashore, making no delay, but receiving the letter and hastily returning to their vessel. Cormat's assurances gave them the utmost confidence, and, to make amends for the six days of foul weather at sea, they surrendered themselves to the most extravagant rejoicings. In the mean while, sir William was quietly effecting the plan he had secretly laid for their

* Monson, p. 229. † Ibid.

capture. Understanding that there was "a nook of land two miles in breadth," which separated the river where the pirates lay from another river which flowed into the sea opposite to the island, he took several of the Irish, without communicating his intentions to them, and, with the help of his own company, caused them to draw two boats over land; and having reached the other river, he made them row thirty miles to the place where it was agreed the fire should be made. The Irish who assisted at this manœuvre were quite as much astonished at it as the pirates, who were so amazed when sir William appeared amongst them, that "they had not power to resist, but yielded like so many wolves caught in their own snares." The whole gang were seized and carried to Broad Haven, where the captain was executed as an example to the rest, as much mercy being shown to his associates as the rigorous character of the admiral's instructions would permit. By this achievement the pirates were effectually banished from Broad Haven, and for some time afterwards they wholly abandoned the Irish coast.

The country was so completely cleared of the sea-faring adventurers, that sir William went, to use his own words, "groping along the coast," not being able to procure a pilot; touching on the 12th of July at Vintry, which had relieved him twice before; and making a complete circuit of the three kingdoms before he reached the Downs, on the 18th of August.

This was the last voyage sir William Monson made in the reign of king James, and the last year but one he served in the narrow seas. But he was not yet quite done with the pirates. Soon after his return from Ireland, he despatched a bark to that coast to obtain information as to how matters were going on, and whether the severe course he had taken had produced any beneficial effects. The first harbour on the Irish coast at which the bark arrived, she met a pirate vessel commanded by one captain Tucker, a regularly bred seaman, and noted for his expertness in his profession. This man endea-

voured to insinuate himself into the acquaintance of the person intrusted with the bark, hoping through that means to obtain his pardon from the government; and he succeeded so far that, although that individual was strictly ordered to keep watch on the northern parts of Ireland, and there to inquire into the conduct of pirates, and the reception given to them by the people, he returned to the admiral with a letter of submission from Tucker, throwing himself entirely upon his mercy, sending him at the same time a handsome present, — "but," says Monson, "I was always cautious in such cases how to connive at pirates, as in my letter I expressed," — and promising to remain a certain time on the coast, in the expectation of an answer. The winds, however, happening to be contrary, sir William expected that Tucker would leave Ireland before his answer could reach him; and he accordingly transmitted numerous copies of his reply by different vessels, sailing in different directions, hoping that some of them might chance to fall in with the pirate. As he anticipated, Tucker left the coast, but, taking a northern course, he missed all the vessels, and being in distress for provisions he fell upon the fishermen, and then made sail for the north of Farro, where he met with another pirate, who, as the event proved, was even less honest than himself. "These two consorted together," says sir William, "as thieves use to do, in mischief." It does not appear, however, that their concert lasted very long, or was productive of any benefit in common.

The navigation about the Farro islands is attended with considerable danger, owing to the great tides and their setting; and Tucker's ship, in company with his companion, was wrecked on the rocky shore. Monnocho, as his companion falsely called himself, recognised no distinctions in cases of this kind between friends and enemies: all spoils which he had the power of taking were alike to him; and instead of affording help to his comrade in distress, he played the part of a hawk over his prey, seizing upon the whole of Tucker's wealth,

and treating the unfortunate man and his company with the utmost cruelty. Apprehensive, however, that if he detained them in his own ship they might make a faction against him, he captured an English fisherman, and put Tucker and his followers into her to seek a new fortune. "And here they parted company," adds the chronicler, "like two wolves, that they should separate themselves to seek their prey, they care not where, nor of whom, purposing never to see one another, unless the gallows gave them a meeting." The sequel of their adventures affords a remarkable illustration of the inscrutable agency of divine retribution.

Monnocho and Tucker directed their barks to opposite points of the compass; the former scouring the waters about the Farro islands, and the latter taking his chance in another direction in the open sea. A very short time elapsed before Monnocho, growing bold by long impunity, made a venture into Denmark, where he was seized, and where he expiated his crimes on the gallows, hanging "a spectacle for all men to behold."

In the mean while, Tucker's tyranny over the poor fishermen, in whose boat he and his lawless companions were cast to the mercy of the ocean, generated a spirit of revenge amongst them that speedily sought and obtained ample satisfaction. The fishermen saw their provisions diminishing day after day, and found themselves subjected to so much oppression, and compelled into such iniquitous acts, that they resolved to watch an opportunity of rising in mutiny against the pirates. The attempt proved fortunate, and, after a fierce struggle, some of the pirates were slain, others wounded, and the remainder, including Tucker, were carried in chains to shore, and delivered over to the hands of justice. Tucker was committed to the Marshalsea in Southwark, and being hourly in expectation of his well-deserved doom, he bethought him of sir William Monson, and appealed to his merciful interposition as the last hope that remained to him; reminding him of his former desire to abandon his wicked way of life, and of

the great misfortune that befell him, in not being able to wait long enough on the Irish coast for sir William's answer. "I confess," says the old admiral, "I was much moved and grieved with his calamity, when I remembered how his penitency appeared in his former letter to me, repenting his misdoings, and detesting his kind of life, with a desire of pardon and forgiveness of his offences past."

1616. The application came at an unlucky moment, for just at this time some powerful influences were working at court for the ruin of Monson, whose invidious command in the narrow seas had brought many dangerous enemies upon him. But, being prompt in whatever he undertook, he was able to effect Tucker's pardon and release before those secret machinations succeeded in depriving him of his interest with the government.

Tucker was now at liberty. But all his resources were gone, and he was equally bare of means and friends. His gratitude, however, to Monson, determined him to remain in London until he could see his benefactor and, acknowledging the great obligation he owed him, make a solemn protestation of a total amendment of his life. Monson felt that his repentance was sincere; and knowing that his credit was lost, and that nobody would trust him with a stock to begin any honest business, he generously restored to him the greater part of the valuable token Tucker had formerly sent to him from Ireland.

The reformed pirate was not long determining his choice of occupations, and embarking his little capital in a freight at sea, he made a voyage to Denmark, whither he had often traded before. Having safely arrived there, he set about his affairs with zeal; but one day happening to pass a river, he fell in with a ferryman who knew him [illegible], and who had formerly been taken by [illegible] enemies and treated with severity. The man no sooner recognised him, than he hastened to a magistrate, and speedily obtained a warrant for his apprehension; which was the more readily granted, as the Danes exhibited

great alacrity and vigour in their prosecution of such offenders. Tucker was immediately arrested, carried to prison, tried, and sentenced to death on the evidence of the fisherman. But the most remarkable part of the case was, that the gibbet on which he was executed, adjoined that on which Monnocho, his former companion, was still hanging; so rapidly, so certainly, and with such singular coincidence, did the judgment of Heaven overtake their offences.

"These two men's cursed courses," observes sir William Monson, "are not unlike a novel; first in their unexpected meeting in remote islands, where they were both strangers; secondly, that upon their meeting they protested and vowed friendship; though I must say, that the agreement of ill men in mischief cannot be called friendship: But call it what you will, it did not long continue; for there was a bone cast between them, as it were, between two ravenous mastiffs, to strive for, and the stronger to carry it away. After these two pirates had parted company, the one stood to the northward, the other to the southward, a quite opposite course to one another, and where there was never likelihood of meeting more; but rather to avoid and eschew each other, their quarrel was so mortal; and yet both of them tasted one fortune alike; first in their apprehension, and after in their manner of execution; but above all, the place never doubted or feared by them; and where, perhaps, in many ages, the like will not happen again, it being out of the road-way for such people to resort to."*

When Monson accepted the appointment of admiral of the narrow seas, he was not unmindful of the difficulties against which he should have to contend, arising from the jealousy and malice of the Dutch. In other respects the post was easy enough. "I must say," he observes, "that as in former imployments, I went not without danger of life by enemies, by the peril of sea

* Monson, p. 499.

and famine, as I have formerly repeated; in this imployment I was to fear neither foe nor famine, the king having a general peace with all princes and nations, and my imployment being not so far from home, but that in few days I might be supplied with victuals; though I account another danger greater than the rest, which consisted in accidents of the sea, and extremity of storms and foul weather, in the south and straitest part of England, where commonly I was to lie at anchor; and upon any occasion being put from my anchors, the narrowness of the seas betwixt land and land, would put me in imminent danger of shipwreck and life. The shoals and sands were no less dangerous, considering that very often we were to be attended with fogs and mists; besides, that we were sometimes put to double a lee-shore, which, if we failed of, we presently perished."* But such perils as these were held lightly by Monson, in comparison with the suspicions, slanders, and ingratitude to which the faithful discharge of his duties constantly exposed him. The convoy of the Spanish ministers, the assertion of the neutrality of the English waters, and the frequent necessity of compelling the Dutch to acknowledge the supremacy of the British flag in the narrow seas, rendered him a mark for falsehood and treachery on all sides, and it would have been utterly impossible for any man to have carried himself honestly through such a conflict of warring interests, without incurring malevolent and unjust aspersions. The only matter for surprise is, that his strict impartiality did not much earlier draw down upon him the vengeance of his enemies; and that, having at last fallen under their venom, he was not utterly crushed by their influence. The actual and immediate pretext upon which he was removed from his appointment and committed to the Tower, is not distinctly stated either by himself or any contemporary writers; but it appears that the insinuations which were thrown out against him at court had

* Monson, p. 472.

the effect at last of bringing him into temporary disgrace. He frequently alludes to this circumstance incidentally in his tracts, always in terms of proud resentment, but never enters into any specific details. After having described the risks of the station in which he was employed, he goes on to speak of the still greater risks he ran at the hands of secret foes. "But," he says, "God so provided for me, that I escaped all these hazards; and at last found malice had a greater power and force against me, then by sea I found, or otherwise I deserved; for when I thought to have left my painful labours at sea, to have enjoy'd tranquillity of peace on land, envy unluckily and unlooked for seized upon my innocency. For, being thought a bosom friend to a nobleman I much honour'd, who at that time began to be aimed at, and was afterwards borne down by a court faction, though I was one of the meanest in number, and unworthy to have knowledge taken of me, as a man of no eminency; yet, considering how my estate then stood by my engagements, and otherwise, I found fortune more aversed to me than most of the others had felt, by malicious practices."*

There seems to be no doubt that the zeal with which he acted against the Dutch, and the active part he took in promoting an inquiry into the state of the navy a year or two before, to the undisguised mortification of the earl of Nottingham, who was then lord high admiral, were the principal causes of his troubles. Some odium also fell upon him in consequence of the energy with which he pursued and overtook the lady Arabella Stuart after her escape in 1611, although, in doing so, he acted in strict accordance with his orders. The circumstances connected with this event are not a little curious, and are thus dimly indicated by himself. "Many other accidents," he informs us, "happen'd in the narrow seas, that need no remembrance; and I will conclude with the escape of the lady Arabella,

* Monson, p. 472.

twenty-four hours before sir William Monson had order to pursue her; which he did with that celerity that she was taken within four miles of Calais, shipp'd in a French bark of that town, whither she was bound. The manner is so commonly known, that no more needs be said, but that it was done; though the accident was so strange and unlook'd for, that few could be persuaded but that her escape was plotted, with an intent to take her again. And it was the rather believed, because sir William was not rewarded according to the importance of that service."* The lady was confined in the Tower, in consequence, as it was pretended, of her marriage with Mr. Seymour; but the real cause of her confinement was that she was too closely allied to the crown,—a fact which had a greater influence over the conduct of the government than sir William appears to have suspected.

Immediately after his arrest, sir William was examined by chief justice Cooke, and secretary Winwood, at Hatton House, but no transgression of any kind could be established against him. When he was brought before them, he demanded that they would inquire into his behaviour and the course of his life from infancy, and hoped that it would prove loyal, honest, and spotless. And he adds, "as a second suit, I humbly desire that either they, or any other, would examine the service I have done to the state in the time of the late queen, when there was greatest occasions for men to show their abilities and deserts; as also what imprisonment I have endured in Spain; what famine, hurts, and other casualties I suffered; what wealth has been brought into England by my means; with what hazard and fortunate success I have obtained both wealth and victory, as in particular, and which is freshest in memory, the last carrack, valued at almost 200,000*l.*, and disposed of by his majesty at his accession to the crown."† A man under such circumstances might be fairly ex-

* Monson, p. 218. † Ibid. p. 225.

cused for referring to his past services in vindication of his conduct and character, and he elsewhere justly exults in the unimpeachable fidelity and correctness with which his duties were uniformly executed. "I will boldly and truly say," he observes, speaking of his employment under king James in the narrow seas, "there was never service neglected, omitted, or misperformed, that I was commanded upon; which I look upon as strange, and not to be paralleled by any that enjoyed his employment before: and if that time be considered, six years of them twelve bred many doubts and differences, how an English admiral should carry himself betwixt the Hollanders and Spaniards, the wars continuing between them; yet such was his hap and care, that he committed no error for the one or the other justly to except against him." *

1617

The unspotted clearness with which his reputation passed through this painful ordeal, showed how groundless were the malicious charges, whatever they may have been, that were brought against him; and the term of his imprisonment must have been very brief, as we find him consulted in the following year by the privy council as to the best manner of suppressing the pirates and laying siege to Algiers. He bore the whole of this most unmerited indignity with fortitude, although it greatly injured his fortunes; and, in after life, he refers to his own conduct on this occasion as furnishing a seasonable example of patience to his eldest son. "Let me, good son," says the veteran, looking back upon the fluctuations of his long life,—"let me be your pattern of patience; for you can witness with me, that the disgraces I have unjustly suffered (my estate being through my misfortunes ruined, my health by imprisonments decay'd, and my services undervalued and unrecompenc'd), have not bred the least distaste or discontent in me, or alter'd my resolution from my infancy,—that is, I was never so base as to insinuate into

* Monson, p. 230.

any man's favour, who was favour'd by the times; I was never so ambitious as to seek or crave employment, or to undertake any that was not put upon me. My great and only comfort is, that I serv'd my princes both faithfully and fortunately; but, seeing my services have been no better accepted, I can as well content myself in being a spectator, as if I were an actor in the world."*

The ruin of his estate, however, seems rather to have been a figurative expression referring to the disappointment of his just hopes, than to any actual losses sustained by his labours in the public service; for he expressly reminds his eldest son, in the dedication of his first book, that he shall leave him but a small fortune, charging him to rate his expenses accordingly; but adding, that, little as it was, it was great to him, since he had attained it by his own endeavours and dangers, and nobody could challenge any interest in it but himself. It is evident, therefore, that although his fortune was much below his deserts, it was gained solely by his services, as he possessed no estate by inheritance.†

The resignation of the earl of Nottingham, and the appointment of the duke of Buckingham in his place, may, probably, have hastened the liberation of Mon-

* Monson, p. 153.

† Monson gives a detailed account of his family which places this fact in the clearest light. It is addressed to his son in the following passage:—"Your grandfather's great-grandfather was a knight by title, and John by name, which name we desire to retain to our eldest sons: God blessed him with many earthly benefits, as wealth, children, and reputation. His eldest son was called John, after his father; and his second William, like to yourself and brother; but upon what displeasure I know not (though we must judge the son gave the occasion), his father left him the least part of his fortune, yet sufficient to equal the best gentleman of his shire, and particularly the ancient house call'd after his name. His other son, William, he invested with what your uncle now enjoys. Both the sons, while they lived, carried the port and estimation of their father's children; though afterwards it fell out that the son of John, and nephew to William, became disobedient, negligent, and prodigal, and spent all his patrimony; so that in conclusion he and his son extinguished their house, and there now remains no memory of them. As for the second line and race, of whom your uncle and I are descended, we live as you see, though our estates be not great, and of the two mine much the least, which notwithstanding is the greater to me, in respect I atchieved it with the peril and danger of my life; and you will make my satisfaction in the enjoyment of it the greater, if it be attended with that comfort I hope to receive from you."

son; but, to whatever circumstance his speedy and honourable acquittal may be ascribed, he was no sooner released from the Tower than he was called before the privy council to furnish his opinion as to how the pirates could be suppressed, and the town of Algiers attempted. The design against Algiers, of which Monson strongly disapproved, was a favourite project with Nottingham; and "the duke of Buckingham," says Monson, "being young and infected with the disease of youth to hearken to base flattery, gave ear to those that thought to make use of his favour with the king, and advised him to promote this voyage, promising it should redound to his everlasting honour at the first entrance into his place."* We have already seen how much disgrace followed upon the attempt†; but that was to be attributed less to the hopelessness of the undertaking than the want of means and skill in its conduct. "The intention was to be commended," says Monson, "and the management was to be blamed."

The ravages of the pirates had inflicted such an enormous amount of injury upon the trade of Great Britain, that the merchants came forward with large offers of pecuniary assistance to enable the government to put an end to the evil, the magnitude of which was constantly increasing. But the difficulty was how to carry on the extensive operations necessary for the purpose. Upon this subject, Sir William Monson's statement before the privy council is remarkably elaborate, evincing an intimate acquaintance with all the details of the inquiry.

In the first place, he laid down a general principle that, as the profits from the destruction of piracy would be universal, the charge ought to be general also; and that the gains from the sale of slaves and goods recovered from the hands of the pirates should be equally distributed. But that, as every nation was not equally provided with strong and swift ships, the enterprise

* Monson, p. 234. † See antè, p. 63.

should be confided to the fleets of England, Spain, and Holland,—all other towns and countries bordering on the sea to furnish their quota in money; and of the fleets employed, each nation to furnish an equal proportion of men and tonnage. The nature of the service rendered it desirable not to employ any ships under 250 tons burthen, nor above 300, with the exception of the king's ships; lesser ships being likely to become a prey to the enemy should they part company, and larger ones depriving the fleet of the power of distributing its strength as circumstances might render necessary.

Having thus sketched the requisite force for embarking upon an undertaking which he believed would occupy some years, he proceeds to suggest other points of management important to its success. He recommends that the generals should be fully empowered to execute martial law; and that their authority should be determined beforehand, in order to avoid any questions and differences that might afterwards arise. Safe conducts to Christian ports, with authority to obtain necessaries, to provide for the sick, and to deposit prizes, were also necessary; and it would be desirable to carry money or commodities to re-victual, and all kinds of provisions to trim and careen the ships; a treasurer to look to the payment of money, a stock for the disbursement of necessaries, and ample provision of muskets and ammunition, and especially chain-shot for the ordnance; because, where there are many people, as commonly in pirates, chain-shot will make a great slaughter amongst them, and such confusion withal, where there are so few sailors to tackle their ships, that they will be taken upon the stays, or lie upon the sea at our mercy. He further suggests the necessity of having the ships musket-proof, and to have all the spare decks and other things of weight taken down, which would be a great ease to the ships in sailing.

Secresy in the conduct of this expedition he considered indispensable, because there were so many En-

glishmen in the habit of trading with the pirates, and supplying them with powder and other necessaries, that it was to be feared such persons would convey private intelligence to the pirates, in the hope of facilitating their escape, and screening themselves from discovery. In order to secure this important object, he proposed that the ships should be prepared under some other pretence, and that even the captains should not be informed of the real intention until they were out at sea. The French king ought also be required to prohibit his subjects from trading with the pirates; it being a common and daily course, especially with the inhabitants of Marseilles and Toulon.

The place of rendezvous to be the islands of Bayonne, as the most central and convenient for the squadrons to meet without suspicion; England and Holland pretending various purposes; while the squadron of Spain, coming thither from St. Lucar, Cadiz, or Lisbon, would completely throw the pirates of Algiers and Tunis off their guards, who could not possibly suspect that a squadron furnished in the part of Spain nearest to them, and carried off to the part farthest from them, could ever be intended to act against them. The months of August and September would be the best time in the year for the undertaking, because in these months the pirates usually put to sea, on account of the vintage and other great trades, and commonly also in these months the fleets return to Spain from the Indies, and the galleys retire into harbour. These preliminaries being arranged, Monson advised that the fleet should not appear within the Straits until the pirates were at sea, lest, receiving intelligence of its motions, they might be afraid to venture out. One advantage of having them at sea would be, that the fleet might obtain information as to where they were, from ships that had seen them, and, observing the winds, could conjecture where they might be met; or, if it should be found that they scattered, the fleet could scatter also. Another advantage would be, that the pirates would have no harbour to defend them,

from their going out until their return home, all Christian ports being closed against them,—they having no shelter but the open roads of Tunis and Algiers within the Straits, and Sally and Santa Cruz without; so that, if the fleet should miss them at sea, it must secure them on their return, by spreading two squadrons ten or twelve leagues from Algiers, from whence they could have no intelligence, as they could not be discerned from the shore.

With respect to any mariners that might be taken from the pirates, it would be advisable that they should not be ransomed or set at liberty; for, their numbers not being great, not more than twelve years having elapsed since the English taught them the art of navigation, the diminution of their strength would speedily drive them from the seas. As to renegades, who should be taken in the service of the Turks, Monson advised that they should be immediately executed for the terror of others.

Upon the character and fitness of the general, the experienced commander lays great stress. He proposes that "such an English general be appointed, and the ships with that care fitted, that may give reputation to the action; for, considering the reputation that we have had in sea affairs, it behoves us, upon such an occasion as this, because we shall join with other nations, to carry it with honour. That such a general be appointed as shall have more care to perform the service, than to his own ease, pleasure, or ostentation. That he keep the sea, and avoid seeking harbour, unless necessity compels him, and then not to let it to be to the leeward of Algiers; for so pirates may go in and out at their pleasure: and moreover, that he enter no harbour, but such as have good outlets, lest the service be neglected, and he not able to get out. And lastly, as the ships shall grow foul, and be forced into harbour to trim, that he do it with this consideration,—that he keep a squadron out at sea, whilst the others are fitting in harbour, and upon the return of the clean squadron to sea, whilst the other squadron is in trimming, to put himself into one of those ships; for it is not the part of a general upon any oc-

casion to leave his fleet, though for a time he may leave his ship."

Such was the substance of the suggestions submitted to the privy council in reference to the plan of the proposed expedition: but as Monson was impressed with a strong conviction that any attempt upon Algiers would be attended with great danger and uncertainty, he added his opinions upon that part of the question with a degree of candour which was more honourable to his integrity than characteristic of his prudence. The lord high admiral was well known to be a strenuous supporter of the scheme, and the Spanish ambassador was said to have earnestly urged it upon the attention of the government. Sir Robert Mansel, then high in the confidence of the duke of Buckingham, and vice admiral of the realm, was also an advocate for this wild descent upon an almost impregnable town; and although there existed great differences of opinion amongst the officers of the navy as to the practicability of the project, the whole weight of official authority and government influence was in its favour. The boldness, therefore, with which Monson pointed out the numerous hazards of the siege, and the doubtfulness of its issue, proves the devotion with which he was prepared to sacrifice his professional interests to a paramount sense of duty; for, in giving so strong an opinion against the expedition, he, of course, abandoned all expectation of being employed in it, should it be determined upon, or of ever obtaining any promotion under the administration by which it was projected.

His arguments on the subject are lucid and conclusive. "Whosoever knows Algiers," he observes, "cannot be ignorant of its strength: the inhabitants consist principally of desperate rogues and renegadoes, that live by rapine, theft, and spoil, having renounced God and all virtue, and become reprobates to all the Christian world. This town is, and has been, of so great annoyance to the Christians lying over against it, that they have been forced to attempt it by surprise; but still have failed of their designs, either by intelligence the town had had,

or by their carefulness to defend it; for no man but must think that a town which depends upon its own strength, being in continual danger of stratagems and sudden surprises from the bordering enemies, both Moors and Turks, who have the conveniency of galleys to transport and land an army at pleasure, will be extraordinary watchful and circumspect to fortify itself, and withstand all dangers that can befall it.

"And if those Christian countries that lie open to it, could never prevail in their sundry attempts, being nigh thereto, and having conveniency to embark and transport an army without suspicion or rumour, and to be succoured by the islands of Majorca and Minorca, if necessity required; but especially having intelligence with some of the town, for the delivery of it, as about fourteen years since it happened by the practise of a renegade, called Spinola, which failed; what hope have we then to prevail, who cannot so secretly furnish an army and fleet, but that all the world must ring of it, in gazettes and other intelligences? Or if it be once known in Marseilles, it cannot be concealed many hours from Algiers, there being a settled trade and correspondence between those two cities.

"But allowing our designs to be kept secret till the very time we arrive upon that coast, yet the warning will be sufficient for a garrison town of less force and fewer men than Algiers to prevent a surprise. In such a case as this, the time and wind are principally to be regarded; for a large wind that is good to carry a fleet into a landing-place in an open bay, will be dangerous, if it overblow upon a lee shore; and it will make so great a sea, that it will be impossible for men with their furnitures and arms to land without apparent danger; and what resistance a few men are able to make, I refer to consideration.

"On the other side, if we ply into the bay with a scant wind, and it gives us a good entrance to land, by reason of the smoothness of the sea, yet the defendants shall have these advantages; — they will descry

us from the shore a long time before we can draw near, and consequently have time sufficient to withstand our landing. With their galleys they may cut off our boats, with our men, if ships ride not within command of the shore, besides many other casualties the sea and weather afford. Besides, our ships can but land the third part of our men at once, whereby we shall attempt to land with but the third part of our army; and if we do it near the town, they will still have warning enough; or if it be far off, the march will be inconvenient, and they warned by fires. But if we fail of surprising Algiers, and attempt by siege, we have neither necessaries to land our ordnance, nor to draw it to a place fit to raise a battery, wanting engines, cattle, and other conveniences for that purpose. It must be considered how to relieve our siege, and defend our besiegers against the sallies of the town, which have ten men to one of ours. We must likewise forecast, if we fail of the attempt, to bring off our men with safety, as a point of great providence in a commander.

"Whosoever shall enterprise Algiers, his greatest strength by sea must be in galleys, which can run near the shore, and command the landing-place with their ordnance, or if an enemy draw down his forces there, to withstand him, he may soon bring about his galleys, quit that place, and land where he shall see no danger; ships cannot do so when they are at anchor, but must have wind and tide for their purpose. But all I can say is nothing to what follows; for you must understand the Algerines are a sort of outlaws or miscreants, that live in enmity with all the world, acknowledging the great Turk in some measure, for their sovereign, but no further than they please themselves. Now, that part of Barbary where Algiers is seated, is a spacious and fruitful country, and abounds in numbers of people; and though the king of it be a Mahommedan, as well as the Algerines, yet they live in perpetual hatred and war; but so, that if either of them is attacked by Christians, they will presently join

as partners in mischief, and we shall no sooner land, but we shall be welcomed by three or four score thousand of those ungodly people.

"Having shewed the impossibility of taking Algiers either by surprise or siege, now shall follow the little use we can make of it, either to annoy the king of Spain, or any other potentate; as also the small profit we shall make of it,—no, not so much as to defray the tenth part of the garrison, or any hope to go farther with a conquest.

"If it be conceived to lie conveniently to annoy the king of Spain, or any other enemy, it will prove otherwise, considering the distance from England to be relieved, and the many casualties we shall undergo at sea, having neither the Christian nor Turkish shore to friend, and yet we must sail in the Mediterranean, where we cannot pass unseen, or unmet, because of its narrowness.

"The harbour of Algiers, which must entertain us, is of so small a compass, that it will not receive above twenty ships; which number, and no more, we must allow, both to annoy and defend ourselves from all enemies, either Christians or Turks. The place affords neither victuals, powder, mast, sails, ropes, or other necessaries that belong to ships; and if there be but a want of the least of them, England alone must supply them. Then consider the charge and danger that is like to follow to this little purpose; for the expense is certain, and less than 5000 men cannot be allowed for garrison, and the twenty sail of ships aforesaid. The profit and advantage that can be made of it, must be by theft and rapine at sea, which the Turks cannot afford us, they having little or no trade in shipping. The princes of Italy are in the same condition; and therefore our only hope must depend on the spoils of Spain, which we cannot expect in the Straights, they having no trade of importance upon those coasts; and what we shall take without the Straights, we shall sooner do it from England than from Algiers; and prizes so taken will be sooner and safer brought for England than carried to

Algiers, where they must pass so many dangers, as I have said before." *

This statement completely suspended the intentions of the government for a time; and, although some show of resistance to the pirates was got up in the dock-yards, at least in the form of a report, nothing was actually done for three years afterwards. The result of sir Robert Mansel's enterprise against Algiers in 1620, which verified all Monson's predictions, has been already detailed in the biography of that admiral.

1618. In the mean while fresh work was in preparation for Monson, who seems now to have been occasionally employed, in counselling the admiralty upon all matters concerning the service. The abuses that had from time to time grown up in the navy assumed at last a character of such gross corruption and glaring mismanagement, that a commission was issued to investigate and remedy them. This was a subject to which Monson had long before given considerable attention. So far back as the year 1603, at the request of secretary Cecil, he furnished an elaborate statement of the disorders that had crept into the service, and of the means by which they might be cured. This document exhibits very clearly the principal points to which it was essentially necessary to direct the inquiries of the commission.

The first abuse he touches upon is of a class that could have existed only at a period when the navy had become demoralised by a long continued war, and when letters of reprisal had given birth to a predatory spirit utterly subversive of discipline and true zeal in the public service. "Nothing breeds disorders in our sailors," Monson justly observes, "but liberty and overmuch clemency: the one they have in their ordinary ships of reprisal, where no discipline is used, nor authority obeyed; the other in escaping punishment when they justly deserve it; which hath brought her majesty's service to be no more accounted of than the actions of private men.

* Monson, pp. 233, 234.

It is strange what misery such men will chuse to endure in small ships of reprisal, though they be hopeless of gain, rather than serve her majesty, where their pay is certain, their diet plentiful, and their labour not so great. Nothing breeds this but the liberty they find in the one, and punishment they fear in the other. The ships these men covet to go in, are neither of service nor strength to the state, or annoyance to the enemy; their owners are men of as base condition as themselves, making no more reckoning what outrages their ships commit at sea, than the men themselves that commit them. They grow so bold by the lenity used toward them, that they as confidently detain men after they are pressed, as if there were no law to prohibit it. Nor are they satisfied with a competent number of men in their ships, but commonly carry twice as many as their ships and victuals require; and the first caravel or fisherman they take, they put their spare men into, who many times sink in the sea, famish for want of victuals, or are forced ashore into Spain, where they must either be compelled to serve against their country, or die in misery. And thus have more seamen been consumed, than in all other actions or enterprizes against Spain. And no man dares reprove it, because the lord admiral is interested in all such prizes as these unprofitable ships take." *

To these causes he does not hesitate to ascribe the loss of the Indian fleet when sir Richard Lewson was forced to leave sir William Monson with half the ships at Plymouth for want of sailors to man them, while at that very time there were more men suffered to go in private ships than would be sufficient to man the whole navy. Nor was this the only evil arising from these practices; for in dearth of other resources, the ships were forced to be supplied with fishermen at the season of their voyage to Newfoundland, to the serious injury of an important branch of industry. And the fishermen thus brought into the navy were generally so spiritless and unservice-

* Monson, p. 197.

able, that Monson regarded them as a principal cause of the sickness that prevailed in the ships.

Another inconvenience arising from the private voyages was, that they frequently proved highly prejudicial to the royal service; the men venturing in them being very often taken prisoners, and forced to reveal the designs of the government, which, by forewarning the enemy, enabled them to frustrate the operations of our fleet. The voyages of Drake and Cavendish round the world furnish two remarkable illustrations; for although these enterprises were honourable to the commanders, yet, in Monson's opinion, it would have been much better that they had never been undertaken, except with a larger force; "for," says he, "we have now discovered to the Spaniards our finding our way through the Straits of Magellan, which they thought to conceal from us: we have passed by thec oast of Chile and Peru up to Panama, cross'd over to the Phillipine and Molucca Islands, and to the East Indies. Thus have warn'd, without annoying them, to strengthen themselves in those parts; so that such places as had no defence, are now made able both to defend and offend, as appeared by the taking of Mr. Hawkins in the South Sea, 1594." *

In order to remedy these abuses, he proposes, that as they crept in by the permission of the lord high admiral, it is necessary in the first instance to obtain his lordship's consent to their removal. Secondly, not to admit men to become owners of ships merely because they can afford to purchase and victual them, but to examine their condition and qualifications, and make them give security that they will not connive at the abuses referred to. Thirdly, to restrain private actions while her majesty's are on foot; or to compel them to be carried on in company with her ships, giving them a share in the prizes proportionate to their adventure; or, if they refused that alternative, to make it lawful for

* Monson, p. 197.

them to adventure four months in the year, during the season when the royal ships were laid up in harbour, compelling them to return on a certain day, and charging the vice-admirals with the duty of seeing that they did not carry more men or less provision than was actually requisite. "This will be the way," he adds, "to redress all abuses, to make men obedient to discipline and command, to avoid sickness in her majesty's ships, to employ none but such as are serviceable, not to molest the poor labouring fishermen, to give the merchants satisfaction, and to preserve the life and liberty of sailors."*

Of the remaining abuses there were so many, that it was useless to reform one unless the whole were to be reformed. The victualling of vessels, upon which the lives of the mariners depended, was so ill cared for, that there was not a man in the service who had not reason to complain; and the gunners, to whose charge the strength of the ships was committed, instead of being chosen by their merit, were preferred for their money. The ships themselves were equally chargeable with impediments, especially in the northern voyages; for, although their deficiencies were made known before they departed, the officers of the navy, either from frugality, or from an adherence to precedents of former ages which had no application whatever to the new services in which the ships were employed, were indifferent to the adoption of the requisite improvements. In addition to all this, the sailors were so ill treated, that they alledged their grievances as a sufficient pretext for disinclination to perform their duties.

"The way," continues Monson, "to redress every abuse, is, to execute severe justice upon the chief men in office; as first, the victualler, if he fail either in goodness or quantity of her majesty's allowance, let his life answer it; for no subject's estate is able to countervail the damage her majesty may sustain by such defect.



* Monson, p. 198.

And to take away all excuses of his part, and to provide there may be no failing of the service, it were convenient to have surplus of victuals transported in other ships, to be exchanged, if upon view the other prove to be ill-conditioned.

"Secondly, for the gunners: their frauds in powder and shot, and other things under their charge, are intolerable; and they have been the more embolden'd by the baseness of some captains, who have consented to their theft.

"For reformation hereof, it were good to have a deputy appointed in every ship, from the officers of the ordnance, to take charge of powder, shot, musket, &c., and to deliver them to such men as shall be accountable for them at the end of the voyage; for it is no reason so great a charge should be committed to the gunners, who make no conscience to steal, and may steal without controulment when it is in their possession.

"Another thing the captain must have orders to forbid, and look precisely it be obey'd, which is the lavishness of shooting for pleasure at the meeting of ships, passing by castles, and feasting aboard; for, indeed, there is more powder wastefully spent in this sort, than against an enemy.

"For the third, which is the disability of ships to the southward, it is occasioned by the great weight of ordnance, which makes them laboursome, and causes their weakness; and, considering how few gunners are allowed to every ship, it were better to leave some of these pieces at home than to pester the ship with them. I must say, and with truth, that all her majesty's ships are far under-manned; for when people come to be divided into three parts, the one third to tackle the ship, the other to ply their small shot, and the third to manage their ordnance, all the three services fail for want of men to execute them.

"Neither do I see that more men can be contained in the queen's ships to the southward, for want of stowage for victuals, and room to lodge in. No ship

that returns from the southward should go to sea again under half a year's respite; in which time she will be well air'd, and her ballast must be chang'd.

"There should be a general workman appointed in harbour, carefully to overlook the ships that shall be employed: this man should go the voyage, and have the like charge at sea. Nothing that is necessary for ships, but must be carried in a great abundance by a deputy from the officers of the navy, as I have formerly said in the case of the officers of the ordnance. All precedents of former times of furnishing the queen's ships to be abolish'd; and whoever takes upon himself this office as deputy, to be bound to give an account of the surplusses remaining, that what is not spent may be restor'd; which will nothing encrease the charge of carrying them to sea; and yet the ships shall be so provided, as no casualty that can happen at sea will bring them into distress. Besides, they shall supply the want of such prizes as they take, who, by reason of their long voyages, have consum'd their sails, ropes, and tackling, as in the like case we found by the carrack, which we could not have brought for England, if we had not supplied her want out of the queen's ships.

"And lastly, for the men that sail in the ships, without whom they are of no use: their usage has been so ill at the end of their voyages, that it is no marvel they show their unwillingness to serve the queen; for, if they arrive sick from any voyage, such is the charity of the people ashore, that they shall sooner die than find pity unless they bring money with them.

"And seeing her majesty must and does pay those that serve, it were better for them, and much more profit and honour to the queen, to discharge them upon their first landing, than to continue them longer unpaid; for, whether they are sick or lie idle in harbour, their pay runs on till they and their ships are discharged, to the great consumption of victuals and wages, which falls upon the queen.

"Wherefore it is necessary, that an under-treasurer

be appointed in every fleet, who shall carry money for all necessary disbursements."*

These outlines present an accurate picture of the state of the navy at that period; and, it appears, that the abuses complained of by Monson in 1603 remained unredressed to the time of the commission in 1618, when he found it necessary to submit the majority of these reformations afresh for the consideration of his majesty, together with others suggested by subsequent experience.

One of the topics upon which he lays particular stress, is the means by which intelligence of the enemy can be secured, and the enemy prevented from obtaining intelligence; "for in so doing," he observes, "a man is armed to encounter an enemy naked and unprovided, as I have instanced in many examples before; for, whosoever is successful by chance and good luck rather than by providence and foresight, cannot challenge the honour as his own, but must allow fortune a share with him; for success is the mistress of fools, and true management proceeds from judgment."†

He instances, as examples, some of the expedients he employed himself, for this purpose, with success during the Spanish war. "The first means we used to get intelligence of the affairs of Spain upon our arrival, was to hail into the height of the Burlings, a small desart island, whither every night the caravels of Peniche, opposite to it, resorted to take fish, which serv'd the whole country. About the time the caravels were to draw near the island in the night time, we used to leave some ships' boats, well manned, near the shore, where there could be no suspicion of them, and, at the dawning of the day, the shallops suddenly boarded and seized some of the said caravels, of which we made good use in two kinds:—the first, was the intelligence we received of the state and affairs of Lisbon, and the whole coast; as also what preparations

* Monson, pp. 198, 199. † Ibid. p. 199.

were made, either to defend or offend. The second was in respect of the caravels' excellent sailing, for there were few ships but they could fetch up, and then keep sight of them both night and day, till our approach to them. Thirdly, by the unusual sails caravels carry, by means whereof we deceived the Spaniards, and made them believe they were their own. At last, when the voyage was at an end, the poor men were restored again to their vessels, and some reward bestowed on them."*

In the south of Spain he obtained intelligence by another method, devised entirely by himself. Having received information from certain Scotch and French ships of five galleons riding at St. Lucar, watching the wind and tide to sail for the West Indies, he despatched captain Love to the ports of Sallee and Mamora, in Barbary, with a view to make circumstantial inquiries. If captain Love failed at Sallee he was to proceed to Mamora, keeping his business secret, even from the English who went with him in the bark, and carrying various commodities with him that he might enter the forts under the pretence of trading with them. He was to seek out the principal Englishman in either place, and deliver him a letter superscribed "*To my faithful countryman;*" and if there was no Englishman there, and he found it necessary to communicate with a stranger, he was to find some Hollander residing there as agent or merchant, to whom he was to deliver a letter superscribed "*To my dear friend and neighbour.*" But if he found neither, he was to insinuate himself into the acquaintance of some Spaniard and Portuguese, and to ascertain what he could by circumventions, so that his real intentions should not be suspected. If the information thus obtained agreed with that furnished by the French and Scotch ships, it might be relied upon. The particulars he was specially to inquire after were as follows: —

* Monson, p. 199.

"The number and quality of all ships at Cadiz or at St. Lucar. Secondly, whether the galleons you are imployed to hearken after be gone to the Indies, or no; or whether they came over the bar the last spring tide; or if they be not gone, to demand the cause of their stay, or when they will depart. To enquire whether there be any ships appointed to convoy them to the Canaries, and how many, and their names, because I have a catalogue of all the king of Spain's ships, and may judge of their strength accordingly. To learn whether they are after their ordinary course of sailing, for fear of her majesty's ships being upon their coast. Speak nothing of their wealth, lest it should give some cause of mistrust. I will not write thus particularly, either to the Englishman or the Hollander; but they having my letters to credit what you shall say, and shewing my hand to these instructions, it will be sufficient to give them satisfaction." *

He was also particularly charged not to suffer any of the bark's company to go ashore, nor near enough to the Moors to permit any of them to come aboard; but if any of the English were to land, he was to caution them strictly not to betray any knowledge of where Monson lay, or of any of the queen's ships, but rather to say that it was four months since they left England. If the cleanliness of the ship should seem to contradict this statement, they were to say, that they had refitted at Mogothor, an island in Barbary. When the necessary intelligence was thus obtained, captain Love was to rejoin the admiral at the place, where he left him; but, missing him there, he was to sail for Puerto Santo, near Madeira, "where," says Monson, confident of the issue, "I intend to refit my ships after the fight, if I chance to meet with the galleons aforesaid."

At Terceira, captain Whiskens was despatched in a small caravel, for a similar purpose, and instructed to keep company with the Primrose of London, which was

* Monson, p. 200.

bound for Graciosa, till he arrived at that island, and then to ply into the road of Villa Franca and St. Michael, where he was to endeavour to speak with the ships riding there under Scotch colours, but which were properly English. In order to avoid suspicion, he was to speak with them in the night.

The particulars he was to inquire after, were: as to the state of the West Indian fleet; whether they still continued at the islands waiting for a convoy from Spain; the time of their departure, and the port to which they intended to repair; whether they kept their treasure on board, or, if landed, at what distance they rode from the shore; whether they had any intelligence as to the English ships being out at sea; and any other information he could obtain.

Having satisfied all these demands, captain Whiskens was to proceed to Terceira to examine the state of the ships there, and ascertain whether it would be possible to surprise them at anchor. If he found the treasure-fleet gone, he was to make no stay, but to return to the coast of Spain, where he would find the admiral ten or twelve leagues west from the rock; but if the fleet was still hovering about, waiting for a convoy, then he was to communicate with some English man-of-war, and deliver a certain letter with which he was charged by Monson for that purpose.

This letter, after setting forth that her majesty was apprised of the arrival of the plate-fleet at the island of Terceira, and had sent several ships to intercept it on its homeward passage, enjoins all English captains and masters to help, aid, and assist captain Whiskens in the weighty service in which he was engaged, and then proceeds to give them the following minute instructions:—

"If you shall understand the plate-fleet intends not to return home without ships to guard it, that you presently thereupon use the best means to give notice to sir Richard, or me, when you shall know by captain Whiskens where to find us; or else that you keep the

road of Angra, and send captain Whiskens himself to look in; which soever of you comes, must observe these directions following:—Upon the Spanish fleet's putting to sea, both of you to pursue them astern, 'till you bring them to the height they mean to sail in; and that done, then one of you to lose company of them in the night, and to ply with all speed to the place aforesaid, to meet sir Richard or me. And that the other bark do still attend the fleet, that if they should alter their height, she may in like manner leave them in the night, and follow the directions aforesaid, as the other bark is directed; but with this caution, that you keep a strict account of the shifting of the winds, from the time you left them, until your meeting with us; for knowing their height, and observing the winds shifting, there will be little doubt of our meeting. The service you will do to the queen and state by this, and the good that will redound to yourself, needs no repetition; and therefore, not doubting of your willingness and care therein, I bid you farewell."*

Monson also mentions, that during the Spanish war he knew the state to use a stratagem of a different kind, when it was thought desirable to obtain information respecting the condition of the Spanish navy, the places where their ships lay, and their furnishing and building. This stratagem was to send a spy, disguised as a pilgrim, to travel through all the ports of Biscay and Gallicia, pretending to be on his way to offer up his devotions to St. Jago de Compostella; by which means he was enabled to obtain all the information he required, and to return with a full relation of how things stood.

The elaborate commentaries drawn up by sir William Monson on naval affairs, embrace every item of practical importance or professional interest; and the improvements that were rapidly adopted, under the auspices of the new commission, may be referred in no inconsiderable degree to the suggestions he submitted to

* Monson, p. 201.

the government, and the energy with which he prosecuted them. The failure of the expedition to Algiers, however, instead of restoring him to the favor of the admiralty, by its complete vindication of the advice he had given them, seems rather to have operated to his prejudice, since it proved to the world, that the government were wrong and that he was right; and, with the obstinacy which frequently commits men to fresh errors from a reluctance to acknowledge the errors of the past, the administration resolved to attempt new and still more hazardous enterprises, in the hope of repairing that inglorious discomfiture. These undertakings were also contrary to Monson's advice, and, of course, he remained unemployed.

1620.

He appears to have remonstrated in vain against the inexperience of the persons employed in the conduct of these expeditions, at a time when "the realm never enjoyed braver and more warlike ships, commanders of greater antiquity and valour, seamen of greater experience and skill, or more abundance and choice of ammunition and arms." A great person in authority, he tells us, was spoken to by one of greater blood than himself, who observed to him, in a friendly spirit, that he did not see a man of experience employed in the fleet, which made him doubt of its success; to which the "great person" answered, "not," says Monson, "like one that thinks example of more weight than conceit, but rudely, rashly, and disrespectfully: That they were all fools who commanded in the queen's time, in comparison of those now employed. But it might have been more truly told him, That men in authority, who govern more by will and chance, than by reason and advice, are dangerous in a state; for nothing is so great a weakness, as for a man to think he knows much, when in effect he knows nothing at all."

1625. The first of these ill-managed undertakings was an expedition against Cadiz, in 1625. King James died on the 25th of March, and left the country in a state

of incertitude as to whether war or peace should ensue; the balance of probabilities, however, being on the side of hostilities. The prince immediately upon his accession determined the question, less, however, upon public than private grounds. He was offended at the delays that had been offered by Spain to defer the marriage, then in treaty with his sister, nor was he well pleased with the reception he had met in his journey to that country. He accordingly resolved to resent these affronts, and ordered out a fleet to sea, with rather more haste than discretion. The winter season was approaching, his commanders were young and untried, and a variety of other forbidding circumstances conspired to render the prospects of the expedition sufficiently gloomy.

Before the fleet sailed Monson communicated to a noble friend numerous arguments in detail, to show the hopelessness of a project of such magnitude, commenced at such an unpropitious season of the year and under such unpromising auspices. "I have addressed to you," he observes in this able statement, "my opinion of this secret and concealed fleet, whose design and unknown orders, gave cause of admiration, and, consequently, of censure; every man judging as his fancy leads him, but all concluding of victory to us and ruin to Spain, whither it is conceived to be intended, by the rendezvous of ships and men in the western parts; some threatening Portugal, some the islands, others the bay of Cadiz and city of Seville; others the state of Genoa and islands adjacent; some the West Indies, and the fleet from thence expected."

He begins his examination of these various aspects of the undertaking with Portugal, showing that the nature of the shore was disadvantageous to the invader, and in like manner favourable to the enemy resisting; that the men must of necessity be landed in boats, which could not contain the number of the soldiers at thrice ferrying; and that, consequently, only one third part of the men would be engaged at the time of the

greatest need; nor could the castle of Lisbon be forced except by field-pieces, which could not be landed from the want of a castle or harbour to shelter them. The people, also, were unfavourable to the English, and the barrenness of the country was such that it could not yield subsistence to an army.

The islands, including Terceira, the Canaries, and the Azores, presented a still more hopeless prospect, having not a single harbour to entertain ships, there being nothing but open bays, subject to numerous dangers from the winds and the waters, and exposed to storms of great violence, which commonly lasted nine months in the year, during which time the shores were in the highest degree hazardous.

Cadiz, fatal to the Spaniards and fortunate to the English on two memorable occasions in the reign of Elizabeth, holds out many advantages to the invader. But Monson predicted that the fleet in this instance was too late, and that the Indian ships would have departed before they could arrive there.

If an invasion of the continent of Spain were intended, especially of Andalusia and Seville, the provinces which, above all others, flow with milk and honey, there ought to be consideration, says the experienced admiral, of the plan of landing, the distance and fatigue of the march in an insufferable parching sun, which our soldiers never could endure; besides stores, carriages, and other necessaries, ought to be thought of, for which no provision whatever had been made. "I will not much insist upon the attempt," he continues, "because I think it is much less reasonable than any of the rest; first, in seeking to invade a country where we have neither friend nor faction, but shall find their hands and hearts all join to repulse us; a country populous, and the more for their mighty and continual trade, fronting upon their enemies in Barbary, which makes them ready to receive every alarm, and put themselves under arms. If we believe history, and not a hundred years before Spain was grown great by

their Indies, the moors of Grenada had often more then by five degrees to invade Andalusia, out of their bordering territories, than we carry, and could not prevail; then what hope can we expect, Spain being since that time so mightily increased in greatness and wealth?

"It seems we make less account of the strength of Spain than of any other country of Europe; for I am persuaded no kingdom, having warning of the approach of an enemy, is so unprovided, that they will suffer 12,000 or 14,000 men to march quietly forty or fifty leagues into their country."*

With respect to Genoa and the Straits, which the expedition was expected to invest as one of its multifarious objects, Monson points out the necessity in the first instance of securing a safe port for defence and relief not far from home; "for," he adds, "where soldiers are transported far by sea, ships cannot contain victuals to maintain them; and to hope for succour in the country invaded, were too desperate a thought." But the design upon Genoa was full of great danger, because no harbour could be secured nearer than Marseilles in France, which is 100 leagues distant. Nor did it appear that any effectual impression could be made on the place from the sea. "I do not conceive," says Monson, "we shall either hurt or damnify the city of Genoa by this adventure of ours; for, in anchoring near the shore, the lanthern of Genoa will beat us from the road; if further off, we cannot hinder the gallies going in and out, but they will be able to relieve the town in spite of us; besides, other stratagems may be used by gallies to fire us. I confess, if Corsica or Sardinia could be surprised, they would yield us relief and refreshment, with good harbours for our safety."†

The West Indies, according to Monson, afforded less temptation than all points of attack. Nothing could be got by proceeding against them, and great loss or

* Monson, p. 239. † Ibid. p. 240.

hazard must be encountered in the attempt. The strong towns were sufficiently fortified to stand a siege against invaders who had no means of replenishing themselves with provisions; and if even these towns were taken, the provisions procured in them would be comparatively useless, consisting solely of cattle which would not take salt, and which would be unfit for consumption at the expiration of three or four hours. On the other hand, the weak towns are never trusted with wealth of any value, and the inhabitants are always prepared to quit them on the sudden, carrying off their goods or burying them in the earth.

All these prophecies, as far as they applied to the limited course which the expedition actually attempted, were literally fulfilled. A few days after the ships put out to sea the long boats were lost and other damage sustained, in consequence of the tempestuous state of the weather, which scattered the ships, and rendered it extremely difficult for the fleet to keep together. It was intended that they should put into St. Lucar, but they found it impossible, so many difficulties were opposed to it by the captains and masters. The general demanded of them why they did not explain those difficulties to his majesty at Plymouth, in the council that was held there before they departed? to which they answered, "It was the depth of winter, and stormy." But that was a circumstance which they knew quite as well before they left England as after; and it afforded, moreover, no satisfaction whatever of the question. "What was this," exclaims Monson, "in answer to the impossibility of going to St. Lucar? Could the summer remove the bar, and give them a safe entrance? could the summer season give them more knowledge of pilotship than they had before their coming thither? or did they not know that winter was approaching when they were called to the council at Plymouth, for it could not be above twenty days more winter than it was when they were at Plymouth?"

The general was even more culpable in his ignorance

than the captains. Instead of knowing how to meet this strange answer of his officers, he tells us that when they replied to him in this way he could say no more to them, "seeing I was no great seaman." This was an avowal of incapacity not likely to be passed over in silence by the old admiral. "Would any man," asks Monson, "thus confess his ignorance in a command he undertook? or would any man ever take upon him the charge of a general by sea, that had never past further than between England and Holland? It were good to know whether he sought the employment, or whether it was put upon him against his will: if he was led into it by ambition, let him answer his error, and that with severity; if it was procured by others, they ought to have the same chastisement he deserved. Betwixt the one and the other, it is a pity the kingdom should bear the dishonour."

The dilemmas of the fleet seem to have increased as they advanced. In one of the many councils they held, it was determined at last to bear into the bay of Cadiz, and anchor before port St. Mary. Another council was now held, when it was resolved to open an assault on fort Puntal; but having advised "with the most experienced captains and masters," the general discovered that this "was difficult, for want of water;" whereupon, says he, "at three of the clock in the morning I arose, and received the communion aboard the Ark-Royal; after which I commanded the master to carry up the ship to Puntal, but he excused it, for want of water." Upon this frivolous narrative Monson observes in his rough, vigorous, and sensible way—"Here is still direction, writing, and communion when there should be fighting; and because he speaks of the communion, it is not improper to set down what queen Elizabeth said of the like success in 1590. Sir John Hawkins being sent general of a fleet to sea, spent seven months without taking one Spanish ship. At his return he writ a long apology to the queen, and, for his conclusion, told her that Paul planteth, Apollo watereth, and God giveth

the increase. 'God's death (said the queen upon reading his letter), this fool went out a soldier, and is come home a divine.'"*

The exploits of this farcical general are, on the whole, more humourous than instructive; and the record of them would be idle for any useful purpose, were it not that they afford an apt illustration of the great evils that are sometimes inflicted upon a nation by favoritism and corruption, in the choice of individuals to fill responsible posts. In this instance, there was no colorable excuse for intrusting so important an expedition to so incompetent an officer, there being at the very same time, some of the most experienced commanders in the service unemployed. The incapacity of this general to conduct such an enterprise, or even to assume any duty whatever connected with the navy, was not less glaring than the folly with which, on his return home, he exposed himself to the castigation of his contemporaries. Not content with having brought the undertaking to a contemptible issue, he considered it advisable, perhaps for the purpose of vindicating his reputation, or, more probably, of gratifying his vanity, to publish a narrative of his proceedings. This publication drew an acute and masterly criticism from Monson, who, replying to it paragraph by paragraph, reduced the vain glory of the pompous historian to rags, and traced the original causes of the failure of the project to the ignorance, weakness, and indecision of those to whom its execution was committed. After laying bare all the errors of the expedition, Monson thus characterises the publication in which they were attempted to be defended: — "I confess, nothing in your discourse doth make it appear to be writ by a soldier at land or sea, but a plain and absurd style, the unproper terms used by sea and in ships, and the often repetition of some words, which is not proper in oratory. From soldiers, neither eloquent words nor forms are requir'd; their actions must give matter for scholars to amplify upon; and though this may excuse the writing of the pamphlet, yet it can no

more clear you of blame in your carriage of the action, than the projector of it; it being hard to judge, whether of you two deserved the most shame, the one in advising the other in executing."*

There has rarely been a more striking illustration of the danger of rushing into print in defence of a doubtful cause than was exhibited on this occasion. If the general had remained silent under his discomfiture, the affair might have passed over and been forgotten, but his book produced a discussion that not only put every body in possession of all the circumstances of the case, but kept them long before the public. In another place Monson observes: "Most men, I confess, had an ill opinion of the voyage before their going, a worse after their return, but worst of all upon publishing the pamphlet; for it has stopp'd the mouths of all those that could force arguments to excuse it: some, out of charity and good-nature, forbore to think the worse of it; some, out of judgment, did no more condemn it than an action that failed by fortune in the execution; some, that would seem wiser than others, said, that there was a greater mystery in it than the ordinary people conceived; some said, they had intelligence with Cadiz, or other places of importance, but took no success. But this book has discovered all, for they find the project here as ridiculous as the execution of it." †

The confessions of the writer of this unlucky book certainly exhibit marvellous simplicity, for in relating the most ridiculous events of the voyage, he hardly seems conscious, that they are likely to subject him to the contempt of his readers. Pursuing the narrative of the proceedings upon the approach to Puntal, he tells us, that on "the 25th there was a motion to march four or five miles to recover some boats, to serve instead of their long-boats they had lost at sea; and so they marched forward and back again, brought away their boats, spoiled the fishermen's nets, masts, and other provisions they there found."

* Monson, p. 251. † Ibid. p. 248.

Upon which Monson observes, "Here was marching forward and backward, which we may properly call a set dance. These boats, I confess, saved your honour; for something you did upon them, though you did nothing upon the ships; and for your attempt upon the fishermen's nets, you made the enemy have a feeling of it, they being tied to observe fasting days from fish, which now they must want."*

This "marching," is doubtless a specimen of the misappropriation of terms referred to in a former place by Monson; and, when the writer of the book talks about marching backwards and forwards, and bringing away boats, he has not even the poor excuse of a bad jest to set up for such an abuse of technical language.

On the same day, that was distinguished by this dance of boats, the colonels met at Puntal; and after a serious deliberation they resolved that nothing could be done upon the Spanish ships, in consequence of the wind and tide, which they said was the very reason why lord Essex, in 1596, could send no ships "to do the enemy harm." This assertion Monson extinguishes with as much good humour as could be fairly expected from him, with his recollections of the triumphant and valiant conduct of Essex fresh in his mind. "I confess," he observes, "that if my lord of Essex had followed your example, to be talking three or four days of what he performed almost in as many hours, he had done the enemy no more harm than you; but what he did, and by the good advice he did it, I have shewed before; and if you call it no harm to the enemy, to have the best ships Spain ever enjoyed, burnt and taken, to the number of nine-and-fifty sail, with a mass of wealth in them; and this to be done in despight of your fort, which takes up three leaves of paper in your book of difficulties; I say, if this be no harm, and your taking of fishermen, boats, and nets, be a spoil and harm, I confess yours were the honourable action, and

* Monson, pp. 248, 249.

that of my lord of Essex of small consequence in respect of yours."*

The imbecility of the councils held throughout the entire of this grotesque expedition, constitutes a prominent feature in its history. The individuals who officiated at them seem to have been utterly unacquainted with the usages of the service, the management of ships, the seas in which they rode, and the coast they came to invade. Sometimes they were put out of their calculations by the dangers they apprehended from the enemy; sometimes they were frustrated by the most trivial accidents; and sometimes by their own culpability in neglecting to avail themselves of favourable opportunities. But the most formidable obstacle they had to contend against was the wind. Whenever they wished to land at Port St. Mary the wind invariably blew right in their teeth, and forced them to abandon their design; and when they wanted to get out of the way, still the wind was against them, and they were forced to remain where they were. Whatever appeared most desirable at the moment was always defeated by an adverse wind, and at last the winds, which had so long thwarted their heroic aspirations, blew them (not exactly, however, against their consent) home, and landed them safely on the hospitable shores of Kinsale, which, under circumstances of a different kind, had so often before received the intrepid mariners of England.

That this enterprise, had it been conducted with the requisite vigour and judgment, might have been rendered formidable if not fatal to Spain, there is very little doubt; and Monson attributes its failure solely to the rashness with which it was projected, and the miserable spirit of ignorance that pervaded its execution. He says, that "in many ages (or rather in no age) shall we have the like opportunity again to annoy the state of Spain, as was then offered us, if our land forces had been discharged at the beginning of summer, when they

* Monson, p. 249.

war first raised, and the fleet employed upon a sea action only; for, take it for a maxim, that sea and land enterprises together are the bane of one another, as experience has made it appear. At this time, that the expedition was undertaken, we well knew the Spanish fleet had dispossess'd the Hollanders of the town of Baye, in Brazil, a little before taken by them; we likewise knew they were to return to Spain with a million of pounds in wealth: which after proved true.

"And yet this was not all, and the worst that Spain was to receive from us: this happened when they had no suspicion of us as enemies, nor any shew of hostility made, to give them warning or distrust.

"If therefore we had employed our fleet, then in readiness, to the Terceira islands, where we assuredly knew the Spaniards would touch in their return, as indeed they did, all scatter'd and ill provided, we had without all doubt or question intercepted them, and possess'd so much wealth of theirs, as would have maintain'd a royal war against them, till his majesty had been reveng'd of the affront offered him, as was conceived at his being in Spain.

"Besides this wealth, we had cut off his fleet, which consisted of fifty or sixty of his best galleons, which in an age could not be restor'd, whereby he would have been unable to undertake any action against us. This was discover'd to some, before the fleet's going out; but either neglected or not believed." *

1627. Notwithstanding the issue of this ill-contrived project, another scheme of nearly a similar nature was attempted in 1627. This undertaking appears to have been equally unfortunate, both in the original plan and its subsequent management. The object was to surprise the isle of Rhé, for which purpose the rendezvous was appointed at Portsmouth on the 17th of June. Several provision-ships that had attended the army to Plymouth were drawn together here, but in making their way one of them was lost.

* Monson, p. 252.

The first objection Monson takes to the design — an objection which includes the causes of all the mischiefs that ensued — is the place of rendezvous. The reasons he urges against resorting to Portsmouth as the point of meeting, will hold equally valid on all similar occasions. "You must understand," he observes, "that Stoke's Bay, where our ships rode, is forty leagues from Plymouth, by the way of St. Helen's Point; and the course of the channel is east-north-east and west-south-west: Ushant, which is the head-land of France, and by which you must pass either from Plymouth or Portsmouth, if you will sail to St. Martin's, is twenty-six leagues from Plymouth, south-westerly; so that there was forty leagues' run to fetch those ships which could have brought themselves; and a ship lost, which had not so happened, but by their going to fetch them.*"

Having met, however, at Portsmouth, and an easterly wind prevailing at the time, they should have consulted as to their future proceedings before they ventured out. There lay before them a choice of three courses: — 1. To keep to sea with a wind which must inevitably bring them in a short space to leeward. — 2. To land in Conquet road, or some other part of France. — 3. To return to Plymouth or Falmouth, there to await a more favourable opportunity. Of these three courses the first was obviously the most dangerous; and, with the usual indiscretion which marked their councils, they determined upon adopting it. The result was exactly what might have been anticipated by any experienced mariner; they kept the sea until they were to leeward of the French shore, and foolishly spent a whole day in chasing some Dunkirkers, "when," says Monson, "in two hours they might have discerned whether they could fetch them up or no." If they had made Plymouth or Falmouth the point of departure, they would have been carried direct to St. Martin's in two or three

* Monson, p. 252.

days, without any risk of being scattered at sea; but as it was, they were exposed to a continuation of foul weather, and got so far to leeward, that, even if they would, they could not have recovered either of their ports. At last the ships were dispersed by storm; sixty of them arriving at the citadel of St. Martin's, the chief strength of the island, on the 10th of July, and the remainder on the following day. The arrival of these ships, in this disorderly way, completely frustrated the object of the expedition. Had the whole fleet arrived together, the island would have been surprised, and all its provisions seized; but the time which was thus afforded by the irregular approach of the vessels, enabled the French to secure themselves in the castle. Of 6000 or 7000 troops, which formed the military force of this expedition, it was supposed that more than one half perished before the English left the island.

Referring to these signal failures, Monson gives the following excellent piece of advice to all future commanders:—"Thus," he says, "I have run over such errors as I have briefly collected out of the ill-carry'd action to the island of St. Martin's, wishing that generals may not only see, but foresee, that they may with judgment determine what they shall put into execution, before they attempt it with force and courage; for great actions ought to be resolved on by leisure, and performed with speed. They should not say and stay, but say and do. They must consider, that the first enterprise in war gets the best reputation; and a thing well begun is half ended."*

The rashness of these expeditions was rendered still more conspicuous by the spirit of opposition, that was every day becoming more and more manifest between the king and the parliament. Immediately after his accession, in 1625, Charles proposed the attempt upon Cadiz, not only against the feeling of parliament, but without

* Monson, p. 253.

sufficient funds to carry it on. He hoped, probably, by precipitating a foreign war, to divert the house of commons from the consideration of the grievances which the patriots were constantly pressing upon the attention of the people; and, he was so intent upon the project, that he went to Plymouth in person to inspect the preparations. The difficulty of obtaining the necessary means, however, was so great, that he endeavoured to remedy it by raising a forced loan, through circulars addressed to the lieutenants of counties, by procuring money upon his plate and jewels, and even by the plunder of the Spanish maritime towns, the commander of the expedition having been distinctly instructed to save the wealth of any town that might be taken, towards the charge of the fleet.* Thus, persisting in equipping expensive armaments at a time when the exigencies of the royal treasury had reduced the king to the last extremity, the ship-money tax, devised by the infamous Noy, was adopted as a last resource to sustain the unpopular schemes of the infatuated monarch. The history of the ship-money controversy is too well known to require any particular notice in this place. It was imposed by the king, and resisted by the people; and, while on the one hand, it conferred imperishable infamy on the name of Noy, it drew out, on the other, the patriotic energy of the virtuous Hampden.

Sir William Monson was amongst the few who defended the levy of the obnoxious ship-money; but his motives, however untenable, were pure and disinterested. Looking only to the honour of the country, and remembering, with strong feelings of resentment, all the wrongs and insults we had endured from the Dutch, he sought

* "Our rashness in these expeditions," says Monson, "appear'd greater than our discretion, in bidding defiance to the two mighty and potent princes of Europe, Spain and France, both at one time, without help or assistance from abroad, and under the uncertainty of money, the then parliament opposing his majesty's demands. To the Spaniards we only showed our teeth, with a desire to bite; France provided for us, and plucked out our teeth before we could bite, as is to be seen by the unfortunate and unadvised expedition to the isle of Rhé, which left such a mark of dishonour upon our nation as former times could never be taxed with." — p. 234

to impress upon his countrymen the obligation of subscribing liberally to punish that insolent power. With the gallant spirit of a British admiral, he desired above all things to vindicate the sovereignty of the sea, nor could he discern in the mode adopted by the monarch of raising the requisite funds, the slightest encroachment upon the rights of the people. He looked upon all kinds of tyranny with such abhorrence, that he could not even suspect its approaches in England, regarding it as an impossibility under a constitution so carefully fenced round by safeguards. "God be thanked," he exclaims, in his discourse upon ship-money, "this kingdom never admitted of tyrants' title;" so far was he from supposing that, at the same moment, he was employed in advocating one of the most oppressive measures that had ever been forced upon the nation.

His arguments are wholly confined to the grand object of retaliating upon the Dutch, against whom he felt an old grudge, which he longed to gratify. "Here is an occasion," he says, "offered for all true Englishmen, to have a feeling of public and national wrong; for a reproach to a discreet man is more than the lance of an enemy. What affront can be greater, or what can make a man valianter than a dishonour done to one's prince and country, especially by a people that was wont to know no more than how to catch, pickle, and feed upon fish, till now they are made drunk with our English beer? and so rude and unruly, that they strike at us, their next and best neighbours and friends?"

The entire purpose of the discourse is to show, that, as the whole country was disgraced by the insolent conduct of the Dutch, so the whole country ought to cooperate in seeking revenge — the rich by subscriptions, and the poor by their persons. He even suggests that if the opportunity should be suffered to pass away, Holland, taking advantage of our inertion, with nothing "but a pond betwixt us," would gradually excel us in her shipping, and at last strike successfully at our ma-

ritime power. "It will be better," he observes, "for you to contribute now, whilst you have something, than to be bereaved of all you have." So strongly was he impressed with the importance of chastising and crushing these daring fishermen, that he considered no sacrifice too great for accomplishing so desirable an end. "Do, like the matrons of Rome," he exclaims, "in case of necessity, who, wanting a cup of gold to present to Apollo, contributed towards it with their jewels and bracelets; for which they received the reward of virtue, honour, and fame."

Although arguments of this description, springing from the resentment of an old seaman jealous of his country's naval reputation, had no effect upon the people, who were at that moment too much engrossed with domestic discontents to give much attention to the affairs of Holland, they were not thrown away upon the king, who soon found a colorable pretext for acting upon them. The Dutch carried their insolence to such a pitch, that the king's flag was no longer a protection, even in the narrow seas; and they not only fished in British waters with impunity, but employed the celebrated Grotius to assert their right in a treatise called "Mare Liberum." Selden was commanded by the king to answer this treatise, which he did in another entitled "Mare Clausum." But the question still remained unsettled. It was not likely to be decided by a paper war; and the wily and active proceedings of the Dutch speedily brought it to a tangible issue.

Frequent offers of amity had been made to Holland, but they were treated with inexplicable indifference; and at length a disposition was exhibited to form an alliance with France to the exclusion of England. After a long negociation between the two countries, an offensive and defensive league was finally entered into, by which France was pledged to declare war against Spain. Such a combination was justly regarded with suspicion by Charles; nor could any satisfactory reason be assigned for it at a time when France and England were mu-

[re]ally willing to afford assistance to Holland by consent. The dangers threatened by this league were too serious to admit of any delay in the adoption of protective measures; and, intelligence reaching England that a combined fleet was in preparation, the objects of which were not declared, it was believed that the intention of the new allies was to wrest from the king of England his ancient prerogative of the narrow seas. To meet this formidable contingency, his majesty issued immediate orders for fitting out a fleet for sea; "not intending," says Monson, "to injure any nation, but to keep himself and subjects from being injured, and to curb the insolency and pride of any people that should go about to infringe his royal prerogative."

1635.

While this fleet was in progress, and money was raising all over the country to furnish it, a variety of reports were spread abroad impugning the motives that led to so oppressive a levy. The king and his ministers were openly charged with making the fleet a mere pretence for extorting money from the multitude, to be afterwards employed in other purposes *; and some did not hesitate to assert, that the fleet itself was destined to be employed against the liberties of the people. The city of London took a prominent part in resisting the demand. Being assessed for seven ships of war, the corporation petitioned the king for exemption, on the ground of ancient privilege; but the petition was rejected, and the writ enforced by the lord mayor. The objections, however, that were made to the new burthens, soon gave way, according to Monson, to a general conviction in favour of the design; for, he tells us, "when they saw the end in arming such a royal navy, and the necessity of it, to give terror to the world, after so many imputations cast upon our nation by our former unfortunate actions at sea, it bred a great alteration in the disposition of people, as well at home as abroad."

* Rapin, who lived amongst the Dutch, and was not disinclined to favour them, says that it was manifest the king sought a quarrel with the Dutch, after thirty years of forbearance, only as a pretence to impose the tax of ship-money.

The armament consisted of nineteen royal vessels and six merchant ships, the whole commanded by the earl of Lindsey, with sir William Monson as vice-admiral, and sir John Pennington as rear admiral, with strict instructions to give no occasion of hostility to other nations, but resolutely to defend the prerogative of the sea; this fleet departed from Tilbury Hope on the 26th of May, 1635. About the same time, or a few days later in the month, the French and Dutch fleets joined at Portland, for the avowed purpose of questioning this prerogative, which they proclaimed wherever they came. "But it is to be observed," says Monson, "that the greatest threateners are the least fighters; and so it fared with them; for they no sooner heard of our readiness to find them, but they plucked in their horns, and quitted our coast, never more repairing upon it; which gave great satisfaction to the shores we passed, that were before struck with a terror."

As it was supposed that the enemy had retired upon the coast of Bretagne, a bark was despatched thither to obtain information concerning their designs and resources, and returned with such intelligence as removed all apprehensions of seeing anything more of them for the rest of the year. It was deemed advisable, however, to keep the sea until the 1st of October, during which interval, says Monson, "we made good our seas and shores, gave laws to our neighbour nations, and restored the ancient sovereignty of the narrow seas to our gracious king, as was ever due to his majesty's progenitors."

The triumphant issue of this demonstration, without a blow being struck at either side, appears to have exercised as salutary an influence abroad, as it did at home in stilling the murmurs of the reluctant tax-payers. While the fleet was in preparation, the foreign journals teemed with the most injurious aspersions; accusing the government of the basest motives, and seeking by a variety of insinuations and fabrications to inflame the discontents of the English. But in the sequel, all these

calumnious accusations died away, and, to use the words of the veteran Monson, the mouths of the detractors were stopped by that noble expedition, which conferred so much honour on the king, and filled his enemies with terror. Some allowance must, of course be made for the enthusiasm with which sir William speaks of this armament, for it was the last in which he was engaged.

He was now sixty-six years of age, and may be supposed not to have been unwilling to retire from the hardships of his profession; although he was ready to serve again had he been required. In the following year a second fleet was fitted out for the same purpose as that of the year preceding, his majesty finding so much advantage from it that he resolved to persevere in his intentions, so that it should not be looked upon by other nations as a sudden or ostentatious determination, but rather as a fixed resolution to assert and maintain the sovereignty of the seas. This fleet was placed under the command of the earl of Northumberland, recently created lord high admiral, sir John Pennington being appointed vice admiral, and sir Henry Maroon rear admiral. Monson does not appear to have been consulted upon this occasion, and afterwards, in commenting upon the voyage, which was not as successful as could have been desired, he observes, that had his opinion been demanded, he would have advised a course which would have brought Holland and all her wealth to his majesty's mercy, putting him in possession of her provinces, which he might have afterwards released, if he pleased, upon the payment of a yearly tribute.

1636.

Sir William Monson having now finally relinquished the public service, retired to his seat at Kinnersley in Surrey, where he occupied the last years of his life in the composition and arrangement of his "Naval Tracts."

These remarkable papers contain the most complete body of materials extant concerning the stirring period in which their distinguished author flourished. They are divided into six books, each devoted to a particular

section of the general subject. The first book presents a succession of narratives of the various actions that took place during the protracted war with Spain in the reign of Elizabeth; showing the causes of occasional miscarriages, the advantages obtained in other instances, and exhibiting, with fearless impartiality, the abuses that existed in the government of naval affairs at that period, together with such suggestions for their removal as his extensive experience enabled him to point out. The second book is chiefly occupied with an account of the naval policy of James I. and his successor, of the proceedings against the pirates, with plans and stratagems for their suppression, the unfortunate expeditions against Spain and France, and other matters connected with the supreme right of the king over the narrow seas. The third book treats of the admiralty, tracing the duties and obligations of every officer in the service, with a multitude of minute particulars connected with the construction of ships, their internal economy their management at sea, and a variety of other subjects relating to our maritime interests. The fourth book is a collection of voyages of discovery and conquest in various parts of the world from the earliest times. The fifth is filled with projects of naval aggrandisement; and the sixth is dedicated to an elaborate treatise on the best way of improving the fisheries, as a source of national wealth.

In these tracts the character of the writer, his profound knowledge of the great theme he undertook to develope, and his untiring zeal in the service of his country, are so clearly pourtrayed as to spare history the necessity of pronouncing any panegyric upon his merits. The composition of these pieces gave ample employment to a mind which survived in all its original vigour the decline of his bodily powers. But he did not live to consign them to the press, and they were not published until many years after his death, which took place at Kinnersley in February, 1642, in the seventy-third year his age. He left a large family to inherit an unspotted

1642.

name and a moderate fortune. He was one of the ablest commanders of his age, skilled beyond all others in the subtle tactics of his profession, and eminently distinguished by all those noble and valiant qualities which have long been peculiarly characteristic of the British navy.

EDWARD MONTAGUE,

AFTERWARDS EARL OF SANDWICH.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PERIOD OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

The prodigious advance made by the British navy from the time of Elizabeth to the commonwealth, forms one of the most memorable passages in the maritime annals of the country. Whatever judgment may be pronounced on the first princes of the house of Stuart, in reference to other parts of their policy, there can be no doubt that they contributed efficiently to strengthen and consolidate the naval power of England. A brief retrospect of the progress of the navy up to this period will impart to these isolated biographies something of the character of a continuous historical narrative.

If implicit reliance were to be placed upon the gorgeous descriptions that have been handed down to us of the vessels of antiquity, we should be compelled to infer that the ancients were well acquainted with at least the fundamental principles of the art of ship-building. But all such descriptions are deceptive; and the historians and poets to whom we are indebted for them, being themselves ignorant of the construction of ships, seem rather to have been captivated by their external pomp and rich embellishments than to have examined or understood their capacity for useful service. The honour of having been the original inventors of the art has been attributed by some writers to the Egyptians, and by others to the Phœnicians. Probably, the former made the earliest attempts, which were rapidly improved upon by the bolder genius of the latter.

The first vessels employed by the Egyptians were of

the rudest construction, and barely of sufficient security to navigate the waters of the Nile. They were formed of small square planks cut from the acantha or Egyptian thorn, nearly three feet each way, lapped over each other like tiles, and fastened by wooden pins. By this simple process, without any lining of timber, the hull of the Nile boat was completely formed, when the requisite number of seats or benches were placed inside for the rowers, and the joints being caulked with papyrus, the fabric was ready to be launched. The introduction of a mast formed from a strait stick of the acantha, a sail of papyrus, and a rudder passing through the keel *, were soon suggested by necessity, and adopted. As these barks, however, were incapable of stemming the current of the river, they were generally towed by persons on shore; but, on returning, it was customary to fasten a hurdle of tamarisks across the prow, which, being let down into the water and steadied by ropes or bands of twisted reeds, had the effect of increasing the velocity, the water acting with greater force on the extended surface of the hurdle, than it would have done on the vessel itself. To balance the head and stern, which might otherwise be affected by the hurdle, and to cause the boat to swim with an even keel, a stone of considerable weight, pierced through the centre, was suspended from the stern by a rope. † Such were the vessels employed for centuries by the Egyptians, yet the accounts that have descended to us of their magnitude and magnificence, might almost justify us in believing that they were constructed with the most finished art.

There is no doubt that even amongst the Egyptians and Phœnicians some of the elementary principles were discovered not long after they made their incipient experiments. They must have found out, for example, that the breadth of a vessel, carried beyond certain proportions, retarded her progress, — that rotundity caused a boat to roll, — and that if the breadth were diminished

* From κοίλη — the hold of a ship.
† Charnock, History of Marine Architecture, vol. i. p. 5.

too much, it rendered the vessel liable to be overset by any sudden shock. These points were certainly known to the Romans; but we find that they were also familiar to the inhabitants of the South Sea islands, whose galleys bear a strict analogy, in respect to contour, to those of the Romans and probably the Grecians. The wherry of the Thames waterman is built upon a similar plan, and is in effect little else than a galley in miniature.* Resemblances of this kind have frequently been referred to in proof of the common origin of the arts of different races; but necessity, pushed to extremity, must always create expedients bearing closely upon the same results. We need not perplex ourselves with an inquiry into the genealogical descent of the inhabitants of the Sandwich islands, to satisfy our curiosity about the origin of their ships, since we find in their modes of life and their geographical position sufficient motives to stimulate their ingenuity in that direction.

The invention of floating vessels belongs to ages too remote to permit it to be traced with certainty. It would seem that all countries intersected by rivers or lying seaward, resorted, in the first instance of necessity, to the employment of such means of transport by water as their particular circumstances enabled them to devise. But it is not in such speculations that the interest of the subject lies, but in the improvements of modern times suggested by increased experience, and reduced to a science at last by the progress of mankind in the acquisition of knowledge. Taking this view of the history of maritime enterprise, we shall find that the construction of sea-worthy ships and the formation of efficient navies belong to a much later period than is generally supposed.

The raft was the earliest resource of aboriginal nations, and from that imperfect beginning other modes of transport were gradually introduced. We are told that the only difficulty in forming these rafts "amounted simply to the attention that the logs or trees of which

* Charnock, vol. i. p. xi.

they were formed, should be so firmly lashed together that there might be no danger of their separating or breaking loose from each other."* Notwithstanding the manifest danger attending these crazy vessels, if such they may be called, distant and hazardous voyages were frequently made in them, and numerous islands in the Mediterranean are said to have been colonised by people who had no other means of navigation.

While this perilous method of sailing was adopted in some countries, a shorter course was hit upon in other places, where a single tree, hollowed artificially, was made to serve every purpose. This description of vessel was at first, probably, limited to the accommodation of a single person, resembling the small kajaks of the Esquimaux; but, wherever the timber was large enough to admit of greater capacity, larger canoes were scooped from the trunks of trees, and in some instances they were of sufficient dimensions to contain thirty persons. In these contrivances we have the first indications of the forms and proportions of vessels destined for war and commerce.

The celebrated vessel built by Sesostris, and the splendid galleys of Cleopatra, would appear from the extravagant descriptions of the ancient writers to have been constructed with as much skill as a modern man-of-war: yet we know that all those parts of a ship which are now considered essential to solidity and fleetness were wholly unknown even to the Romans. So little, indeed, were the true principles of ship-building understood, that the galleys were sometimes built of so large a size, with a view to intimidate the enemy, that they became unwieldy; and sometimes so light, probably for the sake of rapidity in sailing, as to be unfit for the purposes of war. Anthony lost the battle of Actium in consequence of the ungovernable bulk of his vessels, and the Carthaginians were frequently sacrificed by the extreme fragility of their boats. It has been one of the many triumphs of modern art to strike the happy mean, and

* Isidorus, b. xix. ch. 1. quoted by Charnock.

combine power and swiftness in the construction of ships.

During the early ages of the Athenian republic, the vessels of that state were little better than open boats; and they were so ill adapted either for attack or defence, that at the battle of Salamis the largest Grecian vessel was capable of containing only eighteen soldiers, exclusive of the rowers and the persons who worked the galley. It was not until after the time of Themistocles that decks or platforms, placed above the rowers, and extending from stem to stern for the soldiers to stand upon, were introduced.*

Iron was profusely used by the ancients in binding the planks and beams of their galleys; but they soon discovered that nails and bolts made of that material were liable to corrode, and to make the timbers *iron-sick*, which produced leakage and decay. To avert this evil, they substituted brass, which, although more expensive in the first outlay, proved ultimately more economical. But still they found great difficulty in closing up the planks, so as to prevent the water from forcing itself through. This serious inconvenience led to the discovery of that process which is called caulking. The first application of this kind consisted of pounded shells formed into a paste with water, which, being carefully introduced into the chinks, excluded the water for a short time; but, not being adhesive, it soon cracked, and, falling out by degrees, left the crevices open, as before to the admission of the water.† This mode of caulking is still used by the Chinese. "Their ordinary boats," says sir George Staunton, "consist of five planks only, joined together without ribs or timbers of any kind. These planks are bent to the proper shape, by being exposed some time to a flame of fire. They are brought to a line at each end, and the edges are joined together with wooden pins, and stitched with bamboo split into flexile threads, and

* Charnock, i. 91. † Ibid. i. 99.

the seams afterwards smeared with a paste made with quick-lime from sea-shells and water.* Others are made of wickerwork smeared all over, and rendered water-tight by the same composition as is used for the former." The process of burning the shells and reducing them to lime was adopted as a remedy for the defects of the former mode, but it was found insufficient. Wax and pitch were afterwards tried; but it was not till the application of bruised flax, beaten with a mallet, and driven in between the planks and seams of vessels, was brought into practice, that the evil was finally provided against. This ingenious discovery was known to the Belgæ, and is referred to by Pliny.

Sheathing vessels with hides, hardened for the purpose, firmly attached to the bottom, and covered with a coat of resin or pitch, was of frequent use amongst the ancients; for which purpose lead appears also to have been employed. The discovery of Trajan's galley in the lake Riccio, where it had remained under water upwards of 1300 years, places this fact beyond doubt. Leo Baptisti Alberti, who inspected this curious relic, says that "the pine and cypress of which it was built had endured, and were then in so sound a state, as to be nearly incredible: the bottom was, according to the modern and easily comprehended scientific term, doubled: the seams had been evidently caulked with linen, and the whole of the external part carefully smeared, or payed with a coat of Greek pitch, over which was brought an exterior covering, or what is now called a sheathing, formed of lead, rolled or beaten to a proper thinness, and closely attached to the bottom by a sufficient number of copper nails."† Here we have caulking and sheathing together, above 1600 years ago; "for," says a modern writer, "no man can doubt

* This circumstance, says Charnock, well explains the term of *ὀστράκινα πορθμεῖα* used by Strabo, and strangely supposed by Schæffer to mean vessels built with *sea-shells*.

† Charnock, i. 101.

that the sheet of lead nailed over the outside with copper nails was sheathing, and that in great perfection, the copper nails being used rather than iron, which, when once rusted in water with the working of the ship, soon lose their hold, and drop out." * The plan of sheathing ships with lead was suggested soon after the Restoration, but it was not found efficacious, and copper was subsequently brought into general use.

The refinements introduced by the Greeks and Romans exercised, however, but a temporary influence over the progress of the art, and nearly all their improvements were buried in the fall of the Roman Empire. Even in the first ages of the Christian era the resources of other navigators were clumsy and scanty; and the Saxons, who covered some of the largest European seas with their frail vessels, seem to have hardly emerged from aboriginal ignorance in these matters. "If the fact," observes an ingenious writer, "were not established by the most unquestionable evidence, it might appear an attempt to rouse the credulity of a modern reader, by the description of the vessels in which the Saxon pirates ventured to sport in the waves of the German Ocean, the British Channel, and the Bay of Biscay. The keel of their large flat-bottomed boats was framed of light timber, but the sides and upper works consisted only of wicker, with a covering of strong hides. In the course of their slow and distant navigation, they must always have been exposed to the danger, and very frequently to the misfortune of shipwreck; and the naval annals of the Saxons were undoubtedly filled with the accounts of the losses they sustained on the coasts of Britain and Gaul. But the daring spirits of the pirates braved the perils both of the sea and of the shore; their skill was confirmed by the habits of enterprise; the meanest of their mariners was alike capable of handling an oar, of rearing a sail, or of conducting a vessel; and the

* Locke. Hist. Navigation — Harris's Voyages.

Saxons rejoiced in the appearance of a tempest, which concealed their design, and dispersed the fleets of the enemy. After they had acquired an accurate knowledge of the maritime provinces of the West, they extended the scene of their depredations, and the most sequestered places had no reason to presume on their security. The Saxon boats drew so little water, that they could easily proceed fourscore or a hundred miles up the great rivers. Their weight was so inconsiderable, that they were transported on waggons from one river to another; and the pirates who had entered the mouth of the Seine or the Rhine might descend with the rapid stream of the Rhone into the Mediterranean."* This latter statement might stagger modern belief, were we not in possession of well-attested facts of a similar kind, and of a still more startling character. The ancients, having no scientific control over their vessels in dangerous waters or contrary winds, regarded the navigation round the Peloponnesian Cape with such horror, that, in preference to risking the perils of those dreadful seas, they are said to have actually drawn the imperial fleet across the Isthmus of Corinth. This feat, incredible as it appears, is even less marvellous than an enterprise accomplished during the American war by a British officer, captain Schanck, who, in an enemy's country, and destitute of the facilities that were probably employed by the ancients for such purposes, conveyed a considerable number of vessels, amongst which were some of no insignificant tonnage, overland from Sillery to lake Champlain.

After the Saxons had obtained confirmed possession of Britain, they devoted themselves to the domestic affairs of their new settlement, insensibly relinquishing the sea, and suffering their naval advantages to pass so completely out of their hands, that at the close of two or three centuries, they were utterly unable even to defend the coasts. When Alfred came to the throne,

* Quoted by Charnock, i. 215, 216.

he found the country exhausted, the people impoverished, and their maritime power reduced to insignificance. He immediately set himself about the laborious task of repairing these misfortunes, directing his energies mainly to the grand object of fighting the enemy at sea, which he regarded to be a matter of paramount importance to a country having so extensive a line of shore, compared to her whole superficies.* His first object was ships. Although he was not skilled in navigation, he readily detected the points where the enemy was defective, and caused a new kind of vessel to be built for warlike purposes, the plan of which he devised himself. All that is known of these vessels is that they were longer, stronger, and swifter than any that had previously been used in this country, that they were better manned and provisioned, and that, in sending them out to sea, Alfred issued express injunctions that they were neither to give nor receive quarter, but to put to death all who fell into their hands.† The construction of these improved ships had acquired for Alfred the historical reputation of being the founder of the British navy; but history, like poetry, frequently confers false glory. Whatever advances may have been made in the art of ship-building by that monarch, it is certain that he was not able to bring up his naval power to an equality with that of the Danes, who continued long after to harass the coast in defiance of his new galleys. It is obvious, also, that the national marine could not have received any decided impetus from the vigorous and creative genius of Alfred, since it was unable to resist the Norman fleet, which was so feeble itself that it could not prevent a debarkation of Danish troops three years afterwards, nor even when united with the British ships defend the country from similar attacks.‡

* Saxon Chronicles † Campbell, i. 66.

‡ Charnock, i. xxiv. According to some writers William's fleet consisted of 900 sail; others augment it to 3000. But enough has been said in the above outlines to show how fallacious such numerical displays were. When naval architecture was in its infancy, vessels were numerous because they were small; but as the art advanced, the number was reduced in proportion to the advantages gained by improved construction. A seventy-

The earliest appearance of a British armament, worthy of being considered as a fleet, available for defence or attack, was in 1106, under Henry I., surnamed Beauclerc, the youngest son of the Conqueror. To this monarch, who issued imperative orders to prevent Norman vessels from approaching the shores of England, Selden ascribes the first assertion on the part of Great Britain of the sovereignty of the seas *; but Charnock, apparently with better reason, gives the credit of it to king John, who was the first to insist on the exclusive right of the English to the dominion of the seas. A mandate to his chief admiral is extant, in which he orders him to arrest, seize, and make prize of all ships found thereon †; a bold resolution in that age of desperate adventure and imperfect means. This question of naval sovereignty continued to be agitated at intervals, with more or less success, according to the immediate resources of the country; and towards the close of the thirteenth century, it seems to have been tacitly surrendered by other maritime powers. In the reign of Edward II., the Dutch were compelled to obtain licenses to fish on the English coasts, so vehemently and successfully was the prerogative disputed.

No specific particulars have been preserved of the navy of Henry I.; but its extent may be inferred from the fact that, upon one occasion, during the crusading expeditions by which that age was distinguished, seven thousand men, with their stores and baggage, were transported to Joppa in English vessels. In the succeeding reign the navy declined, but was restored by Henry II., some of whose ships were capable of containing three hundred persons. Richard Cœur de Lion made a still greater advance; and proceeded in person to the Holy Land, in 1190, with a fleet consisting of

four of the present day would have sunk the whole Norman fleet. A remarkable illustration of the difference between weight and numbers is furnished in the instance of the Armada, which with a vast forest of masts had but four vessels of greater tonnage than the Triumph commanded by Frobisher.

* Mare Clausum. † Charnock, i. xxvi.

nine ships of extraordinary size, one hundred and fifty smaller ones furnished for war, besides thirty-eight galleys, and a considerable number of inferior craft to carry provisions and serve as tenders. John was no less eager to sustain the naval power, and required that all foreign vessels, wherever they were met at sea, should strike their colours to the English flag; a custom which, from that time forth, was never relinquished, although it was not always vigilantly enforced.

Under Henry III., the navy declined again. It was reduced so low, that in 1269 the whole force that could be collected to attend the princes to the Holy Land, was thirteen small vessels, containing only a thousand individuals, including mariners and soldiers. This decadence of the maritime force was to be attributed entirely to the weakness and timidity of the government. The mode then employed of raising the navy was by levying upon certain towns and corporations a specified quota of shipping and men, in return for various privileges conferred upon them by royal charter. But the requisitions of the patient monarch were capriciously complied with in some instances, wholly refused in others, and, in the case of the Cinque Ports, the armed vessels which ought to have been placed at the disposal of the sovereign were employed in piratical depredations, not only in foreign countries, but on the English coasts. Unable to contend against such obstacles, Henry permitted the navy to fall into contempt.

Edward I. was favoured by peculiar circumstances, in his efforts to restore to the English the supremacy of the sea. A quarrel arose between some English and Norman sailors, which, in consequence of the cruelty exhibited by the latter, was taken up with enthusiasm by the whole country, and aid procured from Ireland, Holland, and other places towards the formation of a powerful fleet. The Normans were equally active in preparations; and when the two fleets met a sanguinary conflict ensued. The English at length prevailed, making prizes of no less than two hundred and forty

vessels; but many thousands were slain on both sides, or swallowed up in the waves. This event inspired the government with new energy, and in 1296 the monarch was able to collect a fleet sufficiently formidable to transport an army of sixty thousand men from Winchester to Flanders.

The reign of the second Edward was as unfortunate for the marine of the country, as it was for himself; and it was not until the contentions with France, arising out of the claims of the English monarch upon the French throne, plunged his successor, Edward III., into a foreign war, that the English navy can be said to have emerged from its infancy, and made a steady progress towards systematic organisation. All previous movements were irregular and incidental, depending more upon the endurance and resolution of the men than upon their tactics or their ships. The victories of Edward III. exhibit superior skill in naval manœuvres, in the disposition of lines, and the successful employment of stratagems. His armament in 1328 consisted of a fleet of 500 vessels, and while the loss on his side scarcely amounted to 4000 men, the French are said to have lost upwards of 30,000.

Several of the monarchs of England possessed ships of their own previously to this period; but it was only in the fourteenth century, that a royal navy, augmented to an extent at all proportionate to the increasing trade of the country, and placed in some measure upon a permanent basis, came to be formed. Some writers refer the first existence of a state navy to the time of Henry VII.; but unquestionable evidence might be cited to prove that this is an error.* During the cala-

* "Edward IV." says Mr. Willet, in a paper read before the Society of Antiquaries in 1792, "had several ships of his own, which he employed sometimes in war, and often in trade, in which he dealt largely. It appears from Cunning's monument in Red Clift Church at Bristol, that he at one time furnished this prince with 2470 tons of shipping to purchase his peace, among which were the Mary and John, of 900 tons, and the Mary Radcliffe of 500 tons, being two of the largest ships belonging to any Englishman at that early period, though many of that size, and larger, are to be found among the Venetians and Genoese of that time." In an order issued by the same monarch in 1481, the royal navy is expressly mentioned.

mitous wars of the Roses, the navy was grievously neglected; but marine architecture had already made such strides, that even that interval of suspense did not obliterate the acquisitions of the preceding period. The naval resources of the state were limited to a collection of transports in the time of Henry V.; and at the close of the civil war, Richard III. did not possess a single ship of any considerable weight. The restoration of tranquillity by the union of the Roses in the person of Henry VII. occasioned a revival of commerce, and consequently of maritime pursuits. The navy was now rapidly augmented; and from that period to the time of Elizabeth, when both the merchant and the royal services were called into more extensive action than they were ever engaged in before, its progress was uninterrupted.

If we compare the construction of the ships of Edward III., who abandoned the use of galleys in warlike enterprises (although they still continued to be used by the Venetians and Genoese), substituting in their places vessels of a larger size, with the improvements introduced under the house of Tudor, we shall perceive at a glance the great progress that was made at this period. "Even in that immense and formidable fleet," says Charnock, "if numbers alone could be said to constitute strength, belonging to Edward III., the general construction of the hull was extremely void of art; the sails and rigging were precisely of the same description, and the slight mast reared in the centre served to sustain a square sail, on which depended the only means then used of conveying the vessel across the ocean, at times when it was considered inconvenient to make use of the oars. The vessels rose considerably both at the head and stern, which varied very immaterially in form and shape from each other; and in short, the whole contour was so simple, and so easily described, that although the arts of painting and sculpture were in a very rude state at that time, there is but little reason to doubt, from the concurrent testimony of history, that the ships

built in the reign of the last Richard very strongly resembled the commercial ships of the ancients."* In the fifteenth century, the Scotch built a magnificent ship, apparently to exhibit their command of the mechanical arts; and as they never aspired at any period of their history to a maritime reputation, this specimen of their abilities in that remote age may be referred to, rather as a proof of what they could have accomplished than of what they did. We have the following curious account of this remarkable vessel: —

"The king of Scotland rigged a great ship called the Great Michael, which was the largest, and of superior strength to any that had sailed from England to France, for this ship was of so great stature, and took so much timber, that except Falkland she wasted all the woods in Fife, which were oak wood, with all timber that was gotten out of Norway, for she was so strong, and of so great length and breadth, all the wrights of Scotland, yea, and many other strangers were at her device, by the king's command, who wrought very busily in her, but it was a year and a day ere she was completed. To wit: she was twelve score foot of length, and thirty-six foot within the sides; she was ten foot thick in the wall and boards, on every side so slack and so thick, that no cannon could go through her. This great ship cumbered Scotland to get her to sea. From that time that she was afloat, and her masts and sails complete, with anchors offering thereto, she was counted to the king to be thirty thousand pounds expence by her artillery, which was very great, and costly to the king by all the rest of her orders. To wit: she bare many cannon, six on every side, with three great bassels, two behind in her dock, and one before, with three hundred shot of small artillery, that is to say, myand and batterd falcon, and quarter falcon, flings, pestilent serpentens, and double dogs, with hagtor and culvering, corsbows and handbows. She had three hundred mariners to sail her, she

* Charnock, i. 367.

had six score of gunners to use her artillery, and had a thousand men of war by her, captains, shippers, and quarter-masters."

Some allowances must be made for exaggeration in this picture of the wonderful Scotch ship; but making all due abatement on that score, the magnitude of the design cannot fail to excite admiration. The paucity of cannon in a vessel of such dimensions might justly occasion some surprise, were it not that cannon was not introduced into English ships until towards the close of the fifteenth century, and must have been a novelty at the time when this vessel was launched.*

The improvements adopted in the subsequent period, although inconsiderable in comparison with the advances made after the time of Elizabeth, afford sufficient evidence of the attention that was bestowed upon the subject. "Whoever were the inventors," observes sir Walter Raleigh, "we find that every age has added somewhat to ships; and in my time the shape of our English ships has been greatly bettered. It is not long since the striking of the topmasts, a wonderful ease to great ships, both at sea and in the harbour, hath been devised, together with the chain-pump, which taketh up twice as much water as the ordinary one did. We have lately added the bonnet, and the drabler, to the courses; we have added studding-sails, the weighing anchor by the capstern. We have fallen into consideration of the length of cables, and by it we resist the malice of the greatest winds that can blow. Witness the Hollanders, that were wont to ride before Dunkirk with the wind at north-east, making a lee shore in all weathers; for true it is, that the length of the cable is the life of the ship in all extremities; and the reason is, that it makes so many bendings and waves, as the ship riding at that length is not able to stretch it, and nothing breaks that is not

* Cannons are said to have been first used at sea by the Venetians in 1387, in their wars with the Genoese. They were first employed in England by Henry VII., and mounted *en barbet* over the gunwales. The first royal ship of war was built by Henry VIII. in 1514, when port-holes, invented in 1500 by a French builder, were first introduced.

stretched." He also notes an improvement by which the lower parts were raised much higher above the water than they had been in preceding reigns; but it seems that even then the evil was but imperfectly remedied, nor was it completely provided against until after the Restoration.

Thus in the shape of vessels, in the employment of additional masts, in the adoption of jointed topmasts, and in a variety of minor but important points of utility, both as regarded the internal arrangement of ships, and the economy of labour, great improvements had been made in sir Walter Raleigh's time. But many reforms yet remained behind, as he did not himself hesitate to testify. "It is a special observation," he says, "that all ships sharp before, that want a long floor, will fall roughly into the sea, and take in water over head and ears. So will all narrow-quartered ships sink by the tail. The high charging of ships is it that brings them all ill qualities, makes them extreme leeward, makes them sink deeper into the water, makes them labour, and makes them overset. Men may not expect the ease of many cabins and safety at once in sea-service. Two decks and a half is sufficient to yield shelter and lodgeing for men and mariners, and no more charging at all higher, but only one low cabin for the master; but our mariners will say, that a ship will bear more charging aloft for cabins, and that is true, if none but ordinary mariners were to serve in them, who are able to endure, and are used to the tumbling and rolling of ships from side to side, when the sea is never so little grown. But men of better sort and better breeding would be glad to find more steadiness, and less tottering cadge work. Albeit the mariners do covet store of cabins, yet indeed they are but sluttish dens, that breed sickness, in peace serving to cover stealths, and in fight are dangerous to tear men with their splinters."

In these remarks, sir Walter omits all reference to one of the most serious evils existing in the naval service, during the period of Elizabeth's reign, partly,

perhaps, because he profited by its continuance, and partly from an unwillingness to provoke the jealousies of his contemporaries and the censure of the sovereign. The evil to which we refer was the employment of "gentlemen captains," who were totally ignorant of maritime affairs, and who, going abroad in search of plunder rather than honour, not only brought much disgrace upon the service, but frequently involved the royal ships in unnecessary conflicts. In such cases discipline was out of the question, the captain was at the mercy of the master, and numerous abuses crept in, which, in despite of all the triumphs of that brilliant reign, reflected infinite discredit on the authorities. In a memoir upon the expeditions of the royal navy, from 1585 to 1603; drawn up by a Mr. Gibson, who appears to have been consulted on the subject by the government, this injurious practice is described as the source of all the misfortunes and checks that retarded the progress of the navy in those days.

Speaking of the accounts of these various expeditions, Mr. Gibson observes, "In perusing them, I finde many accidents to have happened for want of tarrpawling commanders, or gentlemen thoroughly acquainted with maritime affaires, as may readily be seene by compareing the conduct of sir Francis Drake, sir John Hawkins, sir William Boroughs, sir Martin Frobisher, and sir William Monson, with that of my lord Effingham, the earles of Southampton and Cumberland, lord Thomas Howard, sir Richard Lewsham, sir Richard Grenville, captain Lister, sir Francis Veere, sir William Brookes, &c." By this enumeration he affords particular illustrations of his meaning, which could not be very readily mistaken. He observes also, that the narratives of those expeditions were written more fully and methodically than had afterwards been the custom, which he attributes to the fact, that "our clergymen employed in these expeditions tooke the pains to write the history of their voyages, while our gentlemen captaines, to prevent haveing any more such true relations,

take care, by ill usage, &c., not to carry any function, at this day, to sea with them." He also observes, that "all remote undertakings, when managed by gentlemen, have proceeded slowly; witness Virginia, Jamaica, Carolina, &c., compared with New England, Barbadoes, &c., settled by seamen." Merchants were more adventurous with experienced commanders, whose courage and conduct they were assured of, than with landsmen in whom they felt no confidence. Besides, these gentlemen captains exhibited no judgment in the choice of officers, and were generally distinguished by rashness, which passed for courage, instead of real valour tempered by discretion.

Great loss of life and other calamities frequently resulted from the ignorance of these men. Gibson instances the case of sir Richard Grenville *, "who, by neglecting his opportunity for want of seamanshipp, brought himself into danger by his willfulness, and lost his shipp and the lives of many brave men foolishly." In the earl of Cumberland's expedition in 1591, there was another "great miscarriage for want of seamanshipp, by not sending home their prizes as soone as taken, but toweing them at theire sterne, till a storm came, that forced them to cast off one loaden with suggar, which, by springing a leake, was forced to make to the shore, and stranded to save her men." Several instances of a similar kind are referred to by the writer, who especially blames the government for rejecting on different occasions the wise advice of the experienced Monson.

He observes also, that the "gentlemen captains" had certain notions of etiquette, which seriously injured the interests of the service. "I find," he says, *punctillues* of honour oft insisted on by gentlemen, and the loss of many a good design; when on the other hand, the tarrpawlings observe noe grandure, but, like devells,

* Grenville was a brave man, notwithstanding the strictures of Gibson; but his bravery was of the violent kind, leading him rather to seek than to avert danger.

count themselves most happy that can doe most and soonest mischief to their enemys."

The custom of employing indiscriminately land officers as admirals, and naval officers as generals, prevailed to such an extent, in the reign of Elizabeth, that their functions frequently became confounded, so that in sieges and battles when naval officers went ashore, they might without any impropriety have placed themselves at the head of the troops. When large fleets were sent out to sea, the command was sometimes divided between the general and the admiral. Thus in the expedition of the earl of Essex and lord Howard, there appears to have been no difference in their authority, although the former was a general, and the latter an admiral; for in their manifesto, they describe themselves as holding the command in common, "We, Robert, earl of Essex, &c., and Charles, lord Howard, &c., lord high admiral of England, having the charge of a royal navy of ships, &c." Sir John Wingfield, who was killed in the assault upon Cadiz, and who distinguished himself in the land service, commanded the Vanguard on that memorable occasion.* This practice, injurious to both services, was continued, occasionally, down to the time of queen Anne, when the earl of Peterborough was joined in the command of a fleet with sir Cloudesley Shovel. The French occasionally adopted it to a still later period, but it is now universally abolished.†

* Charnock, ii. 156. Monson's Tracts, p. 168.

† Sir Robert Slingsby, comptroller of the navy, complains, in a paper written in 1669, of the great inconvenience that had accrued to the service from the union of the offices of master of the naval and master of the land ordnance in one person. He shows that the two services ought to be kept distinct, and that the office of the ordnance by sea ought to be embraced in the duties of the navy office. The following passage affords a curious illustration of the manner in which the administration of naval affairs was carried on at that time.

"The last master of the ordnance of the navy, distinguished from the master of the ordnance by land, was sir William Winter, after whose death it was thought fitt to unite that place in the same person with the mastership of the ordnance by land, whereby the navy office and the office of the ordnance have since become soe perfectly distinct that there have many inconveniences happened by it in all great expeditions. Their orders for preparations being distinct, and the c[illegible]cell apart, it always happened that one of them stayed for the other, which occasioned both great expence of

Upon the accession of Elizabeth, the navy was in so reduced a state, that it required many years to effect the augmentation which was necessary merely for the protection of the narrow seas. Great as her exertions were to enable her to accomplish this object, the royal navy in 1578, twenty years after her accession, amounted to only twenty-four ships, of different sorts, the largest of which, the Triumph, was a thousand tons, and the smallest, the George, was under sixty.* The total burthen of these vessels amounted to about 10,400 tons. The general marine of the country was so low, that there were only 135 vessels in the whole kingdom above 100 tons burthen, and not more than 656 that exceeded 40 tons. So rapid was the advance, however, from this time, that in 1582, only four years afterwards, there were not less than 135 vessels engaged in commerce, the smallest of which was upwards of 500 tons burthen.†

---

time and money, besides many differences in judgment between the two officers, and interlocutory messages and letters between occasioned still greater retardation. At the returnes of the fleete, the officers of the ordnance having still need of the assistance of the mariners, or ship-keepers, for takeing out and disposing of their ordnance, carriages, and ammunition, they being subordinate only to the officers of the navy, will not move without their orders, whereby there often happen differences and complaints between the subordinate officers of both offices. To remedy which it hath been proposed to disjoin the officers of both offices of the ordnance by sea and land, and to unite the office of the ordnance by sea to the general office of the navy. But the masters of the ordnance of England having been, ever since, of great quality and interest, would never suffer such a collop to be cut out of their employment. I can find noe trace in the navy of any subordinate officers to the masters of the ordnance, and therefore presume, that though they were two distinct masters of the ordnance, one for the land service, and the other for the navy, yet the office of the ordnance, and all the subordinate officers, were the same as they now are; nor was it inconsistent for them to act by distinct warrants from distinct masters, each in their severall places, nor can it reasonably be imagined, that the uniting of these two offices were intended as the extinguishment of one, but rather the annihilation of the duty of two offices in one person, and if soe, then certainly he continues an officer of admiralty and navy still, and ought to performe the duty of both, and doubtless if he should re-assume his place of session with the rest of the principal officers, as his predecessors did (which was next to the vice-admirall), the inconveniences above-mentioned would be avoided, and a single warrant from the lord high admirall for the setting out any ships would serve, which now are multiplyed. But certainly since the two principall officers of the navy have discontinued their session in the office, it hath been (more than any other) subjects for question, inquisition, or accusations."

* Charnock. Entick, New Naval History. In the latter work the augmentation is placed in the year 1575, an evident mistake.

† Monson.

The naval resources of the kingdom at the period just referred to may be estimated from the scale on which Drake's hazardous expedition in 1576 was planned. It consisted of two vessels, one of 100, and another of 80 tons, a fly-boat of 50, a bark of 30, and a pinnace of 15 tons. "Such was the armament," says Charnock, "destined not only to pass over and explore unknown seas, to attempt a passage through straits both dangerous and tremendous, but also to carry on hostilities against one of the most formidable maritime nations in the universe, and to convince mankind that the remote distance, the dangers of the navigation itself, a superior force to contend with, and the impossibility of receiving succours in case of misfortune, were insufficient barriers against English perseverance and intrepidity."

The miraculous success of that expedition, and the impetus it gave to commercial speculations, diffused extraordinary ardour throughout the country; and our merchant strength steadily advanced to so great a height of prosperity, as to enable the government, when the mighty armament of Spain threatened our coasts, to command auxiliary aid of more than double the power, in numbers and weight, it could have called into requisition two years before. By a return of the number of seafaring men, which was furnished in 1583, it appears that there were at that time available for the public service, 1,484 masters, 11,515 mariners, and 2,299 fishermen, besides 957 wherrymen plying between London Bridge and Gravesend. In 1587, the cinque ports furnished a return of 214 ships, barks, and boats of various tonnage from 2 up to 120 tons, together with 228 masters and 952 mariners; and in 1588, the total number of vessels, according to similar returns, amounted to 1755, of which 183 were above 100 tons, 180 under 100 tons and above 80 tons, and 1,392 under 80 tons.*

The royal navy — which must be carefully distinguished from the commercial marine, which at this pe-

* Cotton MSS.

rial invariably formed a part of the great enterprises undertaken by the government — was augmented in like proportion. At the death of Elizabeth in 1603, it amounted to 42 ships, with a total tonnage of nearly 17,000 tons.* The strength of this navy was distributed as follows: there were two ships of 1000 tons, three of 900, three of 800, two of 700, four of 600, four of 500, two of 400, one of 350, one of 330, one of 300, two of 250, five of 200, and the remainder were of various inferior rates. The unremitting exertions of queen Elizabeth may thus be said to have created a navy within less than half a century; for the miserable remnant of shipping left by queen Mary did not deserve so responsible a title.

But the progress of James I. was still more remarkable; for he not only enlarged the number of ships, but considerably improved upon the former modes of building. The immediate credit of these improvements is to be ascribed to the skill of Phineas Pett, the renowned naval architect, whose genius was fostered in the court of the Stuarts. In 1618, James had already added no less than 17 vessels, of different descriptions, to the navy of Elizabeth. One of these, the Vanguard, was of 651 tons burthen; another, the Assurance, was of 600 tons, and a third, the Nonsuch, of 500. But the most splendid of them all was the Prince Royal, of 1400 tons, the largest vessel that had at that period ever been built in England.† This ship exhibited the first bold deviation attempted in this country, not only from the practice of all other nations in ship-building, but from the customs that had prevailed up to this time in the British dockyards; and if nothing more was accomplished than the construction of this magnificent "floating castle," forming a new era in marine architecture, it would amply entitle the monarch under whose auspices it was

* Entick says it was computed at 1600; but the actual tonnage was 16,915 tons, exclusive of a few small vessels whose tonnage is not given in the official returns.

† See *antè*, p. 52.

projected, to the gratitude of posterity. Richly encrusted with gorgeous ornaments, after the fashion of the ancient galleys, it sacrificed in all other respects the forms of traditional beauty to practical convenience; and, unlike the unwieldy fabrics which it resembled only in the splendour of its external embellishments, it was perfectly manageable at sea.

While these important improvements were going forward in the art of building ships, there is no doubt that great abuses were taking deep root in the administration of the navy; but the vigilant commission of inquiry which was early instituted in this reign probed the evil to its foundations, and finally removed it altogether. It may be remarked also that the commercial marine had drooped suddenly at the close of the war, the merchants thinking it more convenient and economical to hire foreign bottoms than to engage in the outlay of building ships for themselves. But this error was speedily rectified, and the merchant service advanced in a few years with greater celerity and profit than at any former period. In 1615, according to Monson, the port of London did not possess ten vessels above 200 tons burthen; and such was the subsequent progress of commerce, that in 1622, three years before the death of James I., the small port of Newcastle alone had upwards of one hundred sail of ships, each of which exceeded that tonnage.

The infliction of ship-money by Charles I. was arbitrary and unpopular; and deserved, upon political grounds, the full measure of indignation with which it was visited. But whatever crimes were committed by that headstrong monarch against the liberties of his subjects, it would be a still more heinous offence against truth to refuse to acknowledge the benefits he conferred upon the navy. His motives may have been questionable, and his policy was, at least, injudicious in provoking the hostility of Holland, France, and Spain, at the same moment; but the fleets he organised had the effect of successfully developing the strength of the

country, and proving to the world that the power which scattered the argossies of Spain before the winds, and, to use the language of a writer of that day, made the ocean quake under her keels, was still capable of vindicating her maritime supremacy. After he had furnished two complete fleets, the first in 1635, under sir William Monson, and the second in 1636, under the earl of Northumberland, Charles made preparations for a third armament in the following year, when he added several new vessels to the existing force, and amongst the rest a ship of gigantic dimensions, called the Sovereign of the Seas. As this vessel presented an extraordinary advance upon all that had been done in this way previously, a minute description of it is essential to a complete view of the scientific progress of the period.

The following account of the Sovereign of the Seas is from a tract written by Thomas Heywood, and inscribed to Charles I. After a variety of flourishes, the author proceeds to give a profuse but exact picture of that marvellous ship: —

"Upon the beak head sitteth royall king Edgar on horseback, trampling upon seven kings: now what hee was, and who they were, I shall briefly relate unto you, rendring withall a full satisfactory reason to any impartiall reader why they are there, and in that manner placed.

"Upon the stemine head there is a Cupid, or a child resembling him, bestriding and bridling a lyon, which importeth, that sufferance may curb insolence and innocence restraine violence, which alludeth to the great mercy of the king, whose type is a proper embleme of that great majesty, whose mercy is above all his workes. On the bulk head right forward stand six severall statues in sundry postures, their figures representing Consilium, that is, Counsell; Cura, that is, Care; Conamen, that is, Industry; and unanimous endeavours in one compartement: Counsell holding in her hand a closed or folded scrole; Care a sea compasse; Conamen, or Industry, a lint stock fired. Upon the other, to

correspond with the former, Vis, which implyeth Force, or Strength, handing a sword; Virtus, or Virtue, a sphearical globe; and Victoria, or Victory, a wreath of laurell. The moral is, that in all high enterprises there ought to be, first, Counsell to undertake, then Care to manage, and Industry to performe: and in the next place, where there is Ability and Strength to oppose, and Virtue to direct, Victory consequently is always at hand ready to crowne the undertaking. Upon the hances of the waste are foure figures, with their severall properties: Jupiter riding upon his eagle, with his trisulk, from which he darteth thunder, in his hand; Mars, with his sword and target, a foxe being his embleme; Neptune, with his sea-horse, dolphin, and trident; and lastly Æolus upon a camelion, a beast that liveth onely by the ayre, with the foure windes his ministers or agents; the East called Eurus, Subsolanus, and Apeliotes; the North winde, Septemtrio, Aquilo, or Boreas; the West, Zephyrus, Favonius, Lybs, and Africus; the South, Auster, or Notus. I come now to the sterne, where you may perceive upon the upright of the upper counter standeth Victory, in the middle of a frontispiece, with this general motto, *Validis incumbite remis.* It is so plaine, that I shall not need to give it any English interpretation. Her wings are equally display'd: on one arme she weareth a crowne, on the other a laurell, which imply Riches and Honour. In her two hands she holdeth two mottoes: her right hand, which pointeth to Jason, beares this inscription, *Nava;* which word, howsoever by some, and those not the least opinionated of themselves, mistaken, was absolutely extermin'd and excommunicated from a grammatical construction, nay, jurisdiction, for they would not allow it to be verbe or adverbe, substantive nor adjective; and for this, I have not onely behind my back bin challenged, but even *vivâ voce* taxed as one that had writ at randum, and that which I understood not. But to give the world a plenary satisfaction, and that it was rather their criti-

cisme than my ignorance, I intreate the reader but to examine Rider's last edition of his dictionary, corrected and greatly augmented by Mr. Francis Holyoke, and he shall there read *navo, navas*; and, therefore, consequently *nava* in the imperative mood signifies a command to imploy all one's power to act, to ayde, to helpe, to indeavour with all diligence and industry, and therefore not unproperly may Victory point to Jason, being figured with his oare in his hand, as being the prince Argonaut, and say, *nava*, or more plainely, *operam nava*; for in those emblematicall mottoes there is allways a part understood. She pointeth to Hercules on the sinister side, with his club in his hand, with this motto, *Clava*, as if she would say, O Hercules, be thou as valiant with thy club upon the land as Jason is industrious with his oare upon the water. Hercules againe pointing to Æolus, the god of windes, saith, *Flato*, who answereth him againe, *Flo*. Jason pointing to Neptune, the god of the seas, riding upon a sea-horse, saith, *Faveto*, to whom Neptune answereth, *No*. These words, *Flo* and *No*, were also much excepted at, as if there had been no such Latine words, till some, better examining their grammar rules, found out *Flo, flas, flavi*, proper to Æolus, and *No, nas, navi*, to Neptune, &c.

"In the lower counter of the sterne, on either side of the helme, is this inscription:

> "Qui mare, qui fluctus, ventos, navesque gubernat,
> Sospitet hanc arcam, Carole magne, tuam.

"Thus Englisht:—

> "He who seas, windes, and navies doth protect,
> Great Charles, thy great ship in her course direct!"

"There are other things in this vessel worthye remarke, at least, if not admiration; namely, that one tree or oake made foure of the principall beames of this great ship, which was forty-foure foote of strong and serviceable timber in length, three foote diameter at the

top, and ten foote diameter at the stubbe, or bottome. Another as worthy of especiall observation is, that one peece of timber, which made the kelson, was so great and weighty, that twenty-eight oxen and four horses with much difficulty drew it from the place where it grew, and from whence it was cut, downe unto the water-side.

"There is one thing above all things for the world to take speciall notice of, that shee is beside tonnage so many tons in burden, as their have beene yeares since our blessed Saviour's incarnation, namely, 1637, and not one under or over; a most happy omen, which though it was not the first projected or intended, is now by true computation found so to happen. It would bee too tedious to insist upon every ornament belonging to this incomparable vessel, yet thus much concerning her outward appearance. She hath too galleries of a side, and all parts of the ship are carved also with trophies of artillery, and types of honour, as well belonging to land as sea, with symboles, emblemes, and impresses appertaining to the art of navigation; as also, their two sacred majesties' badges of honour, armes, eschutcheons, &c., with severall angels holding their letters in compartements: all which workes are gilded quite over, and no other colour but gold and blacke to bee seen about her; and thus much, in a succinct way, I have delivered unto you concerning her inward and outward decorements. I come now to describe her in her exact dimensions.

"Her length by the keele is 128 foote, or thereabouts, within some few inches. Her mayne breadth or widenesse, from side to side, 48 foote. Her utmost length from the fore-end of the sterne, *à prorâ ad puppim*, 232 foote. She is in height, from the bottome of her keele to the top of her lanthorne, 76 foote. She beareth five lanthornes, the biggest of which will hold ten persons to stand upright, and without shouldring or pressing one the other.

"She hath three flush deckes and a forecastle, an

halfe decke, a quarter decke, and a round house. Her lower tyre hath thirty ports, which are to be furnished with demi-cannon and whole cannon throughout, being able to bear them. Her middle tyre hath also thirty ports for demi-culverins and whole culverins. Her third tyre hath twentie-sixe ports for other ordnance. Her fore-castle hath twelve ports, and her halfe decke hath fourteene ports. She hath thirteene or fourteene ports more within board for murdering peeces, besides a great many loope-holes out of the cabin for musket-shot. She carrieth, moreover, ten peeces of chase ordnance in her right forward, and ten right aft, that is, according to land service, in the front and the reare. She carrieth eleaven anchors, one of them weighing foure thousand foure hundred, &c., and according to these are her cables, mastes, sayles, cordage, which, considered together, seeing majesty is at this infinite charge, both for the honour of this nation and the security of his kingdome, it should bee a great spur and encouragement to all his faithfull and loving subjects to be liberall and willing contributaries towards the ship money.

"I come now to give you a particular denomination of the prime workemen employed in this inimitable fabricke: as first, Captaine Phineas Pett, overseer of the worke, and one of the principal officers of his majestie's navy, whose ancestors, as father, grandfather, and great grandfather, for the space of two hundred yeares and upwards, have continued in the same name officers and architectures in the royall navy, of whose knowledge, experience, and judgement, I cannot render a merited character.

"The maister builder is young Mr. Peter Pett, the most ingenious sonne of so much improved a father, who, before he was full five and twenty yeares of age, made the model, and hath since perfected the worke, which hath won not only the approbation but the admiration of all men, of whom I may truly say, as Horace did of Argus, that famous shipmaster, who built the great

Argo, in which the Grecian princesse rowed through the Hellespont, to fetch the golden fleece from Colchos,

> "—— Ad charum Tritonia devolat Argum
> Moliri hanc puppim jubet" ——

that is, Pallas herselfe flew into his bosome, and not only injoyn'd him to the undertaking, but inspired him in the managing of so exquisite and absolute an architecture.

"Let me not here forget a prime officer, master Francis Skelton, clerk of the checke, &c." *

It appears that this art of ship-building was preserved as a close secret amongst its professors, and that the family of the Petts, who, according to this statement, inherited the patronage of the government through so many generations, were not only the most skilful naval architects of their time, but contrived to preserve the mystery of their craft with complete success. The object of all this secresy was, no doubt, to prevent other nations from profiting by our ingenuity, which was the more necessary in an age when improvement was making such rapid strides. The fact is referred to by Fuller, who says, "I am credibly informed, that that mystery of shipwrights for some descents hath been preserved successively in families, of whom the Petts about Chatham are of singular regard. Good success have they with their skill, and carefully keep so precious a pearl, lest otherwise among many friends some foes attain unto it. It is no monopoly which concealeth that from common enemies, the concealing whereof is for the common good. May this mystery of ship-making in England never be lost till this floating world be arrived at its own haven, the end and dissolution thereof." †

The personal interest which the king felt in the progress of the Sovereign of the Seas is attested by the architect, who tells us that his majesty went to Wool-

* "A true Description of His Majesty's royal Ship, built this Year 1637, at Woolwich, in Kent, to the great Glory of the English Nation, and not to be paralleled in the whole Christian World. By Thomas Heywood."

† Worthies of England.

wich to see the frame laid. "May 14. 1635, I took leave of his majesty at Greenwich," says Phineas Pett, "with his command to hasten into the north to provide and prepare the frame timber, plank and treenels, for the new ship, to be built at Woolwich. I left my sons to see the moulds, and other necessaries, shipped in a Newcastle ship, hired on purpose to transport our provisions and workmen to Newcastle. Attending the bishop of Durham with my commissions and instructions, whom I found wonderfully ready to assist us with other knights, gentlemen, and justices of the county, who took care to order present carriage, so that in a short time there was enough of the frame ready to lade a large collier, which was landed at Woolwich; and as fast as provisions could be got ready, they were shipped off from Chaply wood, at Newcastle, and that at Barnspeth park from Sutherland. The 21st of December, we laid the ship's keel in the dock; most part of her frame coming safe was landed at Woolwich. The 16th of January, his majesty, with divers lords, came to Woolwich to see part of the frame and floor laid, and that time he gave orders to myself and my son to build two small pinnaces out of the great ship's waste. The 28th, his majesty came again to Woolwich, with the Palsgrave his brother, duke Robert, and divers other lords, to see the pinnaces launched, which were named the Greyhound and Roebuck." *

This ship was not only the greatest in point of magnitude that had been built up to this time, being 1637 tons burthen, but, beyond all comparison, the strongest and most seaworthy. It was, in this respect, that it exhibited the most remarkable advance upon all preceding vessels, and even upon the Royal Prince, built only nineteen years before. That beautiful vessel appears to have been employed only on holiday occasions, and yet it was deemed incapable of further service not very long after Charles I. ascended the throne; while

* Phineas Pett, Journal.

the Sovereign of the Seas, destined to the most severe trials, continued in constant use for a period of nearly sixty years. The history and fate of this noble vessel are thus briefly and touchingly described by the architect. The date of this entry in Pett's journal is January 29. 1696.

"The Royal Sovereign was the first great ship that was ever built in England: she was then designed only for splendour and magnificence; and was in some measure the occasion of those loud complaints against ship-money in the reign of Charles I., but being taken down a deck lower, she became one of the best men-of-war in the world, and so formidable to her enemies, that none of the most daring among them would willingly lie by her side. She had been in almost all the great engagements that had been fought between France and Holland; and in the last fight between the English and French, encountering the Wonder of the World, she so warmly plied the French admiral, that she forced him out of his three-decked wooden castle, and chacing the Royal Sun before her, forced her to fly for shelter among the rocks, where she became a prey to lesser vessels, that reduced her to ashes. At length, leaky and defective herself with age, she was laid up at Chatham, in order to be rebuilt; but, being set on fire by negligence, she was, upon the 27th of this month, devoured by that element which so long, and so often before, she had imperiously made use of as the instrument of destruction to others."*

The unquiet reign of Charles was so unfavourable to the solid acquisition of power, that it would excite no surprise to find that the navy had diminished in his hands; but, notwithstanding all the obstacles that impeded the monarch, he devoted himself with such perseverance to this paramount object, that he either rebuilt or added eighteen vessels to the royal navy, leaving it not only more powerful than he found it as to nu-

* Phineas Pett, Journal.

merical strength, but considerably improved in all other points of view.* Even his ill-advised wars helped, strangely enough, to increase the national prosperity, while the more meritorious actions of the commonwealth had a contrary effect. "It is observable," says sir Robert Slingsby, "whilst during the wars his late majesty had with France and Spaine both at once (though the great expeditions had but ill success), this nation hath rather been enriched than impoverished by that warr; and during the time of the late usurped powers, tho' the nation was grown more martiall, and tho' they were in firm league with France, Portugall, and Sweedland, and the king of Spaine, whose navall force was much more inconsiderable than formerly, by the loss of Portugall and Dunkirke, the nation was by that warr impoverished above 100ty ships, taken and destroyed, and the trade of this kingdome almost ruined." The same writer observes, that for twenty years previously (he wrote in 1669), there was scarcely one good merchant-ship built; that of what had been in being there were then very few left; and that the merchants, trusting to the government for convoy, took no care of making defence for themselves, so completely did the commonwealth crush the commercial marine of the country.

All trust-worthy authorities, on the contrary, agree in describing the reign of Charles, agitated as it was by domestic convulsions, as having been eminently beneficial to the mercantile interest. Sir William Monson says that the general commerce of the kingdom had succeeded so much from the death of James to the commencement of the civil war, that the port of London alone could have furnished, in case of emergency, one

* "The theoretic principles of the art," says Charnock, "had, within a few years, become considerably improved, particularly in the form of the bottom. The immense square stern and full bow, which had been originally copied from the Hollanders, with whom it had been a custom for many years, began to yield considerably to the more taper stern and sharper bow, which, under some modifications, has continued in use among the British ships even to the present time." — Vol. ii. p. 296.

hundred sail of ships of considerable burthen, mounting cannon, and fitted up in all respects as vessels of war.

The advantages which thus flowed in such a full stream upon the commercial public may be attributed to that very zeal for the advancement of the navy which induced Charles to enforce the ship-money levy, and, above all, to the new principles in the construction of vessels, which were introduced under his fostering protection. It is to this latter part of the subject, that attention may be usefully directed, as it contains the proofs of those eminent services which he never ceased to render to that branch of the national strength in which he rightly judged the security of the kingdom resided. "The wonderful stride," observes Charnock, "made towards the improvement of ship-building in general, and more particularly of vessels intended for warlike purposes, appeared to promise a rapid ascension to what should experimentally be considered as the ne plus ultra of perfection. Amidst every surrounding foible, and improvident mark of conduct, the attention of Charles to this great naval concern was apparent in every action of his regal life, long as he was permitted to exercise the functions of a king, uncontaminated, and without restraint." Speaking of the superiority in structure of the Sovereign of the Seas, compared with the rude misshapen floating fabrics of the preceding century, or even with vessels of a more recent date, whose high and enormously towering poop, and no less extravagantly formed forecastle, served only to augment the dangers of the sea service, the same writer breaks into the following apostrophe to the marine architecture of Charles I. which will appropriately conclude this rapid summary of its progress to the times of the commonwealth.

"Could the shades of Howard, of Drake, and of Frobisher, have risen from their tombs, and beheld the sudden conversion, though they might have readily confessed the wisdom and propriety of the alteration, they would have been little inclined to believe that the new object presented to their eyes was a structure applicable

to the same purposes with those on board which they had themselves been accustomed to assert the honour, and vindicate the cause of their injured country. Nor, as may readily be augured, did improvement rest on the reformation just pointed out. The increase of dimensions and burthen naturally produced an increase of force, in respect to cannon, an accommodation for a more numerous crew, and a prevention, or at least ease, of many of those inconveniences and dangers which vessels of a more ancient construction had very frequently experienced. In point of force, ships of the first rate had advanced from fifty guns to sixty, and afterwards to one hundred; the tiers of cannon were augmented from two to three; and the tonnage of the first class of ships became augmented from a thousand, or at most eleven hundred tons, to nearly eighteen hundred.

"The tide of improvement appeared to keep a perfect level throughout the whole of its course. The ship intended to perform distant voyages, and that which was destined for the humble occupation of domestic commerce, all became augmented in proportion to the ranks they respectively held in the maritime world; and the very boats, or skiffs, participated in the general prevailing principle. In short, Britain, which had long aspired to the dominion of the seas, now appeared in earnest as to the establishment of her claim; and had not those destructive events intervened, which are too well known, there appears little doubt, that the pursuit in question would, long ere it actually did effect that purpose, have raised her into the first rank and power."

1625—1672.

1625. Edward Montague, the only surviving son of sir Sydney Montague, and grandson of Edward lord Montague of Boughton*, was born on the 27th of July,

* This nobleman, in common with every member of his house, except the subject of the present memoir, was strongly attached to the royal family,

1625. His family were ancient and distinguished by their talents and public spirit through all their branches. His father, the youngest of six sons, was a staunch royalist, and when the troubles broke out between the king and the parliament, suffered himself to be expelled from the House of Commons rather than subscribe an oath "to live and die with the earl of Essex." The reason he assigned for refusing to swear to such an absurdity, not being vulnerable to argument, was promptly disposed of by a vote of expulsion. "I will not swear to live with that nobleman," he exclaimed, "because he is an old man, and I might die before him; nor will I swear to die with him, because the earl is going with an army against the king, which I do not know how to free from treason, and therefore cannot tell what end that great man may come to." * This answer, so unpalatable to the parliament, was highly relished by the king, who declared that the expulsion of this gentleman for a simple avowal of his sentiments, was a most arbitrary proceeding. † It would have been fortunate for Charles if the tyranny he condemned in others had been more carefully avoided by himself.

Edward Montague, thrown at an unusually early age into the whirl of public business, with all the advantages of a liberal education, appears at once to have taken his stand on the opposite side. At seventeen years of age, he married the daughter of Mr. Crewe, afterwards lord Crewe of Stene, and in the following year, 1643, he

1642.
1643.

---

and, like many other persons of quality, was sacrificed for the fidelity with which he adhered to his principles. "Thus they took prisoner," says Clarendon, "the lord Montague of Boughton, at his house in Northamptonshire, a person of great reverence, being above fourscore years of age, and of unblemished reputation, for declaring himself unsatisfied with their disobedient and undutiful proceedings against the king, and more expressly against their ordinance for the militia, and notwithstanding that he had a brother of the house of peers, the lord privy seal, and a nephew, the lord Kimbolton, who had as full a power in that council as any man, and a son in the house of commons very unlike his father, his lordship was committed to the Tower a close prisoner, and though he was afterwards remitted to more air, he continued a prisoner to his death."—vol. ii. p. 16.

* Warwick's Memoirs. † Clarendon. Campbell.

received a commission to raise and command a regiment under that very earl of Essex, whose service was declined with so much firmness by his father. The boldness of this step was not less striking than the vigour with which he proceeded to carry it into execution. His family connections were extensive and powerful, and seem to have been freely placed at his disposal. The regiment was raised with such promptitude, that the young colonel was enabled to take the field at its head, within six weeks from the date of his commission. Such energy as this was well calculated to elevate him to a high place in the confidence of the parliament; but it was the zeal of nature rather than of party. It belonged to his character, and distinguished all his actions to the close of his life.

1644. The regiment joined the parliamentary army in the beginning of October, 1643; and early in the following year, colonel Montague passed through the terrors of his first campaign—a campaign, too, of the most sanguinary and revolting kind, fought upon the native soil of the contending parties, and sacrificing to the phrenzy of domestic feuds the most sacred obligations of home and kindred. The first action in which he served was the storming of Lincoln, on the 6th May, 1644, one of the most fatal conflicts of that disastrous war. On the 2nd of July following, he was at the carnage of Marston Moor, and exhibited so much bravery on that occasion, that when the city of York shortly afterwards proposed to capitulate, he was appointed one of the commissioners for the settlement of the articles. He was at this time only nineteen years of age.

1645. Throughout the subsequent events of the war he displayed equal courage, and was similarly distinguished. He was present at the battle of Naseby, and, in July 1645, he stormed the town of Bridgewater; an achievement of no great mark, but, considering the ferocious spirit in which these small sieges were conducted at both sides, not unlikely to have been attended with greater personal danger than even more formidable undertakings.

In the following September, he commanded a brigade in the attack upon Bristol, displaying remarkable abilities worthy of a nobler occasion; and when the place surrendered, he was one of those who subscribed the articles of capitulation granted to prince Rupert. He was afterwards appointed, together with colonel Hammond, to convey the intelligence of the surrender of Bristol to the parliament; and the news was considered so important, that it was commemorated, by a solemn thanksgiving. It is difficult to express the feeling of loathing disgust with which the modern historian records these blasphemous instances of grace after slaughter.

An officer who rendered such signal services to the cause of the parliament had a strong claim to a seat in the house; which was conferred upon him amongst the rest of his honours by the electors of Huntingdonshire. It does not appear, however, that he took any part in the proceedings. But his opinions were eagerly sought after by the heads of the republican party; and although he did not occupy a prominent place in the discussions, he exercised no inconsiderable influence in the secret direction of affairs. Whether his brief but stormy experience in the parliamentary camp had somewhat shaken his original zeal, or whether he had in the first instance embraced the popular side without reflection in the heat of boyish enthusiasm, and was now led, by a similar rashness of temper, to compassionate the misfortunes of the king, we have no means of ascertaining: but he seems to have become cautious and reserved as the catastrophe of the tragedy approached, absenting himself from the House when the soldiery in 1647, declaring against the Parliament, impeached eleven of its members.* His youth was, perhaps, a sufficient

1647.

* It is not a little curious that in the movement which was made by a fraction of the army to secure the person of the king, the house of colonel Montague was fixed upon for his majesty to rest at on his forced flight from Holmby to Newmarket. Clarendon alludes to the circumstance, and gives the following passage from the letter of the general announcing it to the parliament. The letter sets forth that "the soldiers at Holmby had brought the king from thence, and that his majesty lay the next night at colonel Montague's house, and would be the next day at Newmarket; that the

excuse for avoiding the responsibilities attached to such proceedings, and, being more a soldier than a legislator, he may have pleaded that his profession was to act, not to judge. Yet, throughout all this early hesitation, we may readily discern a gleam of the old royalist principles, by which his family had long been distinguished, and which, in spite of the temptations of his position, still lurked in his mind. The truth was, he was too young for the sullen craft and hard inflexibility of the party with which he had accidentally entered life.

But a man of such promise was not to be lost without an effort to retain him. Besides, the Montagues were people of old standing in the country; and, although Cromwell affected to despise antiquity and hereditary honours, he was not insensible to the importance of gaining over as many converts with noble blood in their veins as he could purchase with places or cajole by flattery. He tried both methods with colonel Montague; extolled his valour, his discretion, and his independence; and finally ensnared him into a seat at the treasury board. Montague is said to have acted with his usual energy while he held this appointment, and to have repented afterwards of his share in the transactions in which it involved him.

The usage of mixing up naval and military functions, without reference to the education or habits of the individual, which prevailed to such an injurious extent in the reign of Elizabeth, was frequently adopted in the wars of the commonwealth. To this usage Montague was indebted for his introduction to the naval service. When the war with Holland was brought to a close, he was relieved from his irksome duties at the treasury, 1656. and, in conjunction with admiral Blake, appointed to the command of a fleet destined for the Mediterranean.

Blake, like Montague, had commenced his career in the army. He was the son of a Spanish merchant who

---

ground thereof was from an apprehension of some strength gathered to force the king from thence, whereupon he had sent Colonel Whaley's regiment to meet the king. — *Hist. Reb.* vol. iii. p. 37.

left him a small estate near Bridgewater, which enabled him, after his father's death, to complete his education at Oxford. Failing to obtain academic preferment, he left the university after residing there for seven years, and was soon afterwards elected member of parliament for Bridgewater. The early dissolution of that assembly gave a new turn to his fortunes; and when the civil war broke out he declared for the parliament, and, procuring a commission as captain of dragoons, obtained considerable notoriety by his boldness and dexterity on many occasions of imminent peril. At Bristol he offered a desperate resistance to prince Rupert, and in consequence of the valour he displayed throughout the subsequent campaign was appointed governor of Taunton in 1644. He is said to have been a man of a morose humour, but fond of the society of "good fellows," who relished his saturnine wit, and the rampant bitterness with which he used to inveigh against courts and courtiers.* But, notwithstanding his anti-monarchical spirit, he disapproved of the trial of the king, which he considered cruel and illegal, having been often heard to exclaim, that he would as freely venture his life to save the king, as ever he had done to serve the parliament; a saying which, like many other strange things that were said and done in those days, is neither very intelligible in itself, nor very creditable to the political morality of the utterer.

As might have been expected from one who talked so loosely and vehemently, the king was no sooner put to death, than Blake became a more furious republican than ever. His blunt zeal and reckless courage recommended him to rapid promotion, and he was removed from the dragoons to the navy, and from thence, in conjunction with Deane and Popham, to the command of the fleet that was sent out against prince Rupert. In this capacity he displayed extraordinary resolution and great abilities: but the successful issue of his naval exploits does not diminish the wonder which the appoint-

* Clarendon.

ment of a horse-officer to such a post must naturally excite. It has been attempted to be explained by an ingenious speculation upon the probable motives of the new government. The parliament, says a modern writer *, had lately taken upon themselves the rank, though not the title, of states-general, and therefore might be inclined to make use of deputies for the direction both of fleets and armies, who were to judge in great points, and to be obeyed by such as were skilful in their profession, either as seamen or soldiers; for, in their judgment, to command was one thing, and to act another. This explanation, if it be of any value at all, is quite as applicable to one form of government as another, and leaves the personal question exactly where it was before. All governments must employ men of ability to judge in great points, and to represent their interests abroad; but the puzzle, which this explanation does not satisfy, is, that any government should choose a man to command a fleet whose whole experience had been previously confined to the command of a troop of dragoons.

Blake, nevertheless, acquired so great a reputation at sea, as to obtain a warmer panegyric in the pages of history than had ever been before bestowed upon any naval commander who came so late to the study of the profession, mastering its difficulties with unexampled rapidity. "He was the first man," says a contemporary historian, "that declined the old track, and made it manifest that the science might be attained in less time than was imagined, and despised those rules which had been long in practice, to keep his ship and men out of danger, which had been held in former times a point of great ability and circumspection; as if the principal art requisite in a captain of a ship had been to come home safe again. He was the first man that brought the ships to contemn castles on shoar, which had been thought ever very formidable, and were discovered by

* Campbell, ii. 117.

him to make a noise only, and to fight those who could rarely be hurt by them. He was the first that infused that proportion of courage into seamen, by making them see by experience what mighty things they could do if they were resolved, and taught them to fight in fire as well as upon water; and though he had been very well imitated and followed, he was the first that gave the example of that kind of naval courage and bold and resolute achievements."* It is superfluous to observe, that this character of Blake does palpable injustice to the distinguished men who preceded him in high commands in the British navy, but it serves to show the estimation in which he was held in his own day.

Such was the man with whom Montague was joined (at Blake's own desire†) in the command of the fleet in the Mediterranean. Great difficulties were experienced before the vessels could be got out to sea, in consequence of discontents amongst the officers, who were so ill-disposed to the service in which they were about to be engaged, that many of them insisted upon resigning their commissions. Montague undertook to appease their scruples, and addressed himself to the business with so much dexterity, that he restored the recusants to discipline, without resorting to any measures of severity; and by the time the ships sailed a good understanding prevailed amongst the company.

Magnificent projects were meditated by the admirals. Their first design was to fall upon the Spanish fleet in the harbour of Cadiz. The consideration of this bold undertaking was referred to a council of war, and abandoned as impracticable, but not without reluctance, after a minute examination of the position. The reduction of Gibraltar was next thought of, as a point of immense importance to the future operations of the English in those waters. Montague, however, appears to have doubted the likelihood of success. He was of opinion that the only way by which that fortress could be taken

* Clarendon. † Lediard, ii. 567.

would be by landing a large body of forces on the isthmus, and thus, cutting off all communication between the town and the main, to make an energetic assault upon the garrison; but, distrustful of the impatient spirits of the seamen, he recommended that the force to be employed, to the number of five thousand, should be exclusively military. The siege of this place, long afterwards, proved that his judgment in this instance was erroneous, for it was to that very impetuosity which he so much feared, that the success of the enterprise was to be mainly attributed.*

The fleet, unable to strike any decisive blow against Spain, after cruising about for some time idly before Cadiz, made for the opposite coast of Barbary, for the purpose of chastising the Tripoli and Sallee rovers, who, notwithstanding the terror inspired by Blake's appearance off their shores during the preceding year, still continued to manifest an insolent disposition. But it was no easy matter to crush these desperate barbarians, who seemed to possess a charmed life in the prosecution of their lawless practices. Montague perceived the difficulty of subduing them by ordinary means at sea, and suggested the advantages that might be derived from taking forcible possession of some place on the coast of Africa, not merely in respect to the facility it would afford in overawing the rovers, but the protection it would render to our trade in the Levant. This suggestion would no doubt have been promptly acted upon; but in the meanwhile such terms as satisfied the Protector were proposed and accepted, and Montague was disappointed in the execution of a favourite design.

The fleet was now perfectly useless, discharging a sort of negative duty from which no practical results of any kind could flow. It was checked by orders from home, which, instead of leaving a wider discretion to the admirals, exhibited a tendency to circumscribe their powers. Independently of this, the whole policy of the

* Campbell.

war was doubtful. While other nations were carrying on a profitable trade with Spain, which the English could not prevent, without engaging single-handed in hostilities with a confederacy of maritime powers, this fleet was cruising about for no better purpose than to show how much naval strength England could afford to squander for nothing. Montague remonstrated earnestly with the government on this subject, showed how much prejudice was done to our trade by a perseverance in this ruinous course, and proposed that, if we were still to maintain an offensive attitude, it would be sufficient to keep a squadron of light frigates in those seas, leaving the fleet at liberty to undertake more advantageous enterprises. But the Protector was obstinate. He had already made his calculation, and, right or wrong, he resolved to keep a strict watch upon Spain. The fleet was accordingly ordered back to Cadiz, and Montague was compelled to resume his forlorn post in the autumn.

Fortunately it happened on this occasion, that, hopeless as the design was in itself, it yielded an accidental benefit. While the main body of the fleet lay off Cadiz, endeavouring to provoke the Spanish squadron into an engagement, or trusting to good fortune for an opportunity of intercepting the rich flotilla that was then expected home, captain Stayner in the Speaker, accompanied by the Bridgewater and the Plymouth, went to a neighbouring bay to take in fresh water and provisions. On his course he luckily fell in with eight galleons returning from America. Such an unlooked for prize may be readily supposed to have excited the drooping ardour of the men, who attacked the galleons with such tumultuous fury that in the course of a few hours, one was sunk, another burnt, two were forced ashore, and others taken, on board of which they found money and plate to the value of six hundred thousand pounds.*

* According to some accounts, two of the galleons escaped; others say only one. Whitelocke says that two were sunk and two burnt, that one

The vessel that was burnt had on board the marquis of Badajos, viceroy of Mexico, with his wife, and sons, and daughters. The marquis, together with his wife and eldest daughter, perished, but the rest of his family and nearly one hundred other persons were saved by the humanity of the English. Admiral Montague, in a letter to secretary Thurloe, gives the following account of the silver taken in the galleons: "There have been some miscarriages by the ships that did take the ships of Spain; but I shall delay to tell of them here; and I judge the best way to improve mercies of this kind is to look forward: however, that is my business at this time. The silver they brought is on board this ship, and the Vice-admiral: in the Admiral we have five hundred and fifty sous of silver, and boxes of plate, and nine pieces of silver, not well refined, like sugar-loaves. In the Vice-admiral there is a hundred and twenty-four sous of silver, all which we judge may produce nearly two hundred thousand pounds. I hope I speak the least, and that it will make much more. In the galleons' holds, also, there is that space between the mainmast and the bulk-head of the bread-room, not yet rummaged."*

Montague was charged with instructions to convey the treasure to England, and he requested that some trusty persons might be sent to meet the fleet at Portsmouth, for the purpose of receiving the silver. Great pains were taken to make a due impression of the magnitude of this prize upon the public mind. When the precious ore reached London it was placed in open carts and ammunition-waggons, and thus ceremoniously conveyed in a sort of triumph through Southwark to the Tower, to be coined. A guard of only ten soldiers accompanied the waggons, by way of making an ostentatious display of confidence in the people. Nor was all this exhibition without its effect, for there was

---

was taken containing two millions of silver, and that it was believed one of those which were sunk had as much.

* Thurloe's State Papers, v. 509.

scarcely a single event that occurred throughout the period of the interregnum, which procured so much popularity for Cromwell. Montague was loaded with panegyrics (although in reality his whole share in the transaction consisted in carrying home the treasure); the Protector lavished the most unbounded flattery upon him; and he received the formal thanks of the Commons from the lips of the Speaker.*

The activity necessary to be observed in a species of warfare, which constantly exposed the English to aggression from several foreign powers, soon opened fresh employment for Montague, who in the following year was appointed to the command of the fleet in the Downs. His intimacy with Cromwell and his family had now increased to such a height, that few persons in the kingdom stood so high in favour at court. He was present upon all occasions of public interest, the Protector testifying his regard for him, by always placing him near his person. Upon the second inauguration of Cromwell in Westminster Hall, which took place in June, 1657, we find Montague assisting conspicuously in that anomalous ceremony. The earl of Warwick stood on the right of his highness's chair with the sword of state, and the lord mayor on the left with the city sword. "Near the earl of Warwick," says Whitelocke, "stood the lord viscount Lisle, general Montague, and I, each of us having a drawn sword in our hands." When the Protector, leaving the assembly, entered his "rich coach," we find Montague again in his train, occupying one of the boots! "In the upper end of it sat himself (Cromwell), in his robes," continues Whitelocke; "in the other end sat the earl of Warwick; in one boot sat his son Richard and I, with a drawn sword in my hand; and in the other boot sat the lord viscount Lisle

1657.

* "Upon general Montague's coming into the House, the Speaker gave him the thanks of the House for his great and good services done for this commonwealth at sea."—*Whitelocke*, p. 653. This piece of gross flattery was at least premature, for up to this time Montague had rendered no services whatever at sea, except that of sailing from Cadiz to Barbary and back again.

and general Montague, with swords drawn in their hands."* It is not to be doubted, therefore, that whatever Montague's private sentiments may have been, he exhibited no disinclination to repay the patronage he received by a close attendance upon the Protector.†

The principal objects for which the fleet in the Downs was designed, were — to keep a strict watch upon the Dutch, to carry on the war with Spain, and to assist and facilitate the impending enterprise upon Dunkirk. It does not appear that Montague took any positive measures to promote any one of these objects; yet it is said that he did all he could: but upon this occasion, probably, as upon the former, the best thing he could do was to do nothing. Here then was another fleet splitting in the sun, to forward remote ends by a sort of stagnant menace. He seems to have grown weary enough of this laborious indolence, and by way of relaxation made a journey to the camp of marshal de Turenne, to consult him about the best means of carrying on these negative hostilities. Having satisfied himself on this point, he returned, no wiser it may be suspected than he went, and went on board the fleet, which continued to cruise about the channel until the beginning of winter.

This sort of life was ill adapted to such a man as Montague, and it is not very surprising that he should soon have grown sick of it. He is said, indeed, to have entertained serious thoughts about this time of retiring from the public service altogether. A service so unprofitable could hardly have had any other effect upon a temper so mercurial than that of producing disgust. It is not improbable, also, that he discovered the political immorality of the business he was employed to advance; that he thought it alike impolitic and unjust to assist the trade of the French by harassing the trade

* Whitelocke, p. 662.

† Montague's personal attachment to Cromwell is said to have so completely overpowered his good sense, that he was one of those very injudicious persons who strongly urged the Protector to take the title of king. — *Clarendon's History of the Rebellion*, iii. 570.

of all the rest of the world; and that he felt some awkward compunctions of conscience in ransacking the Dutch ships for silver, which seems to have been the only active function he discharged in the Downs. In addition to all these weighty reasons for desiring to renounce his command, he had very cogent objections to urge against the obscure and evasive character of his instructions. This was the greatest difficulty of all to an officer who wished and endeavoured to perform his duties with zeal and punctuality. He never could penetrate the real meaning of the orders he received, which, without fairly leaving him to the exercise of his discretion on any single point, constantly subjected him to the necessity of acting on his own responsibility. The apparent design of the government was to secure a retreat for themselves from the consequences of any act in which the fleet might become involved, playing fast and loose with foreign powers, just as occasion served, and ready at any moment to offer up the admiral as a victim. Montague's letters to Cromwell plainly betray the embarrassment in which he was thus placed; and it is evident enough, that the Protector expected him to follow his own course, without being able to justify himself afterwards by official sanctions. A letter from Richard Cromwell in reference to the business of the flag, places this sinister policy in an unequivocal light. In that epistle Montague was commanded in express terms to insist upon the honour of the flag from all nations within the British seas, the writer observing, at the same time, that he did not exactly know what those limits were, and that he (Montague) was to execute these orders with caution, since peace or war depended on them. It was obviously impossible to obey such directions without risking censure one way or the other; yet Montague carried himself through the dilemma with so much sagacity that he not only escaped blame, but satisfied all parties by his urbanity and candour, except the Dutch, who complained bitterly of the vigilance with which he searched their vessels.

1658. While he was meditating plans of retirement, Cromwell died. The principal project which engrossed attention at this moment was the war between Sweden and Denmark. The Dutch, conscious of the injury which their trade would suffer from the success of the former, openly assisted the latter with a formidable fleet. Cromwell thought that it was of no less importance to the trade of England to assist Sweden; but he proceeded more cautiously, and, instead of openly supporting his ally, he procured a commission for sir George Ayscue in a Swedish ship, and sent out a fleet under the command of vice-admiral Goodson, with private instructions to act under Ayscue's orders. This fleet was long retarded by contrary winds, and, arriving too late to be of any use in the northern seas, was forced to return to England. In the mean while the demise of the Protector produced a general expectation that this Swedish enterprise would be abandoned; but Richard Cromwell was resolved, in this instance at least, to follow out the intentions of his father. He accordingly caused a fresh fleet to be put into requisition for the Baltic, and appointed Montague to take the command.

This was the most considerable naval armament that had been sent out of England since the commencement of the Dutch war. The admiral's ship, the Naseby, carried 70 guns and 600 men; the Resolution, 80 guns and a like number of men; in addition to which there were fourteen ships carrying 50 pieces of cannon and upwards, twenty-eight 40-gun ships, four of 30 guns, and twelve smaller vessels, varying from 22 to 28 pieces of cannon. The whole fleet consisted of sixty ships, carrying 11,820 men.

1659. The avowed object of this expedition was to bring about a peace between the belligerent powers. But the whole proceeding was a practical blunder. When Montague arrived in the Baltic, he wrote to the king of Sweden and to the Dutch admiral, informing them that he was instructed not to respect the private advantage of England, but the public tranquillity of Europe, by en-

gaging them both to enter into an equitable peace. The king of Sweden was well known to be indisposed to pacific measures, so that this method of entreating him at the head of a powerful squadron had a very suspicious aspect. It was as much as to imply that England was resolved to go to war for the purpose of enforcing tranquillity. An armed mediation of this description was not only unwarrantable but absurd.

The perplexities of the situation in which Montague found himself thus involved were still farther increased by the ingenious methods adopted by the parliament to tie up his hands and outrage his feelings. While they placed him nominally in command of the fleet, they compelled him to act in conjunction with three commissioners, colonel Algernon Sidney, sir Robert Heywood, and Mr. Thomas Boon, who were appointed to conduct the negociations: and, as if this were not sufficient to shatter his fidelity and destroy all confidence in the protection of the government, they deprived him of his regiment of horse before he left home. Such inexplicable treatment, under circumstances of such grave responsibility, was characteristic of the craven fears and strange disorders that agitated the administration.

The death of Cromwell loosened, if it did not wholly destroy, the ties that bound Montague to the republican party; and these indignities were not likely to inspire him with renewed ardour in their cause. The moment was favourable to the royalists, and they promptly took advantage of it to sound the discontented admiral.

In the fleet with Montague there was a cousin of his, Edward Montague, the eldest son of the lord Montague of Boughton. This gentleman was well known to Charles and to Clarendon, who had long kept up a private correspondence with him, and who had induced him to take that voyage for the purpose of endeavouring to wean over the admiral to their side. The time was now arrived when they were to test the success of his influence. A messenger was dispatched with a letter from Charles and another from the chancellor, to be delivered pri-

vately to Edward Montague, without the knowledge of the admiral's colleagues. The strictest secresy was necessary in the management of this delicate and hazardous affair; and, unluckily, the person who was entrusted with the mission was not only known to the fleet, but was possessed of such frank and exulting loyalty that he very nearly betrayed the whole business. It was with difficulty he could be prevailed upon to suppress his enthusiasm; and Edward Montague finally sent him away without permitting him to speak with the admiral, or allowing him to suppose that he knew any thing of his errand.

The service required by Charles was, that Montague should speedily bring back the fleet to England, in order to be ready to co-operate with sir George Booth, who was already at the head of an army, in Chester, where a general combination was formed to declare for the king. As soon as the fleet appeared upon the coast, his majesty or the duke of York was immediately to go on board. The plan was plausible, and much argument was not necessary to fix the wavering inclinations of Montague. He saw that such an opportunity might not occur again to enable him with credit to embrace the cause of the king; and he felt that if he refused, and the king prospered, he would be placed in a dangerous predicament, without having the consolation of carrying with him the sympathies of the opposite party. He was probably moved also by higher considerations — a sense of returning allegiance to the exiled Stuarts, a conviction that the monarchical principle was better adapted to the wants and habits of the English than republican institutions; and a desire to restore the honour of the navy, which had been seriously tarnished during the period of the commonwealth. The answer transmitted to the king contained sufficient proof of the willing disposition of Montague to promote his views.

The change which this resolution insensibly produced in the manner of the admiral did not escape the penetration of colonel Algernon Sidney. His suspicions,

already excited by the conduct of the messenger, who if he had remained a single day longer would have been committed to prison by the plenipotentiaries, were now confirmed by the frequent conversations that took place between Montague and his cousin, and other equally significant circumstances. In this emergency it was imperative upon the admiral to act with decision, and, availing himself of the absence of his colleagues, who were at Copenhagen, he called a council of the flag-officers of the fleet, and, submitting to them a plain statement of the impossibility of doing any thing for the honour of their country by remaining where they were, not having any authority to fight, and being therefore useless, he suggested the necessity of returning home, a necessity especially enforced by the dearth of provisions, there being scarcely enough in the fleet to carry them to England. Similar sentiments had no doubt been already entertained by nearly all the officers present, and the question was quickly decided. Thus fortified by the opinions of the council, Montague shaped his course for England, to the consternation of his diplomatic colleagues, who, without having received any notice from him to that effect, had the mortification to witness from the shore the departure of the vessels. The rapidity of the movement was fortunate; for Sidney and the rest were in possession of secret instructions to secure the person of Montague on board his own ship, and dispose of the command of the fleet as they thought fit, upon the first symptom of disaffection. Frustrated in the execution of their object, they discharged their venom against the admiral in a despatch to the parliament, accusing him of treachery and desertion.

By the time the fleet arrived in England, a sad reverse had already taken place in the king's affairs. Sir George Booth, completely overthrown, was a prisoner in the Tower; the Rump was restored to its authority; and the complaint of the plenipotentiaries was already in the hands of parliament. But Montague was not easily dismayed; his secret was safe in the keeping of his cousin;

and, without waiting for a summons, he went up to London and presented himself before the parliament to give an account of his conduct. He justified his return by the unanimous opinion of the flag-officers, that his provisions must have failed if he had staid until the winter had shut him up in the Sound. The candour of his address and the reasonableness of his arguments disarmed the jealousy with which his proceedings were regarded, and the parliament was content with accepting his resignation, and appointing Lawson, a rigid anabaptist, in his place. All hope of the king's restoration was at an end for the present, and Montague withdrew to his estate in the country, resolved to dedicate the remainder of his life to tranquillity and retirement.

1660. During the events that immediately afterwards ensued, he strictly observed his resolution not to interfere in public affairs; and it was not until those revolutions were over which followed Lambert's invasion of the parliament, and general Monk's march into England, that he was prevailed upon to abandon his repose for the royal service. Being solicited to resume the command of the fleet, he sent privately to the king for his approbation before he would consent. Having procured the required sanction, he transmitted to his majesty a list of such officers as might be confided in, and another list of those whom he apprehended it would be necessary to reduce by force; desiring at the same time to be informed whether the king placed implicit confidence in Monk (whose conduct for a long time was so unintelligible to the king's party), and wishing that no notice might be taken to his excellency as to how his own inclinations stood.* The king's reliance upon Monk at this juncture was testified by a letter in reply directed to Monk and Montague, for the purpose of being communicated to the fleet; in which his ma-

* "It was no small inconvenience to his majesty that he was restrained from communicating to either the confidence he had in the other, which might have facilitated both their designs. But the mutual jealousies between them, and indeed of all men, would not permit that liberty to his majesty." — *Clarendon's History of the Rebellion*, iii. 596.

jesty expressed the "comfort" it afforded him "to hear that the fleet and ships, which are the walls of the kingdom, are put under the command of two persons so well disposed to, and concerned in, the peace and happiness of the kingdom."

Montague went on board the fleet at once, and was amazed to find Lawson, from whom he expected the strongest opposition, as well disposed to serve the king as himself. All reserve was now laid aside, he caused his majesty's letter to be read publicly in the ships, and without waiting for orders from the parliament, sailed direct for Holland, sending an officer to the Hague to inform the king that he was ready to receive him.* Before he departed, he left two small vessels behind to attend the parliamentary commissioners, which they looked upon as a mark of disrespect; but the king was so pleased with the warmth and energy displayed by Montague on this occasion, that he covered the proceeding by an antedated order. As soon as the vessels arrived at the Hague, the duke of York went on board to take the command of the fleet as lord high admiral, and was received with acclamations of joy. A list of the names of the ships was given to his royal highness, who returned with it to his majesty, that he might "new christen those ships," says Clarendon, "which too much preserved the memory of the late governors and of the republic." When the ceremonials incidental to the occasion were concluded, admiral Montague conveyed his majesty to England, and in two days afterwards received the riband of the garter on board the flag-ship in the Downs.

The services he rendered the king in this great crisis were munificently acknowledged and rewarded as soon as the court was settled; and amongst the dignities and

* Admiral Montague in the minutes of his journal preserved in Kennett's Chronicle, says that sir John Grenville went on board the Naseby at ten o'clock at night, with a message from general Monk, that the king's presence was urgently required in London, and desiring him therefore to sail at once, which he accordingly did, sending sir John over to apprise the king that the fleet should be ready to attend him.

honours conferred upon those who had been mainly instrumental to the restoration, we find the admiral created by letters patent, bearing date 12th July 1660, baron Montague of St. Neot's in the county of Huntingdon, viscount Hitchingbroke in the county, and earl of Sandwich in Kent; sworn into the privy council, and appointed master of the king's wardrobe, admiral of the narrow seas, and lieutenant admiral to the duke of York.

As admiral of the narrow seas, the earl of Sandwich was placed in a favourable position to improve his influence, having upon all occasions the escort and care of all persons of rank and distinction passing between the courts of Europe and England; but he scarcely required any opportunities of that kind to establish himself in the good opinion of the new monarch, who appears to have taken him at once into his confidence. He constantly attended the council, especially when questions of foreign policy were under consideration, and was looked up to in a short time as one of his majesty's principal advisers. At the coronation he carried St. Edward's staff, occupying a place as conspicuous as that which he had so recently filled at the inauguration of Cromwell.

The first question of importance upon which his lordship was consulted by the council, was the sale of Dunkirk, and he has been heavily censured for the advice he tendered to the crown on this occasion. The question was this:—Dunkirk had been taken by Cromwell from the Spaniards, and now that the commonwealth was at an end, the Spaniards claimed its restoration as a matter of right. The French, on the other hand, asserted that they had entered into a compact with Cromwell, by which the place was to be delivered to them upon payment of the expences of the war, which they were now ready to pay down, demanding the fulfilment of the stipulation. The king, of course, was not bound by any arrangements entered into by Cromwell; and the point to be decided by the council was, whether Dunkirk should be sold or kept? They agreed that it

ought to be sold; and, the purchase money being paid, it was delivered over into the hands of France. Accounts differ very much as to the grounds upon which the council arrived at this conclusion, and the part that was espoused by the several ministers implicated in the decision. Clarendon, if his own authority may be relied upon, was against it in the first instance, although he afterwards conducted the bargain with M. d'Estrades, the French plenipotentiary. Monk was, from the beginning, in favour of the sale, supported by the earl of Sandwich, who said that the coast of Dunkirk was generally so tempestuous, and the ground so rolling upon every storm, that there never could be any certain steerage into the port.* Reasons so weak as these must have been contemptuously rejected as being utterly insufficient to justify the sale of so important a position on the French coast; and, according to Clarendon, others were put forward of a stronger kind, both by Sandwich and Monk. They asserted that Dunkirk, being no harbour, was of little utility; that the expence of keeping it was greater than the crown could afford; and that, if we continued to hold possession of it, we should be inevitably involved in a war. Burnet's account agrees in the main particulars with this statement; but is darkened by a suspicion to which Clarendon makes no reference. He says, "the military men," alluding evidently to Monk and Sandwich, who were the only members of the army or the navy, except the duke of York, present at the council, and who were both ordinarily designated as generals, "the military men, who were believed to be corrupted by France, said the place was not tenable; that in time of peace it would put the king to a great charge, and in time of war it would not quit the cost of keeping it."† What is meant by the corruption of the military men cannot now be satisfactorily determined; but it does not appear that they received any recognition of their services in

* Campbell, vol. ii. p. 285.
† Burnet, vol. i. pp. 311, 312. Oxford edition.

this matter from the king of France, while the part taken by Clarendon in promoting the sale was specially acknowledged in an autograph letter from that monarch. As to the opinions of Monk and Sandwich concerning the difficulty of keeping the place, it is curious that, upon this point, they were directly opposed by the count Schomberg, who strongly urged his majesty to retain possession of Dunkirk, which, he said, considering the naval power of England, could not be taken. He had considered the place well, and was sure it could never be taken as long as England was mistress of the sea.*

There can be no doubt that Schomberg was right, and the "military men" wrong; and notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to vindicate the earl of Sandwich from blame in this affair, he cannot be extricated from the imputation of having tendered bad advice to the king. The "corruption," hinted at by Burnet, is unsupported by facts of any sort, and may be dismissed as a hasty and injurious surmise. If there were any corruption in the case, it was much more likely to have originated with the king of England than the king of France; for the money obtained by the sale of Dunkirk was destined to be lavished upon his majesty's mistress. Probably this was the secret moving power that swayed the decision of the council, and Sandwich may not have been invulnerable to such seducing influences. One of his biographers earnestly defends him against the charge of having consented to the transfer of the place to the French, asserting that, on the contrary, he declared for demolishing it. † But this defence, unsustained by any authority whatever, is totally unworthy of credit. The question was not between selling and demolishing Dunkirk, but between selling and keeping it. If the earl of Sandwich were conscientiously convinced that it would be imprudent to keep the place, the only judicious alternative that was left open was to

* Burnet, i. 311, 312. Oxford edition. † Campbell, ii. 286.

part with it upon the best terms that could be obtained. But to incur the expence of destroying it, and then to suffer it to pass quietly into the hands of the French, or perhaps to become a source of contention between France and Spain, was a piece of weakness which it is impossible to reconcile with the general sagacity of his lordship's character.

That he believed Dunkirk not worth the cost of keeping, seems to have been his principal reason for desiring to relinquish it. He said to his friend Pepys, that "he wondered any wise people should be so troubled for Dunkirk, and scorns all their talk against it, for that he sees it was not Dunkirk, but the other places, that did and would annoy us, though we had that, as much as if we had it not." * His lordship's biographer adopts the same view, and says that "the earl of Sandwich did not set a higher value upon Dunkirk than, in the condition it was then, the place deserved." It is strange, that while his lordship was so impressed with the uselessness of Dunkirk to England, he did not foresee of what value it might become to France; and that, despising it on account of the low condition in which it happened to be at that time, he did not perceive the advantages that might be gained by strengthening and improving it. His biographer, although he vindicates the persons concerned from "any suspicion of corruption or ill-intention in this transaction," admits with sufficient candour that the "sale of Dunkirk to the French is a thing never to be vindicated;" and furnishes the following ample excuse for the indignation with which it has been subsequently regarded by the people of this country. Having stated that Louis XIV. spent many millions in fortifying it, "not because the place deserved it, but because it was the only port by which he could annoy us" (a proof that it deserved all the pains he could bestow upon it), the writer proceeds to observe, that "after it was thus improved and fortified, all those inconveniences taken away

* Pepys' Diary, i. 173. 394.

which made it useless in our hands, and a multitude of works raised, for which England would never have been at the expence, it became such a thorn in our sides, and we were made so thoroughly sensible of its importance, in the situation it then stood, that it is no wonder at all posterity believed whatever they were told of the iniquity of selling this place, and heartily detested the ministers, whoever they were, by whom the measure was taken, though certainly they did not, indeed could not, perceive the consequences." * There is more goodnature than discernment in this apology for the great error committed by the earl of Sandwich in this affair. It would have been better to have frankly condemned his lordship's short-sightedness at once, than to set up as an excuse that he could not perceive the consequences. It was his duty to weigh the consequences maturely before he ventured to decide; and if he had done so, he must have perceived them to their full extent. Military and naval men are expected to understand the value of fortified positions; but the most inexperienced civilian, by a glance at the map, might have anticipated the effects that fell upon our trade by the surrender of Dunkirk to the French. Those effects were so disastrous †, that not very long the place was strengthened, the English ministers, in a preliminary article to the treaty of Utrecht, insisted upon the demolition of Dunkirk, stipulating not only that the town and port should be destroyed, but that there never should be a harbour there again. The earl of Sandwich must have foreseen the available importance of such a place, and it is idle to attempt to screen him from the responsibility of his conduct. The fact seems to be, that the king wanted the money to stop the clamours of his mistress; the sale of Dunkirk was privately determined upon, before the council was called to give validity to the transaction ‡;

* Campbell, ii. 259.

† Dunkirk did us more damage, says Bolingbroke, than almost all the ports of France, either in the ocean or the Mediterranean. — *Craftsman*, vol. v. p. 187.

‡ Clarendon says in his Defence, " It is very well known to his majesty,

and Sandwich, in common with others, was persuaded by representations rarely unintelligible at courts, to sanction a proceeding which can neither be defended nor palliated.*

The duties imposed upon the earl of Sandwich during the first few months of his employment in the narrow seas were merely ceremonial and complimentary. In September, 1660, he went with a squadron of nine ships of war to Helvoetsluys, to bring over the king's sister, the princess of Orange, who died soon after her arrival in England; and when the fleet returned, his majesty

---

and to several persons yet alive, that the parting with Dunkirk was resolved upon before I ever heard of it;" and a variety of authorities are cited in the last Oxford edition of Burnet to show, by an accumulation of circumstantial evidence, that the sale of Dunkirk and the Portugal match, as it was called, were both settled by the intervention of the queen-mother of England (which D'Estrades, by the way, denies), and the court of Portugal.

* The zeal with which Dr. Campbell labours to rescue Monk and the earl of Sandwich from the odium of having been actuated by any unworthy motives, sometimes carries him, *malgré* his usual prudence, beyond the strict limits marked out by the authorities extant on the subject. For example, he thus sums up the important points of Clarendon's statements:—"1. That the French king was displeased at the negociations being communicated to the military men, and consequently had not corrupted them. 2. The chancellor managed the whole transaction, brought it to bear, and for this had the thanks of the French king. 3. Monk was not satisfied with the price, nor privy to the sale, till the price was settled. 4. Upon the treasurer's proposal the design of selling Dunkirk was taken up, carried on, and concluded, not by Monk, but the chancellor. 5. The money was carefully expended and not squandered." It is not a little curious that the only points in these five heads that are of the least importance to the question—the 1st and 5th—are either not stated by Clarendon, or stated with the very opposite meaning. He does not say one word about the king of France being displeased that the military men were consulted, which Dr. Campbell uses as a proof that he could not have corrupted them; and instead of saying that the money was carefully expended and not squandered, he merely tells us that the king promised not to employ it on any ordinary occasion, but to preserve it for "some pressing accident, as an insurrection or the like," which, he adds with no little significance, "was reasonably enough apprehended." But he is totally silent as to how it was actually expended. The other items are equally erroneous. The second states that the chancellor managed the whole transaction, and got the French king's thanks. We know, it is true, from other sources, that the king wrote to Clarendon to thank him; but Clarendon himself asserts that the "treatment he received after coming into France was evidence enough that that king never thought himself beholden to him." As to having managed the whole transaction, Clarendon was only one of four or five commissioners appointed to conduct the negociation. The third item is an equally vitiated version of the original, for Monk, instead of being dissatisfied with the price, or not being privy to the sale, is actually stated by Clarendon to have been one of the very commissioners who arranged the sale with the French plenipotentiary. The value of the fourth item may be estimated from the integrity of the others.

and the duke of York went on board the admiral's ship, now named the Resolution, slept there that night, and reviewed the whole squadron on the following morning.

1661. The approaching marriage between his majesty and the infanta of Portugal, whose dowry was 300,000*l.*, the island of Bombay in India, and the city of Tangier in Africa, rendered another expedition necessary, for the double purpose of securing Tangier against the Moors, and bringing over the queen. A numerous fleet, consisting of eighteen men of war and two fire-ships, commanded by the earl of Sandwich and admiral (now sir John) Lawson, was accordingly appointed; it being secretly determined to take advantage of the presence of the fleet in the Mediterranean, to punish the insolence of the Algerine and other Barbary pirates, who had latterly resumed their depredations upon our merchant vessels. The peace they had made with admiral Blake no longer restrained them, since the death of that valiant commander; and they had recently fallen upon English ships with as much recklessness as upon those of Holland or France. Setting sail from the Downs on the 19th June, the earl of Sandwich appeared before Algiers on the 29th July, and sent captain Spragge on shore with the king's letter to the principal person in the government, and another from himself requiring the presence of the English consul, Mr. Brown, which was immediately complied with. That evening a council of war was held, and the next morning captain Spragge and Mr. Brown were ordered to wait upon the regency with certain propositions to form the basis of a treaty, the first article of which was, that no English ships should, for the future, be liable to search on any pretence whatever. Up to this point, the regency appeared willing enough to enter into negociations, but the moment this demand was made, they returned a disdainful answer, that they would enter into no peace which would have the effect of depriving them of the right of search. This impudent reply was immediately followed up by a brisk

fire on the fleet from many new works the Algerines had lately erected for the defence of the port. It was in vain to contend in the face of a battery that was held to be almost impregnable, and, after returning the fire of the pirates, and attempting to burn the ships in the harbour, which would have been accomplished but that the wind was unfavourable, the earl of Sandwich withdrew his ships.

The project, however, of reducing these sea-robbers was not abandoned. Sir John Lawson was left behind, with a strong squadron in the Mediterranean, to protect the English trade, and chastise the Algerines wherever he might chance to meet them. Like a true British admiral he soon grew weary of tracking the waters in pursuit of the marauders, and, sailing at once for Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, he made such a formidable demonstration, as to compel those governments to renew their treaties with England. The only difficulty he found, was in the case of Algiers. Upwards of one hundred and fifty English, Irish, and Scotch slaves, and several captured ships, were delivered up in the first instance, at the demand of sir John Lawson, and sent home; but when the question of surrendering the goods came to be debated, the Algerines broke off the treaty, and the negociations terminated in an open declaration of war. Matters were now, if possible, in a worse dilemma than they had been left by the earl of Sandwich, in so far as Algiers was concerned. Nothing could be done against the fortification within which the audacious regency lay in perfect security. The only vessel within Lawson's reach was a Corsair of four-and-thirty guns, with a crew of two hundred and fifty men. Here was a good opportunity for a reprisal, and, seizing the Corsair, he confiscated her, and sold such of the prisoners as were Turks or Moors, to the French admiral, the duke of Beaufort, who was then cruizing in the Mediterranean. Shortly afterwards, sir John Lawson was called home; but captain Allen, who replaced him with twelve ships

of war, was successful enough to force the Algerines into a treaty. This arrangement certainly did not restrain them long, although it had a good moral effect in the end. The fact was, that the Algerines had strengthened their harbour at this period so effectually, that they believed themselves invulnerable to assaults from without; but they discovered at last that mere security in their port was not enough, and that, severe as was the chastisement they incurred by their offences upon the sea, it was possible to provoke a still larger measure of punishment from the Christian powers, by adding to the crime of piracy the guilt of a deliberate violation of a voluntary engagement. The treaty if it did not bind them, was at least useful in drawing increased infamy upon them when they infringed it to resume their lawless courses. This had happened, no doubt, before; but the repetition of such perfidious atrocities, attended, as they were, by increasing danger, had a natural tendency to exhaust that confidence which enabled the Algerines for so many years to spread terror over the seas they infested.

While these proceedings were going forward at Algiers, the earl of Sandwich, agreeably to his instructions, went to Tangier, which was to be delivered to him on the part of the queen regent of Portugal, previously to the departure of the infanta from Lisbon. By a mere accident he obtained possession of the place, and had he arrived but a few weeks later, the object of his visit must have been completely frustrated.

The queen regent appears to have been perfectly sincere in the disposition of the proposed dowry, and resolved to execute all the conditions imposed upon Portugal, in that transaction, with religious fidelity. But the young king, now rapidly advancing towards his majority, had different views, and was already impatient of his mother's control. Factions, within and without the palace, fanned these disagreements, and menaced the contemplated arrangements for the marriage with ominous tokens of popular fury. The delivery of

Tangier into the hands of a heretic power, was regarded with universal dissatisfaction, the more especially as it was not unlikely to draw down upon Portugal the fulminations of the Vatican, already sufficiently incensed against that country by the artful representations of Spain. The queen, conscious of the obstacles against which she had to contend, had taken her measures with corresponding caution, recently appointing to the government of Tangier a man whom she believed to be wholly devoted to her, and who, she expected, would implicitly obey her commands in delivering up the place to the English admiral. In this expectation she was grievously mistaken, as it is certain that the governor undertook the trust with a contrary resolution; but, as the event proved, he was prevented from carrying his meditated treachery into effect.

A few days before the arrival of the earl of Sandwich, the governor, at the head of the entire cavalry force and half the foot of the garrison, marched into the interior, where he was cut off by an ambush of Moors, and slain, together with his chief officers and a considerable portion of the soldiery. The town was now at the mercy of the Moors, but being either too confident of their advantage, or lacking numbers to retain it, they left it undefended; and when the earl landed it was delivered up to him by the remnant of troops that yet remained within its walls. His lordship immediately garrisoned it with English soldiers, and placing the government in the hands of the earl of Peterborough, who was commissioned for that office by the king, stood for Lisbon, carrying with him the Portuguese he had found at Tangiers. The appearance in the streets of Lisbon of these men, who were supposed to have been instrumental in the cession of the town, produced such a violent sensation, that the mob would have stoned them to death if they had not speedily effected their retreat.

The reception of the earl of Sandwich was all that could be desired. He found a house and equipage ready 1662.

to receive him, and all other appointments on a scale of magnitude equal to the dignity of the new character in which he was about to appear,—that of ambassador extraordinary to the queen. His arrival was opportune and fortunate in every point of view, except in that which immediately concerned his mission. The Spanish army, recently reinforced, was on its march to a sea-port town close in the vicinity of Lisbon, which was unable to resist so powerful an enemy, and must have fallen into his hands, to the serious derangement of the national commerce. The Portuguese government, thrown into an extremity of alarm, had already made hasty measures for a temporary defence, raising troops for the approaching emergency, and, in the want of a sufficient available revenue, employing a large part of the money that had been destined for the dowry of the infanta. The news of the approach of the English fleet, however, reaching the camp of the Spaniards, they abandoned the enterprise, and the queen regent had the mortification to find that the outlay into which she was thus compelled, had been incurred to no purpose.

A formal audience was now given to the ambassador, after the public rejoicings that ensued upon his landing were over; and the gentlemen of quality, sent by the royal bridegroom, were admitted to the places of attendance assigned to them by his majesty. The queen-mother took this opportunity to explain the distressing circumstances in which she was placed, opening the business with infinite apologies and expressions of concern. She informed the ambassador that, "the streights and poverty of the kingdom were so great upon the late advance of the Spanish army, that there could at this present be only paid one half of the queen's portion, and that the other half should infallibly be paid within a year, with which she hoped the king, her brother, would be satisfied; and that for the better doing it, she resolved to send back the same ambassador, who had brought so good a work with God's blessing to so good an end, with her daughter, to the king."

The perplexity of the earl of Sandwich at receiving this unexpected announcement was indescribable. His instructions were clear and strict respecting the portion. He was to convey back the whole sum, which he well knew his master stood in need of. But how was he to escape the dilemma into which he was plunged by this open confession of inability on the part of the queen? He had already taken possession of Tangier, and had left a strong garrison in it, and had neither authority to restore it, nor the means of removing the soldiers. Finding it impossible to evade this branch of the difficulty, he remonstrated with her majesty, and endeavoured to obtain payment of the whole portion; but her protestations convinced him that the appeal was hopeless, and thus, upon the last extremity, he consented to receive the infanta on board.

Another embarrassment now presented itself. When the promised moiety came to be paid, it was found that, instead of being discharged in money, in conformity with the terms of the agreement, it was proferred in jewels, sugar, and other commodities, estimated at an under-valuation. This was in some sort an affront to the high diplomatic character represented by his lordship, since it imposed upon him the mercantile function of realising the value of the goods. He therefore peremptorily refused to accept them at any rates or prices, offering to give his receipt for any species of money that might be delivered, but at the same time permitting the merchandise to be received on board his ships, that it might be transferred to some person appointed to receive it in London, who should be obliged to pay at once the amount at which it was valued. This accommodating arrangement was agreed to, and one Diego Silvas, an Amsterdam jew of great wealth and credit, was authorised to accompany the goods, and account for them in specie to his majesty's ministers in London; a special obligation having been entered into, binding the queen of Portugal to complete the remainder of the payment within the ensuing year. These preliminaries

being settled, the infanta and her retinue embarked on board the fleet, and arrived safely at Portsmouth towards the end of May.

No objection could reasonably be taken to the course adopted by the earl of Sandwich in this trying situation; nor have we any grounds for suspecting that the king was dissatisfied with his conduct. But when the royal humours bred subsequent discontents between Charles and his bride, the ambassador who had been placed between them in these very awkward circumstances was made, for a brief season, the scape-goat of their mutual resentments. The queen, before her arrival in England, had heard of a certain beauty with whom the king had lived in notorious familiarity *, and when she came to the palace at Hampton Court, she declared to the persons in her confidence that she would never allow that lady to appear in her presence, observing, that her mother had enjoined her to do so. The king, however, exulting in his florid spirits, that made him confident of success in all such matters, was resolved to make a desperate attempt to overrule this very proper determination, and, a few days after her majesty's arrival, he presented the lady to the queen in her chamber, where the court was assembled. Her majesty was deeply affected by the indignity; her colour changed, tears gushed from her eyes, and her emotion was so excessive that she fainted, and her attendants were obliged to carry her into another room, the company retiring precipitately during the confusion which the incident created. The anger of the king was unbounded at this public exhibition of resistance, if such it could be called, to his wishes; and a quarrel, which commenced in jealousy at one side and tyranny at the other, finally took the form of a violent struggle for ascendancy. The king was resolved to have his own way, and so was the queen; and all the matters of reproach that could be thought of at either side were raked up to swell the torrent of re-

* This lady had just been delivered of a son, whom the king, on the eve of his nuptials, had the bad taste to acknowledge.

crimination. The non-payment of her majesty's portion furnished a fruitful source of acrimony on the part of the king, to which the queen responded by uttering invectives against the favourite. Sandwich received an equal measure of injustice from both; the king pettishly censuring him for accepting the half payment, and for not preparing her majesty to submit herself patiently to his will; and the queen, with more reason, upbraiding him for having given so good, and, as it turned out, so false a character of his majesty. This domestic war fretted the temper of the admiral more bitterly than it could have been chafed by all the pirates in Barbary. At length it began to prey seriously on his health. Clarendon says, that it threw him into a fever, and brought him to the brink of the grave, "till some grace from both their majesties contributed much to the recovery of his spirits." It may be supposed that he was glad enough to escape from this scene of wretched bickering, to take his place once more in his proper element amongst men like himself. The breaking out of the Dutch war happily released him from an attendance at court, which, notwithstanding the returning grace of their majesties, had become painfully irksome to him.

The causes of this war scarcely lie within the scope of a biography; but for the sake of preserving the thread of continuity in the narrative of naval affairs, they may be briefly stated. Heavy complaints had been made, for a long time, of the great encroachments of the Dutch East and West India companies upon the trade of the English in various parts of the world.* The English ambassador at the Hague formally remonstrated with the Dutch government on this subject, but to no purpose. Instead of obtaining redress for the grievances already inflicted, his interference only produced fresh aggressions. The Dutch openly attacked the English on the coast of Guinea, and possessed themselves of Cape-corse castle, one of the stations of the English

* The damages sustained by the English merchants were said to amount to 700,000 or 800,000*l.*

company trading to Africa. The duke of York happening to be governor of the African company, and taking a strong interest in its progress, immediately despatched sir Robert Holmes with four frigates to make reprisals. The brilliant success that followed the efforts of this gallant officer threw the Dutch into consternation. He first took a small fort on the coast, then dislodged the enemy from their settlement on the river Gambia, and built a new fort on its ruins, took two forts on the island of Goree, and reduced Cape-corse castle; and then proceeding to North America, subdued a Dutch colony there called the New Netherlands, the name of which he changed to New York, in honour of the duke. These proceedings were altogether of a private character. Neither of the governments had interfered. The aggressions on the English were committed by the Dutch companies, and the reprisals were made by the African company.

Under such circumstances, and so long as hostilities continued to be carried on by private adventure, conditions of peace might have been easily adjusted. The English people were not anxious for war, and the Dutch had suffered so much by the vigorous retaliation inflicted upon them that they yearned for peace. But De Witte, who was at the head of the war party in Holland, unpopular as he was out of doors, possessed sufficient influence in the cabinet to prevent the universal feeling from having its due influence upon the government. He conceived the design of sending a large fleet, without any previous intimation or declaration of war, to take revenge, with ample interest, for the damages that had been committed by sir Robert Holmes. Admiral De Ruyter, then serving in the Mediterranean against the pirates, was fixed upon for this purpose.

But it was necessary to procure proper orders to authorise De Ruyter to remove his fleet from the Mediterranean where he was acting in conjunction with the English, to the coast of Guinea to act against them.

This difficulty was got over by a trick. The De Witte faction, well aware that the majority of the states-general were opposed to a war with England, had recourse to a base imposition for the purpose of obtaining the necessary authorisation. De Ruyter had just sent home a report of his proceedings against the pirates, which De Witte's party contrived to get referred to a committee of seven in their own interest. This committee drew up an order directing De Ruyter to sail immediately to the coast of Guinea, to make reprisals upon the English. The order thus fabricated was read over to the States in such a hurry as to render it unintelligible, then passed as a matter of course, and being afterwards brought to the president with a bundle of mere formal documents, was signed in common with the rest without enquiry, and despatched to its destination.

De Ruyter prepared with alacrity to perform an undertaking that accorded so well with his secret hatred of the English, and setting sail without delay for the coast of Guinea, he destroyed some of the English factories there, which were wholly unprovided for such an emergency. From thence he proceeded to Barbadoes, where he attacked a fleet of merchant vessels, but was repulsed with great loss, having, independently of the damage done to the other ships, the standard of his own ship shot down, and her sails, standing and running rigging, masts and yards so shattered that it was not without considerable difficulty he could put out to sea again. Recovering this defeat, he passed over to Montserrat, Nevis, and Newfoundland, took upwards of twenty sail of English ships, and returned in triumph to Holland.

These events produced a decisive change in the public mind on the question of war, not only in England but in Holland. The English, exasperated at the ravages committed by De Ruyter, demanded redress,—and the Dutch, acquiring confidence from success, were equally desirous of prolonging hostilities from which they ex-

pected to derive further profits. In this spirit war was 1665. formally declared, by the Dutch in January, 1665, and by the English in the February following.

Upon this occasion, Holland and England appear to have been made the dupes of France, who for her own ends encouraged each party secretly into a war, and deceived both. To Holland she promised assistance the moment hostilities commenced, while to England she declared that she would compel Holland to accept any terms she proposed. "I have been positively assured," says Bishop Burnet, "by statesmen of both sides, that the French set it on in a very artificial manner; for while they encouraged us to insist on some extravagant demands, they, at the same time, pressed the Dutch not to yield to them; and as they put them in hopes that, if a rupture should follow, they would assist them according to their alliance, so they assured us that they would do us no hurt."* De Witte, acute, cautious, and vigilant as he was, suffered himself to be completely cajoled by the agents of the French government, playing off in turn his own game of deception upon the States. He affected to be convinced of the necessity of peace, declared that there was nothing he desired so much as to obtain it upon safe and honourable conditions, and expressed his implicit reliance upon the sincere desire of France to bring it about; but the enemy was so insolent on late occasions that they neglected all overtures, believing that the factions and divisions in the Dutch fleet would deprive Holland of the means of setting out another fleet; he was, therefore, of opinion that it ought to be the first design. If a fleet were ready to go out, he doubted not but a peace would quickly follow, France having pledged herself to declare war against England, if the king should not consent to what was just and reasonable, and to assist the Dutch with men and money and all his own naval power, which the duke of Beaufort was then preparing and making ready in all the ports

* Burnet, i. 362.

of France. But it was not to be expected, he added, that they would send out their fleet which was much inferior to the English, unless they first had a Dutch fleet at sea ready to join them.*

This artful appeal shows the ascendancy France had secured over the wily pensioner, who, in stating that England neglected overtures which, in fact, never were made to her, did not more successfully blindfold the States, than he was himself blindfolded by the treacherous promises of his pretended ally. The conduct of the French ambassador at the English court betrayed the same disposition to impose upon the government, but he was met by a different spirit. The king at this time was staying at Salisbury in consequence of the plague, which was then raging in London, and the French and Spanish ambassadors went down there for the purpose of making some propositions to effect a treaty of peace. In the course of the negotiations that ensued, the French ambassador stated that his master was so far engaged by treaty with the Dutch, that if the king would not accept of a just and honourable peace, his majesty must declare himself on their behalf, which he was unwilling to do. This announcement greatly amazed the king, who had been previously assured by France, that this very treaty was merely of a commercial character, and that there was nothing whatever in it prejudicial to the interests of England. The king, indignant at the perfidy of France, replied that if there were any such engagement, he had not been well dealt with, for that the French king had given his word to him, that he would not enter into any treaty with the Dutch, but *pari passu* with his majesty; and that his majesty had always been ready to embrace peace, which had never yet been offered by the Dutch, nor did he even know what conditions they expected. The ambassadors either were, or pretended to be, much offended at the insolence of the Dutch, and

* Clarendon's Life, Continuation, 274.

confessed that they were not solicitous for peace, but only desired to engage the king their master in the war; but, that if his majesty would make his demands, which they presumed would be reasonable, the other should be brought to consent to them." This was, no doubt, a bait to induce the king to propose terms, which the Dutch were already prepared to reject; but his majesty was too strong in the rectitude of his own intentions to be entrapped into a compromise of his position. He replied that, "they had begun the war upon him, and not he upon them, and that God had hitherto given him the advantage, which he hoped he should improve; and till they were as desirous of a peace as he, it would not become him to make any propositions." *

Burnet refers the springs of the French policy in this business to a design upon Flanders, and a desire to advance the interests of popery by weakening the two great protestant powers. "It was the interest of the king of France," he observes, "that the armies of the States might fall under such a feebleness, that they should be in no condition to make a vigorous resistance, when he should be ready either to invade them, or to fall into Flanders; which he was resolved to do, whensoever the king of Spain should die. The French did thus set on the war between the English and the Dutch, hoping that our fleets should mutually weaken one another so much, that the naval force of France, which was increasing very considerably, should be near an equality to them, when they should be shattered by a war. The States were likewise the greatest strength of the protestant interest, and were therefore to be humbled. So, in order to make the king more considerable both at home and abroad, the court resolved to prepare for a war, and to seek for such colours as might serve to justify it." † This is probable enough; but the assumption that the war was undertaken on the part of England, as a court measure to procure popularity for

* Clarendon's Life, Continuation, 276. † Burnet, i. 261.

the king, is utterly untenable. It was a war of necessity rather than of choice or intrigue. Hostilities were commenced by Holland, not by England; and the declaration of war was issued in the first instance by the Dutch. The court, therefore, had no great need to seek for colours to justify a proceeding which they could not prevent.*

Before the fleets of the two nations were prepared for sea, but after the war had actually broken out, sir Thomas Allen, now raised to the rank of vice-admiral, cruizing about the mouth of the straits with a squadron of eight or nine vessels, fell in with a Dutch fleet, coming home richly laden from Smyrna. This fleet consisted of no less than forty merchant vessels, some of them very large, and well provided with ordnance, the whole under the convoy of four third-rate men of war. Notwithstanding the inferiority of his force, Allen attacked the enemy with so much vigour, that he sunk several of the ships, killed Brachel, the commander-in-chief, seized four of the richest prizes, one of which foundered at sea on her voyage to England, and drove the remainder into the bay of Cadiz.† Nor was this the only instance in which the Dutch had reason to repent their obstinacy, even before the great armaments came

* Rapin, who always defends the Dutch, throws the *onus* of aggression upon sir Robert Holmes. This is clearly a misstatement. Sir Robert simply made reprisals for past injuries, retaking a fort which the Dutch had previously taken from the English.

† Brandt, in his "Life of De Ruyter," asserts that the English took only two of this fleet, and sunk one. Of the latter incident he gives the following account:—"John Reyloffs of Horn, master of the merchant ship called the king Solomon, being surrounded by four of the English men of war, who plied him with their broadsides on every quarter, defended his ship a long while, with an unheard of courage, hoping some of his comrades would come to his relief; but, at length, none of them having that courage, his ship was entirely disabled for continuing the fight, whereupon an English frigate, having grappled, boarded them, and after a stout resistance cut down all before them. The English being masters of the upper deck, Reyloffs retired to his close quarters, where he defended himself with an uncommon valour, till his ship, having received several shot under water and being ready to sink, he was about to surrender, when the ship being sunk to her lower port-holes, and her ports being so shattered that they could not resist the water, she sunk in a moment, with near a hundred English in her, most of whom were drowned. This brave commander with some few of his men, had the good fortune to get into his yawl; the main-yard lying across the shallop so that he could not get it clear; and thus he was, though with great difficulty, saved."

into collision; for in the preceding November the English fleet, hovering on the coast of Holland, met the homeward-bound Bourdeaux fleet, and captured no less than 130 sail. Of these some proved to be French bottoms, and were discharged, but the rest were declared lawful prizes.

These losses compelled the Dutch, contrary to their usual practice, to lay an embargo on all vessels in their ports; by which their commerce and fisheries were completely stopped for that season. They also released about fifty English and Scotch vessels, which had been seized in their harbours; and when these vessels arrived in England, the civility was returned by the restitution of all the Dutch vessels that had been detained here under similar circumstances. The object of this proceeding was to show that there ought to be some difference between the wars of trading nations, and those that are entered into by arbitrary princes in the mere lust of ambition.*

The English fleet sailed for the Dutch coast on the 21st of April. It was composed of one hundred and fourteen men of war and frigates, twenty-eight fireships and ketches, and about twenty-one thousand soldiers and seamen. It was divided into three squadrons; the first, under the red flag, commanded by the duke of York, assisted by Pen and Lawson; the second, or white squadron, commanded by prince Rupert, assisted by Monson and Sampson; and the third, or blue squadron, commanded by the earl of Sandwich, assisted by Cuttins and Ascough. The Dutch fleet, although the first to arm, was not yet ready to put to sea, and the duke of York, arriving at the Texel on the 28th, continued to cruize there for nearly a month, to the great alarm of the country, for the purpose of preventing a junction between the fleets of Holland and Zealand. During this interval he took several homeward-bound vessels, but was at last so disabled by a storm that he was obliged to retire towards the English shore.

* Campbell, ii. 144.

The Dutch took prompt advantage of this circumstance, and by the latter end of May their ships appeared about the Dogger sands. Accounts differ slightly as to the actual strength of this powerful armament, but there is sufficient agreement to justify the following estimate. The whole force, consisting of upwards of one hundred men of war, besides fireships and yachts*, carrying four thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine guns, and upwards of twenty-two thousand men, was divided into seven squadrons; the first commanded by admiral baron Opdam; the second by Evertsen, vice-admiral of Zealand; the third by Cortenaer, vice-admiral of Maese; the fourth by Stillingwerth; the fifth by Van Tromp, the son of the famous old admiral; the sixth by Cornelius Everts; and the seventh by Schram.

The movements of this fleet opened with an adventure which greatly exasperated the English, and raised the already blustering spirits of the Dutch. The English Hamburgh fleet, consisting of nine merchant vessels, with their convoy, a frigate of four and thirty guns, was expected home at this time, and the Dutch detached a squadron to their own coast to lie in wait for its arrival. The fleet, supposing that the duke was still on that coast, came up at this inauspicious moment, and fell into the hands of the enemy. The loss sustained by our merchants on this occasion was computed at between two or three hundred thousand pounds; but no blame could be attached to any party, although there were loud murmurs about bad management, as there always will be in such matters. The duke of York had taken all the precautions in his power, by sending a ketch to inform the fleet of his departure from the Dutch coast; but the ketch missed the convoy a sea, and the catastrophe was thus inevitable.

The duke of York is said to have been averse to this war; and the delay that had taken place since he em-

* Lediard says that the fleet consisted of 121 men of war, besides fire-ships, &c.; other writers say 112 men of war and 30 fire-ships, yachts, &c.; and Campbell reduces it to 103 men of war, 11 fireships, and 7 yachts.

barked increased his disrelish for it. His family, who were on board his vessel, were discontented at not receiving so much respect from the sailors as they anticipated; but it was so unreasonable to look for the etiquette of courts under such circumstances, that his family were more to blame for requiring, than the sailors for neglecting, the display of idle ceremonials in the face of an enemy. Clarendon tells us that during the pause which intervened before the meeting of the fleets, the duke sent the earl of Falmouth ashore with compliments to the king, and to give him an account of the good condition of the ships. The earl also visited the chancellor, and said that "they were all mad who had wished this war, and that himself had been made a fool to contribute to it, but that his eyes were open, and a month's experience at sea had enough informed him of the great hazards he ran in it." He spoke of Pen as a sot, and a fellow that he thought would be found wanting in courage. Both the king and the duke, he observed, were inclined to peace, convinced that the charge and expence of the war would be insupportable; and he concluded by adding, that as soon as the approaching action should be over it would be good time to make a peace, which he desired the chancellor to think of, and to speak with the king, whom he would find disposed to it. And so he returned to the fleet.*

Such were the private distrusts and conflicting sentiments that prevailed in the English admiral's ship on the eve of the engagement. On the other side, secret influences no less powerful, were at work to shake the enthusiasm with which the Dutch commander approached the eventful conflict. Baron Opdam, a man of great resolution and courage, was selected for the responsible post he filled to gratify the Dutch nobility, who had a very small share in the government, and to mortify the orange party, to whom Opdam was believed to be opposed. De Witte, however, who had raised him to this

* Clarendon's Life, 264.

elevation, having some reason to suspect that he was favourable to the prince of Orange, suddenly became his enemy, and, as soon as he was out at sea, wrote to him, directing him to fight at all events. This letter was written in the name of the States, but the peremptory character of the style betrayed its real authorship. Opdam's own opinion and that of his officers was against hazarding an engagement so soon*; but he resolved to obey his orders. Addressing the council of war, he exclaimed, "I am entirely in your sentiments; but here are my orders: to-morrow my head shall be bound with laurel or with cypress." His forebodings of the issue were so discouraging, that, before the engagement, he sent his plate ashore; and with these feelings he prepared for battle.

Having previously lost sight of the English, by retiring upon the Maese, he weighed anchor at once, in obedience to his instructions, to go in search of them; but they saved him the trouble. They were already out at sea, and he came up with them after an hour's sail, about the turn of the morning of the 3d of June.† At three o'clock, the engagement commenced, the Dutch admiral bearing down directly on the duke, with the intention of boarding him. In the beginning, the English had the advantage of the weather gage, and the two fleets several times "charged through each other" with great fury and intrepidity, which has been accounted a mistake on the part of the English, who, having the wind in their favour, ought to have contented themselves with simply meeting the encounter of the

* The main objection was the state of the wind. Opdam came in sight of the English fleet not far from Harwich, but the wind being southerly, and the next morning south-west, he retired to the mouth of the Maese. From thence he sent an express to the States, explaining the reason of his retreat, and stating that he did not think it prudent to attack the English while they had the advantage of the wind. It was in reply to this despatch that De Witte ordered him to fight without more delay.

† Lediard observes that if, as most accounts agree, this battle was fought off L'Aystoff, the Dutch fleet must have been under sail all night; and that the battle was fought on the English coast is plain, because the remains of the Dutch fleet were pursued the whole night and day after, before they could reach the Maese and the Texel. Brandt says it was about ten leagues N. E. by N. off L'Aystoff: Basnage says about eight leagues.

enemy.* For nine hours the carnage continued without much apparent advantage on either side, till about one o'clock at noon, when the earl of Sandwich, with his blue squadron, broke through the enemy's centre, separating the fleet into two parts, and throwing the whole into a state of general confusion.

Opdam, all this while, had never forsaken his resolution to board the English admiral, and in the midst of the consternation which ensued upon the gallant action of the earl of Sandwich, the duke of York, in the Royal Charles, a ship of eighty guns, was engaged in close fight with the Dutch admiral, in the Endracht, of eighty-four guns. The collision was so close that the Dutch writers assert that the Endracht actually boarded the Royal Charles, admitting, however, that the valiant resistance they met with obliged them to retire. The duke of York was in imminent peril during this engagement. The earl of Falmouth, lord Muskerry, and Mr. Boyle, second son of the earl of Burlington, and several of his grace's footmen, were killed by his side by a chain-shot. They were so close to the duke that he was sprinkled by their blood and brains; and it is said, by some writers, that he was wounded in the hand by a fragment of Mr. Boyle's skull. In this terrible crisis, either by an accident within, or a grenado, or other shot from the duke's vessel, the gun-room of the Dutch admiral took fire, and the ship was blown up, destroying in the conflagration at least five hundred men, amongst whom were several volunteers of the best families in Holland. Thus perished poor Opdam, whose gloomy forebodings were realised under circumstances of more than ordinary horror.†

The Dutch vice-admiral perceiving the fate of his

* Basnage.

† Some of the Dutch writers assert that the destruction of Opdam's ship was caused by captain Smith, who, perceiving the duke's danger, contrived, without being detected, to steal under the admiral's side, and set fire to the powder. This statement is almost incredible; for it would have been nearly impossible to have accomplished it without placing himself in as much peril as the ship he fired. Basnage says that a black in Opdam's service was suspected of having done it, in revenge for some ill usage.

commander, made a desperate attempt to revenge him, and would have succeeded in boarding the Royal Charles, but for the intrepidity of captain Smith, who, running his vessel between, boarded and burnt the Dutchman, taking the captain prisoner, who afterwards died of his wounds. The greatest confusion now prevailed amongst the vessels. Four Dutch vessels falling foul of each other, were burnt by a fire-ship, and three others soon afterwards suffered the same fate. The whole Dutch fleet seemed now to be but one blaze; and the cries of so many miserable wretches, who were perishing either by fire or water, were more frightful than the noise of the cannon.* The victory was as complete as it was sanguinary, and the approach of night, under the shelter of which the remnant of the enemy endeavoured to escape, alone prevented the destruction of the entire armament.

The loss on the side of the Dutch was great. Vice-admiral Stillingwerth was shot by a cannon ball through the middle, and Cortenaer received a shot in the thigh early in the engagement, of which he almost immediately died. The English took eighteen of the largest ships, sunk or burnt about fourteen more, took about two thousand prisoners, and killed upwards of four thousand men. On the other side, the loss was comparatively slight in number, but it included some names of high rank and great promise in the service. Only one ship was taken, and the loss in men was about two hundred and fifty killed and three hundred and forty wounded.* Of the distinguished persons who were killed, the most conspicuous were the earl of Falmouth †, lord Mus-

* Lediard.

† The death of this nobleman is said to have plunged the king into greater grief than any circumstance of a similar kind that ever occurred to him. Clarendon gives the following account of his majesty's inordinate sorrow; from which it would appear that his majesty lavished his regrets upon an object not altogether worthy of them. "The trouble and grief in many noble families, for the loss of so many worthy and gallant persons, could not but be very lamentable in wives, in fathers and mothers, and in the other nearest relations: but no sorrow was equal, at least, none so remarkable, as the king's was for the earl of Falmouth. They who knew his majesty best, and had seen how unshaken he had stood in other very terrible assaults, were amazed at the flood of tears he shed upon this occa-

kerry, and Mr. Boyle, who fell beside the duke of York, the earls of Marlborough * and Portland, rear-admiral Sampson, and sir John Lawson.†

---

sion. The immenseness of the victory, and the consequences that might have attended it; the safety and preservation of his brother with so much glory, on whose behalf he had so terrible apprehensions during the three days' fight, having, by the benefit of the wind, heard the thunder of the ordnance from the beginning, even after, by the lessening of the noise, as from a greater distance he concluded that the enemy was upon flight: yet all this, and the universal joy that he saw in the countenance of all men for the victory and the safety of the duke, made no impression towards the mitigation of his passion for the loss of this young favourite, in whom few other men had observed any virtue or quality which they did not wish their best friends without; and very many did believe that his death was a great ingredient, and considerable part of the victory. He was young, and of insatiable ambition; and a little more experience might have taught him all things which his weak parts were capable of. But they who observed the strange degree of favour he had on the sudden arrived to, even from a detestation the king had towards him, and he concluded from thence, and more from the deep sorrow the king was possessed with for his death, to what a prodigious height he might have reached in a little time more, were not at all troubled that he was taken out of the way." — *Clarendon's Life*, 268, 269.

* Of this nobleman, lord Clarendon gives the following character in his notice of this action. "The earl of Marlborough," he says, "who had the command of one of the best ships, and had great experience at sea, and being now newly returned from the East Indies, whither the king had sent him, with a squadron of ships, to receive the island of Bombayne from Portugal, was in this battle likewise slain. He was a man of wonderful parts in all kinds of learning, which he took more delight in than his title; and, having no great estate descended to him, he brought down his mind to his fortune, and lived very retired, but with more reputation than any fortune could have given him.—" *Life*, p. 266. Shortly before his death, this gallant gentleman, suffering under the agonies of his wounds, wrote the following letter to sir Hugh Pollard, comptroller of his majesty's household. The document is remarkable on many accounts, but on none more than as an illustration of that serenity of spirit with which a brave and good man can surrender his life in the service of his country. "Sir, I believe the goodness of your nature, and the friendship you have always borne me, will receive with kindness the last office of your friend. I am in health enough of body, and (through the mercy of God, in Jesus Christ) well disposed in mind. This I premise, that you may be satisfied that what I write proceeds not from any fantastick terrour of mind, but from a sober resolution of what concerns myself, and earnest desire to do you more good after my death, than mine example (God of his mercy pardon the badness of it) in my lifetime may do you harm. I will not speak aught of the vanity of this world; your own age and experience will spare that labour. But there is a certain thing goeth up and down the world, call'd Religion, dressed and pretended fantastically, and to purposes bad enough, which yet by such evil-dealing loseth not its being. The great good God hath not left it without a witness, more or less, sooner or later, in every man's bosom, to direct us in the pursuit of it; and for the avoiding of those inextricable disquisitions and entanglements our own frail reasons would perplex us withall, God, in his infinite mercy, hath given us his holy word, in which, as there are many things hard to be understood, so there is enough plain and easie, to quiet our minds, and direct us concerning our future being. I confess to God and you, I have been a great neglecter, and I fear a despiser, of it: God, of his infinite mercy, pardon me the dreadful fault. But, when I retired myself from the noise and deceitful vanity of the world, I found no true comfort in any other resolu-

The fight had lasted without intermission, from three o'clock in the morning until seven o'clock in the evening; and as night advanced, most of the Dutch ships, thinking of nothing but how to escape, hoisted sails and endeavoured to make sail. Cornelius Van Tromp in vain attempted to stay their flight, holding out to the last, when the whole fleet had left him, except twelve vessels, and even then reluctantly abandoning the post of honour.*

---

tion than what I had from thence. I commend, from the bottom of my heart, the same to your (I hope) happy use. Dear sir Hugh, let us be more generous than to believe we die as the beasts that perish; but with a Christian, manly, brave resolution, look to what is eternal. I will not trouble you farther. The only great God, and holy God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, direct you to an happy end of your life, and send us a joyful resurrection. So prays your true friend, Marleburgh.' *Old James, near the coast of Holland*, April 24, 1665. I beseech you to commend my love to all mine acquaintance; particularly, I pray you, that my cousin Glascock may have a sight of this letter, and as many friends besides as you will, or any else that desire it."

† Clarendon gives the following account of sir John Lawson's death, with a sketch, distinguished by his usual felicity, of that officer's life and character:—

"In the middle of the battle he received a shot with a musket bullet upon the knee, with which he fell: and, finding that he could no more stand, and was in great torment, he sent to the duke to desire him to send another man to command his ship, which he presently did. The wound was not conceived to be mortal; and they made haste to send him ashore, as far as Deptford or Greenwich, where, for some days, there was hope of his recovery; but, shortly, his wound gangrened, and so he died with very great courage, and profession of an entire duty and fidelity to the king.

"He was, indeed, of all the men of that time, and of that extraction and education, incomparably the modestest and the wisest man, and most worthy man to be confided in. He was of Yorkshire, near Scarborough, of that rank of people who are bred to the sea from their cradle. And a young man of that profession he was, when the parliament first possessed themselves of the royal navy; and Hull being in their hands, all the northern seamen easily betook themselves to their service; and his industry and sobriety made him quickly take notice of, and to be preferred from one degree to another, till, from a common sailor, he was promoted to be a captain of a small ship, and from thence to the command of the best vessel..

"He had been in all the actions performed by Blake, some of which were very stupendous; and in all the battles which Cromwell had fought with the Dutch, in which he was a signal officer, and very much valued by him. He was of that classis of religion which were called Independents, most of which were Anabaptists, who were generally believed to have most aversion to the king, and, therefore, employed in most offices of trust He was commander-in-chief of the fleet when Richard was thrown out: and when the contest grew between the Rump and Lambert, he brought the whole fleet into the river, and declared for that which was called the parliament, which brake the neck of all other designs, though he intended only the better settlement of the commonwealth "—*Life*, 267.

* The failure of the Dutch in this engagement was attributed to the ill-conduct of the officers, for the sake of screening De Witte; and in order to satisfy the rage of the incensed populace, several executions took place on their return home. Four of the officers were publicly shot at the Helder;

Nothing more remained to be done, on the part of the English, but to pursue the enemy. "The duke," says Clarendon, "was infinitely tired, and was prevailed upon to repose himself after he had taken some sustenance, which he did after he had given the master of the ship, an honest and a skilful seaman, direct and positive charge 'to bear up in that manner upon the Dutch fleet, that he might lose no ground, but find himself as near, when the day should appear, as he was when he went to sleep.' The fleet had no guide but the lanthorn of the admiral, and were not to outsail him, of course, and behaved themselves accordingly. But when the duke arose, and the day appeared, the Dutch fleet was out of view, and before he could reach them, they were got into their ports, or under the shelter of their forts, that it was not counsellable for the great ships to pursue them farther: yet some of those ships which made not so much way, or had not steered so directly, were taken by the lesser ships that followed them. And the duke had received so may blows on his own and the other ships, that it was necessary to retire into port, where they might be repaired." *

The duke's conduct provoked severe censures in England. Even the Dutch wondered that his grace did not pursue his good fortune with as much zeal as he displayed in the fight, frankly admitting that if he had, he must have taken the whole fleet. Bishop Burnet gives us the following minute and curious particulars of the circumstances connected with this mysterious affair, as far as he had any knowledge of them. After the flight of the Dutch vessels, he says, "the duke ordered all the sail to be set on to overtake them. There was a council of war called, to concert the method of action, when

---

four more were ordered to have their swords broken over their heads by the common hangman; and the master of the vice-admiral was obliged to stand upon a scaffold with a halter about his neck, under the gallows, while the others were executed, and was afterwards sent into banishment. Such was the way by which the Dutch hoped to cover their disgrace.

* Clarendon's Life, 265, 266.

they should come up with them. In that council, Pen, who commanded under the duke, happened to say, that they must prepare for hotter work in the next engagement. He knew well the courage of the Dutch was never so high as when they were desperate. The earl of Montague, who was then a volunteer, and one of the duke's court, said to me, it was very visible that made an impression. And all the duke's domestics said, he had got honour enough; why should he venture a second time? The duchess had also given a strict charge to all the duke's servants to do all they could to hinder him to engage too far. When matters were settled, they went to sleep: and the duke ordered a call to be given him, when they should get up to the Dutch fleet. It is not known what passed between the duke and Brounker, who was of his bedchamber, and was then in waiting: but he came to Pen, as from the duke, and said, the duke ordered the sail to be slackened. Pen was struck with the order; but did not go to argue the matter with the duke himself, as he ought to have done, but obeyed it. When the duke had slept, he, upon his waking, went out on the quarter-deck, and seemed amazed to see the sails slackened, and that thereby all hope of overtaking the Dutch was lost. He questioned Pen upon it. Pen put it on Brounker, who said nothing. But the duke denied he had given any such order. But he neither punished Brounker for carrying it, nor Pen for obeying it. He indeed put Brounker out of his service: and it was said, he durst do no more, because he was so much in the king's favour, and in the mistress's. Pen was more in his favour after that, than even before, which he continued to his son after him, though a quaker; and it was thought that all that favour was to oblige him to keep the secret. Lord Montague did believe that the duke was struck, seeing the earl of Falmouth, the king's favourite, and two other persons of quality, killed very near him; and that he had no mind to engage again, and that Pen was privately with him. If Brounker was so much in fault as he seemed to be,

it was thought the duke, in the passion that this must have raised in him, would have proceeded to greater extremities, and not have acted with so much phlegm." *

The correctness of this statement has been called into question, but too vaguely to set it aside. It appears by an extract given by speaker Onslow from the journal of the house of commons, that the order was carried not to Pen, but to Harman; which merely proves that Burnet mistook one name for the other. Then we are told that the king observed of this action, that "the Dutch were pursued till night, and had it not been for an accident, most of them would have been taken before they got into the Texel." † Instead of disproving the truth of Burnet's story, this only confirms it. The king did not reveal the nature of the accident that prevented the duke from taking the fleet: Burnet supplies the deficiency. No doubt, had it not been for the untoward accident of a pretended mistake in the orders, such would have been the result.* It seems plain enough, through all this mystification and special pleading, that the duke of York did not follow up his advantage as he ought to have done; and there are many circumstantial reasons for suspecting that the influence of the duchess prevailed over his own wishes, even giving him full credit for the most valiant resolutions. The queen-mother afterwards prevented him from taking the command of the fleet, although some of the flattering historians assure us that it was very much against his will.

* In this instance, as in most cases involving the honour of royalty, it was necessary to sacrifice somebody, that the duke's reputation might be saved. The most convenient person in the drama was Brouncker, who carried the message from his royal highness to captain sir John Harman, ordering that officer to slacken sail. This Brouncker was in his royal highness's service, was evidently a creature capable of performing any mean services that might be required at

* Burnet, i. 397. 399. † See note, ibid.

his hands, a time-serving favourite of the duchess of Cleveland, the king's mistress, and, by the force of patronage employed for none of the purest purposes, a member of parliament. The question of veracity lay between the duke of York and Brouncker. "The duke said he never gave orders to slacken sail—Brouncker unquestionably conveyed such orders in the duke's name to sir John Harman. To this point the whole affair ultimately narrowed itself. For six months, however, the duke continued to keep this man in his service *; but at last the public indignation forced his royal highness to take some step towards vindicating himself, and he discharged Brouncker. It is said, that the interest of the duchess of Cleveland protected him against any farther proofs of the duke's resentment, which the reader may believe or not, according to the measure of his credulity. When the war was over, the House of Commons took up the business, happening to be in a very ill humour at the time: but it is clear enough that if the House really intended to investigate such a question upon public grounds, they would have taken it up long before. The interval that had elapsed cannot be otherwise regarded than as an experiment upon the forbearance of the people; for if the matter had been suffered to drop into oblivion, it never would have been heard of in parliament. The inquiry that ensued upon this tardy proceeding was stamped with all the characteristics of a solemn farce. Sir John Harman stated that the duke went off the deck about ten o'clock, giving orders to bear up as close to the Dutch as they could; which they did, and were so close upon them that night, that they were ready to run into the body

* Dr. Campbell says that the real cause — the message carried by Brouncker — of slackening the sails, was concealed from the duke of York all this time, other excuses being made to him, such as a brisk wind from shore, and their fire-ships being all spent. — ii. 152. Where did Dr. Campbell find this statement? It would be desirable to ascertain the source of such a ridiculous fiction, for the sake of warning all future historians to keep clear of it. The duke was informed of Brouncker's conduct the moment he came upon deck the next morning. Why did he not dismiss him then?

of the enemy; that Brouncker came up afterwards, and persuaded him to lower the sails because the duke was so exhausted by his exertions that he required repose. In his second examination, Harman, gradually recollecting all the particulars, said that Brouncker used the duke's name in a commanding way, as if he did it by authority, without precisely asserting so much. After this, it appears sir John Harman was arrested on the Speaker's warrant, to compel him to give still more minute information; and upon this occasion, he stated that Mr. Brouncker, finding that he would not shorten sail, upon his arguments and persuasions, went down again to his royal highness, who was all this time in his cabin, and, coming up soon after, informed him that the duke had commanded that it should be so: "whereupon," said sir John Harman, "I gave order for the doing it."* The discrepancies in these statements are very remarkable, and no ingenuity can rescue them from suspicion. But, perhaps, some allowance ought to be made for sir John Harman's imperfect recollection of the circumstances, nearly three years having elapsed between the date of the battle and his last examination. The battle took place on the 3rd June, 1665, and this final statement, which brought the matter home to Brouncker, was made on the 20th April, 1668. When this crimination of Brouncker was fully elicited from Harman, after a violent application of the Speaker's authority, intended, no doubt, to refresh his reluctant memory, Brouncker was expelled from parliament, and ordered to be impeached. The most luminous commentary that can be made upon the whole affair is, that, although the duke's character was seriously implicated in the transaction, the impeachment, thus ordered by parliament, was never prosecuted. How did

* Supposing that this order were really given without the duke's knowledge, says Basnage, commenting upon this affair, his royal highness would still be exposed to the charge of having acted very unlike a true hero in sleeping at the beginning of a triumph, before he had made his harvest of laurels complete; but, he adds, the sequel shows that the duke was not the most courageous of men.

this happen? By what powerful interposition was Brouncker protected? By the duchess of Cleveland, or *the duchess of York?*

When the fleet returned home immediate preparations were made to refit it for sea. The duke, it seems, was "very impatient" to have the vessels repaired, and was above all things desirous to take the command again, his family remaining still on board, getting ready such things as were wanting for his accommodation. The queen-mother, however, says Clarendon, prevailed on the king to promise her that the duke should not go again in that expedition; which promise was concealed from the duke, his majesty believing that the confidence inspired by his royal highness's name contributed materially to procure the means for defraying the necessary expences. His majesty's opinion on this subject might be challenged by some reasonable presumptions to the contrary; but we must not interrupt the progress of the narrative to discuss such by-way topics.

The fleet, to the number of sixty sail, was ready in less than a month. The king and the duke went together to go on board, the latter being under the impression that he was to take the command; but on their way thither his majesty acquainted his brother with his resolution, and the promise he had made to the queen their mother; with which the duke was much troubled, and offered many reasons to divert his majesty from laying his command upon him; but when he found there was no remedy, he submitted, and gave orders for disembarking his family and goods.*

The relation of this incident, although it has little to do with the life of the earl of Sandwich, is essential to the completion of the narrative of the first engagement with the Dutch, and of the duke of York's personal share in the war. The interference of the queen-mother to prevent the duke from risking his person in the second expedition, following so close upon the

* Clarendon's Life, 271.

duchess of York's charge to her domestics not to let his royal highness "engage too far," will help to show how much his grace was beloved by the ladies of the court, and how much better he was adapted for the chamber than the cockpit. If his grace had really been in earnest in his desire to take command of the fleet, is it likely that such influences as these would have been permitted to prevail over his resolution? Would any of the great commanders of his own or of former times have been stayed in the discharge of their duties to their country by such gentle entreaties and private remonstrances? Or, if the ladies were not already well acquainted with the duke's wishes, is it probable they would have ventured to interpose in a matter of such responsibility? Is it probable that, without a previous knowledge of his grace's disposition, the queen-mother would have attempted to exact such a promise from the king, or that the king would have been weak enough to grant it, before he obtained the consent of the individual whose honour was so deeply concerned in the consequences? The whole transaction is discreditable to all the parties involved in it; and the fact of keeping his royal highness at home, for the avowed purpose of keeping him out of the way of danger, is, in itself, sufficient to reveal the materials of which his grace's heroism was composed.*

* Although we have not yet done with the duke of York in this biography, and shall have occasion again to bring him upon the stage, the present opportunity, is, perhaps, the best that may offer for the introduction of some curiously illustrative anecdotes related of him by Bishop Burnet. This historian has been accused of undue severity in his treatment of the duke, and the modern author of a life of his royal highness attempts to establish several cases of exaggeration, and, perhaps, something worse against the bishop. But without going out of one's way to defend the veracity of Burnet, it may be fairly asserted that his statements about the duke of York have not yet been disproved, notwithstanding the frequency and fury of the assaults that have been made upon them. Certain it is, that the conduct of the duke in almost every incident of his life justifies the general impression of his character left upon the mind by Burnet's incidental sketches and notices of him; and that if he did not deserve the contempt and dislike which the bishop felt towards him and did not attempt to conceal, he had a wonderful way of seeming to deserve it. As to his religion, it has nothing to do with the matter. A man may profess any form of Christianity and preserve the respect of mankind, if his heart be sound and his intellect vigorous; but no shape of religion whatever can be set up as a mask for the vices which are related in the following revolting passage.

It was fortunate, however, for the country that the interposition of the ladies was so successful; for it

It is a bishop who is writing of a prince of the blood royal!— "An accident happened this winter at Oxford, too inconsiderable and too tender to be mentioned, if it were not that great effects were believed to have followed on it. The duke had always one private amour after another, in the managing of which he seemed to stand more in awe of the duchess, than, considering the inequality of their rank, could have been imagined. Talbot was looked on as the chief manager of those intrigues. The duchess's deportment was unexceptionable, which made her authority the greater. At Oxford there was then a very graceful young man of quality that belonged to her court, whose services were so acceptable that she was thought to look at him in a particular manner. This was so represented to the duke, that he, being resolved to emancipate himself into more open practices, took up a jealousy, and put the person out of his court with so much precipitation that the thing became very public by this means. The duchess lost the power she had over him so entirely that no method she could think on was like to recover it, except one. She began to discover what his religion was, though he still came not only to church, but to sacrament. And upon that, she, to regain what she had lost, entered into private discourses with his priests, but in so secret a manner, that there was not for some years after this the least suspicion given. She began by degrees to slacken in her constant coming to prayers and to sacrament, in which she had been before that regular, almost to superstition. She put that on her ill health, for she fell into an ill habit of body, which some imputed to the effect of some of the duke's distempers communicated to her. A story was set about and generally believed, that the earl of Southesk, that had married a daughter of duke Hamilton's, suspecting some familiarities between the duke and his wife, had taken a sure method to procure a disease to himself which he communicated to his wife, and was by that means set round till it came to the duchess, who was so tainted with it that it was the occasion of the death of all her children except the two daughters, our two queens, and was believed the cause of an illness under which she languished long, and died so corrupted that in dressing her body after her death, one of her breasts burst, being a mass of corruption. Lord Southesk was for some years not ill pleased to have this believed. It looked like a peculiar strain of revenge with which he seemed much delighted. But I know he has to some of his friends denied the whole of the story very solemnly. Another acted a better part. He did not like a commerce that he observed between the duke and his wife. He went and expostulated with him upon it. The duke fell a commending his wife much. He told him he came not to seek his wife's character of him; the most effectual way of commending her was to have nothing to do with her. He added, that if princes would do those wrongs to subjects who could not demand such reparation of honour as they could from their equals, it would put them on secreter methods of revenge, for some injuries were such that men of honour could not bear them. And upon a new observation he made of the duke's designs upon his wife, he quitted a very good post and went with her into the country, where he kept her till she died. Upon the whole matter the duke was often ill. The children were born with ulcers, or they broke out upon them soon after, and all his sons died young and unhealthy. This has, as far as any thing that could not be brought in the way of proof, prevailed to create a suspicion that so healthy a child as the pretended prince of Wales could neither be his nor be born of any wife with whom he had lived long. The violent pain that his eldest daughter had in her eyes, and the gout which has early seized our present queen, are thought the dregs of a tainted original. Willis, the great physician, being called to consult for one of his sons, gave his opinion in those words, *mala stamina vitæ*, which gave such offence that he was never called for afterwards."—*Burnet*, i. 416—419.

left the fleet to the sole command of the earl of Sandwich. At first it was intended that his lordship should be joined with prince Rupert in the command; but the king changed his mind, ordering the prince to attend him in London, and placing the sole authority in the hands of the earl. His lordship's intentions were to visit the coast of Holland, and if he found that the Dutch fleet was not ready to come out, he was to sail to the northward to watch the Turkey and East India fleets which had orders to come by that route for the purpose of avoiding the English. It was hoped, also, that the ships might be in time to intercept De Ruyter in his homeward passage; but they were disappointed in that expectation; the Dutch admiral returned unexpectedly by the north of Scotland, and arrived safely in Holland, where he was immediately appointed to the chief command in the navy.

The English fleet sailed on the 5th July, from Southwold bay; and, obtaining intelligence that the Dutch were not yet ready for sea, the earl of Sandwich directed his course to the north, where the Turkey and India fleets, consisting of twenty sail, under the command of commodore Bitter, had already taken shelter in the port of Berghen in Norway. The earl of Sandwich had received intimation of this circumstance, and proceeded with despatch to discharge the duty which consequently devolved upon him.

At this period, sir Gilbert Talbot, the English resident in Denmark, was sent for by the king, who informed him of the arrival of the India ships at Berghen, where they were to remain until the Dutch fleet was ready to join them. His majesty complained freely of the conduct of the States in drawing him into a war with Sweden, in the expectation that he should be forced to apply to them for money, and to surrender into their hands the customs of Norway and the Sound by way of security.* The arrival of the rich vessels from Turkey and

* Burnet, i. 407.

India in the port of Berghen appeared to his majesty to present a favourable opportunity of enabling his majesty to unite his interest with the king of England, which he proposed to do by allowing the king of England to possess himself of all the treasure, which he was afterwards to divide equally between them. His majesty thought it reasonable that he might expect half the value, for the discharge of which he would rely upon the king's honour, after the ships had arrived in England; for it would be necessary that he should protest against the proceeding as an act of violence which he could not resist.* This honourable proposal was promptly agreed to, and sir Gilbert Talbot communicated it that day to the king. The answer was favourable, and letters to that effect were immediately transmitted to the earl of Sandwich.

Continuing his course for Norway, and resolved not to lose so fair a moment for attacking the Dutch fleet, his lordship considered it prudent to communicate his movements to sir Gilbert Talbot, asking at the same time for a more distinct account of the nature of the king of Denmark's engagements, that he might the better know what he was doing.† The king of Denmark, however, finding that the business was not very creditable to him, had stipulated that the agreement should not be put into writing, so that it was very difficult for sir Gilbert to comply with the earl's request. He did send an answer of some sort, but it never reached its destination, owing to a variety of accidents.

The earl of Sandwich had now arrived near enough to justify him in taking immediate measures for attacking the fleet. His situation was peculiarly distressing. The intimation he had received from Talbot apparently warranted him in going into the Danish port, but, not

* Clarendon. Life, 278. In a narrative of this transaction written by sir Gilbert Talbot, the ambassador is stated to have made this proposition to the king of Denmark, finding his majesty disposed to fill his coffers at the expense of the Dutch. It is immaterial from which side the proposal originally came; its entertainment is equally disgraceful to both.

† Campbell, ii. 283.

knowing whether the governor of Berghen had received a similar intimation, he was perplexed how to act. In this difficulty he resolved to remain out at sea, on the look out for De Ruyter, while he sent admiral Tiddiman with a squadron of fifteen or sixteen good ships into the harbour. As soon as these vessels approached close to the harbour, Tiddiman sent a gentleman on shore to the governor to inform him of his design, and to inquire what orders he had received. This business was rendered still more repulsive by the security in which the Dutch fancied themselves under the protection of the castle in which they had deposited, from the time of their first coming, some of the richest part of their lading, as a place of unquestionable security.* It appears also that the Danish governor had committed himself to their safety on their arrival, promising to do what he could for them †, and otherwise showing them marks of hospitality which afterwards rendered his position extremely embarrassing.

When Mr. Clifford, the gentleman sent by admiral Tiddiman, announced the object of his mission, the governor expressed his regret that he had arrived so soon. He could not deny that he had received orders from Copenhagen, but he expected more perfect directions within four and twenty hours, and likewise the presence of the viceroy of Norway, who was his superior officer, and would infallibly be there the next day. He had no objection, however, that the ships should come into the port, on the assurance that they would not attempt any hostile act without his consent ‡; but he insisted on the necessity of defending the port until he should receive explicit orders, which he expected notwithstanding in a very little time. §

The delay in the receipt of the governor's orders was occasioned by the distance of Berghen from the capital. The viceroy of Norway, who resided at Christiana, had

* Clarendon. Ibid. † Campbell, ii. 153.
‡ Clarendon, 278. § Burnet, i. 409.

his instructions sooner, and sent out two galleys to communicate the agreement to the earl of Sandwich; but they missed him, as he was already before Berghen.

Agreeably to the understanding entered into between Mr. Clifford and the governor, the English squadron entered the harbour, to the consternation of the Dutch, who immediately changed the posture of some of their ships, and, new-mooring the rest, put themselves upon their defence. The port of Berghen exhibits the peculiarity of having a great number of formidable rocks, between which the sea runs so deep that the largest ships may float in safety; the English vessels, consequently, found themselves in so many chambers separated by rocks. The Dutch having entered first, secured that line of the sea which lay next the shore, to which they were so close that they could descend from their decks upon the land. This circumstance would have been all the better for the enterprise, if the Danes had been friendly to the action.*

Upon Clifford's return to the fleet a council of war was held, as to the course to be taken in this emergency. Tiddiman was a good officer, a rough man who knew well how to execute orders, but, being an indifferent judge of the grounds of them, he relied upon the advice of Clifford. The result of this conference was that the attack should be delayed no longer. First, it was apprehended, that if any further procrastination took place, the Dutch fleet under De Ruyter might probably come to the relief of the treasure ships; second, it would afford the vessels time to fortify themselves, and probably render the attempt impracticable; third, the attack was resolved upon, because they suspected that the governor was merely acting an unavoidable part, and that he really wished the action to take place without his declared consent.

During the night the ships remained still. The next

* Clarendon, 279.

day the governor was importunate for the postponement of the enterprise, and some angry words passed between him and a gentleman of quality who was a volunteer on board the ships, which it was suspected did not contribute much to reconcile him to the English. At last, the commander communicated to him his determination to weigh his anchors and fall upon the Dutch; but the governor's reply, which was meant literally to dissuade him from his intention, had the effect of still further perplexing the chapter of accidents, by confirming the former impression, that 'the governor did not exactly mean what he said.'

The ships were now brought out of their several channels; and, to the astonishment of the English, it was discovered that the Dutch had made profitable use of the interval that had been wasted, on the other side, in interviews with the governor. The English had been, altogether, two days and two nights in the harbour, and during that time the Dutch had unloaded nearly all their commodities, placing them for safety in the castle; drawing on shore also forty-one pieces of cannon, which they planted on a rising ground so that they could shoot over their own ships; while the largest of their vessels were formed into a line across the bay, and a breastwork was cast up, flanking the ordnance on shore, behind which all the inhabitants of the town were in arms. This was fair notice of the intentions and preparations, both of the Danes and the Dutch. But the English still confided in the belief that the governor intended to remain neutral; and, being indifferent to the Dutch ordnance and breastwork, provided the castle which commanded the whole bay did not interfere, they opened the attack at once.* The admiral, however, took the precaution of giving all his captains a strict

* Dr. Campbell says, that the castle fired on the English fleet on the preceding evening. I do not find this statement confirmed by any contemporary authority. Neither Burnet nor Clarendon, who furnish the most authentic accounts extant of this action, make any reference whatever to such a circumstance.

charge not to fire against the castles or forts, and to direct all their shot low at the hulls of the Dutch ships, to prevent, as far as they could, any damage from being committed on the town which lay behind. These instructions had been previously concerted with the governor, and it was afterwards agreed upon all hands that they were faithfully executed.

In the first impetuous rush of the English, they succeeded in dismounting many of the ordnance on the shore; but the complicated and general fire that came upon them from all quarters, speedily discovered to them that the attempt was hopeless. During this stormy fight, the muskets from the breastwork, and the guns from the castle, continued to pour down a deluge of fire upon the English ships, although, as if to perplex the attackers still more, a white flag was hung out from the battlements the whole time. The greatest mischief the English suffered was from the Danish artillery, which, accidentally cutting some hawsers that kept the first line together, compelled them to leave their stations lest they should fall foul of each other; when, getting beyond the reach of the Dutch guns, they came under the fire of a fort on the outmost point, which played upon them afresh, increasing the numerous disasters to which they had been already exposed. In this engagement Edward Montague, the cousin of lord Sandwich, who had been mainly instrumental in drawing his lordship over to the royal cause, was unfortunately slain. He had been master of the horse to the queen, and had joined the fleet in a fit of discontent, without the knowledge of the admiral. Clarendon describes him as "a proper man and well bred, but not easy to be pleased."

As soon as the ships could get safely out to sea, they joined the earl of Sandwich, who had been drawn nearly to the mouth of the harbour, and rendered him a full account of all that had occurred. Shortly afterwards they were followed by a shallop from the governor, with a letter to the officer in command of the squadron, complaining of the conduct of the English in shooting upon

the town, and requesting that Mr. Clifford would give him a meeting at a place to which the shallop should convey him. The earl of Sandwich was unwilling that Mr. Clifford should accept the invitation; but he yielded at length to the entreaties of that gentleman, who went on shore in the shallop.

It now appeared that the action was scarcely over when the viceroy of Norway arrived, at whose instance this meeting was arranged, that he might personally hear the statements at both sides. The governor, on his part, declared that he stood in arms only to defend the town, without being concerned for the Dutch; that he did not fire until after the town had been assaulted, and many burghers killed; and that as a proof of his forbearance, he suffered the English to depart when he had it in his power to sink them; complaining, at the same time, of their want of patience, that would not allow them to defer the assault one day longer, until the viceroy had been present. The viceroy, who was much troubled at what had happened, suggested that another squadron might be sent in, which should have all the assistance that was necessary. Mr. Clifford defended the conduct of the English, on the ground that the Dutch were permitted to land their ordnance, and that the townsmen assisted them in the engagement; and he proposed that the viceroy should begin by seizing some of their ships, and then that the fleet should answer. This the viceroy refused, but made another proposition which exhibited a complete departure from the terms of the original agreement: namely, that the English should seize the Dutch ships, and make a strict division of the goods before they carried them away. To this startling condition Mr. Clifford very properly answered, that he would submit it to the earl of Sandwich, in whom was solely vested the power of concluding and executing such matters. He then returned to the fleet.*

* Clarendon, 280.

The strange conduct of the governor, and the new proposals of the viceroy, gave the earl of Sandwich abundant reason for questioning the sincerity of the Danish government. All this time, too, it must be remembered that he was without any further intelligence from sir Gilbert Talbot, and ignorant of the steps that might have been taken in the interim. These considerations, strengthened by other motives of no less weight, determined him not to run any more hazards amongst the rocks of Berghen at a season of the year when that coast was peculiarly dangerous. He was also strongly influenced by the receipt of intelligence that De Ruyter was come out with his fleet; and as he had no inclination to court an engagement on that iron shore, desiring to have a little more sea-room should he fall in with him, he took that course which he thought would be most likely to bring him and De Ruyter together; an event which he desired above all others. Should he even miss De Ruyter, he still calculated on meeting the East India fleet on their way to Holland in the open sea, where he could more effectually accomplish their capture than in the crowded harbour of Berghen.

But the principal motive which may be presumed to have induced the earl of Sandwich to adopt this deliberate resolution, was a strong sense of the unworthiness of the affair in which he was engaged. "The truth seems to be," says Campbell, "that the earl of Sandwich considered this whole negociation as a dishonourable thing; and, indeed, it is very apparent, that if no respect at all had been had to this agreement, but the English had attacked the enemy's fleet without giving them time to fortify themselves, the whole, or at least, the greatest part must have been either sunk or taken." *

That the resolution to hold no further parley with the Danes was not adopted without sufficient reason, the subsequent conduct of the governor to the Dutch, as we

* Campbell, ii. 290.

shall presently have occasion to show, afforded ample proof. But it is not always easy to collect the various circumstances that influence such movements, so as to be enabled to place them in a clear light; nor, if we could, is it quite certain that, after an interval of fifty or a hundred years, we should be able to estimate them at their real importance. The earl of Sandwich knew the men with whom he had to deal, and preferred the risk of the open sea and a fair engagement, to a collusive bargain with a perfidious ally, and a piratical stratagem against a declared enemy. Had he been left single-handed to the conduct of this transaction, there is hardly any doubt that he must have succeeded; but he was checked by obscure orders, paralysed by doubts and impediments, and finally betrayed into a mesh of difficulties by a strange medley of mistakes and disappointments. The mystery that hangs over the business, holds out a sort of warning to all governments not to commit men of honour to base plots and mean subterfuges. Historians, at both sides, confess themselves puzzled to trace the actual reasons of that untoward proceeding of the Danish authorities, which was the immediate cause of the failure of the attempt on the treasure-ships. Rapin, who would throw it upon the English if he could, endeavours to evade the responsibility of accurate detail, by giving a dramatic sketch of the *imbroglio* of the comedy. "To succeed," he observes, "in this design, there was a necessity of acquainting the viceroy of Norway and the governor of Berghen with it; because, as the king of Denmark was not to appear publicly in it, they were to make a show of protecting the Dutch ships. It was likewise requisite that the earl of Sandwich should be let into the secret, to prepare him how to take the loud complaints the governor of Berghen was to make on account of the outrages committed by the English. But several unhappy incidents rendered the whole project abortive. The governor of Berghen was to have received his orders from the viceroy of Norway, but they were

sent him too late; and the messenger whom Talbot sent from Copenhagen to the English fleet, was intercepted and seized by the Dutch. In short, the earl of Sandwich having advice that they were in daily expectation of De Ruyter, was willing to execute his orders before he arrived, and therefore detached sir Thomas Tiddiman with his squadron to perform it. Sir Thomas fell upon the Dutch with great resolution; but they had time enough to prepare for a defence."

This was the secret of the whole misfortune. The Dutch were allowed time to prepare their defence, which, as we have seen, was patiently drawn out, and even elaborately planned. But through what connivance was this accomplished? or, was there any connivance in the case? Clarendon fairly acknowledges that he cannot solve the problem, and dismisses it with as satisfactory a summary as his information enabled him to give of the circumstances from beginning to end, still confessing, however, that the business was never properly explained. "This whole affair," says lord Clarendon, "of Berghen, and the managing thereof, was so perplexed and intricate, that it was never clearly understood. That which seemed to have most probability was, that as soon as the Dutch fleet came to Berghen, they had unladen many of their richest commodities, and put them into the castle before the governor had received his orders from Copenhagen; and so both his own and his master's faith and honour were engaged to discharge the trust, of which he made haste to send an account to the king, and thereupon expected new directions, which were not arrived when the English fleet came thither: and when they did come, whether that court, according to its custom, did change its mind, and believe they should make a better bargain by keeping what was already deposited in their hands in the castle, than by making an uncertain division with the king; or whether they did, in truth, continue firm to the first agreement, and that the messenger was stopped by extraordinary accidents in his journey (which was

positively alledged; so that he did not arrive in time; or whether the governor was not able to master the town, that was much inclined to the Hollanders, before the vice-king came with his troops, who did make all possible haste as soon as he heard that the English were arrived; or whether the English did proceed more unadvisedly and rashly than they ought to have done, remains still in the dark. And both parties reproached each other afterwards as they found most necessary for their several defences and pretences, of which more hereafter."* If Clarendon, who took so much pains to unravel the secret history of this affair, was compelled to leave it in the dark, a further examination of the scanty authorities, who double upon and confound each other in their accounts of it, would not be likely to diminish the mystery.

Leaving the earl of Sandwich to pursue his course through the northern seas, at a period of the year when, under other circumstances, the fleet would have been laid up in harbour for the winter, we will pause to see what happened afterwards at Berghen in reference to the Danes and the Dutch, forming, in fact, the sequel of the events already related.

The delay that had taken place in fitting out the Dutch fleet, appears to have arisen from want of funds and men. It was only by threats, punishments, and promises that the States were at last enabled to man a fleet, with the gallant De Ruyter at its head, to the great displeasure of Van Tromp, who was of opinion that if he were not entitled to that post by virtue of his illustrious descent, he had sufficiently established his claim to it by his own actions. But he was in some measure reconciled, by discovering that his rival was only nominal commander, the fleet being in reality under the command of De Witte, who, not content with controlling the councils of the States, had now formed the extraordinary resolution of directing their fleets. Pro-

* Clarendon, 281.

curing an appointment for himself and two friends to attend the admiral, every body saw that he contemplated some remote stroke of policy, and the wonder and curiosity of the people were raised to the highest pitch. His intimate friends, indeed, advised him to relinquish the design, and the king of France was shockingly frightened lest any thing should happen to a statesman through whom he had ruled Holland for so many years. But the pensionary not only persisted in his design, but, by a very marvellous piece of good luck, obtained a great naval reputation before he even put out to sea.

Going on board the fleet in the Texel, he found all the officers and pilots unanimously of opinion that they must wait for a fair wind in order to get out. There are two passages out of the Texel, one large and the other small. The latter was too shallow for ships of heavy burthen, and the former was exposed to what they called twenty-two winds, any one of which they said would absolutely prevent a fleet from sailing through. De Witte, who had no knowledge of practical navigation whatever, inquired the reason why so many winds should have the self-same effect? What answer was given to this inquiry is not upon record, but the next morning De Witte demonstrated to the mariners, on their own principles, that there were but four of these points which could retard them It did not require much sagacity, and still less acquaintance with the compass, to enable any man of common sense to make this notable discovery; but it seems the Dutch seamen regarded it as a very remarkable proof of De Witte's skill in his new character. The wind happened, however, to be in one of the adverse points, and De Witte, after sounding the passage with a lead, undertook to carry out two of the largest ships, which he safely performed the next day. This achievement was considered so extraordinary, that the scene of the exploit has ever since been called De Witte's Passage. All that need be said about it is, that it was a cheap way of getting a reputation. The mere fact of beating or working a ship out of a passage

is, as every navigator knows, a simple process, if there be only room enough for tacking; if there be not room enough, the task is one of considerable difficulty, without taking into consideration in either case the state of the currents, which is of more consequence than even the points of the wind. But whether there be room enough or not, it is a process which no man could perform unless he possessed a practical knowledge of navigation. Now De Witte either did or did not understand navigation. If he did, which his biographers deny, there was nothing wonderful in the action; if he did not, we must attribute it to a miracle or a pilot. Not being of a very superstitious habit of belief, we are disposed to ascribe it to the latter. As to the credit of it being given to De Witte, there is nothing at all surprising in that.

The immediate object proposed by the fleet so strangely floated out of the Texel, was to bring off the Turkey and East India vessels from Berghen. As it was known that the earl of Sandwich was out at sea, this was an undertaking attended with no little hazard; but De Ruyter was fortunate enough to pass unobserved, and to make the Danish harbour in safety. When he arrived there, he found the merchant vessels in jeopardy, having found a new and unexpected enemy in their late defender, the Danish governor. The English squadron, it appeared, had no sooner left the harbour, and all expectations of a resumption of the private negotiations were at an end, than the governor, determined to make something of the affair, demanded the sum of 100,000 crowns from the Dutch ships, for the effective assistance he had given them in the late action; threatening very unceremoniously to sink them if they attempted to leave the port until they had discharged his claim. At this juncture, De Witte fortunately arrived; and the Danish governor, suddenly lowering his tone, consented to permit the vessels to depart, satisfying his cupidity by seizing upon the cannon they had left ashore. The treachery of this man's conduct

vindicates the discernment of the English commander, who seems to have penetrated his character in the first intercourse that took place between them.

In the mean while the English fleet had sailed towards the coast of Holland, but was driven to the northward by a violent storm. De Witte was now on his way homewards, when the same tempest that beat back his opponents, scattered his own ships and committed such damage on some of them that he lost a few of the merchantmen and two fire-ships. On the 4th of September, the earl of Sandwich, whose force was also broken by the boisterous weather, fell in with four Dutch East Indiamen and several of their merchant-ships under a strong convoy. This was the opportunity he had long looked for; but the state of the sea precluded the possibility of accomplishing all that he desired, and, considering the unpropitious circumstances by which he was surrounded, it is surprising that he was able to effect so much. After a decisive conflict, he took eight men-of-war, two of the richest East India ships, and twenty sail of merchantmen, the rest escaping in the storm. On the ninth, four men-of-war, two fire-ships, and thirty merchantmen, losing their courses in the fog, joined the English fleet in mistake, and were all taken with upwards of a thousand prisoners. Having thus fairly settled the account of the Berghen affair, with a large balance in his favour, the earl of Sandwich brought home his fleet in triumph.

4th Sept.

9th Sept.

The profits of this enterprise were very acceptable to the public treasury, which was just then much pressed in providing a fleet for the ensuing spring. But much more was expected; to such a height of extravagance did the notion of our naval sovereignty carry the expectations of the people. The darkness and length of the nights in the northern seas in the winter season, were not taken into consideration by those who thought that the earl ought to have captured the whole fleet of merchant vessels; and insinuations were thrown out that he ought to have pursued them with greater vigour

and perseverance. These ungrateful suggestions, however, were not the offspring of popular dissatisfaction; they sprang from another source, private malice and inexplicable jealousy.

Sir William Coventry*, the duke of York's secretary, when this fleet was originally put in motion, exerted his influence to prevent prince Rupert from being joined in the command of the fleet with the earl of Sandwich, not from any desire to serve the latter, but merely to gratify his spleen against the former. Coventry, "who never paid a civility to any worthy man but as it was

* The following character of sir William Coventry is drawn by the chancellor, and is not the less striking by being strongly spiced with personal feeling. "He was a sullen, ill-natured, proud man, whose ambition had no limits, nor could be contained within any. His parts were very good, if he had not thought them much better than any other man's; and he had diligence and industry, which men of good parts are often without, which made him quickly to have at least credit with the duke; and he was without those vices which were too much in request, and which make men most unfit for business, and the trust that cannot be separated from it.

"He had sate a member in the House of Commons from the beginning of the Parliament, with very much reputation of an able man. He spoke pertinently, and was always very acceptable and well heard; and was one of those with whom they, who were trusted by the king in conducting his affairs in the lower House, consulted very frequently; but not so much, nor relied equally upon his advice, as upon some few others who had much more experience, which he thought was of use only to ignorant and dull men; and that men of sagacity could see and determine at a little light, and ought rather to persuade and engage men to do that which they judged fit, than to consider what themselves were inclined to do: and so did not think himself to be enough valued and relied upon, and only to be made use of to the celebrating the designs and contrivance of other men, without being signal in the managery, which he aspired to be. Nor did any man envy him the province, if he could indeed have governed it, and that others who had more useful talents, would have been ruled by him. However, being a man who naturally loved faction and contradiction, he often made experiments how far he could prevail in the House, by declining the method that was prescribed, and proposing somewhat to the House that was beside or contrary to it, and which the others would not oppose, believing, in regard of his relation, that he had received newer directions. And then if it succeeded well (as sometimes it did), he had argument enough to censure and inveigh against the chancellor, for having taken so ill measures of the temper and affections of the House; for he did not dissemble in his private conversation (though his outward carriage was very fair) that he had no kindness for him, which in gratitude he ought to have had; nor had he anything to complain of from him, but that he wished well, and did all he could to defend and support a very worthy person, who had deserved very well from the king, against whom he manifested a great and causeless animosity, and desired to oppress for his own profit, of which he had a very immoderate appetite." pp. 183, 184. As a remarkable contrast to this, it is only fair to refer to Burnet's character of Coventry, which is chiefly noticeable because it praises him for exactly the opposite qualities to those for which Clarendon condemns him. But appearances are in favour of the latter.

a disobligation to another whom he cared less for," without having received any provocation whatever, now set himself about the labour of plucking down the honours he had contributed to confer upon the earl. He had no higher motive apparently to gratify in the calumnies he spread abroad than a natural love of mischief, and an irresistible passion for intercepting the progress of other men's good fortunes. While the fleet was at sea he kept up a constant correspondence with some of the officers, and being thus in possession of all their movements, he was enabled to disseminate plausible statements to the prejudice of the admiral, accusing him, amongst other things, of being too wary in avoiding danger. The king and the duke discredited these vague assertions and defended his character; the latter, who had witnessed his conduct in the midst of peril, declaring that he was a brave and prudent commander, and as forward and bold in the face of danger as the occasion required or discretion permitted. They also expressed themselves abundantly satisfied with the prizes he had brought home, which, little as Coventry affected to think of them, caused great lamentations in Holland, and nearly broke the heart of De Witte. But it is a difficult thing to make a noble reputation, and still more difficult to keep it clear of shadows in the midst of envy and evil-speaking. So it was with the earl of Sandwich, and the injury which the spite of Coventry failed to inflict upon him was brought about through an "unadvised action" of his own, soon after he came into harbour.

The particulars of this transaction are detailed with such accuracy by Clarendon, who was personally mixed up in them, that it will be best to give them in his own words; especially as they are not recorded by any other authority, and would not bear abbreviation without injustice to the subject.

"It was a constant and a known rule in the admiralty, that of any ship that is taken from the enemy bulk is not to be broken till it be brought into the port and

adjudged lawful prize. It seems that when the fleet returned to the harbour, the flag-officers petitioned or moved the earl of Sandwich, 'in regard of their having continued all the summer upon the seas with great fatigue, and been engaged in many actions of danger, that he would distribute amongst them some reward out of the Indian ships;' which he thought reasonable, and inclined to satisfy them, and writ a letter to the vice-chamberlain to inform the king of it, and 'that he thought it fit to be done;' to which the vice-chamberlain, having showed the letter to the king, returned his majesty's approbation. But before the answer came to his hand he had executed the design, and distributed as much of the coarser goods to the flag-officers, as, by estimation, was valued to be one thousand pounds to each officer, and took to the value of two thousand pounds for himself. This suddenly made such a noise and outcry, as if all the Indian and other merchant-ships had been plundered by the seamen: and they again cried out as much that no care was taken of them, but all given to the flag-officers, which the other captains thought to be an injury to them.

"The general (who had nothing like kindness for the earl of Sandwich, whose service he thought had been too much considered, and recompensed by the king at his arrival) had notice of it before it came to Oxford; and according to his universal care (which was afterwards found to proceed from private animosity) sent orders to all the port-towns to seize upon goods which were brought in shallops from the fleet; and gave advertisement to Oxford, of the extraordinary ill consequence of that action, and 'that it would spoil the sale of all that remained of those ships, since the East-India company, which probably would have been the best chapmen, would not now be forward to buy, since so much was disposed of already to other hands as would spoil their market.' And by this time the earl himself had given an account of all that had been done, and the motives, to the duke. The king was justly displeased

for the expedition he had used—'why had his approbation been desired, when he resolved to do the thing before he could receive an answer?'—yet was glad that he had done so, because he would have been more excuseable if he had received it.

"But the duke, who had been constantly kind to the earl, was offended in the highest degree, and thought himself injured and affronted beyond any precedent. This most unjustifiable action could proceed only from two fountains: the one of extreme vanity and ambition to make himself popular amongst the officers of the fleet, who ought not to have been gratified by him at the king's charge. When any such bounty should be seasonable, it was the duke's province to have been the author, and the conduit to have conveyed it: he had himself been an eye-witness of their behaviour in the greatest action; and for the earl to assume the rewarding them by his own authority, was to defraud and rob him of his proper right and jurisdiction. And he looked upon his having desired the king's allowance by the vice-chamberlain, as a trick and an aggravation; for he ought to have asked his advice as his superior officer: and the poor vice-chamberlain underwent his share in the reproach, in having presumed to move the king in a particular that, if it was to be moved at all, had been to be moved by the duke. The other fountain which might produce this presumption, might be avarice, which was the sole blemish (though it never appeared in any gross instance) that seemed to cloud many noble virtues in that earl, who now became a very pregnant evidence of the irresistible strength and power of envy; which, though it feeds upon its own poison, and is naturally more grievous to the person who harbours it, than to him that is maligned, yet when it finds a subject it can effectually work upon, it is more insatiable in revenge than any passion the soul is liable unto.

"He was a gentleman of so excellent a temper and behaviour, that he could make himself no enemies; of so many good qualities, and so easy to live with, that he

marvellously reconciled the minds of all men to him who had not intimacy enough with him to admire his other parts; yet was in the general inclination of men upon some disadvantage. They who had constantly followed the king whilst he as constantly adhered to Cromwell, and knew not how early he had entertained repentance, and with what hazard and dangers he had manifested it, did believe the king had been too prodigal in heaping so many favors upon him. And they who had been familiar with him and of the same party, and thought they had been as active as he in contributing to the revolution, considered him with some anger, as one who had better luck than they without more merit, and who had made early conditions: when, in truth, no man in the kingdom had been less guilty of that address; nor did he ever contribute to any advancement to which he arrived, by the least intimation or insinuation that he wished it, or that it would be acceptable to him. Yet upon this blast the winds rose from all quarters, reproaches of all sorts were cast upon him, and all affronts contrived for him.

" The earl had conveyed that part of the goods which he had assigned to himself in a shallop to Lynn, from whence it could pass by water to his own house. An officer in that port seized upon it by virtue of the general's warrant, and would cause it presently to be unladen, which he began to do. But the servants of the earl appealed to the other officers in equal authority, to whom they brought a letter with them from the earl of Sandwich, in which he owned all the goods to be his (amongst which were his bedding and furniture for his cabin, and all his plate and other things suitable), and likewise a note of all the other goods which might be liable to pay custom, and desired them ' to send one of their searchers with the boat to his house, where he should receive all their dues, without being unladen in the port,' which, beside the delay, would be liable to many inconveniences. The officer who at first arrested it, and who had dependence upon a great man of the country, who

was not unwilling that any affront should be put upon the earl, toughly refused to suffer it to pass without being first unladen; but being over-ruled by the other officers, vented his anger in very unmannerly language against the earl: of all which he being advertised by his servants, sent a complaint to the lords of the council, and desired 'the fellow might be sent for and punished;' which could not be refused, though it proved troublesome in the inquiry. For the officer, who was a gentleman of a fair behaviour and good repute, denied all those words which carried in them the worst interpretation; but justified the action, and produced the general's warrant, which had unusual expressions, and apparent enough to have a particular and not a general intention.

"The general had quick advertisement of it, and writ very passionately from London 'that an officer should be sent for without having committed any other offence than in obeying and executing a warrant of his.' And the other great man, who was of great importance to the king's service, and in the highest trust in that country, writ several letters 'how impossible it would be to carry on the king's service in that country, if that officer should be punished for doing that, when he ought to be punished if he had not done it;' and therefore desired, 'that he might be repaired by them who had caused him to be sent for.'

"Sir William Coventry had now full sea-room to give vent to all his passions, and to incense the duke, who was enough offended without such contributions: 'if this proceeded from covetousness, it was not probable that it would be satisfied with so little; and therefore it was probable, that, though the officers might not have received above the value of one thousand pounds, which was assigned to each, yet himself would not be contented with so little as two thousand, and they might therefore well conceive that he had taken much more, which ought to be examined with the greatest strictness.' There had been nothing said

before of not taking advantage enough upon the enemy in all occasions which had been offered, and of not pursuing them far enough, which was not now renewed, with advice, 'that he might be presently sent for,' though it was known that, as soon as he could put the ships into the ports to which they were designed, he would come to Oxford. And there were great underhand endeavours, that the House of Commons might be inflamed with this miscarriage and misdemeanor, and present it as a complaint to the House of Peers, as fit to be examined and brought to judgment before that tribunal. And they, who with all the malice imaginable, did endeavour in vain to kindle this fire, persuaded the king and the duke, 'that by their sole activity and interest it was prevented for that time, because the session was too short, and that all necessary evidence could not be soon produced at Oxford; but that, as soon as the plague should cease to such a degree in London that the parliament might assemble there, it would be impossible to restrain the House of Commons from pursuing that complaint,' of which nobody thought but themselves, and they who were provoked by them.

"The earl of Sandwich had so good intelligence from Oxford, that he knew all that was said, and began to believe that he had done unadvisedly in administering occasion of speaking ill to those who greedily sought for it, and as soon as his absence from the fleet could be dispensed with, he made haste to Oxford, and gave so full an account of every day's action, from the time that he went to sea to the day of his return, and of his never having done any thing of importance nor having left any thing undone, but with and by the advice of the council of war, upon the orders he had received, that both the king and the duke could not but absolve him from all the imputations of negligence or inadvertency.

"But for the breaking bulk and all the circumstances that attended it, they declared they were unsatisfied. And he confessed, 'that he had been much to blame,'

and asked pardon, and with such excuses as he thought might in some degree plead for him. He protested 'it seemed to him to have had some necessity; that the whole fleet was in a general indisposition, and complained that for all that long summer action' (which indeed had been full of merit) 'they had nothing given to them, nor without some muttering that they would have somewhat out of those India ships before they would part with them; insomuch as he had a real apprehension that they had a purpose to plunder them. And he should have feared more, if he had not complied with the flag-officer's importunity; and thereupon he consented that they should have each of them the value of one thousand pounds, and which he was most confident the goods which had been delivered to them did not exceed.' He confessed 'he had not enough considered the consequence, and that they who had not received any donative would be more displeased, than they who had it were satisfied with it; which he acknowledged was the case; that he was heartily sorry for permitting any such thing to be done, and more for having taken any himself, and humbly asked pardon for both; and desired that his own part, which remained entire, might be restored to the ship from whence it had been taken, which he would cause to be done.'

"A more ingenious acknowledgement could not be made: and they who could not but observe many persons every day excused for more enormous transgressions, did hope that he, who had so few faults to answer for, would have been absolved for that trespass. And the king himself used him very graciously, and so did the duke; and he was sent back to the fleet, to give orders for the sending out a winter-guard, and ordering all other maritime affairs, and for the sending up the Indian ships into the river, with great care that none of the seamen should go on shore, when the plague still raged little, if at all, less than it had done in the summer: and so he himself and most other men believed, and were glad, that an ill business was so well composed.

But sir William did not intend that it should end there."*

The further malice meditated by Coventry was to get the earl of Sandwich dismissed the service. The sole control of maritime affairs being in the hands of the duke of York, Coventry possessed almost absolute power in such matters, from the situation he held. He endeavoured to persuade the duke that the House of Commons would be so incensed with the earl at their next meeting, that nothing would hinder them from falling severely upon him, which would be a great dishonour to the king, if he were at that time in command of the fleet; the only escape, therefore, was, to dismiss him from the charge, which might preserve him from being further questioned, since it would no doubt be interpreted as a punishment, inflicted upon him for his crime. This counsel was mixed up with such professions of personal kindness towards his lordship, that it prevailed with his majesty and the duke, so far as to induce them to confer with the chancellor on the subject. Clarendon said that he would not undertake to excuse any fault the earl had committed; and if it were of magnitude enough for his majesty to remove him from his command, nobody could censure it: but the apprehension that the parliament would take any more notice of what the earl had done than they would of any other breach of order was without any just reason. This opinion was over-ruled; but Clarendon persevered, notwithstanding, in favour of his friend, and at length found a favourable opportunity to procure him an honourable employment, preliminary to his removal from the fleet; so that the meditated disgrace was averted, and the earl of Sandwich was still retained in the favour of his majesty and the duke. The appointment was one of great trust and dignity, being that of ambassador extraordinary, armed with full powers to mediate a peace between Spain and Portugal.†

1666.

* Clarendon, 301. 305.

† In an interview which took place between the chancellor and the earl of Sandwich, while the negotiations concerning the appointment to the

Rapin, who was evidently ignorant of these circumstances, attributes the appointment to the king's dissatisfaction with the earl's services in the fleet. Another writer, who had not the same excuse for omitting to notice so remarkable a passage in the life of the admiral, refers the appointment to a cause still more remote from the truth. "On his return," he informs us, "the earl was received by the king with distinguished marks of favour; but his royal highness's conduct in the great engagement on the 3d of June being much censured, and the king declaring the duke of York should go no more to sea, as the earl's behaviour in the same action had been much applauded, lest his continuance in the sole command of the fleet might be interpreted to the disadvantage of the duke, and our affairs in Spain requiring an extraordinary embassy to be sent into that kingdom, his majesty despatched the earl of Sandwich to the court of Madrid to mediate a peace between the crowns of Spain and Portugal." * This is probably meant as an apology for the earl of Sandwich; but the truth is, that his lordship committed an indiscretion, and that the appointment to the Spanish embassy, instead of being either a proof of his ma-

---

embassy were pending, the latter confided to Clarendon some statements respecting the management of naval matters, which show how much corruption had crept into the office of lord high admiral, and which throw a further light upon the character of his grace's venomous secretary. "He told him then, 'that he was in one respect glad to be removed from his present command, for he was confident that he would see no more great matters done at sea, for that the common men were weary of the war; and that sir William would never suffer any peace to be in the fleet, but had creatures ready to do all ill-offices amongst them, whom he cherished and preferred before the best officers;' and told him many other things which fell out afterwards, and said, 'sir William would make any man who should succeed him weary of his command, by sending such variety of orders that he would not know what to do.' And, shortly after, he gave him a perfect journal of his last expedition, in which there were indeed many orders which must needs startle and perplex a commander-in-chief; it being his usual course to signify the duke's pleasure in matters of the greatest importance, without the duke's hand; which yet they durst not disobey, nor produce in their own justification, being such as in truth were no such warrants as they ought to obey, and yet would reflect upon his royal highness: and told him likewise of the ill inventions he had set on foot, by which prince Rupert was stopped from being joined with him in the command of the last fleet." p. 309.

* Campbell, ii. 291.

jesty's dissatisfaction, on the one hand, or a vent for the duke of York's fragrant reputation, on the other, was devised as a convenient mode of rescuing a gallant man from the consequences of an inconsiderate action.

The success of the mission to Madrid, which was of such delicacy as to bring the former minister into disgrace, developed the talents of the earl of Sandwich in a new capacity. He managed his business with such promptitude and address, that, in the course of a year, he brought the complicated negotiations to an amicable conclusion. He arrived in Madrid on the 26th of May, 1666, and a treaty consisting of forty articles was signed on the 13th of May, 1667.

1667.

Having accomplished so successfully this part of his undertaking, he applied himself with equal zeal to effect a treaty with Portugal; and, passing over to Lisbon, arranged the conditions in three weeks. This treaty was signed on the 13th of February, 1668.

1668.

His lordship gained a high reputation by these affairs. His despatches are referred to as models of wisdom, integrity, and public spirit, remarkable alike for clearness of expression and honesty of purpose; and his majesty was so pleased with the result of his labours, that he complimented him upon his services in an autograph letter, which was followed by another in a similar strain from the duke of York. In Spain, he acquired so much influence by his candour, that his opinions were received with implicit respect, and acted upon almost without question; and the impression he left behind him in that country was eminently conducive to the cultivation of a good understanding with Great Britain, whom he had taught the Spanish monarch to regard as his most valuable ally. Upon his return to England, in September, he was received by the court with marked testimonies of approbation; and admitted to greater confidence than he had ever enjoyed before.

About this time, the colonial possessions of England were assuming increased importance, and it was considered necessary to establish a distinct branch of the go-

vernment to be directed solely to the management of their affairs. A council of trade and plantations, as it was called, was accordingly appointed, and the earl of Sandwich was placed at its head as president.

1670. He was sworn into this responsible office on the 3d of August, 1670, and had directly afterwards the honour of swearing in the duke of York, prince Rupert, the duke of Buckingham, and other gentlemen of high quality, as members of the board. The eminence on which he was now placed may be supposed to have abundantly satisfied his ambition. As vice-admiral, privy councillor, and president of the council of trade, he possessed various opportunities of rendering solid services to his country, of which he availed himself in the most impartial spirit, and with indefatigable zeal. He set himself at once against factions of all complexions, and, consequently, made some bitter enemies. The Cabal laboured hard to thwart and undermine him, but without success. He introduced a new system into the navy; repudiated all claims for promotion that were not founded on meritorious services, and rewarded the deserving wherever and in whatever rank they might be found. He was idolised by the fleet; but disappointed expectants and dilletanti candidates, who had nothing to depend upon but their relationship to persons of rank, regarded him with abhorrence, as an innovator upon the good old system of preferment through private interest. It is said, that the duke of York at last became jealous of his popularity; and, like another royal person who could not bear the presence of a superior, "conspired to remove him." But the secret annals of courts are so rarely trustworthy, that it is difficult to know what to believe, and what to reject.

1672. The third and last Dutch war called his lordship from the tranquillity of Whitehall once more into the tumultuous scenes where he had already reaped some well-earned triumphs. The interval that had elapsed since the close of hostilities had not been passed idly by the States. They had rapidly refitted their navy, which,

although it had suffered severely in the destructive conflicts with prince Rupert, was still in a flourishing condition. Their ships were greatly improved in construction, of considerable capacity, and well equipped; their sailors, now grown accustomed to the hardships of battle, were as brave as any race of men in Europe; and their arsenals were amply stored with ammunition. In addition, they possessed the advantages of being led into action by De Ruyter, a commander to whose genius they owed so many successes, and, which was still more to the purpose, so many resources in times of danger and misfortune.

The naval force of France having been appointed to act in conjunction with that of England, the count D'Estrées, the French vice-admiral, arrived in Portsmouth on the 3d of May, with a squadron of ships. The English fleet joined soon after from the Downs, when they both put out to sea. The duke of York, resuming the station upon which he conferred so little credit on a former occasion, took the command in chief, with the red squadron in the centre; the right was commanded by the count D'Estrées, acting as admiral of the white; and the earl of Sandwich commanded on the left, as admiral of the blue. Accounts differ very much as to the actual strength of this fleet, which is variously represented by different writers. Charnock says, that the British division consisted of sixty-five ships, then esteemed as fit to be stationed in the line, exclusive of frigates, and all other necessary attendant vessels; and that the whole of the force, when united with the division sent by Louis, amounted to upwards of a hundred sail.* Lediard estimates the English fleet at above a hundred ships of all sorts, and the French at forty.† The Dutch writers differ still more amongst themselves, some of them representing it as consisting of no less than one hundred and forty vessels on the English side, and forty-eight stout ships on the

* Hist. of Marine Arch. ii. 411. † Lediard, ii. 597.

French. Charnock's account is, probably, nearest to the truth.

The Dutch fleet, according to the majority of their own authors, consisted of seventy-five large ships, and forty frigates and fire-ships*, commanded by De Ruyter in chief, by Banckert in the van, and Van Ghent in the rear; these three divisions answering to those of the combined fleets, and engaging with each other in the order in which they are severally stated.

Shortly after leaving Portsmouth, the English and French fleets came to anchor in Southwold Bay, for the purpose of taking in water. On the 19th of May they discovered the Dutch fleet about eight leagues E.S.E. of the Gun-fleet, and the next day they prepared to engage; but a dense fog interposed, in which they separated, and lost sight of each other. The English still remained in the bay, waiting the return of clear weather. On the evening of the 27th, being Whit-Monday, there was great revelry on board the fleet, and many officers were permitted to go on shore at Southwold, Dunwich, and Aldborough. A council of the flag officers was held in the evening, and, the weather continuing hazy and deceptive, the earl of Sandwich gave his opinion that, as the wind stood, the fleet rode in danger of being surprised by the Dutch, and he therefore thought it advisable to weigh anchor, and put out to sea. The duke of York slighted the advice, and retorted upon the earl that he spoke out of fear.† If

* One writer, the author of Von Tromp's Life, and Basnage, allow that they had 91 men-of-war, 44 fire-ships, and 23 yachts.

† Bishop Burnet makes at once a false and a barbarous use of this incident, which, if true, is discreditable only to the duke of York. Dr. Campbell treats Burnet on this point with so much justice, that his observations on the point may be advantageously transcribed. "Bishop Burnet says, 'I say nothing of the sea-fight in Solbay, in which De Ruyter had the glory of surprising the English fleet when they were thinking less of engaging the enemy than of an extravagant preparation for the usual disorders of the 29th of May; which he prevented, by engaging them on the 28th.' It is an odd whim of this prelate, that, because people might be disposed to be drunk on the 29th, they should be out of their wits on the 28th. Now the truth of the matter was this, that the feasting happened on the 27th, because it was the Monday in Whitsun-week; but some people have a great mind to set a black mark upon the 29th of May, and on the character of General Monk, for the same reason. Yet let us once more hear his lord-

the duke of York made use of this expression, it only affords a fresh illustration of his character. But it is said that the earl of Sandwich was so affected by it, that in the ensuing engagement it rendered him reckless of life, and led to a fatal catastrophe. This is altogether incredible. The earl must have known his grace better than to be foolishly chafed by any of his rude and coarse sarcasms; and he ought to have known himself better than to suppose that anybody else could be moved by them. Besides, the accusation of fear coming from the duke of York was ludicrous; and was doubly ridiculous addressed to such a man as the earl of Sandwich. The impunity, however, which is accorded to men of that class and stamp renders the anecdote probable enough up to the duke's taunt; but the rest is utterly disentitled to belief. Perhaps the whole was an invention; and some persons have even ventured to speculate that it was invented long after the transaction, in order to heighten the circumstances that occur in the sequel.

At break of day, on the morning of the 28th of May, the Dutch fleet appeared in the offing, bearing up with such force and speed, that if great expedition had not been used on the part of the allies, they ran a chance of being surprised.* Such was the haste in which the preparation for battle was made, that many ships were

---

ship: —' The admiral of the blue squadron was burnt by a fire-ship, after a long engagement with a Dutch ship, much inferior to him in strength. In it, the earl of Sandwich perished, with a great many about him, who would not leave him, as he would not leave his ship by a piece of obstinate courage, to which he was provoked by an innocent reflection the duke made on an advice he had offered, of drawing near the shore, and avoiding an engagement; as if in that he took more care of himself than of the king's honour.' We have seen above, that the earl's advice was, to put out to sea, that they might engage the sooner, and not be surprised The Dutch Gazette treated the earl's memory better than this bishop; for in it we find: ' The earl of Sandwich engaged for several hours with many of our men-of-war, disabled seven of our ships, among which was lieutenant-admiral van Ghent's, vice-admiral van Nesse's, and captain Brakel's; and after putting off three fire-ships, was, at last, burnt by the fourth.'" p. 294, 295.

* Basnage, in the Annals of the United Provinces, asserts, that De Ruyter could have surprised the English fleet and thrown them into the utmost disorder, had he not been tied down to the formality of calling a council, and thereby losing so much time that might have been better employed.

obliged to cut their cables to enable them to get out and form into order. The blue squadron, commanded by the admiral whom the duke of York has got the credit of having accused of fear, was out first, in good order, followed by the red, and next by the white, in its proper station astern. The earl of Sandwich, in his fine ship, the Royal James, of one hundred guns, opened the engagement, falling furiously on the squadron of van Ghent; not to distinguish himself by taking a prominent place in the fight, but to give the rest of the vessels time to form, in which he completely succeeded. Captain Brakel, in the Great Holland, a sixty-gun ship, attacked the Royal James, but was soon disabled, as were several other men-of-war; and three fire-ships were sunk.

When the white squadron got out, the Dutch poured down in great force, and were received, at first, with steadiness and courage by the French; but, in a short time, D' Estrées and his ships sheered off, and left the English to contest the day by themselves.

In the mean time, the duke and De Ruyter were warmly engaged for several hours; and his royal highness was obliged to leave his ship, the St. Michael, in consequence of her standard and mainmast having been shot down, and to go on board the Loyal London. The perils of his situation increased momently, until succour was obtained by other portions of the fleet being sufficiently released to come to his aid. The French squadron kept aloof during the engagement, leaving the English to encounter the whole force of the enemy during a fight which lasted, with incessant fury, from between seven and eight o'clock in the morning until nine at night.

The most desperate part of the battle was that in which the earl of Sandwich was engaged. Soon after he was attacked by captain Brakel's vessel, which had grappled with him for an hour and a half, the whole of van Ghent's squadron came down upon him. He was now literally encompassed, on all sides, by men-of-war and

fire-ships. In the midst of this violent storm of artillery, van Ghent was taken off by a cannon ball, Brakel's vessel was reduced to a wreck, her commander wounded, nearly all his officers killed, and above two thirds of his men. In this contest, which had now raged for five hours, the earl had defended his ship with unexampled bravery; and although he had not received from the rest of the squadron the assistance he had a right to calculate upon, he succeeded in repulsing the enemy sufficiently to enable him to make an honourable retreat. But he could not be persuaded to desist, and continued, at fearful odds, to struggle for victory. Of 1000 men who had been on board, 600 were killed on the deck; and now the destruction thickened faster and faster, nearly all the men were killed, and the hull of the vessel was so pierced with shot that it was impossible to carry her off.

In this desperate exigency the vice-admiral might have relieved him; but the duke required his assistance, and he sailed past heedless of the condition of the wreck and its gallant commander. When the earl saw this, he said to those who were about him, "There is nothing left for us now, but to defend the ship to the last man." Immediately afterwards, a Dutch fire-ship, buried in the smoke of the enemy, grappled the Royal James, and she burst into a sheet of flame. All hope was now at an end. The earl requested of his captain, sir Richard Haddock, and all his servants, to get into the boat, and save themselves, which they did, and Haddock was afterwards taken out of the sea, alive, but severely wounded in the thigh.

Before Haddock took to the boat, according to one statement, he went down into the cabin, where he found the earl with a handkerchief over his eyes; when he informed him of his danger, the earl answered that "he saw how things went (reflecting on what the duke had said the day before), and was, therefore, resolved to perish with his ship." The credibility of this story depends upon the truth of the previous one; but if

seems so improbable, under such circumstances, that there is no difficulty in rejecting it altogether as a pure fabrication.

There are various accounts of the manner in which the catastrophe actually happened, all agreeing in the main fact, but differing in the particulars. According to one statement, some of the sailors would not leave the admiral, but stayed and endeavoured, at his command, to put out the fire, which, in spite of all their efforts, grew worse and worse; and so they perished together, the ship blowing up about noon. Others say that the earl was left alone to encounter the fire and the enemy, which having done for some time in vain, he leaped through the flames into the sea. Either one or two of his sons perished with him.

The result of this sanguinary engagement, in which Evertzen, the admiral of Zealand, was slain, and De Ruyter was wounded, brought neither glory nor advantage of any kind. Great losses were sustained by the Dutch and the English, leaving them upon an equality in that respect. The victory was claimed by both, and gained by neither, and the only pretext for assigning it to the one side in preference to the other is, that the Dutch, being outside, first put out to sea. But the Dutch ask in reply, "Why did you not pursue us?"

Nearly a fortnight after this melancholy event, the body of the earl of Sandwich was found floating on the sea, and was taken up and carried to Harwich, where it was embalmed by the governor, sir Charles Littleton. His death far outweighed all other losses, and could not have been compensated for by the most brilliant triumphs. The following announcement, which immediately afterwards appeared in the Gazette, contains all the remaining particulars of the funeral honours that were paid to the remains of this gallant commander, at the express desire of the king.

"Harwich, June 10.

"This day the body of the right honourable Edward earl of Sandwich, being, by the order upon his coat,

discovered floating on the sea, by one of his majesty's ketches, was taken up and brought into this port; where sir Charles Littleton, the governor, receiving it, took immediate care for its embalming and honourable disposing, till his majesty's pleasure should be known concerning it; for the obtaining of which, his majesty was attended, at Whitehall, the next day, by the master of the said vessel, who, by sir Charles Littleton's order, was sent to present his majesty with the George found upon the body of the said Earl, which remained at the time of its taking up, in every part unblemished, saving by some impression made by the fire upon his face and breast; upon which his majesty, out of his great regard to the deservings of the said earl, and his unexampled performances in this last act of his life, hath resolved to have his body brought up to London; there, at his charge, to receive the rites of funeral due to his great quality and merits.

"The earl of Sandwich's body being taken out of one of his majesty's yachts at Deptford, on the 3d of July, 1672, and laid, in the most solemn manner, in a sumptuous barge, proceeded by water to Westminster bridge, attended by the king's barges, his royal highness the duke of York's, as also with the several barges of the nobility, lord mayor, and the several companies of the city of London, adorned suitably to the melancholy occasion, with trumpets and other music, that sounded the deepest notes. On passing by the Tower, the great guns there were discharged, as well as at Whitehall; and about five o'clock in the evening, the body being taken out of the barge at Westminster bridge, there was a procession to the abbey church, with the highest magnificence. Eight earls were assistants to his son Edward, earl of Sandwich, chief mourner, and most of the nobility and persons of quality in town gave their assistance to his interment in the duke of Albemarle's vault, in the north side of king Henry the Seventh's chapel, where his remains are deposited."

Numerous testimonies, from a variety of quarters, including even the foes of the country, to whom he proved so formidable an adversary, might readily be gathered to show in what estimation the earl of Sandwich was held by his contemporaries, and by those who lived near enough to his times to be able to form a proper judgment of his merits. But such a man's character is, perhaps, traced with more advantage in his life than in the panegyrics of his commentators.

Were it desirable to accumulate such memorials, there are many at hand; but two or three brief instances, from different sources, will sufficiently indicate the tone of the rest. Bishop Parker says of the earl of Sandwich, that "he was a gentleman adorned with all the virtues of Alcibiades, and untainted by any of his vices; of high birth, capable of any business, full of wisdom, a great commander at sea and land, and also learned and eloquent, affable, liberal, and magnificent." Sir Edward Walker observes, that "he was a person of extraordinary parts, courage, fidelity, and affability, and justly merited all the honours that were conferred upon him." The duke of Buckingham declares that "his merit as to sea affairs was most extraordinary in all kinds." Gerard Brant — no very willing witness — exclaims, "such was the fate of this noble peer, who was vice-admiral of England; a man equally brave, knowing, and of a most engaging behaviour; one who had rendered his sovereign the greatest services; not only in the field, but in the cabinet, and as an ambassador in foreign courts;" and the Dutch author of the life of De Ruyter declares that he was "valiant, wise, circumspect, courteous, and candid, as well in words as deeds.'

INDEX.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

H

N.

Q.

R.

T.

THE END.

LONDON:
Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE
New-Street-Square.

THE

CABINET OF BIOGRAPHY.

CONDUCTED BY THE

REV. DIONYSIUS LARDNER, LL.D. F.R.S. L. & E

M.R.I.A. F.R.A.S. F.L.S. F.Z.S. Hon. F.C.P.S. &c. &c.

ASSISTED BY

EMINENT LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC MEN.

THE BRITISH ADMIRALS.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY VIEW

OF THE

NAVAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

BY

ROBERT SOUTHEY, LL.D. POET LAUREATE.

CONTINUED BY

ROBERT BELL, ESQ.

VOL. V.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR

LONGMAN, ORME, BROWN, GREEN, & LONGMANS,

PATERNOSTER-ROW;

AND JOHN TAYLOR,

UPPER GOWER STREET.

1840.

LONDON:
Printed by A. Spottiswoode,
New-Street-Square.